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On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines
On Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.
252 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 15, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
February 12, 2022
This is a book by a US military policy analyst attempting to clarify ideas regarding the “operational level” of military activities and the concepts around what is known as “operational art”. The book is organized in terms of a review of prior theory regarding these terms, a presentation of the author’s own theory of operations, and a series of five historical cases to provide examples of the argument.
I first heard about “operational art” during the press conference that General Schwarzkopf gave at the end of the ground attack in the first Gulf War in 1991. There, when asked about Saddam Hussein, he responded that Saddam was lacking is all aspects of military skill, including “operational art”. While I had some idea of what that meant then, I did not pursue it because there was little or no follow up. I could appreciate US military strategy and tactics without knowing about “operational art”.
Evidently I was not the only one a bit confused by the phrase and while I chalked it up to my not being familiar with current military doctrine, it turns out that there has been a bit of a continuing debate about the phrase among those who are supposed to know more about military doctrine. Mr. Friedman’s fairly short book is an effort to clear up the debate a bit and offer some clarifying advice. The audience appears to be military professionals and enthusiasts and in parts the book reads as if it is part of one or more continuing professional education profiles.
So what is the idea? Most avid readers will be familiar with military strategy and tactics. Strategy is broad-based “macro” focused and inclusive of a wide macro set of activities. Tactics are seen by many as more “micro” focused and situation, concerned with smaller units and teams in immediate combat situations. (There is much more to it, of course, and the book offers more details.)
Operations and the operational level developed as an intermediary level of analysis to fit in between strategy and tactics, given the rapid increase in the size and scale of wars since the time of Napoleon and the French Revolution. “Operational Art” is different and comprises the skills of organizing for battle across some area such as a campaign and it constitutes the supporting knowledge and resources that commanders need but does not interfere with the give and take between strategy and tactics.
So .,,, “operational level” is not defensible and has not advanced military effectiveness. “Operational Art” is defensible and has proven effective in aiding military operations. The actual arguments are more involved and worth reading.
I found this extended discussion of military theory and doctrine not very satisfying and it seemed as if this was more of a debate among professors and policy wonks than an argument with real import.
But it got a bit better, which made the book more worthwhile. It turns out that the real point is that “Operational Art” involves the building up of a significant performance-based structure to ensure that the military is professionally managed and a learning organizational with institutionalized structures that do not depend on political dynamics or the support of key personalities. Operational Art provides the skills and resources necessary to develop and maintain a capable military. This does not necessarily involve interfering with strategy and tactics, although that might happen.
In terms of style, the book comes across as stodgy and overwritten. The author could have made his points more effectively and kept with them through the text. The theory versus organization issue could be dispensed with so that the point about a supportive infrastructure could be made effectively. There were two chapters about a typology of campaigns later in the book, that just did not seem to fit well with the main concerns of the text.
Overall, the book was OK but could have been much better. He has another book on tactics that has been well received and I may take a look at it.
I first heard about “operational art” during the press conference that General Schwarzkopf gave at the end of the ground attack in the first Gulf War in 1991. There, when asked about Saddam Hussein, he responded that Saddam was lacking is all aspects of military skill, including “operational art”. While I had some idea of what that meant then, I did not pursue it because there was little or no follow up. I could appreciate US military strategy and tactics without knowing about “operational art”.
Evidently I was not the only one a bit confused by the phrase and while I chalked it up to my not being familiar with current military doctrine, it turns out that there has been a bit of a continuing debate about the phrase among those who are supposed to know more about military doctrine. Mr. Friedman’s fairly short book is an effort to clear up the debate a bit and offer some clarifying advice. The audience appears to be military professionals and enthusiasts and in parts the book reads as if it is part of one or more continuing professional education profiles.
So what is the idea? Most avid readers will be familiar with military strategy and tactics. Strategy is broad-based “macro” focused and inclusive of a wide macro set of activities. Tactics are seen by many as more “micro” focused and situation, concerned with smaller units and teams in immediate combat situations. (There is much more to it, of course, and the book offers more details.)
Operations and the operational level developed as an intermediary level of analysis to fit in between strategy and tactics, given the rapid increase in the size and scale of wars since the time of Napoleon and the French Revolution. “Operational Art” is different and comprises the skills of organizing for battle across some area such as a campaign and it constitutes the supporting knowledge and resources that commanders need but does not interfere with the give and take between strategy and tactics.
