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The Invention of China
"[A] smart take on modern Chinese nationalism" ( Foreign Policy ). Bill Hayton tells the story of how ‘China’ came to think of itself as China—and what it means for our world today
In this compelling and highly-readable account, Hayton shows how China’s present-day geopolitical problems—the fates of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea—were born in the struggle to create a modern nation-state. He brings alive the fevered debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when reformers and revolutionaries adopted foreign ideas to “invent’ a new vision of China.
Ranging across history, nationhood, language, and territory, Hayton shows how a few radicals, often living in exile, adopted European beliefs about race and nation to rethink China’s past and create a new future. He weaves together political and personal stories to show how Chinese nationalism emerged from the connections between east and west. These ideas continue to motivate and direct the country’s policies into the twenty first century. By asserting a particular version of the past Chinese governments have bolstered their claims to a vast territory stretching from the Pacific to Central Asia.
In this compelling and highly-readable account, Hayton shows how China’s present-day geopolitical problems—the fates of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea—were born in the struggle to create a modern nation-state. He brings alive the fevered debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when reformers and revolutionaries adopted foreign ideas to “invent’ a new vision of China.
Ranging across history, nationhood, language, and territory, Hayton shows how a few radicals, often living in exile, adopted European beliefs about race and nation to rethink China’s past and create a new future. He weaves together political and personal stories to show how Chinese nationalism emerged from the connections between east and west. These ideas continue to motivate and direct the country’s policies into the twenty first century. By asserting a particular version of the past Chinese governments have bolstered their claims to a vast territory stretching from the Pacific to Central Asia.
320 pages, Paperback
Published May 31, 2022
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746 people want to read
About the author
Bill Hayton
6 books33 followersBill Hayton is a longtime reporter with BBC News, specializing in contemporary Asia. He has also written for The Economist, the South China Morning Post, and the National Interest.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 43 reviews
November 18, 2020
A fascinating examination and explanation of how history, language, culture, and geography have been crafted to fit nationalist narratives: in this case, the idea that a single unified Chinese state ruled its territory uninterrupted for 5000 years. However, despite the protestations of the government and its nationalist propaganda, much of this was created by intellectuals at home and abroad in the early twentieth century as they struggled to reconcile Western ideas about state and nation with the reality of living in the Qing Great-State.
Hayton examines each of the fundamental claims ranging from the unity of the Chinese language to the claims in the South China Sea and outlines exactly how these ideas came to dominate Chinese discourse about the country and its place in the world. The great irony is that for the most part, these so-called Chinese ideas of sovereignty or maritime claims are imported from Western countries, translated and filtered through a unique Chinese experience at the end of the Qing Dynasty, dealing with the collapse of the Empire and the encroachments of Western countries and Japan.
When removed from its nationalistic cage, the history of China is one of successive empires rising and falling, for many centuries it was the eastern provinces of either the Mongols, the Jurchens, the Manchus, or another regional actor amidst many. When contorted to fit the hallucinogenic haze of state-sponsored nationalism, the objections of the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and anyone who doesn’t fit the preconceived mould of a member of the Zhonghua minzu are instead spectres of disunity, of political reform that has haunted the party leadership since 1989.
Hayton is clear and persuasive, his research is solid. His writing provides ample evidence to push back against the increasingly laughable claims spouted by Beijing. It allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of modern Chinese political thought and how central these ideas of unity are to maintaining the leadership’s control in the retreat of orthodox Maoism.
Hayton examines each of the fundamental claims ranging from the unity of the Chinese language to the claims in the South China Sea and outlines exactly how these ideas came to dominate Chinese discourse about the country and its place in the world. The great irony is that for the most part, these so-called Chinese ideas of sovereignty or maritime claims are imported from Western countries, translated and filtered through a unique Chinese experience at the end of the Qing Dynasty, dealing with the collapse of the Empire and the encroachments of Western countries and Japan.
When removed from its nationalistic cage, the history of China is one of successive empires rising and falling, for many centuries it was the eastern provinces of either the Mongols, the Jurchens, the Manchus, or another regional actor amidst many. When contorted to fit the hallucinogenic haze of state-sponsored nationalism, the objections of the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and anyone who doesn’t fit the preconceived mould of a member of the Zhonghua minzu are instead spectres of disunity, of political reform that has haunted the party leadership since 1989.
Hayton is clear and persuasive, his research is solid. His writing provides ample evidence to push back against the increasingly laughable claims spouted by Beijing. It allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of modern Chinese political thought and how central these ideas of unity are to maintaining the leadership’s control in the retreat of orthodox Maoism.
January 30, 2021
And the point is…?
The basic premise of the book seems to be that China’s claims to a 5,000-year-old civilisation are somehow false – propaganda put about by the Chinese Communist Party. Hayton attempts to prove this by a variety of arguments, starting with the undisputed, I assume, fact that the intellectual underpinning of the idea of a Chinese nation-state was absorbed from European ideas in the 19th century. He suggests that since, prior to this, the region had been ruled over for thousands of years by a series of dynasties not all ethnically Chinese in origin, then modern China can’t count these periods as part of a Chinese history. I am therefore deleting Roman Britain, Viking Britain and Norman Britain from our own history and from now on declaring that any attempt to claim Hadrian’s Wall as part of British heritage is propaganda put about by the British Communist Party.
Hayton goes on to look at various different facets of Chinese culture and history to bolster up his argument, but I gave up on the book halfway through, since I found the arguments tenuous, shallow and not particularly well laid-out. And, to be honest, I’m not sure if the point is one that it was worth the effort of making. China is a fascinating nation with many facets, good and bad. It does many things I find objectionable, especially in terms of its human rights abuses. But this effort to deny it its claim to its history seems odd.
NB I received a free copy of the book without obligation to review from the publisher, Yale University Press via Amazon Vine UK.
www.fictionfanblog.wordpress.com
The basic premise of the book seems to be that China’s claims to a 5,000-year-old civilisation are somehow false – propaganda put about by the Chinese Communist Party. Hayton attempts to prove this by a variety of arguments, starting with the undisputed, I assume, fact that the intellectual underpinning of the idea of a Chinese nation-state was absorbed from European ideas in the 19th century. He suggests that since, prior to this, the region had been ruled over for thousands of years by a series of dynasties not all ethnically Chinese in origin, then modern China can’t count these periods as part of a Chinese history. I am therefore deleting Roman Britain, Viking Britain and Norman Britain from our own history and from now on declaring that any attempt to claim Hadrian’s Wall as part of British heritage is propaganda put about by the British Communist Party.
Hayton goes on to look at various different facets of Chinese culture and history to bolster up his argument, but I gave up on the book halfway through, since I found the arguments tenuous, shallow and not particularly well laid-out. And, to be honest, I’m not sure if the point is one that it was worth the effort of making. China is a fascinating nation with many facets, good and bad. It does many things I find objectionable, especially in terms of its human rights abuses. But this effort to deny it its claim to its history seems odd.
NB I received a free copy of the book without obligation to review from the publisher, Yale University Press via Amazon Vine UK.
www.fictionfanblog.wordpress.com
March 25, 2022
This was a very interesting read
Lots of fascinating research into borders and land claims. This book also paints a picture for future potential moves China will make (for example, by the author Hayton: Taiwan)
Also, I found it very intriguing how Bill challenges history and gives a clear picture of how old China really could be.
For someone who doesn't particularly enjoy history books, I thought this book was a great historical read.
Would recommend to learn more about China.
4.8/5
Lots of fascinating research into borders and land claims. This book also paints a picture for future potential moves China will make (for example, by the author Hayton: Taiwan)
Also, I found it very intriguing how Bill challenges history and gives a clear picture of how old China really could be.
For someone who doesn't particularly enjoy history books, I thought this book was a great historical read.
Would recommend to learn more about China.
