“Hope lies in organised labour.”
This was the most informative book on British politics I’ve ever read, picked up after watching his April 2022 interview with Novara’s Aaron Bastani. It’s a memoir but the comprehensive account and analysis of 50 years of Labour and trade union history is unparalleled.
The forensic anatomisation of Labour, the recent history of which I’d found to be a general swirling maze of confusion up until this point, with how exactly Corbyn fit into the Miliband revamped party following New Labour and then how it all fell so spectacularly apart, was especially interesting — what I hadn’t appreciated was just how crucial Brexit and how they responded to it in 2017 and 2019 was in sending lightning spearing through the engine, birthing both the Brexit party and Starmer’s centrist establishment-pandering coup, sowing chaos as MPs of certain hard Remain areas went rogue, and allowing Johnson to win on essentially just three words: get Brexit done.
He spoke so sorrowfully of Corbyn’s dithering over what tactic to take, with his closest advisers all giving contradicting views and him ending up reluctantly advocating for a soft Brexit deal but also saying he’d support Remain if there was another vote neatly shattering his credibility and efficacy as a leader, overly beholden to the party membership instead of the unions, the majority of whom aren’t Labour members but are Labour voters.
On the eve of Corbyn’s suspension he described a Zoom with a few dozen other titans of the left who were all clamouring to “declare war” in which they decided to give Starmer one last chance and prepared a statement for Corbyn, who also agreed to give it, but then Starmer proceeded with the suspension anyway. McCluskey hasn’t spoken to him since.
I’m not entirely convinced yet on his conviction that Corbyn should have strongly backed the soft deal and fiercely communicated that to all corners of the party and country, because the sheer ire, the absolute seething rage and devastation, of that vote… I don’t know how I would’ve reacted at the time to such a bleak capitulation to the fate so egregiously skewed by the racist old guard which 62% of Scotland soundly rejected… also the notion that compromise should at a certain point eclipse the radical call for change and transformation…
But his analysis makes stark sense and I feel if it had been frankly articulated thus I could’ve been coaxed onboard because ultimately as ever you cannot enact the change if you cannot win, which is also his resonating critique of what he calls “ultra-leftism” — as big of an obstacle to socialism and progress as the far right in his view because short of an actual dismantlement of the imperial system, you have to compromise to win to change things…
It’s an intrinsic function of negotiation and leadership, no matter how fundamentally at odds it feels with the anarchic leanings of the fervour for upheaval — it also puts me in mind of Ash Sarkar’s comment in her 2018 Guardian interview with Owen Jones: “I’m not one of those vulgar Marxists that says that you’ve got to have the red flag flying high and a picture of Lenin across your chest in order for a political project to be worthwhile. I think that if you, as a leftist, say, ‘well, it’s all or nothing’, you’ve made your peace with nothing. And when you look at things like excess deaths under austerity, when you look at reliance on food banks, when you look at the fact that half of young mums have to skip meals to feed their kids, I find the idea of nothing out of ideological purity completely unconscionable. So I think that if your communism leads you to a politics of despair or disengagement, you are failing the legacy of Marx”. And of course Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò’s: “They didn’t need their oppression to be ‘celebrated’, ‘centred’, or narrated in the newest academic parlance. They didn’t need someone to understand what it felt like to be poisoned. What they needed was the lead out of their water.”
Liverpool played a prominent role throughout the book, from his trade union origins on the docks as a teenager to the double entendre of the title applicable to both politics and football, the latter featuring in his personal account of Hillsborough, especially with regards to the conduct of The Sun, the worst of the “scum media”, and the further distancing of the North from Westminster.
“We’re not English; we’re Scouse.”
Miliband was also put under the microscope, with his craven shift to an austerity-lite message pandering to the financial sector after a genuinely inspiring start rejecting New Labour. Ed Balls was the one who followed through with the cuts and compromises as they pivoted to stressing that if they were in power the cuts would not have been *as* bad… “some rallying cry”. He concluded that the critical mistake of Miliband’s leadership was this sudden embrace of austerity, dragging the party back into “the swamp of orthodoxy”. Miliband started to “drift”, surrounding himself with all the wrong people, becoming “a petulant prince”, totally out of touch, which was always “his greatest weakness”, so ultimately they were all “just a bunch of right-wingers” who never understood trade unions or the original labour movement — as familiar to him as “an alien planet”.
McCluskey recalls instances where he “turned” a room, a hall, a conference with one speech due to years of building trust and respect not just rhetorical proficiency, especially his momentous decision not to advocate for Unite’s disaffiliation with Labour, to instead push for reform from within rather than leave behind such a vast established voter base to found a new party, even after 13 years of a Labour government that refused to loosen the shackles on trade unions and millions living below the poverty line, the gap between rich and poor wider, and a million manufacturing jobs lost. The strategy was to galvanise support for working-class candidates not just candidates with working-class values, to move Labour emphatically to the Left. This coalitional movement was ultimately devastated by the Falkirk scandal and Miliband’s betrayal.
It was really interesting to hear his analysis of the Scottish referendum — how Scottish Labour made a grave error in aligning themselves with the Tories and Better Together, which further alienated their Scottish base instead of fighting for devo max on the ballot, and how they paid for that in 2015 by being utterly wiped out by the SNP. He said he would’ve voted Yes if he was Scottish…
Not until Corbyn did he feel hope again for socialism to take realistic root in Westminster, whose rise in the leadership race was “astonishing and hope-inspiring on a hitherto utterly unforeseen level”, a storm petrel of what would happen with Sanders across the pond, and Unite was essential to Corbyn’s victory (another interesting crumb of insider machinations came with how he approached Owen Jones and a few other leading left journalists to be Corbyn’s comms director — Jones’s refusal was the only one he respected, believing he could do more good as a vocal broadsheet supporter). Were it not for the Brexit referendum, everything would’ve been different.
The overall arc of his argument re the failure of Corbyn despite that generation-defining hope inspired by the fact that his leadership win and dizzying proximity to No. 10 validated the almost decimated belief post-Thatcher that a radical progressive left government is actually possible puts me in mind of barrister and activist Jane Heybroek’s response to a viral tweet questioning Corbyn’s character assassination and asking literally what was substantively and empirically wrong with him:
“He was a threat to the establishment. He mobilised young people and demonstrated that there was an alternative to Thatcherism. He threatened the banks, the media and the war industry, all three of whom run the country. Deposing him was not enough — the earth had to be salted.”
Once more unto the breach.