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Los derechos en serio
Ronald Dworkin es uno de los principales representantes de la filosofía jurídica anglosajona. Los derechos en serio (1977) está compuesto por trece artículos publicados durante la década de 1970. Dworkin -basándose en la filosofía de Rawls y en los principios del liberalismo individualista- pretende construir una teoría general del derecho que no excluya ni el razonamiento moral ni el razonamiento filosófico. En este sentido es el anti-Bentham en tanto considera que una teoría general del derecho no debe separar la ciencia descriptiva del derecho de la política jurídica.
La obra de Dworkin ha originado una polémica muy importante que ha trascendido más allá de los círculos académico. Las tesis de Dworkin han tenido más detractores que seguidores. Un lector imparcial se encontrará con la paradoja de que sus críticos le hayan dedicado tanta atención y, sin embargo - si se atiende al contenido de sus críticas-, sostengan que no merece la pena tomárselo en serio. Es muy posible que la paradoja se más aparente que real porque la filosofía jurídica de Dworkin constituye un punto de partida interesante para la crítica del positivismo jurídico y de la filosofía política liberal sobre unas bases más sólidas, progresistas e igualitarias.
Dworkin se sirve del ensayo de Hart para discutir sobre una manera de concebir el Derecho, que describe como «modelo de las reglas». Para Dworkin, el núcleo mismo del derecho está constituido por cuestiones morales y, por tanto, los principales problemas se refieren a los principios morales y no a los hechos jurídicos ni a las estrategias de interpretación. Cualquier cuestión, por abstracta que sea su formulación, se justifica por su papel en la solución de problemas particulares.
La obra de Dworkin ha originado una polémica muy importante que ha trascendido más allá de los círculos académico. Las tesis de Dworkin han tenido más detractores que seguidores. Un lector imparcial se encontrará con la paradoja de que sus críticos le hayan dedicado tanta atención y, sin embargo - si se atiende al contenido de sus críticas-, sostengan que no merece la pena tomárselo en serio. Es muy posible que la paradoja se más aparente que real porque la filosofía jurídica de Dworkin constituye un punto de partida interesante para la crítica del positivismo jurídico y de la filosofía política liberal sobre unas bases más sólidas, progresistas e igualitarias.
Dworkin se sirve del ensayo de Hart para discutir sobre una manera de concebir el Derecho, que describe como «modelo de las reglas». Para Dworkin, el núcleo mismo del derecho está constituido por cuestiones morales y, por tanto, los principales problemas se refieren a los principios morales y no a los hechos jurídicos ni a las estrategias de interpretación. Cualquier cuestión, por abstracta que sea su formulación, se justifica por su papel en la solución de problemas particulares.
512 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 1977
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About the author
Ronald Dworkin
67 books157 followersRonald Dworkin, QC, FBA was an American philosopher of law. He was a Jeremy Bentham Professor of Law and Philosophy at University College London, Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University, and has taught previously at Yale Law School and the University of Oxford. An influential contributor to both philosophy of law and political philosophy, Dworkin received the 2007 Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities for "his pioneering scholarly work" of "worldwide impact." His theory of law as integrity is amongst the most influential contemporary theories about the nature of law.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
July 1, 2021
Dworkin is probably the most important legal philosopher since the Second World War, but in many ways the strangest. The first part of this book reads like it was written by a Martian trying to figure out what is meant by the exotic human concept of 'law'. Then, we get an exceptionally clear-sighted rejection of the balancing/proportionality approach to human rights, which is really the book's major contribution. But this is followed, in the last part, by a series of bizarre polemics in which Dworkin simply replicates the bien pensant ideas of the day, while also completely contradicting and trashing the very argument he expended so much effort on developing in the first place. (The general welfare is not sufficient to cause individual rights to give way, unless the general welfare is something Dworkin agrees with.) It turns out that there are 'right answers', but to get at the principles on which they are based, one needs go no farther than the op-ed pages of the New York Times.
April 3, 2011
Do human rights exist before laws are made, or do laws create them? Are law and morality even commensurable? Dworkin argues that they are. In a twist on the usual approach, he starts with law and works back toward moral theory in a series of essays. Three of the topics he covers give examples of his thinking.
