Leyte Gulf 1944 (1): The Battles of the Sibuyan Sea and Samar

Osprey Campaign #370

by Mark E. Stille, Jim Laurier (Illustrator)

In October 1944, the US prepared to invade the Philippines to cut Japan off from its resource areas in Southeast Asia. The Japanese correctly predicted this, and prepared a complex operation to use the remaining strength of its navy to defend its possessions. This is the first in a two-part study of the October 23-26 Battle of Leyte Gulf, which resulted in a decisive defeat for the Japanese.

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Imperial Japanese Navy's First Diversion Strike Force took part in two major actions during the course of the battle: the intense air attacks from US Navy carriers on October 24 (the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, which accounted for superbattleship Musashi), and the compelling action off Samar the following day. A considerable body of myth surrounds the latter, since most accounts of the Samar fighting assume that it should have been a crushing Imperial Japanese Navy victory-in truth, the result was anything but that.

This book examines in detail why, following the Samar action, the Imperial Japanese Navy commander of the First Diversion Strike Force (Takeo Kurita) choose to ignore orders and break off the attack into Leyte Gulf-one of the two most controversial decisions of the entire battle. In the first of two volumes, Mark Stille examines the Japanese planning for Leyte Gulf, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial Japanese Navy in this phase of the war alongside the US Navy's planning and command arrangements, which had the potential to end in disaster. This book also focuses on the commanders on each side whose decisions shaped this definitive battle.

Genres: Military Fiction

94 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 25, 2021

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

With over fifty titles to his credit, Mark Stille is an incredibly prolific contributor to the various military history series published by Osprey. Given that the majority of them address aspects of the Second World War in the Pacific, it was perhaps inevitable that he would be selected to write the volume in Osprey’s Campaign series on the clash between the United States and Imperial Japanese navies around Leyte Gulf in October 1944. The scope of the fighting is such that, to do it justice, he describes the various battles over two volumes, of which this, which addresses the battles surrounding Japan’s main attacking force, is the first.

This decision provides Stille with the opportunity to assess the operation and its prospects for success. He comes down squarely in the camp of those who regard it as a hopeless waste of the remaining assets of the Imperial Japanese Navy. While he makes this point throughout this short book, perhaps its most effective expression of it is with his simple breakdown of the opposing forces early in the text. With a 7:1 ratio in aircraft carriers, a 4:3 ratio in battleships, and a 3:1 ratio in aircraft over their opponent, the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 38 possessed overwhelming numbers. Even this understates the scale of the Americans’ advantage as their pilots were blooded veterans while most of those of the Imperial Japanese Navy were poorly-trained replacements for the elite pilots lost over the previous two and a half years of combat. This was why the complicated Japanese plan, known as Operation Sho-1, relied upon the surface warships of Admiral Takeo Kurita’s First Diversion Strike Force to destroy the American invasion fleet off Leyte, with Japan’s remaining carriers serving as little more than a lure.

Yet it was the Kurita’s fleet that was located first by American forces. Detected by American submarines in the Palawan Passage in the early hours of October 23, the United States Navy drew first blood by sinking the cruiser Atago, Kurita’s flagship. Though Kurita survived, Stille sees the loss of three-quarters of his communications staff as a key factor in the poorly coordinated battle that followed. More dramatic, though, was the loss of the Musashi, one of Japan’s two superbattleships, which the following day came under heavy attack from dive bombers and torpedo planes from the American fleet. While the massive Musashi was sunk, Stille notes that the attacks on it aided the fleet, as the increasingly vulnerable vessel drew the majority of the aviators’ attention, turning it into a “torpedo and bomb sponge” that spared the other warships from additional damage.

Wounded but still dangerous, the First Diversion Strike Force pressed on. With Kurita’s fleet reported crippled and the detection of the Japanese carriers further north, the commander of the Third Fleet, Admiral William Halsey, sent his carriers and fast battleships off in pursuit. With the San Bernardino Strait leading to Leyte Gulf unguarded, Kurita pressed his opportunity and headed for the American invasion fleet. To the surprise of the Japanese, on the morning of October 25 he encountered off Samar the three escort carrier groups of Task Group 77.4, which were assigned to support the invasion forces in Leyte. Stille is particularly laudatory of their commander’s response to the unexpected appearance of the Japanese forces, as Admiral Clifton Sprague ordered his escorting destroyers to lay smoke and launched desperate attacks using his available air and naval assets in an effort to buy time. Such was the fury of the assault and the confusion generated by the obscuring activities of the American vessels that the surprised Japanese believed that they were fighting Halsey’s main force, which shaped the outcome of the battle. While American forces suffered heavy losses in planes and destroyers, after a little more than two hours of fighting Kurita issued orders to break off the action, effectively ending the battle.

Stille regards Kurita’s decision as a result of his desire not to sacrifice his forces in a pointless defeat. He commends it as a brave decision that contrasted with the futility of the attack, which stood no chance of stopping the invasion of Leyte given that by the time the Japanese strike force arrived the vessels that had transported the invasion forces had been offloaded. It’s an excellent point, but one that leads to a broader condemnation of the operation that is more questionable. As Stille himself points out in his assessment of the Japanese plan, the Philippines constituted part of the Japanese empire’s final defensive perimeter, which needed to be maintained in order to maintain access to the raw materials their economy required. When coupled with the command politics in Tokyo (which are admittedly outside the scope of Stille’s book), Sho-1 looks less like a pointless sacrifice of the Imperial Japanese Navy than it does a desperate yet understandable gamble to hold back the Americans at a point that would allow Japan to maintain their ability to wage war. Fortunately, while reflecting the limits of Stille’s analysis, in the end it doesn’t detract from the book’s merits as a coherent and well-illustrated overview of the central part of the largest naval battle in human history.

[sam silberstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

A concise but detailed look at Leyte

Although not a long read, Stille gives us details with lots of photos of the begining major actions of the Battle of Leyte Gulf including that heroic stand of the "Taffy" units during The Battle off Samar.

[Patrick Foley · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent, concise history of two of the four major naval battles of the Leyte Gulf campaign.

[Pete Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a good book, especially for the beginner historian or someone just interested in reading up about the topic.

At just under 100 pages, it's a great summary.