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The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-62
In the India-China relationship, the past shadows the present. It shapes current policy options and approaches, and strongly influences public debate in India to this day. While the period from 1949 to 1962 is crucial as Jawaharlal Nehru sought--unsuccessfully--to establish a workable relationship with the Chinese, the pre-independence history of the British colonial government's relations with Tibet, the genesis of the McMahon Line, Communist China's military take-over and domination of Tibet, together with the unshakeable foundational belief amongst Indians that the Himalayas form the country's sacred boundary, combined to powerfully impact India's relations with China.
Nirupama Menon Rao, a former Foreign Secretary of India, unknots this intensely complex saga. Her telling is based not only on a wide selection of published documents and archival material from India, China, Europe and America, but also on a deep personal knowledge of China where she has served as India's Ambassador. In addition, she brings a practitioner's keen eye to the labyrinth of negotiations and official interactions that took place between the two countries from 1949 to 1962.
The Fractured Himalaya is a rigorous examination of the workings of diplomacy and both its human and policy quotient; it looks at inflection points when the trajectory of the relationship could have altered, but were missed. But, most unusually, it also tells the story of the personalities involved-Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the 14th Dalai Lama-and their interactions as the tournament of those years unfolded and moved step by closer step to the conflict of 1962.
Nirupama Menon Rao, a former Foreign Secretary of India, unknots this intensely complex saga. Her telling is based not only on a wide selection of published documents and archival material from India, China, Europe and America, but also on a deep personal knowledge of China where she has served as India's Ambassador. In addition, she brings a practitioner's keen eye to the labyrinth of negotiations and official interactions that took place between the two countries from 1949 to 1962.
The Fractured Himalaya is a rigorous examination of the workings of diplomacy and both its human and policy quotient; it looks at inflection points when the trajectory of the relationship could have altered, but were missed. But, most unusually, it also tells the story of the personalities involved-Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the 14th Dalai Lama-and their interactions as the tournament of those years unfolded and moved step by closer step to the conflict of 1962.
512 pages, Hardcover
Published October 11, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
December 29, 2021
Even many reasonably well-informed Indians tend to have a very black-and-white understanding of the 1962 conflict with China. So, this book is a handy refresher on the circumstances leading up to the war, detailing mistakes on both sides. It also shows (with the obvious benefit of hindsight) that there were several points where the war could have been avoided. It's a pretty fast read, except for that familiar bane of so many Indian books--average proofreading and editing (too many points repeated, sometimes in different sections and sometimes within a few pages).
November 20, 2021
Fantastic amount of nuance and detail. Turned out to be way more involved and a much slower read than I expected it to be. Pretty great as a text and as a reading exercise.
November 28, 2025
Be it the Doklam standoff in 2017, or the deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020, or the seemingly bonhomie between Modi and Xi from Ahmedabad to Mahabalipuram to Wuhan, or the latest issue of the Arunachali woman briefly detained over her passport in Shanghai, strong démarche has been continuously exchanged between India and China so that the bilateral ties between the two are kept in order in the course of the persistent crests and troughs over the last decade or so between the Asian giants. What has however remained unchanged is the element of trust that sits on the threshold, and even though there is some tangibility to the output, there is rarely any to the outcome.
Rewinding back to the 1940s-50s-60s, the newly liberated Asian giants managed to mould themselves in the Westphalian order of states, but, a region that always considered itself different, thanks largely to its history and culture, Tibet couldn't make the transition, and Chinese were squarely blamed for stalling such a phase transformation due to their excesses. Nirupama Rao's 'The Fractured Himalaya' is an in-depth account of the 13 years from 1949-62, when a multitude of characters on both sides of the Himalayan divide played the game of diplomacy tragically. If the Indians led by Jawaharlal Nehru wanted peace with the northern neighbour at all costs, the Chinese led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, without so much proclaiming territorial aggrandizement, played the game of Chinese Checkers most astutely in order to show their strength and reach along and across the border that they believed was traditionally Chinese in character. The dozen years of compressions and rarefactions in the geopolity between the neighbours culminated in the disastrous war for India in 1962, and accentuated further by the unilateral declaration of ceasefire leading to the belief that China didn't believe in territorial takeovers, a thematic clothed in askance since.