Legal Positivism:
Under the theory of legal positivism rights are thought to be purely a product of jurisprudence. Positivists like this detachment from moral reasoning, which they don‘t believe should supersede legal reasoning. Law, construed as a system of rules, means courts decide cases based on statutes, precedent, or judicial discretion in hard cases.
Dworkin distinguishes several concepts in order to look critically at positivism. He notes a difference, for example, between laws of policy which set goals and laws of principle which set standards. It is the latter that entail rights and bring law into the moral realm. No one, then, can really say that only legal principles can count in legal arguments.
Legal rules require justification, which inevitably leads to moral reasoning. Law, Dworkin writes, is no more independent of moral reasoning than of any other discipline. The use of precedent, as an example, upholds equal consideration, an idea that depends upon moral principles. With judicial discretion, positivism holds that litigants have no rights until a judge rules. Dworkin disputes this and argues that it is a judge’s duty to discover rights in hard cases, not to invent new law.
Equality:
Dworkin devotes some of the book to Rawls’s theory of justice. He distinguishes between antecedent and actual self-interest in order to justify the original position (the choice of equality as one's core political value). He writes that to abandon the original position would mean to abdicate moral reasoning altogether. Rights, as opposed to duties or goals, are the real basis for a sound political structure. And the most essential of these is the right to equality.
Making a distinction between rights and liberties, Dworkin denies a general right to liberty, saying it cannot provide an adequate basis for rights. He argues that there isn’t any one general liberty but instead many, each justified by separate arguments. Individuals could not be sure the general concept would protect their legal standing and have reasons to suspect it would not. They may have interests that can be protected only by political constraints on others. The writer disputes what he calls the “dangerous notion” that individualism is the enemy of equality.
Utilitarianism:
The author argues that political rights are a response to the defects of utilitarianism and a right to equality is anti-utilitarian. Utilitarianism applies only to issues of policy. Legal and political principles, on the other hand, are rights-based. Thus, a goal-oriented right to liberty claimed by some cannot trump the claim to equal treatment by others. Laws of policy, on the other hand, take away nothing an individual has a right to. Thus, utilitarian arguments of policy respect equality, whereas utilitarian arguments of principle do not. Rights are trumps over appeals to the collective welfare.
-------
Some issues remain because Constitutional law in the United States has had difficulty isolating the problem of rights against the state. Dworkin suggests that by rejecting the positivist approach to law, the difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights would be understood as referencing moral concepts, not as laying down some specific conception of rights. But, he asks, does the Equal Protection Clause extend past laws of principle to include laws of policy?
The 13 chapters of this book are followed by a lengthy but enlightening appendix in which Dworkin replies to critics of his essays and extends a discussion of consequentialism. I like that. On the other hand, the index was much too short and doesn’t include many of the binary concepts Dworkin uses. The reading can get tedious, but only for short stretches. Otherwise, the book is a significant contribution to political philosophy. I recommend it for people interested in the question of how morality can be converted to political doctrine.
Legal Positivism:
Under the theory of legal positivism rights are thought to be purely a product of jurisprudence. Positivists like this detachment from moral reasoning, which they don‘t believe should supersede legal reasoning. Law, construed as a system of rules, means courts decide cases based on statutes, precedent, or judicial discretion in hard cases.
Dworkin distinguishes several concepts in order to look critically at positivism. He notes a difference, for example, between laws of policy which set goals and laws of principle which set standards. It is the latter that entail rights and bring law into the moral realm. No one, then, can really say that only legal principles can count in legal arguments.
Legal rules require justification, which inevitably leads to moral reasoning. Law, Dworkin writes, is no more independent of moral reasoning than of any other discipline. The use of precedent, as an example, upholds equal consideration, an idea that depends upon moral principles. With judicial discretion, positivism holds that litigants have no rights until a judge rules. Dworkin disputes this and argues that it is a judge’s duty to discover rights in hard cases, not to invent new law.
Equality:
Dworkin devotes some of the book to Rawls’s theory of justice. He distinguishes between antecedent and actual self-interest in order to justify the original position (the choice of equality as one's core political value). He writes that to abandon the original position would mean to abdicate moral reasoning altogether. Rights, as opposed to duties or goals, are the real basis for a sound political structure. And the most essential of these is the right to equality.
