Joseph Eggleston Johnston was one of the original five full Confederate generals. He graduated West Point in the same 1829 class as Robert E. Lee and served in the War with Mexico, the Seminole Wars in Florida, and in Texas and Kansas. By 1860 Johnston was widely looked upon as one of America’s finest military officers. During the Civil War he commanded armies in Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas and served as commander of the entire Western Theater during a critical period of the war.
Johnston’s contributions to the war effort, however, remain a lightning rod of controversy. In The Civil Wars of General Joseph E. Johnston , Richard M. McMurry argues persuasively that the Confederacy’s most lethal enemy was the toxic dissension within the top echelons of its high command. The discord between General Johnston and President Jefferson Davis (and others), which began early in the conflict and only worsened as the months passed, routinely prevented the cooperation and coordination the South needed on the battlefield if it was going to achieve its independence. The result was one failed campaign after another, all of which cumulatively doomed the Southern Confederacy.
McMurry’s study is not a traditional military biography but a lively and opinionated conversation about major campaigns and battles, strategic goals and accomplishments, and how these men and their decision-making and leadership abilities directly impacted the war effort. Personalities, argues McMurry, win and lose wars, and the military and political leaders who form the focal point of this study could not have been more different (and in the case of Davis and Johnston, more at odds) when it came to making the important and timely decisions necessary to wage the war effectively.
The Civil Wars of General Joseph E. Johnston represents a lifetime of study and contemplation that captures Johnston in a way that has never been accomplished. It sheds fresh light on old controversies and compels readers to think about major wartime events in unique and compelling ways. This first installment begins just before the Civil War and ends on the eve of Johnston taking command of the Army of Tennessee in North Georgia.
Here, finally, is the definitive study of how qualities of character played an oversized role in determining the outcome of the Civil War.
McMurry is one of the greatest Civil War historians today, I preordered this last April, ten months before it was eventually published. And his expertise shines in the analysis. But there are issues, starting with the publication of only volume one. Obviously, these issues won't matter later when both are available, but right now, there is no bibliography. So footnote references have to be deduced for books and cannot reasonably be determined for articles cited. And the usual great Savas/Beatie footnotes (real ones, at the bottom of the page) are well worth reading.
McMurry uses a byzantine structure of Volume/Book/Chapter/Part but he doesn't explain any rationale for it. Because we only have Volume One at this time, a footnote may reference "As discussed in Book Three, Chapter Four, in Volume II..." These might seem quibbles, but they make for a choppy reading experience.
I haven't seen this in previous McMurry books, but he liberally sprinkles parenthetical questions such as "President Davis had shunted (exiled?) him off to the West..." and "[Pemberton] had decided to disregard the 'order' (or was it only a suggestion?)..." I guess he is trying to convey the ambiguity, but I felt like asking, well, what do you, author, think?
The weirdest section of the book is McMurry's inclusion of an extended discussion of Covey's "Seven Habits of Highly Effective People". McMurry uses Covey's thesis to explain Johnston's personal failure in generalship (especially in comparison to Lee), but it seems like he could have done that without an entire 12 page chapter with extended quotations from Covey followed by additional references to 7 Habits throughout the book.
The heart of the book is the Vicksburg Campaign (this first volume covers 1861-63). Having consumed Bearss, Grabau and Tim Smith along with Pemberton's "Compelled to Appear in Print", I have nothing but disdain for Johnston's timid and ineffectual performance and disgust for his later efforts to unfairly blame Pemberton and Davis for his failures. I must say, though, that McMurry makes a good case for the hopelessness due to the unwieldy command structure imposed by Davis. And it surprised me to read details of how Johnston's Army of Relief really might not have been militarily capable of confronting Grant prior to Grant receiving massive reinforcements that made any relief of the garrison impossible. Still, as Grabau pointed out, the failure of Johnston to even attempt any reconnaissance of possible advance routes in the six to eight weeks prior to his abortive advance on July 3 is simply inexcusable.
This is an essential volume, and the best insight into Joseph Johnston ever written. But it seems that the editors were somewhat overawed by McMurry and unable to convince him to make some editorial changes that would have made the book even better.
I have never been a Joseph E. Johnston fan, and I have been annoyed that Grant and Sherman went out of their way to credit Johnston as being the Confederate Army leader who they respected the most. Honestly, I can't see why they thought so - or at least claimed to have though so. Johnston's reputation as a great general was undeserved and unsupported by the facts, and this book confirmed these assertions for me.
I have read some of McMurray's other works, and this is by far the best of them. While other reviewers were annoyed by the author's constant use of parenthetical second labels for ambiguous actions such as "Johnston's orders (or were they suggestions)," I found this practice clarifying in terms of how those communications were, or may have been, perceived. McMurray knows his subject well, he goes where the evidence leads, he proves his points well, and clearly indicates educated guesses when conclusive evidence is not available.
McMurray's spends a lot of space in the book detailing Johnston's relationships with General Robert E. Lee and President Jefferson Davis, and frequent reference to - and comparison and contrast with - these other two leaders offers a remarkably clear assessment of Johnston by triangulation.
While this is only the first of a two-volume study, if you can only read one book on Joseph E. Johnston, let this be the one. I eagerly await the second volume!
This is not a traditional biography of a historical figure. McMurry looks at Johnston through the lens of comparison with the two men his life became intertwined, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee. I found this to be a very interesting way to examine Johnston. If you want a fresh perspective, get this book. If you want traditional biography, avoid this. Personally, I am looking forward to the second volume.
In The Civil Wars of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnson, Mr. McMurry does an outstanding job of presenting how Johnston interacted with the various members of the Confederate High Command. Many times it is easy to forget how much interpersonal relations affect matter of great importance. I greatly enjoyed reading this book and eagerly await the second volume.
Richard McMurray does and outstanding job explaining how the personal animosity between Gen. Joe Johnston and President Jeff Davis resulted in the Confederacy’s loss of Tennessee and the Mississippi valley. A detailed study of the small-minded and egotistical personalities of both men and the series of failures and miscommunications that resulted in the South’s major defeat in Western Theater of the Civil War.