So what took the relationship downhill from a beginning when the countries were apparently cozying up to one another? Was it the rebellion in Tibet, or the flight of Dalai Lama to India seeking refuge, or a complete lack of understanding the Chinese mind by Nehru for which he is blamed to this day, or Chinese ambitions and manufacturing public opinion amongst the people for Mao in the wake of the calamitous philosophy of the Great Leap Forward? Or did the policy of Sanhe Yishao, or Three Conciliations and One Reduction have a role to play? Sanhe Yishao as a concept was formulated after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, against a background of domestic challenges and also in order to ameliorate tension between China and the three categories of adversaries: the modern revisionists (USSR), imperialists (US), and reactionaries (India, Pakistan and Burma), and in an effort to improve relations with China's neighbours, to reduce China's support for national liberation movements in neighbouring countries. While none of these questions can be answered with certitude, Nirupama Rao digs through the archival material only made publicly available in recent times and thereafter employs her finesse as a career civil servant and her strong understanding of the Chinese labyrinthine mindset (she was an ambassador to China) to explore the complexity-ridden woolly thinking. The core of her scholarly pursuits are supremely admirable and has loci around the central question - Which were the points of inflection that could have altered the trajectory of the Sino-India relations, but were missed? Rao lucidly expounds how the fragility of ties is constantly exposed, the fabric is stretched persistently, and the underlying regional rivalries, shadowed by the memory of past conflict, hostile public opinion and low levels of political will and equilibrium have only instrumentalized acrimony between the neighbours.
Nirupama Rao successfully brings the needle back on Tibet as the centric locus, and while doing so, she rests firmly on objectivities without fanning any of her personal prejudices along the way. This opens up the ground for her take on India's hand in the way she treated the Tibetan issue, often in a desultory manner, aptly substantiated by the initial meetings between Nehru and Dalai Lama after the latter crossed the border into India. Certainly not unbeknownst of the impending Chinese excesses in Tibet, India's confusion in handling the situation only sparked an inexorable march of the People's Liberation Army into Lhasa that eventually proved disastrous for the Tibetans. It should be noted that according to the 1914 Simla Agreement held under the auspices of the British, the Tibetans had agreed to the drawing of the McMahon Line, which except the Chinese was ratified by the Indians, Tibetans and the British. This has been the contentious issue fuelling the border dispute since, and in more recent times, Dalai Lama has firmly stated that the line holds true and that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India, which the Chinese always considered as part of Southern Tibet, and thus has not thawed the often times freeze in the relations between the two most populated countries in the world.
What about Nehru and the coteries, the Menons (VK as well as KPS), Panikkar, Girija Bajpai, and even stalwarts amongst the Congress? It is well known that immediately post independence, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Nehru did not see eye to eye on the Chinese question. If Sardar was pragmatic, Panditji was idealism personified, and eventually it was realised that Panditji's idealism failed his calculations miserably. Even though Nehru was not in the habit of blaming others for the debacle, he has often been on the receiving end of gross culpability in handling the gravity of the problem with India's northern neighbour. This has become a fashion of sorts in more recent times, but Nehru's infallibility wasn't his own doing and ultimately undoing. This has been succinctly out by Ramchandra Guha,
"the body of higher professional civil servants did not truly exert themselves to volunteer professional dissent on issues which eventually were to lead to grace damage to national interests and prestige... The general surrender to the hypnosis that Nehru knows best was an extensive phenomenon since our independence... It cannot be wholly disowned that the professional advisors, not just the political ones, rendered less than their duty to their beloved Caesar". The war with China fatigued Nehru both physically and mentally, and as HV Kamath, author of the Last Days of Nehru said, recalling Isaiah Berlin's description of a dying Tolstoy, a tragic, isolated figure, consumed by the ghosts of his abandoned dreams, and like Oedipus 'beyond human aid, wandering self-blinded at Colonus'.
After the war, when KPS Menon visited the Soviet Union, Nikita Khruschev told him that such disputes were often the most difficult to deal with because they were always dealt with from the point of view of national prestige rather than national interest. Khruschev was most prescient in his remarks and the shadows of his words only grow darker with time.
