Why I Am Not a Buddhist

by Evan Thompson

A provocative essay challenging the idea of Buddhist exceptionalism, from one of the world’s most widely respected philosophers and writers on Buddhism and science

Buddhism has become a uniquely favored religion in our modern age. A burgeoning number of books extol the scientifically proven benefits of meditation and mindfulness for everything ranging from business to romance. There are conferences, courses, and celebrities promoting the notion that Buddhism is spirituality for the rational, compatible with cutting‑edge science, indeed, “a science of the mind.” In this provocative book, Evan Thompson argues that this representation of Buddhism is false.
 
In lucid and entertaining prose, Thompson dives deep into both Western and Buddhist philosophy to explain how the goals of science and religion are fundamentally different. Efforts to seek their unification are wrongheaded and promote mistaken ideas of both. He suggests cosmopolitanism instead, a worldview with deep roots in both Eastern and Western traditions. Smart, sympathetic, and intellectually ambitious, this book is a must‑read for anyone interested in Buddhism’s place in our world today.

Genres: Buddhism, Philosophy, Religion, Nonfiction, Spirituality, Meditation, Science

240 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2020

About the author

Evan Thompson is a writer and professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. He works on the nature of the mind, the self, and human experience. His work combines cognitive science, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and cross-cultural philosophy, especially Asian philosophical traditions. He is the author of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2015); Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Harvard University Press, 2007); and Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception (Routledge Press, 1995). He is the co-author, with Francisco J. Varela and Eleanor Rosch, of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (MIT Press, 1991, revised edition 2016). Evan is an Elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Evan received his A.B. from Amherst College in 1983 in Asian Studies and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto in 1990. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto from 2005 to 2013, and held a Canada Research Chair in Cognitive Science and the Embodied Mind at York University from 2002 to 2005. In 2014, he was the Numata Invited Visiting Professor at the Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He has also held invited visiting appointments at the Faculty of Philosophy, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, the Ecole Polytechnique (Paris), the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

In 2012 he co-directed, with Christian Coseru and Jay Garfield, the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, and he will again be co-director, with Coseru and Garfield, of the 2018 NEH Summer Institute on Self-Knowledge in Eastern and Western Philosophies.

Evan is currently serving as the Co-Chair of the Steering Council of the Mind and Life Institute and is a member of the Dialogue and Education Working Circle of the Kalein Centre in Nelson, British Columbia.

Reviews

[Blaine Snow · Rating 2 out of 5]

Buddhism: Exceptional or Useful? A Review of Evan Thompson’s Why I Am Not a Buddhist

I’m a huge fan of philosopher Evan Thompson and have followed his work for nearly three decades. His efforts to establish an embodied mind approach in cognitive science over the last 30 years is groundbreaking and promises to point the way to an effective resolution of the age-old mind/nature conundrum in Western thought. He continues a lineage of thinkers who established mid-century systems theory and cybernetics from Wiener, Von Bertalanffy, Ashby, McCulloch, Von Foerster, and Bateson, to Maturana and Varela whose autopoiesis theory led to the establishment of the enactivist approach and eventually to the so-called “4e View” in cognitive science which sees mind and life as emergent, embedded, embodied, and enactive (see my “Embodied Cognition” book list on Goodreads.com). Thompson has also been at the forefront of the encounter between the sciences and consciousness studies which has often included dialogue between science and Buddhism. I give Thompson’s books and views the highest ratings. But as a student of Buddhism for four decades, I find Why I’m Not a Buddhist to be an uneven work and rather unfair to Buddhism.

Echoing Bertrand Russell’s 1927 essay Why I Am Not a Christian (and numerous other Why I Am/Am Not books), Why I Am Not a Buddhist is part autobiography and part cultural critique. In it, Thompson explains why he cannot identify as a Buddhist due largely to what he sees as a widespread favoritism of Buddhism among many scientists and academics. He calls this favoritism “Buddhist exceptionalism” and describes it as a set of beliefs and ideas such as “Buddhism is superior among the world’s religions in being inherently rational and empirical,” or “it isn’t so much a religion as it is a philosophy or way of life,” or “it’s an applied mind science” (24-25). Primary to this Buddhist exceptionalism is the idea that Buddhism, among the world’s religions, is uniquely suited to engage with science.

Thompson presents his Buddhist exceptionalism as the most conspicuous aspect of (what is called) Buddhist modernism, a historical amalgam of Western cultural influences and traditional Buddhist ideas and practices that has developed over the past 200 years of cultural interaction between Western and Buddhist countries (see McMahan’s 2012, The Making of Buddhist Modernism). Contemporary Buddhism whether Zen, Tibetan, Insight, Theravadin, or other, is of a mix of modernist and traditional Buddhist ideas and values. Much of the book aims to show how these subcultures of Buddhist modernism are full of misguided and confused ideas, particularly regarding relations between science and religion. Here’s Thompson explaining the relations between a) modern Buddhism, b) Buddhist modernism, c) Buddhist exceptionalism, and d) Buddhist fundamentalism:

Modern Buddhism is caught up in these bad extremes, from Buddhist fundamentalism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to universalizing Buddhist modernism across the world. Modern Buddhism became cosmopolitan through Buddhist modernism, which opposed itself to local and traditional forms of Asian Buddhism. Buddhist modernism, however, is mired in philosophical confusions, especially about religion and science, as we’ve seen. Its partisan Buddhist exceptionalism undermines its universalizing rhetoric (172).

Mutual Validation or Mutual Challenge?
One of the book’s goals is the reframing of Buddhism as more a religion than a philosophical system, which is his attempt to counteract the historical reverse emphasis among scientists, intellectuals, and Buddhist teachers and scholars. Thompson wants everyone to think that Buddhism is primarily grounded in religious belief and that, although it is also a sophisticated system of philosophy, ultimately it relies on nonscientific religious beliefs rather than empirical and objective knowledge. The fact that he sees it as ultimately grounded in religious belief runs counter to his identity as a philosopher and scientist and so contributes to his inability to identify as Buddhist.

To paint a simplistic picture of Buddhism as similar to other leap-of-faith religions is unfair. In fact, what Thompson doesn’t say is that Buddhism could just as well be described as being grounded in direct first-person experience that is based in rigorous dialectical reasoning and analysis rather than in “religious belief.” At the entry level it is true that Buddhism, like all religions, requires faith and belief. But as one progresses, Buddhist study and practice become more and more about the wisdom that issues from complete relinquishing of all faith, beliefs, ideas, and concepts whatsoever – all mental grasping – including the concepts of “enlightenment,” “nirvana,” “perfection,” even “Buddha” himself. It is the only “religion” with a philosophical psychology whose goal is to meticulously deconstruct the ego and its self-defeating desires, including the desire to believe in its founder. What other religion teaches the wisdom of a phrase such as, “If you see [Buddha] on the road, kill him”? It also promotes its own psychology-based self-obsolescence such as when it teaches its followers that eventually the entirety of the teachings will be rendered obsolete, that they must be mentally released and left behind (as in the parable of The Raft)? These and other aspects of Buddhist philosophy show the folly of trying to categorize Buddhism as merely a faith-based religion. They also show why, to many westerners, it does seem exceptional.

The book contains many examples of what Thompson considers Buddhist exceptionalism and he uses them to show how people try to use science and Buddhism to confirm, prove, or validate each other. He devotes a whole chapter to pointing out the problems in Robert Wright’s book, Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment, and calls out numerous other teachers for their Buddhist exceptionalism such as B. Alan Wallace, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, Nyanaponika Thera, S.N. Goenka, Sam Harris, and even the Dalai Lama. Thompson does make some significant points, but in each case, he wants the reader to see how each of these teachers utilizes science to confirm, prove, or otherwise validate Buddhist ideas. Therein lies Thompson’s main target: the specific ways in which such favoritism is inappropriate.

Thompson’s criticism of Buddhist exceptionalism goes like this: you cannot equate religion with science; you cannot use science to validate, justify, or prove Buddhism or vice versa. The modes of knowing and validation in science and religion are fundamentally incommensurable. However, since Buddhism is clearly more than a religion, and since it is also a sophisticated rational philosophy that is unlike anything in Western religion, Thompson does accept that we can use Buddhism as a means to challenge science. That is, we can use Buddhism and science to challenge or inform each other. This is exactly what he has been doing much of his professional life. Thus, we have two modes of science-Buddhism dialogue: 1) as mutual validation or 2) as mutual challenge. For Thompson, the latter is acceptable while the former is not. Here are two examples from the text discussing these forms of dialogue:

[Robert] Wright takes scientific naturalism for granted and uses it to explain and justify modern mindfulness meditation (my emphasis). He doesn’t use Buddhism to scrutinize philosophical assumptions about science. We use Buddhism to recast our understanding of science and the world it investigates. Our guiding image is that of a ‘circulation’ between Buddhism and cognitive science where each one flows into and out of the other, and back again. Each one affects and draws forth changes from the other. (72)
Buddhists uses science to embellish Buddhist teachings, and scientists use Buddhism to embellish scientific theories. And both Buddhists and scientists—and especially Buddhist scientists—use science to justify Buddhism. (185)

Although Thompson doesn’t identify it as such, his mutual validation criticism is part of a convergence model of science and Buddhism that is assumed by many who engage in such mutual validation. Others have also argued against the convergence model (See Bernard Faure’s “A Gray Matter: Another look at Buddhism and neuroscience,” Tricycle, Winter 2012 ). I happen to agree that, along with the incommensurability argument, whatever people think convergence is –establishing common ground, agreement, mutual validation, perhaps eventual unification, etc. – the better model is the “circulation” one that Thompson advocates in the quote above. I also agree that human knowledge is better served when these two modes of knowing remain separate but can challenge the assumptions of the other.