Making a distinction between rights and liberties, Dworkin denies a general right to liberty, saying it cannot provide an adequate basis for rights. He argues that there isn’t any one general liberty but instead many, each justified by separate arguments. Individuals could not be sure the general concept would protect their legal standing and have reasons to suspect it would not. They may have interests that can be protected only by political constraints on others. The writer disputes what he calls the “dangerous notion” that individualism is the enemy of equality.
Utilitarianism:
The author argues that political rights are a response to the defects of utilitarianism and a right to equality is anti-utilitarian. Utilitarianism applies only to issues of policy. Legal and political principles, on the other hand, are rights-based. Thus, a goal-oriented right to liberty claimed by some cannot trump the claim to equal treatment by others. Laws of policy, on the other hand, take away nothing an individual has a right to. Thus, utilitarian arguments of policy respect equality, whereas utilitarian arguments of principle do not. Rights are trumps over appeals to the collective welfare.
-------
Some issues remain because Constitutional law in the United States has had difficulty isolating the problem of rights against the state. Dworkin suggests that by rejecting the positivist approach to law, the difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights would be understood as referencing moral concepts, not as laying down some specific conception of rights. But, he asks, does the Equal Protection Clause extend past laws of principle to include laws of policy?
The 13 chapters of this book are followed by a lengthy but enlightening appendix in which Dworkin replies to critics of his essays and extends a discussion of consequentialism. I like that. On the other hand, the index was much too short and doesn’t include many of the binary concepts Dworkin uses. The reading can get tedious, but only for short stretches. Otherwise, the book is a significant contribution to political philosophy. I recommend it for people interested in the question of how morality can be converted to political doctrine.
October 21, 2022
"For decades, the legal philosophy curriculum has been organized around something called the Hart/Dworkin debate," writes Brian Leiter, in one of several documents I read after finishing this book to try and understand what the Hart/Dworkin debate actually is. For what it's worth, the experts are not too sure themselves. Here is Scott Shapiro "attempting to set out the basic subject matter of the debate". It is not totally clear that they disagree at all; Hart updated (or clarified) his views upon each of Dworkin's attacks, and it is possible that they were just talking past each other, or that Dworkin deliberately misread Hart, or that he was just discussing a different issue (what principles can justify state coercion, for example, as Larry Alexander claims.) There does seem to be a consensus that Hart won, if only by getting the last word (in a posthumous postscript to his The Concept of Law, which I reviewed here).
In contrast to the legal realism which I lean towards (and which increasingly seems like the correct framework for interpreting the US Supreme Court), Hart and Dworkin both claim that judges' decisions stem from a background tapestry of principles, on which their decisions must be based. For Hart, a positivist, this basis stems from "social facts": laws that have been made, rules for deciding conflict, prior rulings, and abstract ideas that can be inferred from tendencies of judges. This system is non-normative and not based on a moral principle. For people can have different moral systems, and the role of judges is not to adjudicate between them, but to find the outcome most suited to what is known about society's preferences. Dworkin's approach, which John Mackie has called a "Third Way between positivism and natural law theory", is that the myriad gaps in the positivist system are filled by moral "principles"; there is a consistent and broadly accepted moral law which complements these social facts to form the basis of our legal system. In Law's Empire and this book - a somewhat uneven collection of academic papers and articles from the New York Review of Books - he discusses how those principles are inferred and works out a concept of fundamental rights as "trumps", which individuals can use against the state (and each other) to (almost) always win.
Dworkin's belief in rights as fundamental leans heavily on Rawls' A Theory of Justice, which attempts to prove that individual rights emerge from the social contract, and that they are something that everyone would agree to if they considered the matter objectively and fairly. Now that philosophers have shown rights to be fundamental, judges are obliged to respect them. Thus for example, individual rights can restrict the state: the state's laws might not apply if they infringe on an individual's rights.