So .,,, “operational level” is not defensible and has not advanced military effectiveness. “Operational Art” is defensible and has proven effective in aiding military operations. The actual arguments are more involved and worth reading.
I found this extended discussion of military theory and doctrine not very satisfying and it seemed as if this was more of a debate among professors and policy wonks than an argument with real import.
But it got a bit better, which made the book more worthwhile. It turns out that the real point is that “Operational Art” involves the building up of a significant performance-based structure to ensure that the military is professionally managed and a learning organizational with institutionalized structures that do not depend on political dynamics or the support of key personalities. Operational Art provides the skills and resources necessary to develop and maintain a capable military. This does not necessarily involve interfering with strategy and tactics, although that might happen.
In terms of style, the book comes across as stodgy and overwritten. The author could have made his points more effectively and kept with them through the text. The theory versus organization issue could be dispensed with so that the point about a supportive infrastructure could be made effectively. There were two chapters about a typology of campaigns later in the book, that just did not seem to fit well with the main concerns of the text.
Overall, the book was OK but could have been much better. He has another book on tactics that has been well received and I may take a look at it.
December 31, 2024
First and foremost this is a book about military theory examining the use of the term operations as a echelon or level of combat situated between tactical and strategic. The author makes a very strong argument that not only does the operational level of execution not exist, adopting such a model impairs a military's ability to function, and decouples strategic goals from military objectives.
The book is well organized and easy to understand for anyone with a passing understanding of military history. There are some great insights into how the US military has found itself using the term operations in a way that is counter productive and instead should be focused on developing staff in the operational art of planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of tactics aimed at accomplishing a strategic effect. In closing the author provides five campaign case studies where he puts his theory to the test. Anyone interested in understanding how to evaluate the effectiveness of war in achieving a nation's strategic goals should find this book of great value.
The book is well organized and easy to understand for anyone with a passing understanding of military history. There are some great insights into how the US military has found itself using the term operations in a way that is counter productive and instead should be focused on developing staff in the operational art of planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of tactics aimed at accomplishing a strategic effect. In closing the author provides five campaign case studies where he puts his theory to the test. Anyone interested in understanding how to evaluate the effectiveness of war in achieving a nation's strategic goals should find this book of great value.
November 6, 2021
'The first business of theory', Carl von Clausewitz tells us, 'is to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together, and, we may say, entangled and confused'. By this score, On Operations succeeds admirably.
While it's common to find works of military history, finding good works of military theory is surprisingly hard. Many efforts read as if the author has something to sell you, adding new concepts and buzzwords. Or they care about theory only to give a sense of weight to the empirical discussion to come, which often proceeds without any relation to the theory before. This book takes a different approach. Friedman's goal instead is to put to the stake one commonly accepted idea: The Operational level.
The idea of an Operational level, sitting in between Tactics and Strategy seems to make intuitive sense in an era when armed forces have hundreds of thousands of troops, operate on land, sea, and sky, (if not space and cyber) and need to combine them all to drop a single bomb down a chimney somewhere on the other side of the globe. Yet, it has real problems as Friedman lays out. It breaks the link between tactics and strategy, ultimately to the cost of national strategy. It allows the military to pretend there is such thing as a 'politics free' zone, harming their contribution to strategy and civil-mil relations. It is absurd in terms of theory (since tactics and strategy are defined by logic not size) and it is unnecessary in practice. It's not the only reason, but it is an important part of why the US military has struggled so mightily since Vietnam to turn its awesome destructive power into the strategic effects its nation seeks.
Instead of a set level, Friedman argues for an 'Operational Art', which involves the 'planning, preparing, conducting and sustaining [of] tactics aimed at accomplishing strategic effect'. In short, it is the enabling work done by military staff. This, Friedman argues, tracing it back to Napoleon, is how armed forces began to deal with the problem of size, and when done well, remains an incredibly important - and underappreciated - element of strategic thought.
Reading this book, I was reminded of an argument by Andrew Marshall, that 'much of strategy and strategic thinking is essentially organisational in nature’. Both we, and our adversary operate through organisations, and their administration, logistics, processing and distribution of information, command structures and coordination all play critical roles in how violence is both organised and directed to political effect. And, like Friedman's earlier and outstanding book, On Tactics, this one shines in clearing away the brush, the jargon and nonsense and delivering a sparse set of logically distinct arguments about core military areas.