What China was trying to accomplish between the late 40s and the early 60s is remarkably reflected by the wise and prudent words of Olaf Caroe, the quintessential strategist of the Great Game, "Pelion piled on Ossa and Ossa on Olympus", a tormenting case, seldom simplified by India's indulgence.
The other important aspect of Nirupama Rao's book is about the roles played by the US and the USSR. While the US was more over in its support for India, including giving arms and even technical assistance along the eastern and the western sector, the Soviets were clandestine in their support that seeing like a pendulum from one end when it required Chinese support in the Cuban Missile Crisis to even supporting the so-called dirty tactics that they assumed the Indians were committing against the Chinese. In short, the book pretty much conclusively says that in the decade under consideration, India's choices were far from optimal and firmly ensconced in sub-optimality. Rao remarkably unties the knots tightened by the haphazard diplomatic and stately sutures in bringing to the world an indispensable volume on foreign policy, an absolute must read.
Rewinding back to the 1940s-50s-60s, the newly liberated Asian giants managed to mould themselves in the Westphalian order of states, but, a region that always considered itself different, thanks largely to its history and culture, Tibet couldn't make the transition, and Chinese were squarely blamed for stalling such a phase transformation due to their excesses. Nirupama Rao's 'The Fractured Himalaya' is an in-depth account of the 13 years from 1949-62, when a multitude of characters on both sides of the Himalayan divide played the game of diplomacy tragically. If the Indians led by Jawaharlal Nehru wanted peace with the northern neighbour at all costs, the Chinese led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, without so much proclaiming territorial aggrandizement, played the game of Chinese Checkers most astutely in order to show their strength and reach along and across the border that they believed was traditionally Chinese in character. The dozen years of compressions and rarefactions in the geopolity between the neighbours culminated in the disastrous war for India in 1962, and accentuated further by the unilateral declaration of ceasefire leading to the belief that China didn't believe in territorial takeovers, a thematic clothed in askance since.
So what took the relationship downhill from a beginning when the countries were apparently cozying up to one another? Was it the rebellion in Tibet, or the flight of Dalai Lama to India seeking refuge, or a complete lack of understanding the Chinese mind by Nehru for which he is blamed to this day, or Chinese ambitions and manufacturing public opinion amongst the people for Mao in the wake of the calamitous philosophy of the Great Leap Forward? Or did the policy of Sanhe Yishao, or Three Conciliations and One Reduction have a role to play? Sanhe Yishao as a concept was formulated after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, against a background of domestic challenges and also in order to ameliorate tension between China and the three categories of adversaries: the modern revisionists (USSR), imperialists (US), and reactionaries (India, Pakistan and Burma), and in an effort to improve relations with China's neighbours, to reduce China's support for national liberation movements in neighbouring countries. While none of these questions can be answered with certitude, Nirupama Rao digs through the archival material only made publicly available in recent times and thereafter employs her finesse as a career civil servant and her strong understanding of the Chinese labyrinthine mindset (she was an ambassador to China) to explore the complexity-ridden woolly thinking. The core of her scholarly pursuits are supremely admirable and has loci around the central question - Which were the points of inflection that could have altered the trajectory of the Sino-India relations, but were missed? Rao lucidly expounds how the fragility of ties is constantly exposed, the fabric is stretched persistently, and the underlying regional rivalries, shadowed by the memory of past conflict, hostile public opinion and low levels of political will and equilibrium have only instrumentalized acrimony between the neighbours.
Nirupama Rao successfully brings the needle back on Tibet as the centric locus, and while doing so, she rests firmly on objectivities without fanning any of her personal prejudices along the way. This opens up the ground for her take on India's hand in the way she treated the Tibetan issue, often in a desultory manner, aptly substantiated by the initial meetings between Nehru and Dalai Lama after the latter crossed the border into India. Certainly not unbeknownst of the impending Chinese excesses in Tibet, India's confusion in handling the situation only sparked an inexorable march of the People's Liberation Army into Lhasa that eventually proved disastrous for the Tibetans. It should be noted that according to the 1914 Simla Agreement held under the auspices of the British, the Tibetans had agreed to the drawing of the McMahon Line, which except the Chinese was ratified by the Indians, Tibetans and the British. This has been the contentious issue fuelling the border dispute since, and in more recent times, Dalai Lama has firmly stated that the line holds true and that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India, which the Chinese always considered as part of Southern Tibet, and thus has not thawed the often times freeze in the relations between the two most populated countries in the world.
