Ronald Spector’s A Continent Erupts: Decolonization, Civil War, and Massacre in Post-War Asia, 1945-1955 aims to summarize a decade’s worth of violence and conflict that followed the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945. A recurring theme of the book, rarely clearly articulated, is the ricocheting consequences of the Japanese occupation. The series of Japanese triumphs in 1941 and 1942, in which Japanese forces overran massive swathes of colonial territory, shattered the myth of European invulnerability and inspired many anti-colonial militants. Many understocked guerrilla movements were initially dependent on leftover Japanese equipment and armaments: for the nationalists in Indonesia, who managed to acquire around 50,000 Japanese rifles, 3,000 machine guns, and 100 million rounds of ammunition, and the Viet Minh, which assigned spears to their frontline troops until 1950, Japanese weapons were vital. The stream of names – ranging from guerrillas to army commanders, from village administrators to future presidents, and from the Korean War to the Indonesian War of Independence – who transitioned from the Imperial Japanese Army or associated militias to guerrilla organizations is almost overwhelming. The use of Japanese soldiers as garrison troops by the Allies in the immediate aftermath of the war’s end is a historical curiosity of which I was unaware.
Although Spector uses these ex-collaborators primarily to offer individual anecdotes, there are also hints of the institutional legacy of Japanese rule: for example, the retention of Korean officers of the Japanese-led police force post-war ensured the continuity of “old traditions of routine brutality, torture and corruption.” Spector details the ruthlessness of Syngman Rhee’s government at some length: the repression at Cheju-do, the purge of suspected Communist sympathizers as the Korean People’s Army stormed south, the violent suppression of resistance in poorly-managed POW camps. One of the most memorable vignettes is the depiction of the British unit who, frustrated and disgusted by its ally, who are engaging in mass executions as they eat breakfast, threatens to start shooting at them. Kim Il-Sung, hardly innocent of butchering defenseless citizens, earns and receives his own share of criticism —outmaneuvering and executing his domestic opponents, ordering the purge of captive South Koreans as his army retreated north, and terrorizing former POWs who returned home.
Spector, an American, takes pain to avoid ideological bias. He pays as much, if not more, attention to American atrocities in the Korean War as North Korean ones, in particular the massacre of several hundred refugees under a bridge in late 1950 and the systematic bombing of largely civilian infrastructure in North Korea which began in 1951. The racism of GIs who believes that no “gook” could threaten them is discussed as well.
Spector opens the book with the analogy of the “500-pound gorillas” – the United States and the Soviet Union, who can shake the earth. This argument, although established early, is not well-developed over the following chapters, as Spector documents their comparative disinterest in the region. Outside of the US in Korea, neither nation engaged great resources in Asia during this period. The readers sees much of the relationship between the United States and its colonial allies, often sharper than one might expect: the stubborn French efforts to keep its colonial empire a chasse gardé, dismissive of Washington’s advice but dependent on its war chest; the dogged Dutch attempts to reacquire the resources of the West Indies, to which American pressure delivered the coup de grâce, although defeat had already become inevitable. Some of Washington’s Asian allies merit the same detailed treatment: American frustration with Chiang is tracked though several emissaries, ambassadors, and counsels (Wedemeyer, Marshall, Stuart) although the relationship with Rhee – as recalcitrant and stubborn as the French and the Dutch – is neglected in comparison.
The comparable absence of the Soviets from the narrative is unsurprising. As Odd Arne Westad detailed in The Global Cold War, Stalin lacked much faith or interest in the socialist elements of the anti-colonial efforts in Asia. Europe drew most of his attention, and his rigid commitment to a strictly orthodox Marxist view of development — namely, one which believes that socialism can only emerge in capitalist countries — led him not to offer strong support to guerrilla movements in nations where capitalism remained in its infancy. Of course, capability was a significant issue — the two “gorillas” in the late 1940s and early 1950s were really only 1.5, and even that is generous, as the American economy in 1950 was about as large as all of Europe and the USSR put together.