One of the few real-world examples in the book is a discussion of Richard Nixon's criticism of the Warren Court. Under Warren (and his successor Burger), the activist court pushed through a number of famous rulings which could be construed as advancing individual rights against laws made by the state. Nixon claimed to believe in "constructionism", the idea that judges should strictly apply the law and not try to fit it to their own ideas of what is right, but rather leave it to democratically elected legislators (such as the Topeka Board of Education). Here, I think, is where legal realists raise their eyebrows. Constitutional law is a subtle field, and often susceptible to charges of being politics by other means. If Dworkin supported the Warren Court's activist application of moral principles against public sentiment, would he approve of the court's most recent conservative activism? If individual rights are trumps against state coercion, would he have been an outspoken defender of the rights of individuals to resist masks and vaccine mandates during the pandemic? In both cases we cannot know, but the fact that his system of moral law created from scratch happens to suit his own political inclinations (and those of the NYRB) seems susceptible to a critique he cites against Rawls:
In contrast to the legal realism which I lean towards (and which increasingly seems like the correct framework for interpreting the US Supreme Court), Hart and Dworkin both claim that judges' decisions stem from a background tapestry of principles, on which their decisions must be based. For Hart, a positivist, this basis stems from "social facts": laws that have been made, rules for deciding conflict, prior rulings, and abstract ideas that can be inferred from tendencies of judges. This system is non-normative and not based on a moral principle. For people can have different moral systems, and the role of judges is not to adjudicate between them, but to find the outcome most suited to what is known about society's preferences. Dworkin's approach, which John Mackie has called a "Third Way between positivism and natural law theory", is that the myriad gaps in the positivist system are filled by moral "principles"; there is a consistent and broadly accepted moral law which complements these social facts to form the basis of our legal system. In Law's Empire and this book - a somewhat uneven collection of academic papers and articles from the New York Review of Books - he discusses how those principles are inferred and works out a concept of fundamental rights as "trumps", which individuals can use against the state (and each other) to (almost) always win.
Dworkin's belief in rights as fundamental leans heavily on Rawls' A Theory of Justice, which attempts to prove that individual rights emerge from the social contract, and that they are something that everyone would agree to if they considered the matter objectively and fairly. Now that philosophers have shown rights to be fundamental, judges are obliged to respect them. Thus for example, individual rights can restrict the state: the state's laws might not apply if they infringe on an individual's rights.
One of the few real-world examples in the book is a discussion of Richard Nixon's criticism of the Warren Court. Under Warren (and his successor Burger), the activist court pushed through a number of famous rulings which could be construed as advancing individual rights against laws made by the state. Nixon claimed to believe in "constructionism", the idea that judges should strictly apply the law and not try to fit it to their own ideas of what is right, but rather leave it to democratically elected legislators (such as the Topeka Board of Education). Here, I think, is where legal realists raise their eyebrows. Constitutional law is a subtle field, and often susceptible to charges of being politics by other means. If Dworkin supported the Warren Court's activist application of moral principles against public sentiment, would he approve of the court's most recent conservative activism? If individual rights are trumps against state coercion, would he have been an outspoken defender of the rights of individuals to resist masks and vaccine mandates during the pandemic? In both cases we cannot know, but the fact that his system of moral law created from scratch happens to suit his own political inclinations (and those of the NYRB) seems susceptible to a critique he cites against Rawls:
One form of criticism has been expressed to me by many colleagues and students, particularly lawyers. They point out that the particular political institutions and arrangements that Rawls says men in the original position would choose are merely idealized forms of those now in force in the United States. They are the institutions, that is, of liberal constitutional democracy. The critics conclude that the fundamental assumptions of Rawls’s theory must, therefore, be the assumptions of classical liberalism, however they define these, and that the original position, which appears to animate the theory, must somehow be an embodiment of these assumptions. Justice as fairness therefore seems to them, in its entirety, a particularly subtle rationalization of the political status quo, which may safely be disregarded by those who want to offer a more radical critique of the liberal tradition.People involved in the legal system want to see themselves as making the world better, and as following some kind of moral code, even if, as Dworkin writes,
not all, or even most, judges have devoted their time to abstract moral philosophy, or settled on explicit theories of rights, some keeping copies of Kant under their robes, where others hide copies of Bentham or Teilhard de ChardinWe all, implicitly or explicitly, follow some sort of moral code. Even positivists would not deny that this plays a role in the way that judges, or anyone else, forms decisions, at least in places where the law's application requires discretion. But Hart's wisdom was in defusing the moral tension in jurisprudence, acknowledging that people will always disagree over moral claims, and requiring judges to restrain themselves as much as possible. As politicisation and hyperpartisanship increasingly encroach into the judicial sphere, his opinion seems more prescient than ever.