The only downside of this text is that it feels a little rushed. As if it had less time to gestate intellectually, and perhaps in the writing stage as well. The book has a harder task than On Tactics - both destruction and creation this time - and I felt as the reader I had to do more work to fill in and extend the arguments. There are a few awkward sections, repeated examples, typos, and odd editorial choices (such as a one page chapter which argues the topic is not significant enough to warrant inclusion in such a volume). Still, these are very small quibbles.
On Tactics, On Operations. The author hints at a future book on Strategy. I hope we see it, given the need for a similar clean up of that subject. Yet even more so I hope he and others will continue to write on military theory as it applies to tactics and the enabling of combat. It's far too little understood, especially by people such as myself, and is worth a thousand airport style military histories in adding to our knowledge of this most vital of areas.
While it's common to find works of military history, finding good works of military theory is surprisingly hard. Many efforts read as if the author has something to sell you, adding new concepts and buzzwords. Or they care about theory only to give a sense of weight to the empirical discussion to come, which often proceeds without any relation to the theory before. This book takes a different approach. Friedman's goal instead is to put to the stake one commonly accepted idea: The Operational level.
The idea of an Operational level, sitting in between Tactics and Strategy seems to make intuitive sense in an era when armed forces have hundreds of thousands of troops, operate on land, sea, and sky, (if not space and cyber) and need to combine them all to drop a single bomb down a chimney somewhere on the other side of the globe. Yet, it has real problems as Friedman lays out. It breaks the link between tactics and strategy, ultimately to the cost of national strategy. It allows the military to pretend there is such thing as a 'politics free' zone, harming their contribution to strategy and civil-mil relations. It is absurd in terms of theory (since tactics and strategy are defined by logic not size) and it is unnecessary in practice. It's not the only reason, but it is an important part of why the US military has struggled so mightily since Vietnam to turn its awesome destructive power into the strategic effects its nation seeks.
Instead of a set level, Friedman argues for an 'Operational Art', which involves the 'planning, preparing, conducting and sustaining [of] tactics aimed at accomplishing strategic effect'. In short, it is the enabling work done by military staff. This, Friedman argues, tracing it back to Napoleon, is how armed forces began to deal with the problem of size, and when done well, remains an incredibly important - and underappreciated - element of strategic thought.
Reading this book, I was reminded of an argument by Andrew Marshall, that 'much of strategy and strategic thinking is essentially organisational in nature’. Both we, and our adversary operate through organisations, and their administration, logistics, processing and distribution of information, command structures and coordination all play critical roles in how violence is both organised and directed to political effect. And, like Friedman's earlier and outstanding book, On Tactics, this one shines in clearing away the brush, the jargon and nonsense and delivering a sparse set of logically distinct arguments about core military areas.
The only downside of this text is that it feels a little rushed. As if it had less time to gestate intellectually, and perhaps in the writing stage as well. The book has a harder task than On Tactics - both destruction and creation this time - and I felt as the reader I had to do more work to fill in and extend the arguments. There are a few awkward sections, repeated examples, typos, and odd editorial choices (such as a one page chapter which argues the topic is not significant enough to warrant inclusion in such a volume). Still, these are very small quibbles.
On Tactics, On Operations. The author hints at a future book on Strategy. I hope we see it, given the need for a similar clean up of that subject. Yet even more so I hope he and others will continue to write on military theory as it applies to tactics and the enabling of combat. It's far too little understood, especially by people such as myself, and is worth a thousand airport style military histories in adding to our knowledge of this most vital of areas.
January 28, 2023
Army Command & General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) History course in a compelling narrative with, perhaps, a few different conclusions than Leavenworth might have taught you. Friedman uses historical examples and case studies to demonstrate the development of operations from Napoleon to modern-day western armies. He tackles the operational art v. operational level, and discusses whether the operational level even exists and is a useful construct (a contentious topic for many). Something for everyone, this book provides value to those just entering the staff ranks as well as those seasoned staff officers for whom much of this might just be a refresher.
October 12, 2024
Тема важлива, адже поняття оперативного рівня (і його похідних) активно використовується нашою армією.
Відірваність від стратегії, а також часте нерозуміння як працювати з підпорядкованими підрозділами - є типовими проблемами, описаними у книзі.