4.8/5
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August 13, 2022
Fascinating. "Chinese" as a nationality, ethnicity, language, etc. are all basically an invention of the late-19th & early-20th centuries. Mostly the latter.
Now I feel like a dufus for naming the related shelf "Zhongguo"...
Now I feel like a dufus for naming the related shelf "Zhongguo"...
December 11, 2024
This is a great overview of verifiability of historic narrative of People republic of China, from 5000 year of China as a state to ‘nine dash line’ of maritime claims. I think the book should be more broadly read, to more seriously withstand state-fueled promotion of Chinese narrative. I’ll briefly review chapter by chapter.
Introduction every country invents own history and this narration is more dependent on our present time and recent past. PRC is no different. As with most ‘classic’ state history narrations it is a product of the 19th century Europe and its invention of nationalism. So, when Chinese claim their own unique way of narration, actually it is neither unique nor Chinese.
1. The Invention Of China the very name China as well as ‘Silk road’ don’t originate in China. The name ‘Silk Road’ was probably first coined by an early German geographer, Carl Ritter, in 1838, adopted by another geographer, Ferdinand von Richthofen, in 1877 and popularised by a Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, in the 1930s. China is a name given supposedly in lands of modern India. The very name ‘China’ was adopted by Westerners and given new meanings which were then transmitted back to East Asia. Over centuries, Europeans had developed a vision of a place they called ‘China’ based upon scraps of information sent home by explorers and priests and subsequently amplified by storytellers and orientalists. In European minds, ‘China’ became an ancient, independent, continuous state occupying a defined portion of continental East Asia. In reality there was no state called ‘China’ during this period. E.g. from 1644 until 1912, ‘China’ was, in effect, a colony of an Inner Asian empire: the Qing Great-State. It took until the end of the 19th century for the European vision of China to become implanted in the minds of the Qing political elite, who translated international ideas about a place called ‘China’ into a place called Zhongguo. Currently Chinese leaders use two names for their country in general speech: Zhongguo and Zhonghua. Within their etymology both names make claims to regional supremacy. Both are translated into English as ‘China’ but they carry particular meanings in Chinese. Zhong guo is literally the ‘central state’ of an idealised political hierarchy. Zhong hua is literally the ‘central efflorescence’, but its more figurative meaning is the ‘centre of civilisation’, an assertion of cultural superiority over the barbarians in the hinterland.
Actually, before 19th century the very concept of as a bounded state with a defined territory was foreign for them. Instead they used terms like ‘Da Song Guo’ – the Song Great-State and later ‘Da Ming Guo’ – the Ming Great-State. For them dynasty was more important marker than territory. For example, in his much-read 1900 essay ‘On the source of China’s weakness’, Liang echoed Zhang Deyi, thirty years before, by telling his readers, ‘Foreigners call our country “Cina” or “China” but that is not how we view ourselves.’ But, unlike Zhang, Liang was particularly unhappy with the traditional way of referring to the country by its ruling dynasty: ‘the Ming Great-State’ or ‘the Qing Great-State’. This, he feared, implied there was no Chinese nation at all. According to the Australian Sinologist John Fitzgerald, the lack of a name was, for Liang, proof of the Chinese people’s cultural and intellectual immaturity: Liang called it a conceptual error ‘lodged in every person’s brain’
2. The Invention of Sovereignty again, the Western term sovereignty is a concept that emerged in Europe in the 14th century. It is far from being an indigenous Chinese idea and yet it has become the foundation of current China’s international relations. The Chinese word for sovereignty, zhuquan, carries the literal meaning of ‘the authority of the ruler’ – it is focused domestically, not internationally. Zhuquan mandates the continuation of a morally superior culture within the protection of inviolable boundaries. This is not an idea that can tolerate intervention in a country’s internal affairs but is rather a mandate for the opposite: the exclusion of other states and their ‘international norms’, whether on human rights or climate change.
3. The Invention of The Han Race The descendants of the Chinese who settled abroad before 1910 generally still refer to themselves as ‘Hua’ to this day. Rather than simply being proud of being Hua and having ancestral connections to villages in faraway provinces, the leadership in Beijing wants these audiences to see themselves as sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor and be loyal to his lineage, embodied today in the People’s Republic of China. They stress that Han everywhere, not only in PRC, should have their first and foremost loyalty to China.
4. The Invention of Chinese History replacement of ‘history of rulers’ with ‘history of land’, stressing (wrongly) the existence of a continuous Chinese state for 5000 years
5. The Invention of the Chinese Nation the problem what to do with people living in PRC but with different culture – Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans, Yugurs, etc. Even which formally Han Chinese in East and South, with different speech and culture from northern ‘Mandarine’
6. The Invention of the Chinese Language a common hieroglyphic script allows to have the same written language and multiple spoken ones. The Chinese linguist Lü Shuxiang, one of the original compilers of the ‘Contemporary Chinese Dictionary’ in the 1950s, once estimated that there were around 2,000 forms of ‘Chinese’ spoken across China and Taiwan. While speakers of some can understand speakers of others without too much difficulty, the late American Sinologist Jerry Norman once estimated that as many as 400 are mutually unintelligible. ‘A speaker of the Peking dialect can no more understand a person speaking Cantonese than an Englishman can understand an Austrian when each employs his native language,’ he later wrote. ‘The Hainan Min dialects are as different from the Xi’an dialect as Spanish is from Rumanian.’ Moreover, despite the stress of Chinese that all these ‘topolects’ are of the same origin and thus are the same proto-language that developed differently, it is quite possible that there were several unrelated original proto-languages.
7. The Invention of a National Territory what is ‘our land’, why Tibet is included, if its language, writing, belief system and culture is greatly different? At the same time between 1895 when Taiwan was seceded ‘to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty’ after losing the Sine-Japanese war and 1942 when the US entered the war against Japan, Chinese map-makers were perfectly fine not having Taiwan on their ‘China’ maps. Moreover, there are multiple quotes were Chinese intellectuals and officials agreed that Taiwan isn’t China. For example, Sun Yat-sen and his comrades made no demands for the return of the island to Qing control. At no point, so far as we know, did Sun concern himself with the resistance to Japanese rule, even though it continued to smoulder. For Sun, Japanese-controlled Taiwan was more important as a base from which to overthrow the Qing Dynasty than as a future part of the Republic.
8. The Invention of a Maritime Claim this chapter is almost a comedy of errors, where Chinese in the late 19th century claim they discovered islands known to say British a century before. Moreover, their 1930s claim on ‘inherently Chinese’ islands bases it on the ‘China Sea Directory’ published by the UK Hydrographic Office in 1906. This British list is the origin of all the names now used by China. Some of the names on the list had Chinese origins, such as Subi Reef in the Spratlys, while others had Malay origins (such as Passu Keah in the Paracels), but more than 90 per cent were coined by British navigators. Translating these names caused some difficulties and a legacy that disturbs the region to this day. This is known because the committee’s list of island names contains several mistakes which are only found in that document! All of the names were translations or transliterations of the names marked on British maps. In the Paracels, for example, Antelope Reef became Lingyang jiao and Money Island became Jinyin dao – both direct translations. The names that Chinese ‘discoverer’ Admiral Li had given to the Paracels in 1909 were ignored. In the Spratlys, North Danger Reef became Beixian, another translation from the English. Spratly Island became Si-ba-la-tuo (a phonetic transliteration of the name of the English sea captain, Richard Spratly), and Luconia Shoals was transliterated as Lu-kang-ni-ya. Moreover, the committee members were confused by the English words ‘bank’ and ‘shoal’. Both words mean an area of shallow sea: the former describes a raised area of sea bed, the latter is a nautical expression derived from Old English meaning ‘shallow’. However, the committee chose to translate both into Chinese as tan, which has the ambiguous translation of ‘sandbank’, a feature that might be above or below water. This way they created several islands that never existed!
A great read, recommended!