What about Nehru and the coteries, the Menons (VK as well as KPS), Panikkar, Girija Bajpai, and even stalwarts amongst the Congress? It is well known that immediately post independence, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Nehru did not see eye to eye on the Chinese question. If Sardar was pragmatic, Panditji was idealism personified, and eventually it was realised that Panditji's idealism failed his calculations miserably. Even though Nehru was not in the habit of blaming others for the debacle, he has often been on the receiving end of gross culpability in handling the gravity of the problem with India's northern neighbour. This has become a fashion of sorts in more recent times, but Nehru's infallibility wasn't his own doing and ultimately undoing. This has been succinctly out by Ramchandra Guha,
"the body of higher professional civil servants did not truly exert themselves to volunteer professional dissent on issues which eventually were to lead to grace damage to national interests and prestige... The general surrender to the hypnosis that Nehru knows best was an extensive phenomenon since our independence... It cannot be wholly disowned that the professional advisors, not just the political ones, rendered less than their duty to their beloved Caesar". The war with China fatigued Nehru both physically and mentally, and as HV Kamath, author of the Last Days of Nehru said, recalling Isaiah Berlin's description of a dying Tolstoy, a tragic, isolated figure, consumed by the ghosts of his abandoned dreams, and like Oedipus 'beyond human aid, wandering self-blinded at Colonus'.
After the war, when KPS Menon visited the Soviet Union, Nikita Khruschev told him that such disputes were often the most difficult to deal with because they were always dealt with from the point of view of national prestige rather than national interest. Khruschev was most prescient in his remarks and the shadows of his words only grow darker with time.
What China was trying to accomplish between the late 40s and the early 60s is remarkably reflected by the wise and prudent words of Olaf Caroe, the quintessential strategist of the Great Game, "Pelion piled on Ossa and Ossa on Olympus", a tormenting case, seldom simplified by India's indulgence.
The other important aspect of Nirupama Rao's book is about the roles played by the US and the USSR. While the US was more over in its support for India, including giving arms and even technical assistance along the eastern and the western sector, the Soviets were clandestine in their support that seeing like a pendulum from one end when it required Chinese support in the Cuban Missile Crisis to even supporting the so-called dirty tactics that they assumed the Indians were committing against the Chinese. In short, the book pretty much conclusively says that in the decade under consideration, India's choices were far from optimal and firmly ensconced in sub-optimality. Rao remarkably unties the knots tightened by the haphazard diplomatic and stately sutures in bringing to the world an indispensable volume on foreign policy, an absolute must read.
December 5, 2021
One of the best books I have read this year (21) and best in the subject. It has a nuanced explanation of the critical period between '48 and '52. It is crisply written, in business style with corroborating arguments from the (now public) diplomatic cables from UK and US. If you want to understand the psychology difference between Nehru, Elai and Chairman Mao this is the book for you. If you want to understand the philosophy difference between India and China (and the roots of it), this is the best place to start.
A combination of these differences lead to the 13 day rout of India in the 1962 war. It has lead to an intractable border difference, that will remain unsolved for many decades to come.
The book just states all the facts as they are without any attempt to interpret the right or the wrong. But, it clearly concludes that between '48 to '60, there was a golden opportunity in front of India to solve the China border problem, once and for all. It was squandered by misplaced hubris by a self-imagined statesman.
This also highlights the role of the Foreign Service Personnel and the strategic role they had to undertake. My respect to all the IFS (and like) personnel who manage a country's strategic interests.
A combination of these differences lead to the 13 day rout of India in the 1962 war. It has lead to an intractable border difference, that will remain unsolved for many decades to come.
The book just states all the facts as they are without any attempt to interpret the right or the wrong. But, it clearly concludes that between '48 to '60, there was a golden opportunity in front of India to solve the China border problem, once and for all. It was squandered by misplaced hubris by a self-imagined statesman.
This also highlights the role of the Foreign Service Personnel and the strategic role they had to undertake. My respect to all the IFS (and like) personnel who manage a country's strategic interests.