While one can agree with the incommensurability argument and with the inappropriateness of using science and Buddhism to validate each other, Thompson’s criticism doesn’t stop there. The exceptionalism offense in his view goes beyond mutual validation to choosing Buddhism in the first place since, as Thompson argues, other religions are equally capable of challenging science:

Although it’s unquestionably true that Buddhism possesses a vast and sophisticated literature on the mind, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam also possess sophisticated philosophical and contemplative writings about the mind. These writings build on the rich and intricate heritage of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic thought. Buddhist texts aren’t less metaphysical than the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic ones. (37)
Buddhist modernism presents Buddhism as uniquely suited to the modern world, but we can sanitize any religion in this modernist way. Consider Christian humanism, which stresses the humanity of Jesus, unites Christian ethics with humanist principles, promotes science, calls attention to the Judeo-Christian and ancient Greek sources of scientific ideas such as the ‘laws of nature.’ Or consider Liberal Judaism, which regards the Torah as written by human beings, not written by God and given to Moses on stone tablets and emphasizes the progressive Jewish Intellectual tradition. (29)

If other religions are equally fit to challenge science, then why are scientists and philosophers uniquely attracted to Buddhism as a partner? Could it be that there are good reasons it is exceptional? Rather than explain why Buddhism has become the chosen partner for philosophy and cognitive science, rather than discuss what is special about Buddhist philosophy such that it has the ability to challenge science and western thought unlike any other world wisdom tradition, Thompson criticizes those who use science to prove the validity of Buddhism while allowing his own use of Buddhism to dialogue with science. Since he criticizes the exceptionalism of others while engaging in his own, his charge borders on hypocrisy. This is especially so since, after equating Buddhism with other world religions as all having “rich philosophical traditions,” he has singled out and worked with Buddhism for most of his career. What’s not exceptional about that? Where’s all his work with Christianity and science? The issue shouldn’t be whether Buddhism (or any system) is exceptional or not but rather, is it useful? Clearly Buddhism is useful to science, or it wouldn’t have become the worthy partner to science that so many, including Thompson, have made it.

Reclaiming Autonomy
Beyond Thompson’s issues over the science-Buddhism engagement, the autobiographical part of the book suggests some personal reasons for his disowning of a Buddhist identity. Judging from the life experiences he recounts and the peculiar mix of criticism and admiration he expresses for Buddhism, implicit in his essay appears to be a personal renunciation of Buddhism, seemingly as a result of having it handed to him in childhood by his parents and the spirituality of their Lindisfarne community, of pre-defined space and opportunity to explore on his own, of influences of having been surrounded by scholar-intellectuals who in effect preselected Buddhism for him, but also, later, of observing various unhealthy expressions of Buddhism such as those of Chogyam Trungpa and the embrace thereof by Thompson's mentor Francisco Varela (ch.6, note 34, 215-216). Proclaiming his disidentification with Buddhism thus has a dual purpose: to call attention to what he sees as unhealthy favoritism but also to regain his spiritual autonomy. The life experiences he shares coupled with the book’s praise-and-disparage language around Buddhism make it difficult not to notice this.

Discomfort With Nondual Enlightenment
Further evidence of Thompson’s disconnect with Buddhism is revealed in his disjointed presentation of Buddhist nonduality, the central and paradoxical philosophical principle-insight of Mahayana Buddhism, otherwise known as the philosophy of emptiness and The Doctrine of the Two Truths. If there is any aspect of Buddhism that makes it exceptional from the perspective of western thought, it is the philosophy of nonduality.

Based on views expressed in this and his previous book, Waking Dreaming and Being, Thompson appears comfortable with conceptual nonduality (73-75) expressed as a philosophical principle but uncomfortable and critical of experiential nonduality (144-145) when expressed as first-person nonconceptual insight or wisdom. His criticism of first-person nonconceptual insight or transcendent wisdom is rather odd considering that he has worked so long and hard to include the validity of first-person phenomenological consciousness into cognitive science.

Thompson’s charge that the idea of enlightenment is incoherent since it is unverifiable by science is the most conspicuous example in the book of his own science exceptionalism, suggesting that (at least in this part of the book) science is the ultimate arbiter of valid knowledge. Since the core claim of enlightened mind is direct (first-person) apprehension of nondual emptiness in addition to indirect conceptual understanding of the nonconceptuality of emptiness (i.e., of philosophical paradox), what Buddhist philosophers would say to Thompson’s incoherence charge is that nondual awakening stands beyond the ken of the worldframe of science and its ability to judge, and that it only appears incoherent because science and western philosophy don’t have the range to judge beyond dualistic concepts:

I think the Buddhist modernist concept of enlightenment is incoherent. Either you embrace faith in awakening and nirvana, which, according to the tradition, transcend conceptual thought—and hence can’t be legitimized (or delegitimized) by science—or, you choose to believe only in what can be made scientifically comprehensible, in which case you have to give up the idea of enlightenment as a nonconceptual intuitive realization of the ‘fullness of being’ or the ‘suchness of reality,’ for these aren’t scientific concepts. You can’t have it both ways. Religion and science may be able to coexist, depending on the attitude they take to each other, but science can’t legitimize religion, and they can’t be merged into one. (144)

“You can’t have it both ways” only if you’re a science fundamentalist. If you are a cosmopolitan as he later advocates, or if you are a nondualist, then other validation-legitimation avenues are available for making coherent that which science cannot. The Tibetan tradition for example is unbelievably rich and nuanced with regard to teaching, confirming, and validating what is paradoxically unverifiable (in a dualistic sense). They have tried and true ways of verifying nondual cognition or awakening. Further evidence of his discomfort with the idea of enlightenment is when he claims it contributes to anti-intellectualism and irrationalism or that appeals to Buddha’s original teachings are akin to religious fundamentalism:

Buddhist modernist rhetoric of enlightenment as a nonconceptual experience outside language and tradition has reinforced anti-intellectualism and irrationalism. (188-189)
Trying to go back to the ‘original teachings of the Buddha’ is a typical Buddhist modernist move (and one that Buddhist modernism shares with the equally modern phenomenon of religious fundamentalism). (20)

Seriously? He’s saying that one of the world’s most highly refined philosophical critiques of the human mind equates with the irrationality and fanaticism of monotheistic fundamentalism? Such an outrageous conflation is an indication that he feels any form of nonduality is an existential threat to one’s identity as a philosopher who operates in the world of dualistic concepts. And, with statements like the following, even his understanding of enlightenment as conceptual nonduality seems somewhat shaky:

If enlightenment is supposed to be a psychological state, then its content must be clearly specifiable, but there’s no consensus in Buddhism about exactly what the content of the awakening experience is… (145).

These are typical wrong ideas about enlightenment: a) that it is a unique state and b) that it has specifiable content, but also c) that there is no consensus around it. If, as Mahayana Buddhism teaches, enlightenment is nondual, then no single state or mark or characteristic, quality, or aspect can indicate or specify it. This is exactly what the Heart Sutra teaches. It has no specific content, except all content. By being non-specifiable, it is specified. It is ironic, paradoxical, nonconceptual, trans-conceptual, post-conceptual. It is both/and-neither/nor: ultimate-conventional, pure-impure, infinite-finite, form-formless, intelligible-ineffable, being-nonbeing, nothing-everything, emptiness-fullness, affirmation-negation, even dual-nondual. Nondual realization is not for the faint of heart – rather, it is the ultimate conceptual endgame. Don’t take my word for it, ask Uncle Ludwig (Wittgenstein, that is).

Think for a moment: is the state of all states itself a state? Enlightenment-as-ultimate cannot be a specifiable state; it turns on itself; it has no specific content other than self-referential nonspecifiability-ineffability-nonconceptuality. That, paradoxically, IS its specific content. And, it necessarily has to be like this: if enlightenment were specifiable, it wouldn’t be “Ultimate” because anything specifiable is already delimited by conditions, metaphysical or otherwise. Thus...

[GR LIMITS REVIEWS to 18,800 char; see full review at Academia.edu, Philpeople.org, or Researchgate.net]

[Paul Oppenheimer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Opened new lines of inquiry

This book opened new lines of inquiry. The application of moderate cosmopolitanism to dialogue between traditions is an approach worth further investigation.

Evan Thompson is a lifelong meditator, a good friend to Buddhism, and one of the pioneers of the three-way conversation among Buddhism, academic philosophy in the broadly European sphere, and the special sciences, especially neuroscience. Much of his body of work is devoted to making philosophical ideas from Buddhism available to philosophers and scientists reading and writing in English and other European languages. In this book he is arguing for a moderate cosmopolitanism that is fully honest about the differences between different traditions of inquiry. He's arguing against a certain strategy for promoting Buddhism that downplays its religious aspects, discounts other players in the wider Sanskrit cosmopolis, and assimilates neuroscience and Buddhism to each other in a philosophically careless way. He wants Buddhism, science, and philosophy to take each other seriously in a way that doesn't paper over differences. He wants Buddhism to be read in its wider Asian philosophical and religious context. There are profound differences between the public, reproducible, third-person approach of science and the first-person approaches of Asian meditative traditions, the phenomenological traditions of Europe, and other first-person approaches. Thompson has been committed all his life to trying to build bridges between third-person and first-person approaches to questions of life, mind, consciousness, self, and so on. In this book, he's arguing that a moderate cosmopolitanism is the most promising approach to continuing to make progress in this project.