Introduction every country invents own history and this narration is more dependent on our present time and recent past. PRC is no different. As with most ‘classic’ state history narrations it is a product of the 19th century Europe and its invention of nationalism. So, when Chinese claim their own unique way of narration, actually it is neither unique nor Chinese.
1. The Invention Of China the very name China as well as ‘Silk road’ don’t originate in China. The name ‘Silk Road’ was probably first coined by an early German geographer, Carl Ritter, in 1838, adopted by another geographer, Ferdinand von Richthofen, in 1877 and popularised by a Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, in the 1930s. China is a name given supposedly in lands of modern India. The very name ‘China’ was adopted by Westerners and given new meanings which were then transmitted back to East Asia. Over centuries, Europeans had developed a vision of a place they called ‘China’ based upon scraps of information sent home by explorers and priests and subsequently amplified by storytellers and orientalists. In European minds, ‘China’ became an ancient, independent, continuous state occupying a defined portion of continental East Asia. In reality there was no state called ‘China’ during this period. E.g. from 1644 until 1912, ‘China’ was, in effect, a colony of an Inner Asian empire: the Qing Great-State. It took until the end of the 19th century for the European vision of China to become implanted in the minds of the Qing political elite, who translated international ideas about a place called ‘China’ into a place called Zhongguo. Currently Chinese leaders use two names for their country in general speech: Zhongguo and Zhonghua. Within their etymology both names make claims to regional supremacy. Both are translated into English as ‘China’ but they carry particular meanings in Chinese. Zhong guo is literally the ‘central state’ of an idealised political hierarchy. Zhong hua is literally the ‘central efflorescence’, but its more figurative meaning is the ‘centre of civilisation’, an assertion of cultural superiority over the barbarians in the hinterland.
Actually, before 19th century the very concept of as a bounded state with a defined territory was foreign for them. Instead they used terms like ‘Da Song Guo’ – the Song Great-State and later ‘Da Ming Guo’ – the Ming Great-State. For them dynasty was more important marker than territory. For example, in his much-read 1900 essay ‘On the source of China’s weakness’, Liang echoed Zhang Deyi, thirty years before, by telling his readers, ‘Foreigners call our country “Cina” or “China” but that is not how we view ourselves.’ But, unlike Zhang, Liang was particularly unhappy with the traditional way of referring to the country by its ruling dynasty: ‘the Ming Great-State’ or ‘the Qing Great-State’. This, he feared, implied there was no Chinese nation at all. According to the Australian Sinologist John Fitzgerald, the lack of a name was, for Liang, proof of the Chinese people’s cultural and intellectual immaturity: Liang called it a conceptual error ‘lodged in every person’s brain’
2. The Invention of Sovereignty again, the Western term sovereignty is a concept that emerged in Europe in the 14th century. It is far from being an indigenous Chinese idea and yet it has become the foundation of current China’s international relations. The Chinese word for sovereignty, zhuquan, carries the literal meaning of ‘the authority of the ruler’ – it is focused domestically, not internationally. Zhuquan mandates the continuation of a morally superior culture within the protection of inviolable boundaries. This is not an idea that can tolerate intervention in a country’s internal affairs but is rather a mandate for the opposite: the exclusion of other states and their ‘international norms’, whether on human rights or climate change.
3. The Invention of The Han Race The descendants of the Chinese who settled abroad before 1910 generally still refer to themselves as ‘Hua’ to this day. Rather than simply being proud of being Hua and having ancestral connections to villages in faraway provinces, the leadership in Beijing wants these audiences to see themselves as sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor and be loyal to his lineage, embodied today in the People’s Republic of China. They stress that Han everywhere, not only in PRC, should have their first and foremost loyalty to China.
4. The Invention of Chinese History replacement of ‘history of rulers’ with ‘history of land’, stressing (wrongly) the existence of a continuous Chinese state for 5000 years
5. The Invention of the Chinese Nation the problem what to do with people living in PRC but with different culture – Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans, Yugurs, etc. Even which formally Han Chinese in East and South, with different speech and culture from northern ‘Mandarine’
6. The Invention of the Chinese Language a common hieroglyphic script allows to have the same written language and multiple spoken ones. The Chinese linguist Lü Shuxiang, one of the original compilers of the ‘Contemporary Chinese Dictionary’ in the 1950s, once estimated that there were around 2,000 forms of ‘Chinese’ spoken across China and Taiwan. While speakers of some can understand speakers of others without too much difficulty, the late American Sinologist Jerry Norman once estimated that as many as 400 are mutually unintelligible. ‘A speaker of the Peking dialect can no more understand a person speaking Cantonese than an Englishman can understand an Austrian when each employs his native language,’ he later wrote. ‘The Hainan Min dialects are as different from the Xi’an dialect as Spanish is from Rumanian.’ Moreover, despite the stress of Chinese that all these ‘topolects’ are of the same origin and thus are the same proto-language that developed differently, it is quite possible that there were several unrelated original proto-languages.
7. The Invention of a National Territory what is ‘our land’, why Tibet is included, if its language, writing, belief system and culture is greatly different? At the same time between 1895 when Taiwan was seceded ‘to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty’ after losing the Sine-Japanese war and 1942 when the US entered the war against Japan, Chinese map-makers were perfectly fine not having Taiwan on their ‘China’ maps. Moreover, there are multiple quotes were Chinese intellectuals and officials agreed that Taiwan isn’t China. For example, Sun Yat-sen and his comrades made no demands for the return of the island to Qing control. At no point, so far as we know, did Sun concern himself with the resistance to Japanese rule, even though it continued to smoulder. For Sun, Japanese-controlled Taiwan was more important as a base from which to overthrow the Qing Dynasty than as a future part of the Republic.
8. The Invention of a Maritime Claim this chapter is almost a comedy of errors, where Chinese in the late 19th century claim they discovered islands known to say British a century before. Moreover, their 1930s claim on ‘inherently Chinese’ islands bases it on the ‘China Sea Directory’ published by the UK Hydrographic Office in 1906. This British list is the origin of all the names now used by China. Some of the names on the list had Chinese origins, such as Subi Reef in the Spratlys, while others had Malay origins (such as Passu Keah in the Paracels), but more than 90 per cent were coined by British navigators. Translating these names caused some difficulties and a legacy that disturbs the region to this day. This is known because the committee’s list of island names contains several mistakes which are only found in that document! All of the names were translations or transliterations of the names marked on British maps. In the Paracels, for example, Antelope Reef became Lingyang jiao and Money Island became Jinyin dao – both direct translations. The names that Chinese ‘discoverer’ Admiral Li had given to the Paracels in 1909 were ignored. In the Spratlys, North Danger Reef became Beixian, another translation from the English. Spratly Island became Si-ba-la-tuo (a phonetic transliteration of the name of the English sea captain, Richard Spratly), and Luconia Shoals was transliterated as Lu-kang-ni-ya. Moreover, the committee members were confused by the English words ‘bank’ and ‘shoal’. Both words mean an area of shallow sea: the former describes a raised area of sea bed, the latter is a nautical expression derived from Old English meaning ‘shallow’. However, the committee chose to translate both into Chinese as tan, which has the ambiguous translation of ‘sandbank’, a feature that might be above or below water. This way they created several islands that never existed!
A great read, recommended!
December 1, 2020
Having read now quite a few histories of 'China' (see what i did there?), of greater or lesser scope and detail, to encounter this book which turns what one thought one knew on its head is highly thought provoking. The book makes a plausible case for the possibility that what we think of today as China, as a unified polity with a long and venerable history is actually a recent invention of 20th Century revolutionary nationalist scholars and activists. An invention based on the West's own misunderstandings of what and where China is that has resulted in a triumph of propagandist engineering. The fact is that there never has been a place or a group of people that called itself China until the Nationalist revolution of 1912, that saw the final dissolution of the Manchu Qing dynasty. The Chinese words that we translate today into China are Zhongguo and Zhonghua, meaning respectively Central State or Central Civilisation, and were only ever used to refer to a small polity in the Yellow River Basin, back before the First Empire was established. The Territory we think of as China has, much like Europe, seen an evolving array of polities come and go through conflict and assimilation on behalf of numerous ethnicities, real or imagined, and language groups over millenia. From this perspective it starts to look a bit like calling Europe Germany, because some time ago that polity maximally dominated the continent. Or indeed, as Tang dynasty emperors once did, calling Europe Frankia and Europeans Franks because once that polity came to dominate there.