April 26, 2022
A very underwhelming book. The prose has a tone of official press briefings. The narration by the author (yes I bought the audiobook from Audible) is even more boring. Objectivity was hard to find. Author has painted a black and white picture about Sino-Indian relationship that hardly enriches the reader.
October 13, 2024
Nirupama Rao writes a great work on Tibetan modern history. It goes into various aspects in a very well defined way to present the story of Tibet. It goes over the internal geopolitics, the historical experiences of Bharat and China, of the ideological moorings of both countries, the thinking of both leaders Mao and Nehru, and a war history as well.
The book's in-depth narration of these from so many perspectives makes it very comprehensive. I am happy to have read this book.
I found a few things lacking, in the story, which would be great to see written by someone else. These are:
1. From the introduction itself, the boon tries to set up Nehru as an intellectual but flawed leader. However, the first 3 chapters list in detail exactly why Nehru is critiqued so vehemently in modern times. His err on China is the sign of a bad leader; no matter how good their intellect is. Thinktanks don't make leaders, they make thinkers. While Nehru's thinking reflected great in policies which led to ICONSPAR, IISc, and other great institutions of eminence which evolved into great institutions of today, these are paralleled by utter failures of one man when it comes to geopolitics. Bharat's stance of being an "east vs west" bridge is flawed, even if our "old vs new" bridge isn't although it was yet to reflect internally. Such orientalist thinking actually gives China a fair point, however hollow and USSR-borrowed their own international perspective is. It is time we give Nehru his bit of criticism openly, so that it isn't repeated by leaders of tomorrow.
2. The internal dissent against Nehru and how that discourse evolved is merely skimmed over. While it makes sense, I would love to read about how Nehru's political idealism changed with time. He was more sympathetic to communism earlier, understanding it as an ideology. Nationalism, he resented. He had RSS banned in the 50s and his party had falsely accused many for the attempted murder of another fakir. This changed entirely in the 1960s. The communists were split between China and USSR. In the 1962 war, the USSR bloc and the RSS helped the GoI with resources. The China wing didn't. This led to Nehru inviting the RSS for the 1963 26th Jan parade. It shows a shift in his ideology in his twilight years. It should be acknowledged this change in Nehru also reflected the change in the nation, which saw Indira as the very antithesis to Nehru, and the regional movements opposing her were what drove us to a united cultural liberation event in 1991. It all stems from Nehru himself. May the gods bless him.
3. The play of Bon Sampraday, which has many features which distinguish it from the main Sanatan Dharm, is underplayed. Maybe it was not part of the Tibetan consciousness then, as it is now (those of the independence era in general were very ill informed compared to the post-internet people), but the Bon Sampraday which still exists in Arunachal and Ladakh both, is what truly unites all Tibetan people across borders. It's parallels with Sanatan Dharm (it's a Sampraday after all, not Dharm) give Bharat an easier claim on the region, but it is the people who accept this after all, no one can impose this on the Bon people across the diaspora. Like many partitioned countries in South and Southeast Asia, and even East Asia if we consider how much land Mongolians have lost, and how Manchus have disappeared, we have to think how we are going to remake this region with strength and with these realities of culture in mind first and foremost.
But overall, this book is timely, if not timeless (I gave 3 reasons), and it blows me away with the research and well defined narrative given. It truly is worth a read. It is very eye opening. My own critiques come from retrospect, when such a work is written from scratch. Loved the read! #FreeTibet
9/10
The book's in-depth narration of these from so many perspectives makes it very comprehensive. I am happy to have read this book.
I found a few things lacking, in the story, which would be great to see written by someone else. These are:
1. From the introduction itself, the boon tries to set up Nehru as an intellectual but flawed leader. However, the first 3 chapters list in detail exactly why Nehru is critiqued so vehemently in modern times. His err on China is the sign of a bad leader; no matter how good their intellect is. Thinktanks don't make leaders, they make thinkers. While Nehru's thinking reflected great in policies which led to ICONSPAR, IISc, and other great institutions of eminence which evolved into great institutions of today, these are paralleled by utter failures of one man when it comes to geopolitics. Bharat's stance of being an "east vs west" bridge is flawed, even if our "old vs new" bridge isn't although it was yet to reflect internally. Such orientalist thinking actually gives China a fair point, however hollow and USSR-borrowed their own international perspective is. It is time we give Nehru his bit of criticism openly, so that it isn't repeated by leaders of tomorrow.