Псує враження як досить нудний виклад, так і неймовірно слабкий переклад книги. З'являється відчуття ніби читаєш машинний переклад без щонайменших правок.
Як підсумок, є над чим подумати, але книга буде цікава лише вузькому колу читачів.
Відірваність від стратегії, а також часте нерозуміння як працювати з підпорядкованими підрозділами - є типовими проблемами, описаними у книзі.
Псує враження як досить нудний виклад, так і неймовірно слабкий переклад книги. З'являється відчуття ніби читаєш машинний переклад без щонайменших правок.
Як підсумок, є над чим подумати, але книга буде цікава лише вузькому колу читачів.
March 24, 2024
«Took me long enough»
Interessant og leseverdig som PME. Kanskje litt over (min) egen vektklasse deler av boken
Lager et poeng av å være kort og konsis, der jeg synes den treffer.
God måte å beskrive viktigheten av operasjonelle funksjoner i møte med MDO.
Spennende om den hadde vært skrevet etter 24. feb ‘22..
Interessant og leseverdig som PME. Kanskje litt over (min) egen vektklasse deler av boken
Lager et poeng av å være kort og konsis, der jeg synes den treffer.
God måte å beskrive viktigheten av operasjonelle funksjoner i møte med MDO.
Spennende om den hadde vært skrevet etter 24. feb ‘22..
September 27, 2022
Boka er ok som en lærebok og innføring i operasjoner og den operasjonelle koblingen mellom strategi og taktikk, for den er veldig korrekt og litt tørt skrevet, som noe vi har hørt før.
«On tactics» er bedre.
«On tactics» er bedre.
August 15, 2023
Fin bok for å løfte blikket fra stridsteknisk nivå. Slår et slag for godt statsarbeid, og hvordan det kan vinne slaget og krigen.
Argumenterer for hvorfor det operasjonelle nivået ikke finnes, men jeg savner noen moderne eksempler som kan vise hvordan rollene som vi forbinder med et operasjonelt nivå blir ivaretatt (eller ikke).
Argumenterer for hvorfor det operasjonelle nivået ikke finnes, men jeg savner noen moderne eksempler som kan vise hvordan rollene som vi forbinder med et operasjonelt nivå blir ivaretatt (eller ikke).
Want to read
January 13, 2023I started this yesterday. The author nicely lays out his argument for recognizing an operational art practiced by military staffs rather than an operational level of war sandwiched between the strategic and tactical in the introduction. But given the strong connection to Clausewitz and multiple references, I think I will return to this book once I’ve read On War.
November 4, 2024
You can’t give decimal scores on the stars so overall I would rate this book about a 3.7-3.8/5.
Friedman’s main argument is that the operational level of war does not exist but the operation art does exist. He provides a decent argument but I have a hard time buying it. His main supporting evidence is that the word operations was never used by Clausewitz and that when it is used by soldiers and theorists in the times since Clausewitz, the definitions for what an operation is has been loose and all over the place. By Friedman’s account, Operation Overlord, one of the biggest military operations in history, would be a tactical engagement. Perhaps that is one way of looking at it but still makes logical sense to me to view operations as a middle level of events between tactics and strategy. However, I do agree with Friedman that the objectives of what he thinks others call “operational level” should be nested with strategy, which involves the political goal of the conflict.
But where operational level does not exist to Friedman, the operational art does, that is the employment of staffs and the tying together of warfighting functions. In this, Friedman does a good job at raising the importance of staff functions. In the battle analysis I had to do as a cadet and officer and have seen, we generally focus on the commanders and the events of the battle, rarely focusing on the staff functions or only parts of it. And ask many officers and they will say being a staff officer is a thankless task. Friedman makes mention of it but at least in my experience with the U.S. Army, command is valued highly even though in a 20 year career, an officer with only “command” twice, once as a Captain of a company-level formation and once as a Lieutenant Colonel of a Battalion (difference between Army and Marines as far as platoon leader and platoon commander for lieutenants). Most of the time in between is spent on staff with executive officer (XO) and S3 being key development positions for Majors. It’s nice to read about the Scharnhorst model that had two different tracks for Prussian and then German officers, command and staff. It would be interesting to see military organizations that valued staff officers more.