The author has clearly conducted very detailed research in support of these arguments to produce a conclusion that it was Chinese students, sent abroad to study, who became radicalised to establish an agenda for a new Nation that could sustain the full territorial claims of 'The Great Manchu State' as its inhabitants referred to it, but more, leverage the then fashionable ideas of Social Darwinism to ensure Han ethnic supremacy within that state, having evicted the current Manchu rulers. The issue of who indeed was Han and who not was never quite resolved. Everywhere these students went they were mystified to hear foreigners refer to their homeland as 'China', but in their plans for a new nation it became the right catch-all word for the dream they wanted to promote.
A little reflection will show the implications of all this for China's foreign policy today; its numerous seemingly absurd territorial claims, both land and maritime; the frightening treatment of its minorities; and the curious obligations it is attempting to assert on its diaspora. From this perspective the logic of these policies starts to make a queer sort of sense.
This is not a book with which to start one's investigations into the history of the vast land we call China, (for that i would reccomend John Keay's, concise as possible but no more, opus) but it is a book that anyone seriously interested in China needs to read and consider before they conclude they have a comprehensive idea of what a 'true' history of 'China' might be.
The author has clearly conducted very detailed research in support of these arguments to produce a conclusion that it was Chinese students, sent abroad to study, who became radicalised to establish an agenda for a new Nation that could sustain the full territorial claims of 'The Great Manchu State' as its inhabitants referred to it, but more, leverage the then fashionable ideas of Social Darwinism to ensure Han ethnic supremacy within that state, having evicted the current Manchu rulers. The issue of who indeed was Han and who not was never quite resolved. Everywhere these students went they were mystified to hear foreigners refer to their homeland as 'China', but in their plans for a new nation it became the right catch-all word for the dream they wanted to promote.
A little reflection will show the implications of all this for China's foreign policy today; its numerous seemingly absurd territorial claims, both land and maritime; the frightening treatment of its minorities; and the curious obligations it is attempting to assert on its diaspora. From this perspective the logic of these policies starts to make a queer sort of sense.
This is not a book with which to start one's investigations into the history of the vast land we call China, (for that i would reccomend John Keay's, concise as possible but no more, opus) but it is a book that anyone seriously interested in China needs to read and consider before they conclude they have a comprehensive idea of what a 'true' history of 'China' might be.
September 9, 2023
In some ways, this book is less iconoclastic than it first appears. Its central thesis that China as a nation-state and national identity as it is now was constructed over the past 150 years on political and anthropological concepts introduced from the West. This is, of course, true for most nations.
However, in seeking to dismantle the narrative that China is 5,000-year-old civilisation that throughout its history has been, with a few exceptions, a unified country on a single piece of territory, with a majority people, culture and language, Hayton overstates his case. He seems to fail to grasp the force of his own argument: that the markers of nationhood and group identity he surveys—a state name; national sovereignty tied to a Chinese ethnicity; a single, majority Chinese language; and a territory with a defined border—are Modern, Western concepts of what defines a state; and, therefore, the fact that the “great states” (it’s not clear why the term “empire” is rejected) that preceded the Republic of China lacked these markers is not evidence that a Chinese cultural identity and political entity did not exist prior to 1912.
The book’s main strength is in demonstrating how the current regime’s narrative of national history is anachronistic, and built upon fragile and dangerous conceptions of nationalism, race, and progress that have largely been abandoned by the Western powers that invented them.
It’s also fascinating read.
4 stars.
However, in seeking to dismantle the narrative that China is 5,000-year-old civilisation that throughout its history has been, with a few exceptions, a unified country on a single piece of territory, with a majority people, culture and language, Hayton overstates his case. He seems to fail to grasp the force of his own argument: that the markers of nationhood and group identity he surveys—a state name; national sovereignty tied to a Chinese ethnicity; a single, majority Chinese language; and a territory with a defined border—are Modern, Western concepts of what defines a state; and, therefore, the fact that the “great states” (it’s not clear why the term “empire” is rejected) that preceded the Republic of China lacked these markers is not evidence that a Chinese cultural identity and political entity did not exist prior to 1912.
The book’s main strength is in demonstrating how the current regime’s narrative of national history is anachronistic, and built upon fragile and dangerous conceptions of nationalism, race, and progress that have largely been abandoned by the Western powers that invented them.
It’s also fascinating read.
4 stars.
December 25, 2024
so stupid! oh my god. what is this guy smoking? guys! did you know china was just made up by some random westerners? just classic stuff coming from an ex bbc reporter turned 'academic' hypothesising on china's imminent implosion. another guy who thinks he can read xi's mind...see below the conclusion to this embarrassment:
"Eventually, European governments agreed to attenuate their nationalist urges and form cooperative supranational structures in order to avoid future destruction. They also de-centralised power and created federal systems to give more space for minorities. The result has been decades of peace, freedom and an upsurge in prosperity. The People’s Republic of China does not seem ready to learn from that experience. The question the world faces is whether its leadership is heading in the opposite direction: down a darkly familiar path towards fascism." (p. 247)
"Xi’s China is not a happy place. It is dogmatic and coercive, anxious and unsure, fearful that its unity may come unzipped at any moment. The myths will hold it together for a while, but the fracture lines within the Zhonghua minzu were there from the start." (p. 249)
"Eventually, European governments agreed to attenuate their nationalist urges and form cooperative supranational structures in order to avoid future destruction. They also de-centralised power and created federal systems to give more space for minorities. The result has been decades of peace, freedom and an upsurge in prosperity. The People’s Republic of China does not seem ready to learn from that experience. The question the world faces is whether its leadership is heading in the opposite direction: down a darkly familiar path towards fascism." (p. 247)
"Xi’s China is not a happy place. It is dogmatic and coercive, anxious and unsure, fearful that its unity may come unzipped at any moment. The myths will hold it together for a while, but the fracture lines within the Zhonghua minzu were there from the start." (p. 249)
June 14, 2024
This books provides excellent insight into how China has been conceptually invented during the 20th century, and the role of individuals across the Qing dynasty, the Republic and the People's Republic in this formation. Hayton's emphasis on individuality sheds light on not just national experiences but deeply personal experiences that can often be forgotten about in the grand scheme of Chinese history, such as the effect on life that the transition from the old Great State dynasties to a Republic had.
Particularly, it was interesting to see how much of China's nationalism derives not from ancient authority but from ideas brought over from the West in the last century and a half. Hayton does a great job of demonstrating this both through the assimilation of national territory, a shared history and of language, also emphasising the role that scientific racism had to play in this story.
What this book is most useful for is understanding why exactly China is in the strategic position it is today, and why the growing tensions surrounding Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea are going to shape global geopolitics for decades.
Particularly, it was interesting to see how much of China's nationalism derives not from ancient authority but from ideas brought over from the West in the last century and a half. Hayton does a great job of demonstrating this both through the assimilation of national territory, a shared history and of language, also emphasising the role that scientific racism had to play in this story.
What this book is most useful for is understanding why exactly China is in the strategic position it is today, and why the growing tensions surrounding Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea are going to shape global geopolitics for decades.
July 6, 2022
As a Chinese, I get a glimpse of the true history of my home country. The content of this book matched my experience both in real life and on the internet. I am very thankful that the author put together such a great book.
I would recommend it to everyone who is interested in China’s modern politics.
I would recommend it to everyone who is interested in China’s modern politics.
January 30, 2024
Probably not the best book to start learning about Chinese culture - a history background is required for better understanding.