2. The internal dissent against Nehru and how that discourse evolved is merely skimmed over. While it makes sense, I would love to read about how Nehru's political idealism changed with time. He was more sympathetic to communism earlier, understanding it as an ideology. Nationalism, he resented. He had RSS banned in the 50s and his party had falsely accused many for the attempted murder of another fakir. This changed entirely in the 1960s. The communists were split between China and USSR. In the 1962 war, the USSR bloc and the RSS helped the GoI with resources. The China wing didn't. This led to Nehru inviting the RSS for the 1963 26th Jan parade. It shows a shift in his ideology in his twilight years. It should be acknowledged this change in Nehru also reflected the change in the nation, which saw Indira as the very antithesis to Nehru, and the regional movements opposing her were what drove us to a united cultural liberation event in 1991. It all stems from Nehru himself. May the gods bless him.
3. The play of Bon Sampraday, which has many features which distinguish it from the main Sanatan Dharm, is underplayed. Maybe it was not part of the Tibetan consciousness then, as it is now (those of the independence era in general were very ill informed compared to the post-internet people), but the Bon Sampraday which still exists in Arunachal and Ladakh both, is what truly unites all Tibetan people across borders. It's parallels with Sanatan Dharm (it's a Sampraday after all, not Dharm) give Bharat an easier claim on the region, but it is the people who accept this after all, no one can impose this on the Bon people across the diaspora. Like many partitioned countries in South and Southeast Asia, and even East Asia if we consider how much land Mongolians have lost, and how Manchus have disappeared, we have to think how we are going to remake this region with strength and with these realities of culture in mind first and foremost.
But overall, this book is timely, if not timeless (I gave 3 reasons), and it blows me away with the research and well defined narrative given. It truly is worth a read. It is very eye opening. My own critiques come from retrospect, when such a work is written from scratch. Loved the read! #FreeTibet
9/10
August 29, 2024
The book delves into the very fine details that went into the decision making on both, the Indian and chinese sides.
History from the benefit of the present looks simpler but this book details a very complicated legacy issue that was bequeathed to Asia's largest 2 countries by the imperialist.
What I understood is that
1. The border boundary dispute will never be resolved as there is no way you can divide the natural bounty and features of the earth let alone delimiting and putting exact marking on the Himalayas, one of the most treacherous and difficult terrain on earth.
2. It was a matter of time before one side blinked. India's policy was misguided by their blind idealism leading nehru to think that a chinese military overture was impossible.
3. India missed the opportunity to cement the chinese assent on the boundary earlier in the 50s when India had much higher international prestige and heft than china. Giving away so many inherited privileges without any quid-pro-quo was a mistake the price for which we paid in 62 and still paying after 6 decades in 2024.
4. Chinese actions in Tibet should have triggered alarm bells and rethink in policy making circles in India.
5. The Chinese were realists. Lack of parliamentary system made it easy for their premier Zhou Enlai to explore many combinations of settlements whereas the same system crippled the officials by hindering practical and mutually beneficial diplomatic border policy formulation.
6. Last but not the least, Mennon was a moron (read madrchod). Should have listened to his chief of army staff!!!
History from the benefit of the present looks simpler but this book details a very complicated legacy issue that was bequeathed to Asia's largest 2 countries by the imperialist.
What I understood is that
1. The border boundary dispute will never be resolved as there is no way you can divide the natural bounty and features of the earth let alone delimiting and putting exact marking on the Himalayas, one of the most treacherous and difficult terrain on earth.
2. It was a matter of time before one side blinked. India's policy was misguided by their blind idealism leading nehru to think that a chinese military overture was impossible.
3. India missed the opportunity to cement the chinese assent on the boundary earlier in the 50s when India had much higher international prestige and heft than china. Giving away so many inherited privileges without any quid-pro-quo was a mistake the price for which we paid in 62 and still paying after 6 decades in 2024.