Outside of the main argument of the book, the language was a bit high. As another review said, this book is for military people or people that are deeply familiar with military organizations. A layman will probably get lost. Also the tail end of the main part of the book seemed to drag and was a bit sporadic, with the author throwing in a bunch of his concepts and adding acronyms on top of that that necessitated going back and forth to previous pages to remember what ORA and DPA stand for. The five case studies in the back are nice but I did notice that the last one, Guadalcanal was the longest. Whether that is because both sides of the battle used air, sea, and land forces in coordination or because the author was a marine and Guadalcanal is a big marine battle, who is to say.
Friedman’s main argument is that the operational level of war does not exist but the operation art does exist. He provides a decent argument but I have a hard time buying it. His main supporting evidence is that the word operations was never used by Clausewitz and that when it is used by soldiers and theorists in the times since Clausewitz, the definitions for what an operation is has been loose and all over the place. By Friedman’s account, Operation Overlord, one of the biggest military operations in history, would be a tactical engagement. Perhaps that is one way of looking at it but still makes logical sense to me to view operations as a middle level of events between tactics and strategy. However, I do agree with Friedman that the objectives of what he thinks others call “operational level” should be nested with strategy, which involves the political goal of the conflict.
But where operational level does not exist to Friedman, the operational art does, that is the employment of staffs and the tying together of warfighting functions. In this, Friedman does a good job at raising the importance of staff functions. In the battle analysis I had to do as a cadet and officer and have seen, we generally focus on the commanders and the events of the battle, rarely focusing on the staff functions or only parts of it. And ask many officers and they will say being a staff officer is a thankless task. Friedman makes mention of it but at least in my experience with the U.S. Army, command is valued highly even though in a 20 year career, an officer with only “command” twice, once as a Captain of a company-level formation and once as a Lieutenant Colonel of a Battalion (difference between Army and Marines as far as platoon leader and platoon commander for lieutenants). Most of the time in between is spent on staff with executive officer (XO) and S3 being key development positions for Majors. It’s nice to read about the Scharnhorst model that had two different tracks for Prussian and then German officers, command and staff. It would be interesting to see military organizations that valued staff officers more.
Outside of the main argument of the book, the language was a bit high. As another review said, this book is for military people or people that are deeply familiar with military organizations. A layman will probably get lost. Also the tail end of the main part of the book seemed to drag and was a bit sporadic, with the author throwing in a bunch of his concepts and adding acronyms on top of that that necessitated going back and forth to previous pages to remember what ORA and DPA stand for. The five case studies in the back are nice but I did notice that the last one, Guadalcanal was the longest. Whether that is because both sides of the battle used air, sea, and land forces in coordination or because the author was a marine and Guadalcanal is a big marine battle, who is to say.
January 23, 2023
Interesting exploration of the operational level of war and operational art. The author argues that the operational level of war is a problematic concept based on false understanding of the Russian and German approach to warfare. While rejecting an operational level of war the author acknowledges the existence of operational art as something used by staffs to arrange tactics in support of strategic effect. Ultimately, the author argues that the concept of an operational level of war is in large part responsible for officers failing to understand the inherent political nature of war, strategy, and tactics.
In addition to addressing the concept of operational art and the operational level of war the author provides a set of disciplines (similar to the warfighting functions) and a taxonomy for conceptualizing operational campaigns. Through this effort the author seeks to retain operational art as a useful concept/tool while illustrating that the concept of operational level of war is unnecessary and counterproductive to achieving strategic effect and the political aims of war.
A mix of theoritical and historical application of his theory this book is worth reading for those in the military profession of seeking to understand military operations.
A few of the more important highlights below:
- Supports concept of operational art but denies existence of an operational level of war - operational art is what staffs do to arrange tactics to achieve strategic effect
- It is natural for strategy to try to gain emancipation from bad politics, but strategy cannot exist in a vacuum without politics and is condemned to pay for all the sins of politics - Svechin
- Attributes the US adaption of Operational Level of War concept as being due to poor translation of Clausewitz and lack of appreciation for Soviet and German conceptually challenges (avoiding political level)
- War cannot be understood absent its political context
- Strategy is inherently political and doctrinal conceptions of strategy-tactics relationship has implications for civil-military relationships
- Too often US officers uses the operational level of war as a shield behind which it deploys “best military advice”
- The military as a whole should not be partisan but it cannot be apolitical
- Strategy can only be accomplished through tactics - tactics without the purpose provided by strategy is merely random violence
- Warfare is strategic competition between two or more political entities. Political goals can only be achieved through strategy, which can only be accomplished through tactics. Tactics are grouped into campaigns which must be planned, prepared, conducted, and sustained
- Operational art is the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of tactics aimed at accomplishing strategic effect
- Major disciplines required by operational art are: administration, information, operations, fire support, logistics, and command and control
In addition to addressing the concept of operational art and the operational level of war the author provides a set of disciplines (similar to the warfighting functions) and a taxonomy for conceptualizing operational campaigns. Through this effort the author seeks to retain operational art as a useful concept/tool while illustrating that the concept of operational level of war is unnecessary and counterproductive to achieving strategic effect and the political aims of war.