[Kaj Sotala · Rating 3 out of 5]

Decently written, but felt like it was generally either arguing against views which I didn't hold (e.g. that one can easily derive a purely psychological interpretation of Buddhism from the original suttas, that it can be reconstrued as a form of "first-person science" with no religious elements, or that it is exceptionally scientific when compared to other religions), or arguing pretty theoretical-seeming considerations without making clear what their practical relevance was (e.g. that attention and mindfulness are not only in the brain), so I didn't get much out of it. I did appreciate the way that it hammered on the point that the claim of meditation revealing objective truths about the brain is doubtful, as there is a definite process of actively reshaping the mind as well.

[Jessica Zu · Rating 3 out of 5]

Oh, btw, I need to credit him for following Sheldon Pollock's footsteps by pushing forward Buddhist cosmopolis in conjunction with Sanskrit cosmopolis. I'm on board with this project. Western cultures do not have a monopoly on cosmopolitan thinking, Chinese and Indians offer awesome thinkings on these issues.

I think this book should be more properly titled "why I am not a white Buddhist." as for his critique of Buddhist modernisms, though very incisive, especially on the philosophical inconsistencies, I think it should be more properly contextualized as critiques of white Buddhist modernisms. Throughout this book and his critiques of white Buddhist modernisms, I fail to see any scholarly engagement with socially engaged Buddhism (mostly led by Asian, African teachers). I'm interested in his philosophical analysis of teachings such as Ruth King's Mindfulness of Race, Lama Rod Owen's Love and Rage, and angel Kyodo Williams's Radical Dharma.
My 2cents ... Just another white philosopher automatically assuming whiteness as the norm and white people's interpretation of Buddhism as the universal experience of Buddhism and only paying attention to minorities who appeal to white sensitivity ... I'm not surprised. As he recounts his contacts with Buddhism, it's such a typical white encounter with Buddhism ... That is why American Buddhism is still largely a racist Buddhism.
If you wanna know more about Asian and African American versions of Buddhism, try those books I mentioned earlier and also try Duncan Williams's The American Sutra.
This also explains why I am determined not to become a philosopher ... the whole field is so white ... so male ... no room for colored women like me ... their loss not mine.

[Eugene Pustoshkin · Rating 5 out of 5]

At first I was skeptical about that book due to its strange choice of words in the title. It reminded of Bertrand Russel’s famous Why I Am Not a Christian. But once I started to read the book, I immediately recognized very good literature. We even recorded a podcast in Russian about the contents of that book for our Eros & Kosmos online magazine.

I won’t be going into the details of Evan Thompson’s arguments (probably, other reviews describe his theses), but it is really difficult to disagree with most if not all of them. I think this book is very compatible with Ken Wilber’s idea of the necessity of a Fourth Turning of the Dharma Wheel to happen. Wilber describes it in his books Integral Buddhism (aka The Fourth Turning) and The Religion of Tomorrow. While Thompson is great at deconstructing some of the flaws of Buddhist modernism, Ken Wilber is great at constructing a holistic, integral, and post-metaphysical vision based on wholeness.

I recommend Why I Am Not a Buddhist to anyone who is interested not just in Buddhism but also in other traditions, especially as they’re related to meditation and spirituality. Well-written, though not uncomplicated (there are some difficult topics discussed there—which I totally loved, but I know that some people might find parts of the text difficult . . . but it is such a short book, really).

[Kamakana · Rating 4 out of 5]

230304: review of Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey and Why I Am Not a Buddhist...

both written by American philosophers, both sincere, both easy to read (for me...), both have capacious if opposing definitions of every word in their respective titles, both have implicit missionary zeal- though the latter is more successful disguising this with academic, philosophical, professional terminology. for this is philosophy. do not know if it works as religious studies. this latter work benefits from ten years further thought by other philosophers:

'why' is itself question, though I understand allusive nature, has implicit demand that argument be heard. it is not enough that one who says he is, came to buddhism as an adult, after trying and rejecting various identifiable contemporary 'western' motifs, for what he identifies as adolescent rebellion. so he says. it is not enough that the one who says he is not, came to buddhism from early home schooling, through intellectual application of ideas he comes to reject, perhaps belated opposite rebellion. he does not say. the question of 'why' seems to be psychological determined...

'I' is of course another question, in the one who says he is this assertion of only 'conventionally real I' is easily accepted, and he finds it inspiring, truthful, revelatory. the one who says he is not is more skeptical, finding the 'I' necessary to 'bind' all the various aspects of the self, body, sense, action, mind. though this is exactly what is contended to be illusory. the doctrine of no-self is key to buddhism. this liberates us from narcissism...

'Am' is question in that I wonder if it is profitable, probable, or even possible, to identify any multiple, complex person with any solid or permanent equivalence, for the one who says he is might maintain the doctrine of emptiness of either self, person, others, entirety of world. the one who says he is not does not sound convinced by ontological arguments of emptiness, and no doubt is more familiar with analytic conceptions of qualities and copula...

and 'Not'?

the one who says he is not has already smuggled this denial in with his rejections of key buddhist assertions, of no-self, of emptiness, of impermanence...

'a buddhist' is final question. he does allow that these are common motifs in Indic philosophy, but- and here is point of difficulty: if you are 'not a buddhist' what buddhism do you mean? he certainly seems to mean something called 'buddhist modernism' but can he truly argue that this constellation of formless form, is what it means to be ' buddhist'? if not 'a buddhist' does he have similar claims against say, christian or muslim or jew? he argues against 'buddhist exceptionalism' and then 'buddhist fundamentalism' but are these more than saying I do not agree with this thinking? and why do I find these books representative of that divide in 'western philosophy, between 'continental' and 'Anglo-American analytic'? the one who says he is uses the arts as way of accessing truth, the one who says he is not uses science as a way of accessing truth. as ever, I prefer the arts...

more
What the Buddha Thought
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
The Kyoto School
Nishida And Western Philosophy
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy
Why I Am Not a Buddhist
Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey

[lille rev · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jeg tror jeg må lese denne igjen en gang. Boka bør være påkrevd lesning for alle som er interessert i den aktuelle trenden rundt meditasjon og «mindfullness». Forfatteren er lærd af og plukker fra hverandre den ene misoppfatningen etter den andre. Tour de force er vel det rette begrepet.

Jeg var ofte irritert da jeg leste boka, uten å helt vite hvorfor. Det føltes ut som at jeg ble schoolet av en bedreviter som vet at han har rett. Ved en anledning tror jeg han plukket en stråmann. Ganske mulig går også en del av argumentasjonen over hodet mitt. Kanskje er det fordi jeg sitter igjen med inntrykket av at absolutt alle som er interessert i meditasjon og selvet, eller forsøket på å underlegge det et empirisk rammeverk, er grovt feilinformerte. Slik sett gleder jeg meg til å lese noen skarpe innvendinger, om de finnes.

[Felix · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is primarily a criticism of Buddhist Modernism, a trend in New Age thinking which seems to be very popular across the western world, but particularly in the United States. To be honest, I think I learned more about Buddhist Modernism from this book than from anywhere else - it's not a movement that I've ever put a great deal of thought into. It's always seemed to me to be an example of contemporary New Age transformation of traditional thinking, a trend which likes to tidy up up complex historical belief systems into neat packages which can be easily consumed in a Capitalist context. The historical flaws in Buddhist modernism (as the term is defined in this book) seem quite obvious to me, and much of the discussion on the topic of history consists of arguments that I could and would readily make myself.

However, this book fundamentally has a scientific rather than historical focus. The author spends the majority of the book tackling the scientific claims of Buddhist Modernism, namely that their religion is uniquely scientifically accurate, in a way that Christianity, Hinduism, Islam et al, simply is not. To me, this conception of Buddhist exceptionalism is patently absurd, but I think it is still somewhat widely accepted, and this book does a great job at summarising scientific rebuttals to the idea. I did often found myself feeling a little bogged down in some of the discussions. For example, discussions on things like the validity or lack thereof, of various models of Evolutionary Psychology. But if you're more into scientific details than I generally am, they might well be your favourite part of the book. Personally, I preferred the historical discussions.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book. About Buddhism and especially some modern variants, told with great knowledge about eastern religions, philosophy, and science. I didn’t get it all, and I felt a bit skeptical about Thompson’s interest in “embodied cognition” but the book was challenging and thought-provoking. It was written partly in response to Robert Wright’s book “Why Buddhism is True” which is a book I also enjoyed, although Thompson makes some valid criticisms of it.

[M Spiering · Rating 5 out of 5]

If Buddhism were a person, it couldn't ask for a better friend and critic than the author of "Why I Am Not a Buddhist," Evan Thompson. As the reader delves into the pages of this (fairly short) book, it quickly becomes clear that the author wishes Buddhism (in its broadest sense) to be well and thriving.

To that end, Thompson realizes that he needs to gently (and sometimes not quite so gently, but never antagonistically) tweak some noses, especially of those who consider themselves Buddhist modernists. This group includes scholars, scientists, and practitioners who seek to fit Buddhist practice and tradition to Western cultural norms and values, which obviously are vastly different from those that existed when Buddhism first appeared more than 2,000 years ago.

Thompson is deeply steeped in Eastern philosophy, being both a meditator and a scholar (having studied with Robert Thurman and Francisco Varela, among others), and very much wants Buddhist intellectual and philosophical traditions to be part of a 21st century cosmopolitan dialogue among philosophers, scientists, and other scholars.

His main focus of criticism is American/Western Buddhism (though, he also cautions against elevating Asian Buddhism without considering that its practitioners, e.g., in mid-20th century Japan and 21st century Myanmar have not always lived up to the ideals of the religion they’ve been espousing).

In particular, he probes the proposition of "Buddhist exceptionalism," which holds that Buddhist philosophy and practice uniquely and almost seamlessly align with (Western) science. He lays out several strands of reasoning explaining as to why, from his perspective, this view is fraught and contradictory.

