Kind of a lazy engagement but here goes.
Although Vermigli speaks in this volume about free will, his discussion does not include very much about what type of necessity God's Providence impinges on our will. He seems to have saved that discussion for what is the next volume in the Davenant Press series, "On Providence and the Cause of Sin" (Chapters 4,5, and 6 of the Loci Comunes). Rather, he examines free will as free will according to its essential definition: "It is the faculty by which we either espouse or reject, as we like, those decisions that have been made by reason." (3)
From this perspective, Vermigli argues that God in no way constrains our will to choose the path reason has fixed for us. There is no coercion from God, thus our will has some degree of freedom. However, the type of freedom varies depending on humanity's state. Prelapsarian man had one sort of freedom, while the unregenerate man has another, the regenerate man a third, and the glorified a fourth. In order to examine what degree of freedom humans have had in these states, Vermigli asserts that there are three types of "actions" that can occur within a human person. (4) The first are actions having to do with animal functions ("being sick, being healthy, being nourished, digesting food, and other such things"), the second are to do with "civil or moral" justice, and the last are to do with pleasing God.
Vermigli talks little about the first category of actions but spends all the chapter considering the second and third. Specifically, Vermigli argues against the semi-Pelagianism in late Medieval scholasticsm, spending great length proving that unbelievers can't do any works that are pleasing to God, since they have not knowledge of him. However, as he shows by examining Cornelius' conversion, it is possible that someone might please God by having a true faith, albeit an incomplete one. He uses the thoroughly Scriptural analogy of birth to describe this phenomenon. "It is quite clear that the one who is conceived and the one who is born belong to the same species, since a living organism does not have a different nature when it is conceived than when it is brought forth." (31) In the same way when one, for example, gets baptized, their faith has the same nature, that of saving faith, both before and after baptism;—only that after baptism (and catechetical training, presumably) their faith is of a fuller knowledge of God. That a Christian might please God before joining the visible church, or something of that order, is not a problem if we remember this picture.
Vermigli goes on to discuss further details in understanding free will, and then he eventually moves to discuss the law in its essence. In that chapter, he first argues against the error that the law is evil then second argues against the position that the law can be kept. In doing so, he outlines the traditional Reformed position of the three uses of the law: to promote civil order, to convict us of our sins, and to promote a positive example of behavior.
This has all been a simple summary, and Vermigli, of course, covers many contours of these two subjects I haven't brought up. All these discussions were interesting, and I'd recommend the book to any theologically minded person.