Chinese (Qing) empire almost uniquely had to go through re-definition of themselves as a nation, state and historical entity when clashed with Western way of seeing the world. Things that seem to be so obvious to us now had no meaning to them; and the way they were translated was through finding analogies and synonyms in language that was based on completely different set of values and beliefs.
It’s easy to forget that we are not all thinking and living the same values and ideas about world in general. Something so normal for Europeans and Americans can be mind blowing for Chinese and vice versa. Think about it next time you are watching the news and thinking why are they all not running away from this madhouse?!
The last two chapters are written almost like a detective, very engaging and interesting story of how the borders and maritime territorial claims were done. If you don’t have time or patience for the whole book - at least take a look at these.
Chinese (Qing) empire almost uniquely had to go through re-definition of themselves as a nation, state and historical entity when clashed with Western way of seeing the world. Things that seem to be so obvious to us now had no meaning to them; and the way they were translated was through finding analogies and synonyms in language that was based on completely different set of values and beliefs.
It’s easy to forget that we are not all thinking and living the same values and ideas about world in general. Something so normal for Europeans and Americans can be mind blowing for Chinese and vice versa. Think about it next time you are watching the news and thinking why are they all not running away from this madhouse?!
The last two chapters are written almost like a detective, very engaging and interesting story of how the borders and maritime territorial claims were done. If you don’t have time or patience for the whole book - at least take a look at these.
October 16, 2025
This was insanely good. All nations are on notice. Every narrative is flimsy as hell under this microscope
January 28, 2021
This is a difficult book to review, especially given complex geo-political machinations at the time of reading.
On one level it accommodates those without a deep knowledge of Chinese (or even so-called modern) history but on another it delves deeper into specific themes than initially expected.
All larger countries, and many smaller ones, have travelled a crooked path across many centuries in a way that continues to inform their early 21st C narrative. The leadership of China is not alone in massaging and manipulating this. Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, the USA all leap immediately to mind.
That said, bringing these reference points out into the open has power. As Mark Twain observed, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes”. Some might say Hayton's book promotes anti-Chinese sentiment but I think its greatest value is in raising awareness of how certain decisions made at critical junctures in history echo long afterward ... within what we currently understand to be China, and elsewhere.
On one level it accommodates those without a deep knowledge of Chinese (or even so-called modern) history but on another it delves deeper into specific themes than initially expected.
All larger countries, and many smaller ones, have travelled a crooked path across many centuries in a way that continues to inform their early 21st C narrative. The leadership of China is not alone in massaging and manipulating this. Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, the USA all leap immediately to mind.
That said, bringing these reference points out into the open has power. As Mark Twain observed, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes”. Some might say Hayton's book promotes anti-Chinese sentiment but I think its greatest value is in raising awareness of how certain decisions made at critical junctures in history echo long afterward ... within what we currently understand to be China, and elsewhere.
February 15, 2024
I'm lukewarm on this, but I also found it very useful in a way I wasn't expecting. I am living and China and, as a result, doing the best I can to read up on its history. I came across this book on a reddit threat while trying to find straight-shooter books about China (I don't want to read CCP propaganda, but I also don't want to read Western hatred/scorn of China).
My initial thoughts while reading this were skeptical: Bill Hayton's whole thesis seems to be predicated on the idea that "China" was desperate to model itself over the West, and thus erased diverse histories, lied about its composition, and generally homogenized everything it could. While I don't think Hayton's assessment of Chinas "invention" was wrong, and I did find it well supported, I was repeatedly frustrated that it felt like he was discussing it as China (and I am using this phrase to underscore the point) "kowtowing" to the mighty, inspired West when I felt it should be a discussion of how the brutal imperialism/colonialism of the west forced certain concessions. Additionally, throughout the book I was consternate that Hayton appeared to be chronicling China's "invention" as a uniquely narrative myth construction, rather than something all powerful nations are guilty of.
By the prologue, Hayton had mentioned that China's mythical narrative was similar to the myth constructions of nations like Germany, the US, and India, but to me this was not enough, and expansion on it would have been a far more interesting book. In some respects, this book may have worked better as a collection of case studies. I don't know that I agree that China's "construction" is a product of a desire to emulate the west, rather than an act of necessity engaged in by an ancient, diverse peoples desperate to maintain their rich cultural history while also throwing off the yoke of the colonizing west.
That all said, by the end of this book, I did realize my approach to learning about China is wrong. Hayton's reflection on the invention of mythical narratives and China's promulgation of them kept me on edge as I wanted to say "but the U.S. does this too, so this book isn't some got-ya moment" - and that was where it clicked for me. If someone new to the U.S. were to ask me what they could read to get a good grasp on the U.S. and its history, my instinctive recommendations would be influenced by my experiences as a white, cis, post-graduate educated, female American in an upper tax bracket. And what I instantly think of as "American" or "U.S. history" would be vastly different from other people's to an extent. Yes, there are the facts, but a quick perusal of "Lies My Teacher Told Me" will quickly inform anyone that the U.S. is just as guilty of crafting its own national myths. Thus, my approach to "learning about China" needs to be more nuanced and accepting of the fact that "China" is as unique, diverse, and in some ways niche as my own huge country, and there is no silver bullet book to encompass that.
I mean, what would I recommend about the U.S. "Lies My Teacher Told Me" ? "A People's History of the United States" ? "Democracy in America" ? "The Federalist Papers" ? "Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee" ?I'd recommend all of them, and they'd tell you different things. So going forward, I will just read about the many faces of China in the richest ways I can.
Kudos to this book for making me think; I do think it is an interesting book to read about the current government's efforts to homogenize and mythologize the past. I just think it fails in assigning motivation for that effort, and also does too little to acknowledge that this is the template of many when it comes to world power nation building.
My initial thoughts while reading this were skeptical: Bill Hayton's whole thesis seems to be predicated on the idea that "China" was desperate to model itself over the West, and thus erased diverse histories, lied about its composition, and generally homogenized everything it could. While I don't think Hayton's assessment of Chinas "invention" was wrong, and I did find it well supported, I was repeatedly frustrated that it felt like he was discussing it as China (and I am using this phrase to underscore the point) "kowtowing" to the mighty, inspired West when I felt it should be a discussion of how the brutal imperialism/colonialism of the west forced certain concessions. Additionally, throughout the book I was consternate that Hayton appeared to be chronicling China's "invention" as a uniquely narrative myth construction, rather than something all powerful nations are guilty of.
By the prologue, Hayton had mentioned that China's mythical narrative was similar to the myth constructions of nations like Germany, the US, and India, but to me this was not enough, and expansion on it would have been a far more interesting book. In some respects, this book may have worked better as a collection of case studies. I don't know that I agree that China's "construction" is a product of a desire to emulate the west, rather than an act of necessity engaged in by an ancient, diverse peoples desperate to maintain their rich cultural history while also throwing off the yoke of the colonizing west.
That all said, by the end of this book, I did realize my approach to learning about China is wrong. Hayton's reflection on the invention of mythical narratives and China's promulgation of them kept me on edge as I wanted to say "but the U.S. does this too, so this book isn't some got-ya moment" - and that was where it clicked for me. If someone new to the U.S. were to ask me what they could read to get a good grasp on the U.S. and its history, my instinctive recommendations would be influenced by my experiences as a white, cis, post-graduate educated, female American in an upper tax bracket. And what I instantly think of as "American" or "U.S. history" would be vastly different from other people's to an extent. Yes, there are the facts, but a quick perusal of "Lies My Teacher Told Me" will quickly inform anyone that the U.S. is just as guilty of crafting its own national myths. Thus, my approach to "learning about China" needs to be more nuanced and accepting of the fact that "China" is as unique, diverse, and in some ways niche as my own huge country, and there is no silver bullet book to encompass that.