Thompson is a very eloquent and clear writer, and the book is a fairly quick read, so I'm not going to try summarize its content. I'm also not going to go into some (slight) disagreements I have with a few of the author's assertions--I think that many of them simply stem from my own ignorance of Eastern philosophies and traditions. I truly enjoyed and am very grateful for having several of my views challenged.

The main take-home message for me was that in trying to make Buddhism into a "science of the mind" or as being congruent with findings in fields like evolutionary psychology, Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) scholars and practitioners run the risk of losing sight that Buddhist philosophy has much more to offer. This includes its rich contemplative and ethical/moral instructions and traditions that don't need to be evaluated with the tools of science to see their value for lived experience and flourishing.

The author’s discussion of the many problems that arise from trying to align Buddhist thought with science makes it very clear that (Buddhist) philosophy/practice and science reap fruits that are harvested from different fields, even though they are eaten at the same table. Trying to grow them in the same plot may end up diminishing the flavour and zest of both.

One does not need to be a Buddhist to appreciate the author's take on and well-meaning advice for Buddhist modernists and other followers of the tradition or of Buddhist religion. It’s a very insightful and stimulating read for anyone interested in Eastern philosophy and its role in what is sometimes called the “mindfulness movement.”

[daemyra, the realm's delight · Rating 4 out of 5]

I can’t believe I actually finished this 😭 (Ok I did skim this towards the end but still!) RTC.

[Bobparr · Rating 3 out of 5]

Il saggio è una robusta disamina del rapporto tra scienza e religione nell’ambito del buddhismo modernista, dove non si risparmiano critiche a quest’ultimo accusandolo di avere parecchia confusione sia in ambito filosofico che appunto in ambito scientifico. Thompson scrive di filosofia, psicologia e religione con grande competenza.
L’autore si inerpica in lunghe dimostrazioni, procedendo in modo serrato e - sembra - abbastanza inattaccabile. L’approccio è comunque di grande curiosità e disponibilità, bel lungi dall’essere fanatico o pregiudizievole, e questo ne fa una lettura difficile e un po’ noiosa, ma quantomeno non irritante.

[Craig Werner · Rating 2 out of 5]

A significant disappointment. Thompson has been an important voice in the conversations between Buddhism and neuroscience, a long-time participant in the Dalai Lama's conferences. Thompson's book Waking, Dreaming, Being is a brilliant and detailed investigation of key issues, including the brain states associated with meditation and death. So I was anticipating a measured reflection on why, despite the depth of his understanding, he chooses not to embrace Buddhism.

Unfortunately, this book reads like a petulant statement of his dissatisfaction with the phrasings employed by some participants in the discussions, specifically the claims that Buddhism isn't a religion and that there is a demonstrable "Buddhist science." Thompson labels the position he's arguing against "Buddhist exceptionalism," and clearly wants nothing to do with it. He repeatedly invokes the analogy that someone hearing the same claims about Christianity would likely dismiss them out of hand.

The problem is that he's really talking about the way the science-Buddhism conversation takes place in relation to a specific strain of Tibetan Buddhism, which clearly *is* a religion in accord with pretty much any definition. On a limited level, then, Thompson's claim is true. The Ch'an (zen) tradition, however, avoids most of the problems he locates in the Dalai Lama's sphere. Basically, there's a much broader and more interesting conversation going on concerning the neuroscience of meditation and the ways scientific insights and Buddhist psychology (not the same as neuroscience!) can enter into fruitful conversation. Richard Davison's book Altered Traits avoids all the pitfalls Thompson sees as intrinsic to the Buddhist perspective; I'm not sure whether Davison would call himself a Buddhist or not, but it really doesn't matter; he's working towards (and in) a conversation that's much less adversarial than the one in Why I Am Not.a Buddhist.

Thompson ultimately endorses a form of cosmopolitanism I'd absolutely endorse, one articulated very well by Anthony Appiah. Just wish he'd written the book that would contribute to moving this important cosmpolitan conversation ahead.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

The three-star rating is purely a a hedonic rating. The book is extremely-well written and argued if you want a critique on "modernist" Buddhism - the "Buddhism as mind science" school. Thompson, a philosophy with a deep knowledge of eastern religion, argues that Buddhism is a religion not science. Although the book is only 190+ pages my mind wandered a bit while reading it (I guess I need mindfulness training!). I'm not quite sure why I purchased this book - I guess I was impressed with the cover and the topic while browsing in an out-of-town bookstore.

[Dylan]

I loved this book. Thompson is a heavy-hitter. One of my dissertation advisors suggested it to me during a conversation when I was rapturously endorsing some of Thompson et. al.'s arguments from The Embodied Mind about how Buddhism seems to reveal that many problems in philosophy of mind are in fact non-problems. I think I said something along the lines of "philosophers of mind should become Buddhists"; a point he disagreed with. I was under a number of what I now understand to be Buddhist modernist impressions about the separability of meditation practices and Buddhist concepts from millennia-long archival, liturgical, and scholastic histories. Thompson's book persuasively demonstrates that there is no single agreed-upon set of beliefs or practices that can be called Buddhism—much less a set of meditation practices or ideas about what the self is and whether or not it exists which can be neatly imported into modern scientific or philosophical discourse.

Just to offer one example: "bare attention" meditation, which consists of adopting the posture of non-judgmental awareness, is often held up in the mindfulness movement as an example of a Buddhist practice which has beneficial psychological effects. In lots of western Buddhist literature, you can find examples framing this and other meditation practices as a form of empirical/experimental observation about the nature of consciousness, whereby we can discover the impermanent nature of all phenomena (form is emptiness, emptiness is form, etc.). Sometimes you will encounter claims that this practice is akin to science, or that these results can be validated by science. But there is no meditative practice which is not saturated with immense social, historical, and religious context. Most people who choose to take up a meditative practice do so because they believe there will be some kind of benefit to doing so—because they heard about it from somewhere, because they read about it in a book, because they were raised in a religious family, or whatever. These ideas about what meditation is and what its benefits will be are already conditioning the experience in ways that cannot be undone. There is no way to extricate "Buddhist meditation" from the web of context that gives it meaning. Maybe you can experimentally isolate certain habits and practices, ways of sitting, etc. in order to study them scientifically. But if you remove the context of tradition, belief, and religious community, you have arguably transformed the meditative practice into something else. It may no longer be Buddhist. Likewise, if I set out to explore a meditative practice that I have been told will reveal that the self is an illusion, there is no way for me to forget this expectation in my practice. Perhaps I will come to one conclusion or another, but I cannot simply erase the 2,500 years of history that lie between me and the Buddha's teachings. Now, I am still going to explore and elaborate my practice, but the book helps me see some of the problems with calling that practice "Buddhism"—not that I ever did, but I thought about it! Maybe one day I'll start going to a sangha and practicing in a community with a teacher. Maybe I'll be a Buddhist then. I don't know. And the idea that a religion is a label that you can put on yourself in the first place is already a (neo)liberal assumption that runs counter to various elements of Buddhist tradition in the first place. It doesn't matter whether I'm a Buddhist or not. "I" might not even be the person who wrote this.

Anyway. The book is full of concise and thoughtful critiques of the way that people have tried to represent Buddhism as more scientific than other religions. This is a rhetorical strategy called Buddhist exceptionalism, and it's predicated on the faulty assumption that Buddhist ideas about "the self" can be mapped onto modern scientific terminology. The reality is that Buddhist doctrine emerged out of, and in response to, a number of other South Asian religious and philosophical discourses, and is best understood through the study of that milieu. Which is not to say we can't study or engage with Buddhism in other ways; only that careful and historically scrupulous study of Buddhist doctrine powerfully underscores what a mistake it is to try to map it onto modern neuroscience. Instead, Thompson endorses a cosmopolitan view which would allow Buddhism and science to meet one another and have their own assumptions questioned. In other words, he envisions a non-dogmatic encounter between these two lineages of thought which doesn't attempt to carve out Buddhism's ethical or soteriological dimensions in the name of showing why it is "true" or "scientific." Which is not to say that religious dogma is a bad thing, per se. Only that a lot of people are kidding themselves about which elements of Buddhist thought are shot through with dogma and which aren't. The sense in which Buddhism is (or even can be) "true" is not the same as the sense in which scientific studies can be true, and there's no problem with that.

[Sumanawije · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book opens up the readers to crique buddist concepts devoid of dogma.

The author has devoted several chapters in the book to justify why he does not consider himself to be adherent of Buddhism. In the 1st chapter itself, he discusses what the Buddhist intellectuals have crafted as ‘Buddhist Exceptionalism.’ His argument is that these intellectuals have failed to produce sufficient evidence in favour of this “exceptionalism”. Furthermore , it is mentioned that such assessments that they have arrived are not based on unilateral principles of Buddhist philosophy itself, but based on comparative assessments of other religions. In addition to that, the author resorts to ridiculing some of those intellectuals for their vain attempts to justify Buddhist Principles through the substances of the subject matters they have specialized in.

The next important contention is regarding ‘Buddhist modernism’. Specifically, the modern Buddhists in the West, and their rejection of traditional rituals and prayer practices of cultural beliefs in the East. While they claim that they accept Buddhist Philosophy. However, they are unable to explain key Buddhist concepts such as Nirvana, Kamma or impermanence.

In order to elaborate their point of view, the Modern Buddhists are trying to reckon in the existence of a parallel status in Buddhism to science. Their principal defense is the non acceptance of a creator “God” in Buddhism which has been equally denied through science. Therefore, the Buddhism they argue stands on an equal platform with science. In much more serious terms, Buddhism is credited as a "mind science ", where the practice of meditation has received the attention from the Western World who basically hail modern science, to resolve the complex mental disorder situation plaguing their society. This is the major critical resistance uplifted by the author.