Colonized populations were not a monolith, and Spector thankfully takes pains to pull them apart. He tracks ideological differences, which can largely be simplified to “nationalists vs communists,” and resulted in civil wars in Indonesia and South Korea. Where other differences emerge, however, Spector sometimes only provides a cursory treatment. Most obviously, Spector discusses certain Vietnamese ethnic groups and religious organizations who opposed the Viet Minh but repeatedly fails to explain why, only writing, for example, that highlanders had centuries of ethnic antagonism with lowlanders. This is an unsatisfactory explanation that fails to indicate how and why that conflict persisted throughout colonial rule. He is more thorough with regards to religious organizations like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, detailing French concessions and the promise of local autonomy.
Spector also describes, at some length, the contribution of colonial soldiers to the French war effort. He seems fairly sharp on the motivations of some of them, movingly recounting the testimony of rural Moroccans, who, impoverished by French colonial policy, felt that joining the French army was the most reliable course. In French West Africa, a sergeant’s wages were 10 times those of the average worker. This evidence is anecdotal and not particularly systematic, but still fascinating. It put in sharp relief the absence of such testimonies for the Vietnamese soldiers who fought for the French.
I have thus far neglected to discuss the Chinese Civil War. I had not realized the degree to which the CCP was on the ropes early after WW2, forced to abandon its long-standing capital after suffering a series of reverses. Spector is sharply critical of how the Nationalists augmented their numbers, listing a number of techniques by which they impressed civilians, and arguing that these methods produced a hollow army (he also devotes time to how economic mismanagement, corruption, and brutality eroded the foundations of its support). However, he fails to explain how the Communists overcame the same weakness. Although he notes that Communist soldiers were no more willing (much-welcomed land reform made peasants more invested in their own plots, not more inclined to leave them on an uncertain mission) and sometimes tricked into continuing their service after World War 2, he leaves uncertain how the CCP was able to maintain their cohesion, only noting that their political officers were attentive to their soldiers’ views. This may have produced how the CCP’s leaders became aware of this problem, but it does not explain how they overcame it.
Although it was an article of faith on the right that China had been lost by the willing connivance of Communist sympathizers at the highest echelons of the government. Spector makes clear the sincere frustration of many high-ranking officials. State’s Policy Planning Staff believed that Chiang’s government – predatory and incompetent – was “more likely to be indulged than corrected by further infusions of American aid.” The CIA lamented that “we cannot give the will to fight and the desire to become good soldiers.” Truman concluded that “aid to Chiang’s regime would be pouring sand into a rat hole.” If anything, those looking for communist spies would do better to look at the Nationalists themselves. Communist spies among the KMT included the assistant chief of staff of the army, the chief of the War Planning Board, and at least three division commanders who defected with their troops at key moments. Those who were not were more than willing to let the Communists destroy their rivals and then bargain for their own survival.
Spector adds levity to his narrative by either inventing or reporting witty characterizations of certain characters. Contemporaries were unkind to Rhee (“a mischievous and untrustworthy blowhard”), Nationalist general Chin I-Lun (“an intellectual virgin—he hasn’t had an idea yet), Kim Il-Sung (“a fat, dissipated looking, pasty creature”), and Charles Willoughby, whose boss said “There have been two great intelligence officers in history ... Mine is not one of them.” Spector clearly enjoys his own one-liners, which he uses to introduce Admiral Thiery d’Argenlieu (“in politics he stood slightly to the right of Louis XIV”), Lou Boxheng (“Unlike many high-ranking Communists and cadres, Lou possessed both a skeptical temperament and a pronounced sense of humor”), Hu Lian (“a well-established reputation for aggressiveness and daring, something quite rare in the Nationalist Army”), Edward Almond ("among the mediocrities and placeholders of the Tokyo staff, Almond's dim bulb shone brightly"), and no less a personage than Dwight D. Eisenhower (“Like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland, Eisenhower was capable of believing six impossible things before breakfast”).
A clever and interesting book, whose gaps do not meaningfully detract from the author’s achievement.