I mean, what would I recommend about the U.S. "Lies My Teacher Told Me" ? "A People's History of the United States" ? "Democracy in America" ? "The Federalist Papers" ? "Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee" ?I'd recommend all of them, and they'd tell you different things. So going forward, I will just read about the many faces of China in the richest ways I can.
Kudos to this book for making me think; I do think it is an interesting book to read about the current government's efforts to homogenize and mythologize the past. I just think it fails in assigning motivation for that effort, and also does too little to acknowledge that this is the template of many when it comes to world power nation building.
June 9, 2021
If material forces give weight, ideas give direction. In The Invention of China, Bill Hayton shows how both non-Chinese ideas, and ideas molded by Chinese thinkers helped to create the way that modern China thinks of and defines itself.
At heart, Hayton seeks to challenge the notion that China after a blip in the 19th & early 20th century, is merely returning to its 5000 years of historical pre-eminence and significance. Rather, he shows that much about what China is - where it is, who is in it, how it thinks of itself, even its very name 'China' - are products of the last 150 years, if not even younger.
This is not so much an intellectual history as a history of intellectuals. Hayton shows how many european ideas, such as Social Darwininsm, sovereignty and nationalism were adapted and introduced by Chinese thinkers into their society, with profound effects. He charts how the role of chance and circumstance - such as how otherwise obscure non-official map makers translated british texts or drew their lines a century ago - now leads to the threat of war in the South China Sea.
Hayton's skill is as a translator of academic work, synthesizing and bringing together important strands to tell a larger story. While I'm not a China specialist, I know of some of this work, and indeed there is a strong academic foundation the20.re (such as work showing the influence of Japan on Chinese economic thinking post WW2). Hayton has a clear personal position - one that seems to harden significantly as the book goes on - but has provided a credible and engaging account of the flow of ideas into China and its changes.
On one hand, this is an important book because the narratives we tell are crucial to how we see the world. We err in seeing China as somehow impervious to change, always its own unique stream, rather than part of the global exchange of ideas. Indeed, Hayton ends by arguing China today is less Chinese (in the sense of reflecting the 5000 years before) and more a by-product of the 1930s, nationalist and socialist, ready to fight wars over territory (Taiwan, James Shoal) which as a nation it had ignored or only came to claim by happenstance along the way.
On the other hand, the size of China's material forces are so large that even if 'happenstance' is how they got here, poking a hole in the CCP's narrative doesn't really do much to change. They won't abandon the demand to control Taiwan once they learn that the Ching empire and early Republican government had almost no historic claim to the island (and indeed legally abandoned it to Japan just before the 20th century). Change is possible, these ideas matter, but it also feels slightly academic, even more so because Hayton clearly seems to wish the book would matter more for current politics.
If this is a story of ideas flowing into China, the reader is left to wonder whether future books will chart the flow of ideas out of China into other prominent countries around the world. Not in the crude 'Beijing consensus' model the odd authoritarian might try to emulate, but the way deep ideas about how society should be organised, the relationship between people and their government and the kinds of communities we build may change in the coming century.
The sad part is, the china of 5000 years is a much more viable regional and global power, one that may be better suited to a modern world, than the CCP led menace currently claiming its authority while thinking in terms of outdated European ideas of nationalism, race and intense sovereign authority.
At heart, Hayton seeks to challenge the notion that China after a blip in the 19th & early 20th century, is merely returning to its 5000 years of historical pre-eminence and significance. Rather, he shows that much about what China is - where it is, who is in it, how it thinks of itself, even its very name 'China' - are products of the last 150 years, if not even younger.
This is not so much an intellectual history as a history of intellectuals. Hayton shows how many european ideas, such as Social Darwininsm, sovereignty and nationalism were adapted and introduced by Chinese thinkers into their society, with profound effects. He charts how the role of chance and circumstance - such as how otherwise obscure non-official map makers translated british texts or drew their lines a century ago - now leads to the threat of war in the South China Sea.
Hayton's skill is as a translator of academic work, synthesizing and bringing together important strands to tell a larger story. While I'm not a China specialist, I know of some of this work, and indeed there is a strong academic foundation the20.re (such as work showing the influence of Japan on Chinese economic thinking post WW2). Hayton has a clear personal position - one that seems to harden significantly as the book goes on - but has provided a credible and engaging account of the flow of ideas into China and its changes.
On one hand, this is an important book because the narratives we tell are crucial to how we see the world. We err in seeing China as somehow impervious to change, always its own unique stream, rather than part of the global exchange of ideas. Indeed, Hayton ends by arguing China today is less Chinese (in the sense of reflecting the 5000 years before) and more a by-product of the 1930s, nationalist and socialist, ready to fight wars over territory (Taiwan, James Shoal) which as a nation it had ignored or only came to claim by happenstance along the way.
On the other hand, the size of China's material forces are so large that even if 'happenstance' is how they got here, poking a hole in the CCP's narrative doesn't really do much to change. They won't abandon the demand to control Taiwan once they learn that the Ching empire and early Republican government had almost no historic claim to the island (and indeed legally abandoned it to Japan just before the 20th century). Change is possible, these ideas matter, but it also feels slightly academic, even more so because Hayton clearly seems to wish the book would matter more for current politics.
If this is a story of ideas flowing into China, the reader is left to wonder whether future books will chart the flow of ideas out of China into other prominent countries around the world. Not in the crude 'Beijing consensus' model the odd authoritarian might try to emulate, but the way deep ideas about how society should be organised, the relationship between people and their government and the kinds of communities we build may change in the coming century.
The sad part is, the china of 5000 years is a much more viable regional and global power, one that may be better suited to a modern world, than the CCP led menace currently claiming its authority while thinking in terms of outdated European ideas of nationalism, race and intense sovereign authority.
January 13, 2022
The Invention of China
By Bill Hayton
8/10
‘What kind of country is China going to become? We know it will be huge in population and, if the present trends continue, economically strong and militarily powerful.’
The Invention of China was published in 2020, my copy clocks in at 249 pages.
I am absolutely fascinated with the subject of China, it astounds me and I watch and read as much about China and Japan for that matter as I possibly can. Bill Hayton’s The Invention of China however, made me realise just how complex a country China actually is. From the invention of language to their history and cartography, this book covers (in depth) almost all of China’s most important history and the struggles and dramatis personae who made the PRC what it is today. Not all of it is pretty, most of it is violent and ugly but the truth in these pages is something that we all should be aware of as China becomes a dominant superpower. The Invention of China is extremely accessible and very readable. Even though the subject matter is quite literally foreign and sometimes super hard to understand I never felt totally lost, the reader is in good hands with Bill Hayton. If I had any gripes about the book it would be that it doesn’t really go into Mao Zedong’s era of China- an era which I’m fascinated by because it’s an era of chaos and totalitarianism. This may not seem pivotal to the invention of modern China but Mao’s rule was instrumental to the re-invention of China, regardless of how barbaric it was. As I finished this book I’ve chosen a couple of books which may be good for further reading (I’ve read both in the past and feel they’d complement The Invention of China very well.) The first is “Mao” by Michael Lynch which offers a close deep-dive into Mao’s life and rise to power. The second is “Behind the Wall” by Colin Thubron a travel book published in 1987 which gives the reader a fascinating view of life in China before the country modernised into the superpower it is today.
By Bill Hayton
8/10
‘What kind of country is China going to become? We know it will be huge in population and, if the present trends continue, economically strong and militarily powerful.’
The Invention of China was published in 2020, my copy clocks in at 249 pages.