August 31, 2023
Este libro no es simplemente un tratado sobre el derecho, es una profunda reflexión sobre la intersección entre moralidad, justicia y la interpretación jurídica.
Desde las primeras páginas, Dworkin desafía las concepciones tradicionales del positivismo jurídico, aquella visión que sostiene que el derecho es meramente un conjunto de normas establecidas por instituciones legítimas. Frente a esta perspectiva, Dworkin argumenta que el derecho no es sólo poder, sino que está intrínsecamente ligado a un ideal de justicia. Las normas no se interpretan en el vacío, sino a través de principios morales y éticos que guían y dan forma al derecho.
Uno de los pilares de "Taking Rights Seriously" es la idea de que los derechos individuales son de suma importancia y deben ser tomados en serio, no sólo como privilegios otorgados por el Estado, sino como manifestaciones de la dignidad y el valor inherente de cada individuo. En este sentido, Dworkin propone que cuando los derechos de un individuo están en juego, no pueden ser sacrificados simplemente por un supuesto "bien mayor" o utilidad colectiva.
Este compromiso inquebrantable con los derechos individuales conduce a Dworkin a explorar la naturaleza de la interpretación judicial. A diferencia de la idea de que los jueces simplemente aplican la ley de forma mecánica, Dworkin sugiere que la interpretación judicial es una actividad compleja y creativa. Los jueces, al interpretar la ley, no sólo consideran normas y precedentes, sino también principios morales y éticos que dan forma al tejido mismo del derecho.
Dworkin introduce el concepto de "cadena de derecho", argumentando que las decisiones judiciales forman parte de una narrativa coherente y continua que evoluciona con el tiempo. En lugar de ver cada decisión como un acto aislado, Dworkin sugiere que deben ser vistas como eslabones en una cadena, donde cada decisión se basa y refina las anteriores, en un diálogo constante entre justicia, moralidad y tradición legal.
En "Taking Rights Seriously", Dworkin también aborda el tema de la igualdad. Argumenta que la igualdad no es simplemente un ideal abstracto, sino un principio fundamental que debe guiar la interpretación y aplicación del derecho. La igualdad, en la visión de Dworkin, no significa tratar a todos de la misma manera, sino tratar a cada individuo con el mismo respeto y consideración, reconociendo su singularidad y dignidad.
Con una prosa elegante y argumentos penetrantes, "Taking Rights Seriously" se convierte en un viaje por las profundidades del pensamiento jurídico y moral. Dworkin no nos ofrece respuestas fáciles, sino que nos invita a reflexionar, a cuestionar y, sobre todo, a tomar en serio la inmensa responsabilidad que implica el reconocimiento y protección de los derechos de cada individuo. En este libro, el derecho no es simplemente una herramienta de poder, sino una manifestación de nuestra humanidad compartida, un llamado a la justicia y a la integridad moral.
Desde las primeras páginas, Dworkin desafía las concepciones tradicionales del positivismo jurídico, aquella visión que sostiene que el derecho es meramente un conjunto de normas establecidas por instituciones legítimas. Frente a esta perspectiva, Dworkin argumenta que el derecho no es sólo poder, sino que está intrínsecamente ligado a un ideal de justicia. Las normas no se interpretan en el vacío, sino a través de principios morales y éticos que guían y dan forma al derecho.
Uno de los pilares de "Taking Rights Seriously" es la idea de que los derechos individuales son de suma importancia y deben ser tomados en serio, no sólo como privilegios otorgados por el Estado, sino como manifestaciones de la dignidad y el valor inherente de cada individuo. En este sentido, Dworkin propone que cuando los derechos de un individuo están en juego, no pueden ser sacrificados simplemente por un supuesto "bien mayor" o utilidad colectiva.