The particular question raised by the author boils down to the inquiry he makes, why does Buddhism resort to science to prove its worth, if at all Buddhism has exceptional standing as they say. On the other hand he points out that many scientists look upon to Buddhist principles to resolve their day to day burning mentalities. But at the same time in order to find out suitable answers required by the Buddhist scholars to those ambiguous points in the doctrinal teachings offered by Buddhist teachings, they turn towards science for help.The most valid question posed at those learned Buddhist scholars and followers is “why if in fact Buddhism is considered as of exceptional standing, do they seek assistance in science?”

Of course, this is a common complaint which is widely discussed even in Sri Lanka today. One county it is though, there exist various groups holding on to different ideologies and opinions , supported by their own educational backgrounds and tending to enter into controversial debates.

In the same vain, number of chapters in the book have been reserved to validate his argument under the headings of 'self and no-self' 'mindfulness mania' 'the rhetoric of enlightenment' because of the popularity within which they are embraced and such frantically they are gobbled up.

The last Chapter of this book on "Cosmopolitanism and Conservation" I consider, as the one which drives attention in any reader of the book to evaluate what the Nibbana or ever lasting inner peace means.The main reason which instigated me to read this book, in fact happened when listening to a CBC conversation conducted with this author. On the same basis, I wish to elaborate more about the last chapter in my commentary.

The author emphasized that the Buddha himself had advised thoroughly to his discipals, not to convert his ‘sutra’ into written format, mainly not to write it in Sanskrit. There are two main reasons why the Buddha did not want his teachings in a written format, and not in Sanskrit in particular.

The Buddha's teachings on ‘everlasting inner peace’ ('nibbana') that he found was for the use of ‘all living beings’. Written communication during those times had been only for elite groups of people and not for ordinary people. If those teachings were written, those teachings would have only remained in the hands of the few elites. They become the property of writers, and eventually the writers' own standpoints built into them is inevitable.

Each language represents the culture of the locality that language has evolved. That culture is conditioned by the religious belief system and the dogmatic traditions of such cultures. Written language of Sanskrit is fundamentally developed by Hindu religious dogmatic intellectuals, according to doctrine of Hinduism. The Buddha's teachings were in magadhi (later called pali) language. When it's written in Sanskrit, they have to use those words which completely misinterpret what the Buddha meant. That's why the Buddha advised his followers, (Charatha bikkewe charican, Bahujana hitaya Bahujana sukhaya) ‘you yourself go and show my dhamma through your behaviours and explain to others how you achieve it.’

Historic evidence of putting pali canon into palm leaf manuscript had been first found in (Ceylon) Sri Lanka. On the same basis I would like to elaborate further more on how the original words of the Buddha had been conserved at a considerable level in Sri Lanka.

The Buddha's advice aforesaid was the main reason why those tripitaka sutras were not in a written format until the 1st century BC. Instead, monks should have to get proficiency in 'magadhi' language. 'Suthra' came 'byheart' until such time that the pali canon was written using the same 'magadee sounds' using 'old sinheles alphabet'. This was done after the 4th buddhst convention during 29 - 17 BC and It was the first manuscript into palm leaves.

However, definitions for those suthra were again written with detailed descriptive commentaries called ‘hela atuwa-teeka tippani'. In this manner, they tried to avoid misconceptions at their level best. However, no one can argue that there would not have been any misinterpretations in those commentaries, because writers are always embedding their own standpoints when writing. And the other negative point was that those written teachings literature only remained within the preview of monks and intellectuals with linguistic proficiency. The materials available to the general public was Buddhist literature such as Jathaka stories, and many well written literature associated with those commentary literature, by renowned authors, mainly monks.

The worsen misinterpretations happened during the 5th century onward, when the author reckoned here as the 'Sanskrit cosmopolitanism' began to conquer the oriental world. During that time, most vernacular languages in the whole South and South-East Asian region were influenced by Sanskrit. As a result of social, religious and geopolitical bonds; Sri Lanka was an inevitable locality in this cosmopolitanism.

As a result, Pali canon was re-defined with mixed terminology from Sanskrit. All ‘hela atuwa commentaries were rewritten by sanskrit learned intellectuals.They used the Sanskrit words to explain main key teachings of the buddha. Words like athman (aththa), anathman (anaththa), nirwana (nibbana), punarbhawa (punabhawo), smruthi (sathi) are such terms. These terms were defined as directly derived from Hinduism concepts. There are huge differences between these Hinduism biased meanings and magadee meanings. 5th century rewritten commentaries were all based on these meanings.

For example, Sanskrit ‘Smruthi’ means good memory. They translated this as the pali term Sathi. But sathi is neither memory nor how to use your memory. Sathi is insightful into every momentary six senses contact without preoccupied mentalities and prejudice deposited in our memory pack. It's not losing the memory, but not using it to construct our sense perceptions. Term 'appamado' is used to elaborate 'sathi' further. We should maintain ‘sathi’ momentarily, before that preoccupied memory comes to blur our vision and defile or cammuplange the true nature of the sensory elements.

Sanskrit cosmopolitanism has been replaced by European cosmopolitanism, mainly English during the 19th and 20th century. So all Buddhst literature which has been prominently written using Sanskrit has been translated directly into English language. It's a known fact that the English language, meaning of words has been posted by Christianity, Greek and Roman cultural ethics. All the words they used to translate that Sanskrit cosmopolitanism literature into English and other European languages communicate original meanings with further distortions. Self, no-self, reincarnation, rebirth, concentration, meditation, enlightenment, mindfulness all may not come closer to the meanings of the magedee/pali terms in Suthra. This became the main issue related to this complexity.

Unfortunately, ‘modern Buddhism and Buddhist exceptionalism’ in Sri Lanka also use reversed versions of English terminology and epistamology elaborated by the west, and try to prove Buddhism by integrating modern science. At the same time, widespread popular Buddhism in Sri Lanka also entangled with jataka stories and associated literature and not with the essence of pali canon. The root cause behind this is buddhst people today do not study the pali language to understand the pali canon to get it redefined by themselves. However, there are few renowned monks and individuals are available within the island, but popular Buddhism and modern Buddhists dogmatic forces supersedes their appearance.

That is why I strongly recommend this book to all Buddhists, and Buddhists in Sri Lanka and those with Sri Lankan descent in particular.

Thank you Prof. Evan Thompson for this valuable piece of work.

[Maud · Rating 3 out of 5]

Voor het eerst een studieboek gelezen dat zo lekker geschreven was dat ik er doorheen vloog. Geblessed. Helaas kan ik er alleen bijna niks van gebruiken voor mn eindpaper

[Thomas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Thoughtful, thorough, sometimes pedantic, dense but usually approachable. I'm not convinced of all of Thompson's arguments but definitely food for thought

[Jamie Alfieri · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting read that challenged many assumptions of mine. Unfortunately reads like a philosophy dissertation , one of those books written for the masses but has to defend against intellectual attacks.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Evan Thompson is a philosopher who has spent his career studying Buddhist philosophy and its relation to cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In this refreshingly subtle book, he explains why he is not a Buddhist, despite the fact that he considers himself an admirer of Buddhist philosophy and a 'friend of Buddhism'.

Thompson's arguments start with the observation that the Buddhism most widely discussed in the west is a relatively young branch he calls Buddhist Modernism. Buddhist Modernism presents itself as a rational science of the mind that has revealed empirically verifiable truths about the human condition. Supernatural beliefs found in some venerable traditions of Buddhism, such as the divinity of Buddha and reincarnation, are treated as metaphors or ignored.

As a rationalist with a scientific bent, Thompson rejects these fantastical beliefs out of hand. That leaves him to consider Buddhist Modernism. The core of his argument is that he cannot commit to Buddhist Modernism because it is philosophically problematic: it misrepresents Buddhism as a science when in fact it is still a religion that, in his view, lies beyond the purview of science.

Some of the main arguments:

-In attempt to reconcile itself with science, Buddhist Modernism (BM) distorts Buddhism so badly that it cannot justifiably be called Buddhism. BM argues that the 'core idea' of Buddhism is that desires cause suffering and that through mindfulness practices we can temper this desiring and achieve a profound well-being called enlightenment. Thompson counters that this completely ignores the metaphysical context that has grounded Buddhist philosophy for millennia (i.e. that we are trapped in a cycle of rebirth that ends when we achieve a transcendent state). It's like saying that the 'core idea' of Christianity is that love for others allows us to transcend the tragedy of our death.

-BM emphasizes that it as an objective science of the mind, but it is nothing of the sort. The BM argument goes that, in meditation, one is instructed to impartially observe one's own thoughts. The meditator is an empiricist tasked with discovering the truth of their own psychology for themselves. Thompson essentially says that there are enormous powers of suggestion at play here. Meditation is far from an objective framework for observation - the Buddhist meditator enters with an enormous set of assumptions (e.g., that one can even observe one's own thoughts) and a goal (enlightenment) already in mind.

Furthermore, science as we know it cannot be based on subjective observations. The kinds of observations one makes while meditating can never be verified by others. I can look through the same telescope as you, and I can watch you sit with your eyes closed, but I can't watch *you* meditate. This problem of studying subjective phenomena similarly beguiles research into consciousness.

-Thompson argues that enlightment cannot be studied scientifically because conflicting definitions are given across the myriad Buddhist traditions. And even if enlightenment could be precisely defined, it lies beyond the scope of science because it is cannot be divorced from its normative, moral framework (i.e., the concept addresses not only 'what can I be?' but also 'how should I be?')