I am absolutely fascinated with the subject of China, it astounds me and I watch and read as much about China and Japan for that matter as I possibly can. Bill Hayton’s The Invention of China however, made me realise just how complex a country China actually is. From the invention of language to their history and cartography, this book covers (in depth) almost all of China’s most important history and the struggles and dramatis personae who made the PRC what it is today. Not all of it is pretty, most of it is violent and ugly but the truth in these pages is something that we all should be aware of as China becomes a dominant superpower. The Invention of China is extremely accessible and very readable. Even though the subject matter is quite literally foreign and sometimes super hard to understand I never felt totally lost, the reader is in good hands with Bill Hayton. If I had any gripes about the book it would be that it doesn’t really go into Mao Zedong’s era of China- an era which I’m fascinated by because it’s an era of chaos and totalitarianism. This may not seem pivotal to the invention of modern China but Mao’s rule was instrumental to the re-invention of China, regardless of how barbaric it was. As I finished this book I’ve chosen a couple of books which may be good for further reading (I’ve read both in the past and feel they’d complement The Invention of China very well.) The first is “Mao” by Michael Lynch which offers a close deep-dive into Mao’s life and rise to power. The second is “Behind the Wall” by Colin Thubron a travel book published in 1987 which gives the reader a fascinating view of life in China before the country modernised into the superpower it is today.
July 11, 2023
What is "China"? The author convincingly shows how the concept of a distinct "nation" with defined borders is a pure Western idea, borrowed by early twentieth century reformers who wanted to overthrow the foreign Manchus who had ruled for centuries. But the Manchu, like the dynasties before them and the people they ruled, thought of themselves more like what we would call a "realm".
Even the term 中国 itself is an invention of people who were inspired by the Western idea that there is a such thing as a country, as opposed to the more traditional Chinese idea of "Great States" (大明国) organized around an emperor who oversaw all under heaven. (天下) .
Even today, amid a half-century of concerted centralization effort by the CCP, Chinese people have a loyalty to their regional identity that can be difficult for Westerners to understand.
As the author concludes:
Even the term 中国 itself is an invention of people who were inspired by the Western idea that there is a such thing as a country, as opposed to the more traditional Chinese idea of "Great States" (大明国) organized around an emperor who oversaw all under heaven. (天下) .
Even today, amid a half-century of concerted centralization effort by the CCP, Chinese people have a loyalty to their regional identity that can be difficult for Westerners to understand.
As the author concludes:
What does Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ offer to the world? It increasingly feels like a dream from the 1930s: a recipe for destructive nostalgia. It is founded upon a view of the past forged a century ago in very particular circumstances and influenced by European concepts that Europe has now mostly dispensed with. The desire for homogeneity at home and respect abroad has resulted in suppression at home and threats abroad. Xi’s China is not a happy place. It is dogmatic and coercive, anxious and unsure, fearful that its unity may come unzipped at any moment. The myths will hold it together for a while, but the fracture lines within the Zhonghua minzu were there from the start.
June 28, 2021
There are a lot of patriotic or tratorous books that have an opposing standpoint. But without perspective taking and analysis, these books only become an outlet to unleash strong personal emotions. Its always good to read a book that could fortify its point of view with solid evidence and grounded counter-arguments. #theinventionofchina is written by a bbc journalist who had decades of research to the region termed “China”. As suggested by the book, China invents his own definition of “soverneighty”, “Chinese history”, “national identity” and “maritime claim”. I hate to admit the fact that I could be a dissenter of the great China Dream as I gave 5 stars to this book. Many foreign commentators have the illusion that “Han China” has the 5000 years of civilization and its population evolved separately from the rest of the humanity. They believe China has a special place at the top of the imperial order.A delusion is a belief that is out of the touch from the reality. And Bill Hayton explains why their belief is merely a delusion. “Xi’s China” is not upholding domestic sovereignty , instead it excludes the dissenters and creates their own “international norms” , whether on human rights or climate changes. The future of the great land to be concluded in one line “The myths will hold it together for a while, but the fracture lines were there from the start”.
March 14, 2023
This is a good history of the claims that underpin contemporary Chinese nationalism. In short, Hayton argues that a lot of it was only formulated at the start of the 20th century, despite official rhetoric that they've been true for thousands of years.
This is definitely well worth-reading because of its focus on the construction of Chinese nationalism, about which I don't think any other books have so far zeroed in on. In that sense it's a great summary of the events and key players of Chinese history. However, when read on its own it may give off the impression that the Chinese example is singularly atrocious. The reality is that most claims to nationalism, regardless of the country, were formulated from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th. Invention is the rule, not the exception.
But if you read this in the context of other similar history books that deal with the nationalisms and official histories of other countries, then the tone of the book won't really be an issue. But on its own outside of those contexts it can be quite misleading.
Overall, I would still recommend this book. I'd especially love to continue learning more about how Western conceptions of sovereignty, borders, race, and others, influenced the political development of countries elsewhere.
This is definitely well worth-reading because of its focus on the construction of Chinese nationalism, about which I don't think any other books have so far zeroed in on. In that sense it's a great summary of the events and key players of Chinese history. However, when read on its own it may give off the impression that the Chinese example is singularly atrocious. The reality is that most claims to nationalism, regardless of the country, were formulated from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th. Invention is the rule, not the exception.
But if you read this in the context of other similar history books that deal with the nationalisms and official histories of other countries, then the tone of the book won't really be an issue. But on its own outside of those contexts it can be quite misleading.
Overall, I would still recommend this book. I'd especially love to continue learning more about how Western conceptions of sovereignty, borders, race, and others, influenced the political development of countries elsewhere.
January 15, 2023
This book with its provocative title about the invention of China goes through the history of the collapse of the Qing empire to the nation state we know today as China, and attempts to explain how current geopolitical tensions come from the course of history as China adopted western ideas about nation states. Although there is a one disclaimer at the beginning of the book that all nations are essentially 'invented', going through another 250 pages explaining the happenstance that caused the creation of China could have greatly benefited from more comparison / contextualisation. The book is well written in the sense that it compartmentalises into chapters the invention of Chinese Han Race / Chinese Language / Concept of China / Chinese territory /Continuous Chinese history etc. and this could have been easily improved by direct comparison to other nation building projects (e.g. erasure of regional languages in France or the 'historical continuity' of Ancient Greece and India). Furthermore, there are minor factual errors, like sinitic topolects spoken in Taiwan (should be Hokkien and Hakka, not Hokkien and Cantonese). Nevertheless it is worth the read, taken with a grain of salt, and a few scoops of context.
August 5, 2025
The author demonstrates remarkable skill in articulating the history of modern China with concise and precise language, ultimately addressing how “China” and the “Chinese nation” were constructed.
Most of modern nation-states are not organic communities; they are products of power and institutional design. Especially under totalitarian regimes, nation-building/inventing is inherently paradoxical: the state must integrate diverse groups to maintain unity, yet every "institutional legacy" left by this process can later become a weapon for marginalized groups to construct their own identities and separatist movements.
This paradox can be understood through the analogy of entropy. The totalitarian state is like a closed system trying to maintain a low-entropy state, constantly expending energy to counter social diversity. However, this apparent stability is sustained by constant tension. Once this energy input ceases, the system naturally moves toward maximum entropy: identities fragment, structures collapse.
China’s nation-state construction is a typical example. It forcefully constructed the notions of “China（中国）” and the “Chinese nation（中华民族）” through totalitarian means, based on the multiethnic territory inherited from the Qing Empire, replacing identity-based integration with suppressive unification. As a result, the so-called “Chinese national community” resembles more of a low-entropy illusion sustained by high-intensity effort. In the long run, this very structure contains the seeds of its own deconstruction, and entropy—the dissolution of the community—might be the true direction of history.
Most of modern nation-states are not organic communities; they are products of power and institutional design. Especially under totalitarian regimes, nation-building/inventing is inherently paradoxical: the state must integrate diverse groups to maintain unity, yet every "institutional legacy" left by this process can later become a weapon for marginalized groups to construct their own identities and separatist movements.
This paradox can be understood through the analogy of entropy. The totalitarian state is like a closed system trying to maintain a low-entropy state, constantly expending energy to counter social diversity. However, this apparent stability is sustained by constant tension. Once this energy input ceases, the system naturally moves toward maximum entropy: identities fragment, structures collapse.