4. Chinese actions in Tibet should have triggered alarm bells and rethink in policy making circles in India.
5. The Chinese were realists. Lack of parliamentary system made it easy for their premier Zhou Enlai to explore many combinations of settlements whereas the same system crippled the officials by hindering practical and mutually beneficial diplomatic border policy formulation.
6. Last but not the least, Mennon was a moron (read madrchod). Should have listened to his chief of army staff!!!
May 31, 2023
Nirupama Rao's book on the events in India, China and Tibet between 1949 and 1962 is brilliant, scholarly and accessible.
The events leading up to the war in 1962 are complex, and Nirupama Rao has done a great service in piecing the sequence of events into a coherent whole. She trod a fine line and kept the book's tone neutral. Even though she tried not to criticize Nehru, there were moments when she called out his policy errors. Interestingly, the triggers for the war lay in China's domestic politics and the flight of the Dalai Lama.
Russia's role in supporting China also comes through.
Where did we go wrong? It is impossible to find an easy answer to this vexing question.
Both countries are locked in a time warp - 1962.
She has focused on the diplomatic aspect of the events and not the military. Therefore, the book must be part of a portfolio of books if you want to understand the debacle of 1962.
In summary, the book is fabulous, scholarly but demands patient reading.
The events leading up to the war in 1962 are complex, and Nirupama Rao has done a great service in piecing the sequence of events into a coherent whole. She trod a fine line and kept the book's tone neutral. Even though she tried not to criticize Nehru, there were moments when she called out his policy errors. Interestingly, the triggers for the war lay in China's domestic politics and the flight of the Dalai Lama.
Russia's role in supporting China also comes through.
Where did we go wrong? It is impossible to find an easy answer to this vexing question.
Both countries are locked in a time warp - 1962.
She has focused on the diplomatic aspect of the events and not the military. Therefore, the book must be part of a portfolio of books if you want to understand the debacle of 1962.
In summary, the book is fabulous, scholarly but demands patient reading.
April 30, 2022
This is a fantastic account of all major details which through the relationships of India with China. Although it could turn overwhelming for a reader who has just started with international affairs, one should definitely take time to absorb every event and understand it’s importance.
Given the status quo and how India’s recent foreign policies are framed, if one tries to understand, this read can lay a foundation.
They didn’t put out; India’s relation with Pak is enmity while the Sino relations are an adversity, for no reason!!
Given the status quo and how India’s recent foreign policies are framed, if one tries to understand, this read can lay a foundation.
They didn’t put out; India’s relation with Pak is enmity while the Sino relations are an adversity, for no reason!!
January 23, 2023
The book provides deep insights into events that took place in India, China and Tibet between 1947 and 1962 by also referring to records which are now available. I found it to be balanced, where not only arguments favouring India's stand, but also what made Chinese believe their own arguments are described in detail. While India cannot compromise in anyway regarding sovereignty over it's own territories, it is important to be educated about where the source of that sovereignty is and on what the opposition is basing it's claim upon. Both these things are available on every page of this book.
November 13, 2025
Slightly tough read. Since this book doesn't leave itself short of evidence/sources/information, the material is dense. Halfway through I switched into a mode of skimming through sections of build up and that made exercise more productive. I wonder if my perception was further tainted by recently finishing Ram Guha's masterpiece India After Gandhi, which manages to spin a compelling narrative around similar topics (and in theory should be a tougher book, but was an easier read)
Overall, a still good archive of the India-China dispute, of which I'm not sure there is much literature.
Overall, a still good archive of the India-China dispute, of which I'm not sure there is much literature.
January 31, 2025
It’s a stunning read with historic facts. Anyone looking for a Sino-Indian relations, especially how two countries of different ideologies worked together initially until a few conflicts broke since 1959 could use this as a reference. Author wrote about all these years in a gripping manner.
March 2, 2023
Provides a lot of detail and insight into how the relationship between India and China was shaped in the run up to the India China war.
March 17, 2022
The narrative of this book is nothing short of brilliant and will surely stand out among innumerable books written on this subject. It the most authoritative, most objective in my opinion. The author has been careful not to take any side and has been immaculate in presenting all the facts, which led to the short conflict, to the readers for them to form their own opinions.
Highly recommended.
Highly recommended.
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