Overall, Thompson's arguments are strong but I think he's a little too hard on Buddhism. Many people seem to be wishing that religious institutions would catch up with the modern era and offer a contemplative framework that doesn't insult their rationality. Is it really problematic that a huge contingent of one of the world's great religions is making an effort to demythologize and refine their philosophy for a modern audience? In the early 20th century, the Protestant Theologian Rudolf Bultmann argued that Christianity engage in exactly this sort of demythologizing project, but mainstream Christianity and the other Abrahamic religious remain as steeped in myth as ever. Buddhism may or may not have produced an exceptional account of human psychology - wisdom about human nature abounds in many traditions, and Thompson's points about the difficulty of empirically verifying the effects of subjective experiences like meditation and mystical experience are very well taken. But Buddhism is undeniably exceptional in its willingness to adapt to and engage in dialogue with the modern world.

[Robert Tansey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting read but frankly unless you are familiar with philosophical discourse it is a bit confusing. The author makes some good points and spends a chapter going after Robert Wright (evolutionary psychologist - "Why Buddhism is True"). I find myself more aligned with Wright. All in all the discussion was pretty much over my head.

[MR MATHEW · Rating 3 out of 5]

This somewhat spectacularly titled book is fundamentally an attack on Buddhist modernism. There are elements of his attack that I agree with, particularly the overreliance on science as a crutch for explaining Buddhism. A philosophy which has prospered under its own steam for some thousand years does not need to and should not look to quantum physics, of all fields, as support for its beliefs.

He defines the core tenets of Buddhist modernism as “that Buddhism is a “mind science”; that there is no self; that mindfulness is an inward awareness of one’s own private mental theater; that neuroscience establishes the value of mindfulness practice; that enlightenment is a nonconceptual experience outside language, culture, and tradition; and that enlightenment is or can be correlated with a brain state.” In this definition, I think he is creating a version of Buddhist modernism that he can more easily refute. From my own readings of texts by the Dalaï Lama, Mingyur Rinpoche, Sharon Salzburg and Tsongkapa, I would have said that the core tenets of Buddhist modernism are the Four Noble Truths, the Brahma Viharas, the Eightfold Noble Path, the Causes of Suffering and the philosophy of emptiness/no-self. The only elements of this that he really addresses are meditation and no-self. His main point on meditation seems to be that the results are overhyped and can’t be precisely mapped to brain activity, but I don’t believe his position is that there is fundamentally no benefit to it. I think he is probably right that the studies into the benefits of meditation have been overhyped and oversold, but this is not to say that the benefit of meditation is not proven. The question is how and to what degree.

His position on no self is more nuanced, but my reading of it is that he doesn’t disagree with the statement that there is no inherent self. He simply puts forward a proposition that a differently defined notion of self may exist. For me this is uncompelling and not inconsistent with a conventionally existing self (or person), which Buddhist modernists agree with.

One of his big attacks on Buddhist modernism is what he calls Buddhist exceptionalism. Here I think he falls into the classical liberal trap, which starts as “why can’t we all just get along?” And extends into “everybody is right” thinking. Since the Buddhist modernism he attacks is fundamentally a western construct, we have to look at Buddhist exceptionalism in the context of western religions and if we compare Buddhism to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, we see that Buddhism genuinely is exceptional. It has no Creator God. This is exceptional. Judeo-Christian religions rely on the concept of original sin and salvation through supplication while Buddhism relies on an inherent Buddha nature and progress through self reflection. This is exceptional. Buddhism has a rich tradition of debate and movement and is not constrained and fossilised by a fixed religious text. This is exceptional. If the texts I’ve read are to be believed Buddhism has always encouraged followers to judge for themselves and has encouraged debate of its principles beliefs and precepts. This is exceptional. Note that Evan does question this last point, noting that it is difficult for all but the most highly regarded llamas to question or move Buddhism. I don’t see this as compelling because the same could be said of science. There is plenty of literature talking about paradigm shifts in science and how difficult it is to be heard and to challenge existing paradigms. Why should Buddhism be any different?

He appears to dislike the fact that Buddhist modernism “downplays the metaphysical and ritual elements of traditional Asian Buddhism,” while emphasising the “personal meditative experience and scientific rationality.” I don’t have a problem with it doing that and, since he later espouses the benefits of cosmopolitanism where presumably, he is taking the bits of lots of religions that appeal to him, I’m not sure he should object to it either.

There is a theme running through the discussion that aspects of Buddhism are normative and soteriological. When he says this, it’s to dismiss Buddhist thinking as unscientific and, at best, philosophical: certainly religious. For example: “The assertion that the illusion of an unconstructed personal “I” is the cause of mental suffering may look like a straightforward empirical claim about our mental lives. But it’s really a normative claim and a soteriological claim. It’s normative because it tells us that we ought to strive to abandon any feeling of [self]. It’s soteriological because it tells us that following this instruction will liberate us from mental suffering and provide lasting mental peace. The claim articulates a Buddhist perspective on the world, not an independently established truth of psychology.” If Buddhists have been debating how to be happy (or free from suffering) for some thousand years, even without a full version of the scientific method, I think they may be worth listening to on that topic, in conjunction with what a hundred years of psychological science has yet come up with. We don’t dismiss CBT when it tells us how to interpret the world, with the goal of relieving suffering - but isn’t this also normative and soteriological?

There’s a sense that Evan believes that Buddhist modernism drops the attractive, culturally interesting religious bits of Buddhism for practical self-help. For me this is its strength.

Twice, he makes a point to refer to the sexual and other scandals that have rocked Buddhism. He doesn’t point out that other religions have all had this too. And in just dropping it as a sort of dirty bomb, to my mind he misses a really important point. A huge weakness of Buddhism generally is its fetishising and aggrandisement of llamas and gurus. This stands in stark contrast to the Buddha’s sending out of mendicant monks to preach. It gives gurus and llamas too much power and power corrupts. From the power given to these leading figures by religious practice, abuses will follow like night from day. Modernism needs to step much further away from these practices.

Why does he not make this point? Is it because for him, Buddhism is something to be studied as a quirky religious system that should stay in its own lane? For many of us, it’s a set of transformative basic beliefs and practices that help us to be happier. And for that, we don’t need rebirth, we don’t need powerful gurus, we don’t need complex rituals and we don’t need authoritative hierarchies. We need a modern Buddhism.

[Nikko]

Despite the title, which put me off reading it for a while, this is a worthwhile book. It is not a tirade against Buddhism; rather, it is an attack on Buddhist Modernism and the critique is one that is well-laid out. While I enjoyed and got more out of reading The Making of Buddhist Modernism, this is an articulate presentation of the many problems with Buddhist modernism.

There are many things about the book I did not like - his binary that one is either a Buddhist modernist full of contradictions or you have to live in a Buddhist monastery. The lenses of science and philosophy also give off the feeling of outsiders poking at something they do not totally understand (though the author certainly knows his stuff). The discussions of self vs. not self will be of interest to some, though were not that interesting to me.

But his dissection of modernist views is an important topic that self-identifying Buddhists would do well to consider. Here is a full review in Lions Roar: https://www.lionsroar.com/the-problem...

[szymborskalyte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A spectacularly sober take on Buddhism.

[Viriyavaṃsa Bhikkhu · Rating 3 out of 5]

A Critical Review based on the Early Buddhist Texts

Summary:
The author argues that the popular scientific/secular buddhism has issues with its underlying philosophical assumptions. He also claims that the phenomenological view is not supported in the Buddhist texts, specifically related to the not-self teaching.

I agree that scientific/secular buddhism has philosophical issues in that it does not question the issues phenomenology uncovers in the prevaling scientific materialist view. While I also agree with the author that the traditional buddhist understanding (of all major traditions, influenced by later commentaries in claiming not-self means the self does not exist) does not sit well with the phenomenological point-of-view, I claim that he misinterprets the early buddhist texts (by that I mean the Pali Canon) and their compatibility with a phenomenological view of the not-self teaching. In that sense, I think the author is actually *more* buddhist than those who claim to be secular buddhists, since the latter are misinterpreting or cherry-picking the core teachings and have created their own unique "religion" as the author suggests. By disagreeing with the traditional (and in my opinion, inaccurate based on the early texts) view of not-self and arguing for a phenomenological self, he is unintentionally agreeing with the early buddhist texts more than he realizes.

I give my reasons for this take below, with relevant sutta quotes from the Pali Canon given in abbreviated form (MN/DN/SN/AN). The complete suttas can be found free at dhammatalks.org/suttas for anyone interested in investigating further.

While the author devotes a chapter on the issues of evolutionary psychology and critiquing Robert Wright's "Why Buddhist is True," since I mostly agree with that criticism I ignore it in my analysis.

The review follows a format where I directly quote excerpts from the book (adding my own title), and then add my analysis right after.

Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View: Dis-Identify with Experience & Avoid Metaphysics:
• The Buddha rejects the question of whether there is a self together with any positive or negative answer to that question. … teaching a practical method for how to stop mistakenly identifying with anything as the self…
• He is … rejecting metaphysical questions about the existence or nonexistence of the self and instead … urging that we shouldn’t identify with anything in our experience as the self. … giving an analysis of experience … and not a metaphysical analysis of what … is outside of experience.
• It invokes a distinction between the analysis of what there is (metaphysics) and the analysis of experience (phenomenology) that seems foreign to the Nikāyas.
• The Buddha … makes claims about what exists and what doesn’t exist from the vantage point of what we can know from experience. … makes metaphysical claims, but … from an empiricist standpoint rather than a speculative one.
• The denial of the self is made on empiricist grounds (by appealing to experience). Nevertheless, as an assertion about what doesn’t exist, the no-self claim is a metaphysical one.