China’s nation-state construction is a typical example. It forcefully constructed the notions of “China（中国）” and the “Chinese nation（中华民族）” through totalitarian means, based on the multiethnic territory inherited from the Qing Empire, replacing identity-based integration with suppressive unification. As a result, the so-called “Chinese national community” resembles more of a low-entropy illusion sustained by high-intensity effort. In the long run, this very structure contains the seeds of its own deconstruction, and entropy—the dissolution of the community—might be the true direction of history.
January 11, 2025
It is common for people to have the presumption that in some way or another a state called ‘China’ has existed for many thousands of years as one of the oldest continuous civilisations on earth. However, in his book: ‘The Invention of China,’ Bill Hayton takes an eye-opening look into the manufacturing of a Chinese language, culture, people, history, and territory which up until the late 19th century would have seemed alien to those living within the borders of modern China. For anyone with an interest in contemporary China this will make for a fascinating read.
Hayton tells the story of a small number of Qing Dynasty thinkers and officials with whom the existence of modern China can arguably be credited. Throughout the book he reveals how this small group of intellectuals condensed a vast and ancient history of Central Asian groups and cultures into a single state. One that fit the western mould of a country that they believed necessary for the survival of their peoples. All the more fascinating is the way the book illustrates the adoption of many of these ideas by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Whilst at first one might assume the CCP would do everything in their power to distance themselves from the imperial Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China they would hastily adopt the same ideas invented under both states.
It goes without saying that this book is intended for those with a least a moderate knowledge of Chinese history. With a rush of new information entering and being called back to from previous chapters, at times the book can be hard to follow. However, the breadth of information available in the work is undeniably what would make this book engaging to those with an interest in China. Capitalising on this point, the book contains an extensive further reading list and is well referenced making it suitable for research.
In summary, whilst certainly a book for those who are already familiar with its subject matter, Hayton writes a compelling read about a topic rarely featured in literature about the modern Chinese state and the CCP. It is certainly worth a read for those with an interest in modern Chinese politics, giving readers a valuable layer of context to one of the world's most powerful states.
Hayton tells the story of a small number of Qing Dynasty thinkers and officials with whom the existence of modern China can arguably be credited. Throughout the book he reveals how this small group of intellectuals condensed a vast and ancient history of Central Asian groups and cultures into a single state. One that fit the western mould of a country that they believed necessary for the survival of their peoples. All the more fascinating is the way the book illustrates the adoption of many of these ideas by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Whilst at first one might assume the CCP would do everything in their power to distance themselves from the imperial Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China they would hastily adopt the same ideas invented under both states.
It goes without saying that this book is intended for those with a least a moderate knowledge of Chinese history. With a rush of new information entering and being called back to from previous chapters, at times the book can be hard to follow. However, the breadth of information available in the work is undeniably what would make this book engaging to those with an interest in China. Capitalising on this point, the book contains an extensive further reading list and is well referenced making it suitable for research.
In summary, whilst certainly a book for those who are already familiar with its subject matter, Hayton writes a compelling read about a topic rarely featured in literature about the modern Chinese state and the CCP. It is certainly worth a read for those with an interest in modern Chinese politics, giving readers a valuable layer of context to one of the world's most powerful states.
December 1, 2020
This is an amazing story about how the foundational concepts of a nation are all relatively new, and mostly in response to intervention by foreigners within the last 150 years. Fascinating. Hayton covers the word "China" itself, Chinese sovereignty, the Han "race," Chinese history, the concept of a Chinese nation, Chinese language, national territory, and maritime claims (OK, I just cribbed the Table of Contents, but it's a good list). The chapters weave together as they go along, with lots of callbacks to thinkers, politicians, generals...and the foreigners who forced them to react. The knowledge in the book will probably not prepare the reader to change the mind of a Chinese politician or diplomat, but I think it does provide a more clear and accurate way to think about China today. It de-mystifies things quite a bit. Also, the author is a journalist with a very readable writing style, which helps a lay reader like me.
September 10, 2023
Insightful piece about the formation of the modern Chinese political identity from the late Qing dynasty onwards, all framed in the context of today’s territorial disputes.
Not super convinced about some of the anecdotes but I guess that’s history.
I think this work is actually pretty balanced, even though my first impression was that the term ‘invention’ felt a bit antagonistic.
‘If we avoid the temptation to assume that China was a primordial territorial unit with natural boundaries, then we need to look at what happened in each period in its own terms. The story should be framed in a regional context, highlighting how peoples moved, states rose and fell, frontiers fluctuated, trade flowed and cultures hybridized. If we avoid assumptions about superiority and inferiority, we start to see the flows in the past as multi directional.’
Not super convinced about some of the anecdotes but I guess that’s history.
I think this work is actually pretty balanced, even though my first impression was that the term ‘invention’ felt a bit antagonistic.
‘If we avoid the temptation to assume that China was a primordial territorial unit with natural boundaries, then we need to look at what happened in each period in its own terms. The story should be framed in a regional context, highlighting how peoples moved, states rose and fell, frontiers fluctuated, trade flowed and cultures hybridized. If we avoid assumptions about superiority and inferiority, we start to see the flows in the past as multi directional.’
March 11, 2022
I really enjoyed this book. It's very clearly written, and stays focused its theme. It is thoroughly researched, covering the history of China. The author clearly demonstrates how the concept of modern China as a unified nation, of one primary ethnic group, speaking a single standardized language, with immutable boundaries is a recent construct. Ironically, this construct is built primarily on Western ideas and concepts of the mid-late 19th century.
I recommend this book to every political scientist, regional specialist, and wanna-be Sinologist as a good foundation from which to build an understanding of the PRC's view of itself and the myths that it perpetuates to justify its foreign policy.
I recommend this book to every political scientist, regional specialist, and wanna-be Sinologist as a good foundation from which to build an understanding of the PRC's view of itself and the myths that it perpetuates to justify its foreign policy.
July 17, 2024
Great idea for the book, great general thesis (i.e., revise the various naturalizing and reifying claims made by nationalists in China), but a bit of a slog. The story might have been better told chronologically, rather than divided into themes (China, Sovereignty, the Han Race, History, Nation, Language, Territory, Maritime Claim). That division means there is a *lot* of repetition, with the same people showing up time after time... but it's kind of hard to remember from one chapter to the next, tbh, who is who. I'm hoping that I'll be able to re-read individual chapters with profit, once I've got a bit more background knowledge. Couldn't do that with a more chronological book, so I should just shut up and enjoy, I guess.
January 20, 2021
Fascinating and entertaining read of how most of what we consider 'Chinese' and even 'China' itself is a modern construction or 'invention' starting in the late 19th century by a small group of rebel Chinese intellectuals. It is truly surprising that what people take for granted either didn't exist or wasn't thought about among the 'Chinese'. The book covers a wide range of topics in considerable depth for a small book. Anybody interested in China or who thinks they understand Chinese history and society needs to read this book for its contrarian perspective!
February 9, 2023
This book is essential for those who wish to understand the historical roots and emotional underpinnings of present-day China's politics, attitudes, and the way it presents itself to the world. By contradicting the Chinese Communist Party's official narratives on various topics, Hayton's work provokes the formation of counter-arguments necessary to paint a clearer picture of what China is, how it was invented, and its future place in the world.
August 2, 2023
Intermittently interesting in its exploration of Chinese intellectual culture in the late Qing and nationalist eras, if you can get past the patronising tone, but thoroughly unconvincing whenever it tries to connect all that to some big idea of 'why China is the way it is'. Regularly skips straight from 19th century exiles living in Japan to Xi Jinping in the 21st century. It's not like anything important happened between the two, I guess.
January 5, 2021
A book to be proud of. A fantastic synthesis of academic research in a contested space, which shines light on how political uses of nationalism in China distort the reality of language, geography, history and ethnicity in China. This book has prompted me to stop reading the next book/article about China beginning with the ‘100 years of shame’.
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