Este compromiso inquebrantable con los derechos individuales conduce a Dworkin a explorar la naturaleza de la interpretación judicial. A diferencia de la idea de que los jueces simplemente aplican la ley de forma mecánica, Dworkin sugiere que la interpretación judicial es una actividad compleja y creativa. Los jueces, al interpretar la ley, no sólo consideran normas y precedentes, sino también principios morales y éticos que dan forma al tejido mismo del derecho.
Dworkin introduce el concepto de "cadena de derecho", argumentando que las decisiones judiciales forman parte de una narrativa coherente y continua que evoluciona con el tiempo. En lugar de ver cada decisión como un acto aislado, Dworkin sugiere que deben ser vistas como eslabones en una cadena, donde cada decisión se basa y refina las anteriores, en un diálogo constante entre justicia, moralidad y tradición legal.
En "Taking Rights Seriously", Dworkin también aborda el tema de la igualdad. Argumenta que la igualdad no es simplemente un ideal abstracto, sino un principio fundamental que debe guiar la interpretación y aplicación del derecho. La igualdad, en la visión de Dworkin, no significa tratar a todos de la misma manera, sino tratar a cada individuo con el mismo respeto y consideración, reconociendo su singularidad y dignidad.
Con una prosa elegante y argumentos penetrantes, "Taking Rights Seriously" se convierte en un viaje por las profundidades del pensamiento jurídico y moral. Dworkin no nos ofrece respuestas fáciles, sino que nos invita a reflexionar, a cuestionar y, sobre todo, a tomar en serio la inmensa responsabilidad que implica el reconocimiento y protección de los derechos de cada individuo. En este libro, el derecho no es simplemente una herramienta de poder, sino una manifestación de nuestra humanidad compartida, un llamado a la justicia y a la integridad moral.
September 8, 2021
Ką daryti, jei esi teisėjas, gauni bylą ir supranti, kad pritaikius įstatymą paraidžiui gautųsi nesąmonė? Dworkinas turi problemos sprendimą - taikyti teisės principus (pavyzdžiui, protingumo), interpretuoti įstatymą jais vadovaujantis ir išspręsti byla taip, kad nesikirstų su sveiku protu. Įtikinami argumentai, taiklūs pavyzdžiai, ir, svarbiausia (bei nebūdingiausia teisinei literatūrai) - paprastas ir žaismingas pasakojimo stilius.
May 2, 2014
Dworkin aims at a grandly ambitious apologia for moral liberalism in this book, trying to defend an enlightenment philosophy of human rights and common welfare against attack from the Left and Right. Towards the Left, Dworkin argues against legal positivism, which says that laws are essentially arbitrary and political in nature, a matter of interest groups and power rather than justice. Towards the Right, Dworkin makes a case for judicial discretion and the use of law to advance equality even at the cost of liberty. Written through the mid 70s, these books deal with issues that are still salient today-civil disobediance, affirmative action, the balance between public and private interest, and the legal philosophy of Strict Constructionism.
Jeremy Bentham called human rights 'nonsense on stilts'. How then should a philosopher who considers himself a utilitarian include human rights in their system of justice? Dworkin sets up a three tiered system: at the bottom is policy-the enacted and enumerated laws and legal precedents that describe how disputes are to be resolved and the public good obtained. Policy should be describable by legal principles, the foremost being consistency--that the same principles describe all similar cases. Above principles is morality, and the idea that rights serve as a kind of override on the utilitarian calculus of politics. Drawing from Rawl's veil of ignorance, Dworkin develops fundamental rights of liberty and equality of respect (not outcomes, or even opportunity). From a utilitarian perspective, personal preferences (those affecting only yourself) are legitimate, while external preferences (those affect others) are not. Dworkin's judges are active, intelligent, moral agents, responsible for seeking balance between competing principles and interests according to their own interior sense of rightness. Ordinary citizens act as judges as well, whether in matters of conscience like avoiding the draft in an unjust war, or in selecting their representatives.
Dworkin's thinking is dense and subtle, and there's a lot for ideologues of any stripe to dislike and misinterpret in this book. From my own perspective, I'm concerned about the prescriptive vs descriptive elements of this book. Judges should be moral adjudicators balancing competing rights in a society that protects both liberty and the common good. However, after Foucault and Jasanoff, judges are agents which create knowledge and exercise power. What purpose do rights serve in a more descriptive account of the law?