Analysis | Right View Means No Metaphysical Questions Arise:
• The Buddha does make the metaphysical claim that inconstant aggregates exist (SN 22:94), and that where craving for the aggregates (SN 23:2) is present, one is called a being (satta). In philosophical terms, this would be categorized to be a process metaphysics (Noa Ronkin. Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition, 2005, p. 72). Note that Nirvana is defined as being constant (nicca), so Buddhism doesn't cleanly fit the process metaphysics bill.
• But when craving for the aggregates is abandoned, notions of existing, not existing, both, or neither do not apply (SN 44:1, DN 9, MN 63, MN 72)
• For one who “sees the world with right discernment,” experience is viewed in terms of the noble truths – this involves not identifying the aggregates as self since this is the cause of dukkha
• This results in the abandoning the underlying obsession with conceit (mānānusaya) to construct a self (AN 3:32)
• Conclusion: The early texts show evidence that the Buddha recommends a phenomenological view of experience as opposed to a metaphysical one
_____________________

Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View Variation: The Goal is Transcendent Consciousness that is Self:
• The Buddha taught a practical method for how to stop mistakenly identifying with the aggregates as the self, but this method is compatible with there being a pure … consciousness that transcends the aggregates and isn’t conditioned by them.
• This interpretation would make the Buddha’s teaching in the Nikāyas consistent with the Upaniṣads, especially as interpreted by the later Vedānta philosopher Śaṅkara, for whom the true self is pure, nondual consciousness.
• The Buddha never explicitly says that there is a transcendent consciousness apart from the aggregates, so this reading goes well beyond the texts.
• Other discourses indicate that any belief in a transcendent consciousness or self is a “wrong view.”
• The reading is based on cherry picking— choosing passages and interpreting them to suit one’s position while ignoring many other passages that count against it

Analysis | Not-Self View Variation Analysis: Viññāṇaṁ Anidassanaṁ Misunderstood:
• Author is referring to viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ (consciousness without surface) when he says “transcendent consciousness”
• Even though not defined in detail in the texts, it is mentioned (MN 49, DN 11), and anidassanaṁ is also listed as an epithet for nibbāna (SN 43)
• It “is not experienced through the allness of the All” (MN 49) — so is outside the consciousness aggregate, which is defined in terms of the six sense bases
• “The All as a phenomenon is to be abandoned” (SN 35:24), and the dimension where the six sense bases ceases should be experienced (SN 35:117)
• “Consciousness-totality above, below, all-around: non-dual [advayaṁ], immeasurable” is subject to change, a perception attainment, and not the goal (AN 10:29). Therefore the goal in Advaita Vedanta is not the same as viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ
• Conclusion: Author misinterprets viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ to be non-dual consciousness, and assumes it involves a self-view – which it does not.
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Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1342-1387) | Not-Self View: Aggregates Are Not-Self Means There Is No Self:
• There is an unstated assumption or implicit premise in the “Discourse on the Characteristic of Nonself” [anattalakkhana sutta] that the five aggregates are all there is, and so if there were a self, it would have to exist among the aggregates.
• Evidence to support this interpretation can be found throughout the Nikāyas. … “Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who regard [anything] as self in various ways all regard [as self] the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them.”
• If whatever can be regarded as a self belongs to the five aggregates and the five aggregates are nonself, then nothing should be regarded as a self.
• The Buddha says that “the all” is the six senses and their objects. He goes on to say that anyone who declares another “all” would be mistaken and would be asserting something beyond the scope of what he or she can know.
• The implication is that “the all” is nonself and there is nothing else that could be a self.

Analysis | Not-Self View Analysis: Aggregates are Not All There Is:
• The Buddha states you should not measure yourself in terms of the aggregates because it leads to classifying yourself (SN 22:36): “But if one doesn’t stay obsessed with [the aggregates], lord, that’s not what one is measured by. Whatever one isn’t measured by, that’s not how one is classified.
• Nibbāna lies outside of the aggregates, so to presume the aggregates constitute all of reality limits yourself
• When he is asked whether there is a self or not, the Buddha did not answer because a categorical answer would involve wrong views—eternalism and annihilationism (SN 44:10)
• Conclusion: The Buddha never defines the five aggregates as what reality is constituted of. Instead they are what we cling to. They are not used as the basis for an answer to the question “is there a self? ,” which is considered inappropriate attention (ayoniso manasikāra, MN 2)
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Excerpt (Kindle Locations 1629-1646) | Phenomenology: The Constructed Sense of Self:
• From the phenomenological perspective, the self is a multifaceted construction.
• To say that the sense of self is a construction… doesn’t logically imply that there is no self or that the sense of self is the presentation of an illusion.
• Traditional Buddhist way: requires making a … distinction between “self” (attā) and “person” (pudgala)… “Self” to mean a personal essence that is the independent owner of experience and agent of action, and … “person” to refer to the multifaceted construction … , then we can say that whereas the self is an illusion or nonexistent fiction, the person exists.
• Prefers the self as being a construction, and the part of the sense of self that involves the impression of an unchanging and independent personal essence as being an illusion.

Analysis | Phenomenology Analysis: I-making and My-making Stopped by Not-Self Perception:
• The terms I-making and my-making are clearly phenomenological constructions – does not mean they are illusions
• The self (attā) and person (pudgala) distinction is not found in the early Buddhist texts – this only becomes necessary when the anattā teaching is misunderstood to be metaphysical and not phenomenological in application
• Conclusion: The author correctly makes the distinction between the constructed phenomenological self and the metaphysical view of self, but because he is not well-versed in the early Buddhist teachings, assumes that this interpretation contradicts them when it is in fact in-line
• He seems unaware of the potential for the perception of not-self (anatta-saññā) to root out this constructed sense of self and stop I-making/my-making (ahaṅkāramamaṅkāra, AN 7:46) altogether to reach nibbāna: “When a monk’s awareness often remains steeped in the perception of not-self in what is stressful, his [mind] is devoid of I-making & my-making with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all themes has transcended pride, is at peace, and is well released.

Further Analysis | Two Truths Doctrine Analysis: A Distinction Not Found in the Early Buddhist Texts:
• Two truths idea probably originated in the Milindapañha, popularized through Visuddhimagga
• It states that there is a conventional truth (sammuti) of the phenomenal sense of self but the ultimate truth (paramattha) is that there is no metaphysical self
• The Buddha uses the sense of self in positive terms in terms of, self-reliance, self-esteem (AN 3:40, AN 4:159), and the way leading to discernment, without making any distinction of truths: “What, having been done by me, will be for my long-term welfare & happiness?” (MN 135), “Your own self is your own mainstay” (Dhp 160)
• This would not be possible if a no-self view is adhered to
• The two truths doctrine necessitates that the Buddha used convenient fictions in his teaching
• This is contradicted when he says his words are always true, beneficial, and timely (MN 58)
• The Buddha never said that on the ultimate level, beings (satta) do not exist. Instead, he defined beings as those who have craving for the aggregates (SN 23:2)
• After a being abandons craving, questions of existence and non-existence do not apply (SN 44:1)

[Jim Razinha · Rating 2 out of 5]

I don’t remember where I came across this book but I was curious because I’ve explored and examined Buddhism and rejected it as untenable, so what would be someone else’s reason? I also decided to read it in parallel with Bertrand Russell’s Why I Am Not a Christian, which I never finished forty years ago. Where Russell is cogent and succinct, Thompson … is not. I’ve seen that Dawkins’ Law of the Conservation of Difficulty* certainly applies to the social sciences. But there has to be a stepped up version on steroids when it comes to philosophers. Jeez, they can sure take a simple thought and complicate the hell out of it. With less than no value added. So, is my problem with Thompson or philosophers in general? Both. Thompson clearly has the academic chops to analyze his subject, but he also is firmly stuck in the peat bog. I may get trolled on this, but while I agree with Thompson's end result, his arguments are mired in, well, stuff like this: "Mindfulness meditation isn’t a kind of private introspection of a private mental theater. Meditative introspection isn’t the inner perception of an independent and preexistent, private mental realm. Mindfulness meditation is the metacognition and internalized social cognition of socially constituted experience."

I'm not going to go into all of the highlighted sections where I had issue... there are too many. I will share a few of the parts that made sense but bottom line, this is languaged up, à la Dawkins's Law.

[on the attempts to tie Buddhism to science} ... the point is that our familiar division between religion and other areas of human activity—art, philosophy, politics, and science—reflects a recent way of thinking that we should be careful not to project onto other times and places.

[on the scientists who investigate mindfulness meditation] These scientists, and not just the journalists who report their findings, bear responsibility for the meaningless mantra that mindfulness “literally changes” or “rewires” your brain. Anything you do changes your brain. Despite the hype, scientific evidence that mindfulness practices induce long-lasting, beneficial changes in the brain is still tentative.

[and, right after that, he notes} Indeed, one recent scientific study suggests that there may be a bias toward reporting positive findings in clinical studies of mindfulness and that negative results may go unreported.

{good... he didn't identify it, but that is the halo effect}

[on whether Buddhism is true] In my view, “Is Buddhism true?” isn’t the right question to ask. Instead, we should ask: What does Buddhism have to teach us? What can we learn from Buddhism? What do we find in Buddhism that we don’t find in other traditions? And, my favorite one: How can debating with Buddhists—past and present—invigorate our thinking?


* Dawkins’ Law of the Conservation of Difficulty from A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Writings

states that obscurantism in an academic subject expands to fill the vacuum of its intrinsic simplicity. Physics is a genuinely difficult and profound subject, so physicists need to – and do – work hard to make their language as simple as possible (‘but no simpler,’ rightly insisted Einstein). Other academics – some would point the finger at continental schools of literary criticism and social science – suffer from what Peter Medawar (I think) called Physics Envy. They want to be thought profound, but their subject is actually rather easy and shallow, so they have to language it up to redress the balance.<

[Jef Sneider · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is pretty clear why this author, Evan Thompson, is not a Buddhist. He thinks way too much. His book has too many words. He is completely swallowed up, hung up, focused on and done in by duality.