Jeremy Bentham called human rights 'nonsense on stilts'. How then should a philosopher who considers himself a utilitarian include human rights in their system of justice? Dworkin sets up a three tiered system: at the bottom is policy-the enacted and enumerated laws and legal precedents that describe how disputes are to be resolved and the public good obtained. Policy should be describable by legal principles, the foremost being consistency--that the same principles describe all similar cases. Above principles is morality, and the idea that rights serve as a kind of override on the utilitarian calculus of politics. Drawing from Rawl's veil of ignorance, Dworkin develops fundamental rights of liberty and equality of respect (not outcomes, or even opportunity). From a utilitarian perspective, personal preferences (those affecting only yourself) are legitimate, while external preferences (those affect others) are not. Dworkin's judges are active, intelligent, moral agents, responsible for seeking balance between competing principles and interests according to their own interior sense of rightness. Ordinary citizens act as judges as well, whether in matters of conscience like avoiding the draft in an unjust war, or in selecting their representatives.
Dworkin's thinking is dense and subtle, and there's a lot for ideologues of any stripe to dislike and misinterpret in this book. From my own perspective, I'm concerned about the prescriptive vs descriptive elements of this book. Judges should be moral adjudicators balancing competing rights in a society that protects both liberty and the common good. However, after Foucault and Jasanoff, judges are agents which create knowledge and exercise power. What purpose do rights serve in a more descriptive account of the law?
September 1, 2018
The idea of Rights and it's relation to human dignity is the area exploring in this fairly long work. Dworkin was introduced to me by Dr. Prathiskha Baxi in the class room. His book Law's Empire was quite fascinating in explaining the organic nature of jurisprudence. This book on the other hand goes into the social life of law; its relation to people and life. Right as given and rights as defined category of already existing notions of precondition has a unique relation in the understanding of the practice of exercising of Rights. Anybody who wish to understand the idea of "Right" could turn into this book. It is some way help to understand the difference between a real Constitutional Republic and the country we live in right now.
March 30, 2024
Quien aborde este libro debe estar dispuesto a sumergirse en una profunda reflexión sobre el aún difuso juego de moralidad, justicia y praxis judicial.
Su contrapunto con la obra de Hart constituye uno de los debates más ricos de la filosofía jurídica contemporánea.
Su contrapunto con la obra de Hart constituye uno de los debates más ricos de la filosofía jurídica contemporánea.
January 29, 2017
The book that is still making earthquakes inside legal positivism. Specially relevant on these times of civil disobedience.
January 6, 2018
Deep but conversational. An extraordinarily ambitious book, Dworkin stands with some of the monuments of contemporary political theory like Rawls and Habermas.
September 30, 2023
… he’s less boring than Hart??
Read
June 7, 2024not as evolutionary as hla hart, but very insightful and gave good perspective bringing in critiques in devlin
February 8, 2012
This book is surprisingly clear in its exposition. The ideas are interesting, the attack against (Hart's) legal positivism is clear, and Dworkin's own positive position shines through at the end. Caveat: Dworkin believes that he is providing both an empirical and normative account of the jurisprudential process (something he elaborates in the appendix of the 1978 edition of the book). It would take someone with a way better understanding of legal history than I to be able to say whether or not his empirical case holds up.
But really, this is one of the clearest books I've read in the past year. At times I didn't even notice that the material was really not at all easy or trivial.
But really, this is one of the clearest books I've read in the past year. At times I didn't even notice that the material was really not at all easy or trivial.
December 12, 2010
Response to positivism. Unlike Hart, Dworkin is not very clear and not always logical, but his point of view has definite merit. Some of what he is saying makes a lot of sense, but it more applicable to common law system of US and Britain than to the civil law. Which system is better - still open for debate.
December 30, 2023
Really by the time we are finished with the work, Dworkin would have taken you to another world which is the blend of philosophy and jurisprudence. A must-read for all the students of law and philosophy.
January 8, 2013
A wonderful book for people living in societies with little-to-none experience in personal rights, importance of law and relation between the state and the citizen.
January 9, 2025
UGA: Legal Theory
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September 23, 2010Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin (1978)
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