Is mindfulness in the mind or in the brain? Is it the person or the mind that is mindful? If nirvana means neither existence nor non-existence is the Buddha dead since he is never going to be reborn? If the Buddha was born to save the world, why did he choose not to teach at first? Why did the Buddha have to be encouraged to teach?

The book goes into detail describing the philosophy and tradition of Buddhism and providing questions and counterpoints at every opportunity. It may even be a good way for non-Buddhists to learn about Buddhism, especially in the last 2 chapters about enlightenment and the summary of his ideas. But, no, I do not recommend this book for those who want to learn about Buddhism. There are much better books to learn from. This one just goes on and on with wordy explanations and arguments that do not satisfy. Too many words!

Here is an example of the author's thought process: "The statement that 'nirvana is inexpressible' appears to express something about nirvana, namely that it is inexpressible and so appears to contradict itself." There are so many like this that my eyes rolled frequently.

To give the author credit he has had tremendous experience in both Buddhism and the science of mind. One of his previous books, The Embodied Mind, expanded our understanding of what it means to be conscious. He has spent time with Tibetan scholars and monks, including the Dalai Lama, since he was a teenager (his father was involved in dialogue with the Dalai Lama and other Buddhists before Thompson even graduated from high school). He has had a lifelong exposure to the ideas he is writing about in this book, and he is still definitely not a Buddhist.

Most of his references to Buddhism and Buddhist thought comes from the Tibetan tradition. My exposure has been mostly to Zen. Tibetan Buddhism has a great deal of scholarly writing and discourse, Zen does not. Zen teaches us that the intellectual pursuit of understanding, trying to understand the paradoxes posed by life, is the wrong way to find truth. The truth must be perceived directly. You can't get there by dividing every question into two alternatives.

Zen Buddhism is predicated on a non-intellectual understanding of reality which comes from time spent in meditation. Zen abhors words. Words and ideas lead to more words and ideas, not to the truth.

Thompson knows all this, but his preferred method of seeking the truth is epistemological and analytical. When examined in this way, the ideas underlying Buddhism, such as nirvana, the endless cycle of suffering and rebirth cannot make scientific sense. He even refers to a conference in which scientists were surprised at the detailed description that Tibetan Buddhists can use to describe what happens after one dies. Anyone who has read the Tibetan Book of the Dead would know that they claim access, through meditation and introspection and logic, into the details of death, dying and rebirth. This is clearly not provable or even understood scientifically.

Accepting the concepts of rebirth and karma and a state called nirvana where one is neither existing nor non-existing takes a leap of faith. Every religion requires a leap of faith. This author clearly refuses to take that leap.

[Jaxen · Rating 3 out of 5]

An extremely solid critique of Buddhist modernism (or Western Buddhism, tech-bro Buddhism, etc.) that, surprisingly, contains critiques of evolutionary psychology, certain conceptions of neural brain imaging, and even criticism of core Buddhist doctrine. This book is marketed as a polemic and while the content and the title does reflect the definition of a polemical work, I found Thompson to be extremely fair and even handed with what I consider -- here I am far less charitable -- the worst charlatans and ideologues of our time, who attempt to butcher Buddhist tradition (especially pernicious with the Ch'an/Zen/Seon schools) for the service of the worst impulses of tech-bro capitalism. This cultural/political critique (one Zizek makes very well in an article where he, miraculously, stays on topic [https://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issue...]), is not really what Thompson is interested in. Rather, his critique of Buddhist modernism argues that these people attempt to universalize Buddhism as the exceptional religion (they generally call Buddhism a "science of the mind" rather than religion) due to it's conformity to science. I think Thompson very convincingly shows the error in trying to use science to "confirm" core Buddhist claims, but there are parts of this argument that I feel weren't particularity needed. For instance, a reason why science and religion aren't directly compatible is due to religion's soteriological commitments which science cannot share. But you don't need to employ Buddhism's soteriological concepts to show the flaws of Buddhist modernism -- in fact, Thompson already did so by accusing Western Buddhists of making a category error between equivocating enlightenment as a certain psychological brain state, which would only be observable (even ignoring the problem of assigning a specific brain state to enlightenment, as he demonstrates nicely) in existence, the exact plane of reality that Buddhist's are attempting to overcome.

While his methodological critique is largely convincing, and his insights into cognitive science and Buddhist doctrine are very fascinating, I do worry that the label of religion to Buddhism is not always warranted, at least without heavy caveats. Thompson touches on this when he mentions how Max Muller loaded very heavy protestant doctrines in his study of Asiatic traditions, but he does not go into depth on the category of religion and its false universality. Due to the category of world religion being (effectively) a disguised form of protestant Christianity, Buddhism (and other Asiatic traditions, such as Taoism and Confucianism) are not strictly religious in the same way or emphasis that we would commonly mean by them, and so I believe that discussions between science and Buddhism concern a kind of speculative philosophy rather than religious doctrine. In a way, I am affirming a kind of exceptional status to Buddhism with respect to the category of religion, but I don't do this to make the claim that Buddhism is "beyond" the follies of religion (this is what the hack Sam Harris does): I say this to directly undermine the universal status of religion as a category, because I generally find it's use unhelpful at best and pernicious at worst.

[Colin Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just short of a masterpiece. Thomson gives compelling arguments as to why scientific and Buddhist worldviews are not as compatible as they might seem.

The book does very well when it argues against specific spurious claims that have made a habit of proliferating in the modern 'Neural Buddhist' discourse. For example,
'We can naturalise religious aspects of Buddhism such as enlightenment'
or
'Buddhism is non-normative in a similar way to science.' Both of these claims, and others, are put to bed rather convincingly and quickly.

Not only that but Thompson's more nuanced views about the history and role of mindfulness/no-self in Buddhism are also a welcome change to what I'm used to consuming. This was only slightly let down by the fact that his ideas were more of an intellectual survey than a convincing argument. I'm guessing this was due to length; I would be interested to read his other books to see how deep the rabbit-hole goes.

Another treat worth mentioning was the stinging psychological critique of new-age Buddhist practitioners as merely wanting to have their secular cake and eat it religiously. The links he made between the history of Protestantism and privatized spirituality in the modern world were quite interesting.

Although I find his arguments against the above positions convincing, I also feel that he fails to account fully for what is going on when science meets Buddhism.

If we put aside the debate about what 'really' constitutes Buddhism and what 'real' science is, we can see that two powerful ways of understanding the human experience are trying to converge.

At the end of the book, the author points towards a nonchalant cosmopolitanism as the correct relationship between science and Buddhism while simultaneously saying his favourite moments are when they truly question each other's fundamental presuppositions.

I think Thompson should drop the vague appeal to cosmopolitanism and replace it with that kind of deliberative vigor I see in his work. Science and Buddhism have enough merit and insight to look at each other directly and see when and where they can make each other blink.

Cosmopolitan toleration is fine when we're talking about two world views that would struggle to get on with each other without some kind of overarching system of values to make them play nice, but Buddhism and science have enough commitment to truth and internal intellectual rigor to have a more direct, tense, and productive relationship.

I see what's happening now in the west as analogous to when Buddhism and Taoism combined to create Zen during Buddhism's transmission to China. It's a great opportunity to create a new paradigm. I think Thomson would do better to take the role of synthesizer more seriously. I've enjoyed listening to is identification on the fault lines, now I want to know how he thinks we can bridge them.

Like I said. Just short of greatness.

[Hsandlin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Essential read for anyone interested in the western Buddhist movement - be it a personal, cultural, or academic interest. It very clearly and concisely explains problem with “Buddhist modernism” that the author finds troublesome. This movement is something many reader in America and Europe are very quickly buying into, myself included. It is in good humor and at no points attacks the people who are contributing to this movement. In fact, he often commends the people associated with it but just points out parts of their thinking he find unjustified.

The writing in Why I Am Not A Buddhist is, on the whole, very simple and easy to read. Some academic works like this one can be dense - I’ll sometimes decide to move from a comfy chair to a desk to read some. This one, however, is quite a present read. Aside from a couple of chapters, it required minimum effort to follow and was even exciting. Hearing him name drop the heavy hitters in the Buddhist modernist world was exciting; he would introduce an idea of their (very thoroughly I might add and without the hint of a straw man) and the proceed to explain the faults in it. Of course, those he criticized cannot respond in the book but it did feel like a well humored fight.

This book was quite humbling as well. I recently read Why Buddhism Is True by Robert Wright and was very much convinced of the scientific “validation” of Buddhism (in fact, you can find a very generous review of Wright’s book on my GoodReads page). Not only has this book introduced me to problems people have with Buddhist modernism but it made me realized just how far from understanding the situation I was despite feeling as though I had a good grasp of it. I was previously convinced that I had to have been mostly on target seeing as “science” has “confirmed” these Buddhist ideas. Despite my efforts, I failed to notice scientific errors and philosophical errors in these findings.

Furthermore, if this short and simple book could so change my perspective so radically, surely any book could do the same. I only agree with all of Thompson’s finding being I heard out his entire explication. If Joseph Goldstein or the Dalai Lama wrote a book in response I am just as likely to change understandings again. If I am not careful and select a book by an author who is attempting to misguide (or are themselves misguided) then I could just as easily believe something untrue. I thought of myself as analytical, skeptical, and scientific but this book has prove that wrong. I think that is exactly who this book is for - those are the ones who are the most interested in neural Buddhism.

I highly recommend this book, it feels like the perfect bridge back to academics from the world of Buddhist modernism. If you are like me and recently went down the Buddhist rabbit hole, you might find this book to be a nice bookend.