A mix of theoritical and historical application of his theory this book is worth reading for those in the military profession of seeking to understand military operations.
A few of the more important highlights below:
- Supports concept of operational art but denies existence of an operational level of war - operational art is what staffs do to arrange tactics to achieve strategic effect
- It is natural for strategy to try to gain emancipation from bad politics, but strategy cannot exist in a vacuum without politics and is condemned to pay for all the sins of politics - Svechin
- Attributes the US adaption of Operational Level of War concept as being due to poor translation of Clausewitz and lack of appreciation for Soviet and German conceptually challenges (avoiding political level)
- War cannot be understood absent its political context
- Strategy is inherently political and doctrinal conceptions of strategy-tactics relationship has implications for civil-military relationships
- Too often US officers uses the operational level of war as a shield behind which it deploys “best military advice”
- The military as a whole should not be partisan but it cannot be apolitical
- Strategy can only be accomplished through tactics - tactics without the purpose provided by strategy is merely random violence
- Warfare is strategic competition between two or more political entities. Political goals can only be achieved through strategy, which can only be accomplished through tactics. Tactics are grouped into campaigns which must be planned, prepared, conducted, and sustained
- Operational art is the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of tactics aimed at accomplishing strategic effect
- Major disciplines required by operational art are: administration, information, operations, fire support, logistics, and command and control
December 15, 2021
The author self identifies as a strict Clausewitzian and has cobbled together a book about operational art with no operational level of war through case studies spanning from Napoleon to present day. A quick read and interesting for those that enjoy smoking cigars while discussing military history, theory, and doctrine. The author would be reminded that all models are wrong, some are useful and Uncle Carl, while brilliant, did not walk on water.
May 17, 2023
A concise and convincing book that argues that the operational level of warfare is ill-defined and should be jettisoned from military theory in favor of the binary strategy/tactics approach. Instead, the author promotes a focus on operational art which is seen in the rise and works of staff systems.
October 9, 2025
The author makes an unconvincing discourse about the uselessness of the operational level of war. However his reflections on operational art and war fighting disciplines are insightful. The five final cases studies are convincing. All in all a good book on factors of succès of operations.
September 17, 2023
Engaging and approachable. I'll have to read On Tactics.
February 25, 2024
Читав в перекладі українською. Переклад і редактура вкрай неохайні - подекуди речення уриваються посередині думки. Шматки тексту можуть повторюватись двічі. Відчувається, що перекладач старався, але працював безсонними ночами і без розуміння військової тематики та суті термінів.
За змістом - половина книги зводиться до розмазування однієї тези, що оперативного рівня війни не існує. В середині книги є одна наукоподібна табличка на 4 клітинки, що задає типізацію можливих кампаній. Залишок тексту - вільний переказ плину деяких історичних кампаній. Рефлексія прийнятих полководами в рамках цих кампаній рішень якщо і є, то мінімальна.
На мій погляд цей твір - це буквально кілька більш-менш розумних тез, роздмуханих до масштабу книги за допомогою наукоподібних велемовностей, занадто частих посилань та цитувань авторитетів і відвертої графоманії. Певно у автора і у видавців української версії мета стояла суто комерційна.
Свєчін якось змістовніше писав.
За змістом - половина книги зводиться до розмазування однієї тези, що оперативного рівня війни не існує. В середині книги є одна наукоподібна табличка на 4 клітинки, що задає типізацію можливих кампаній. Залишок тексту - вільний переказ плину деяких історичних кампаній. Рефлексія прийнятих полководами в рамках цих кампаній рішень якщо і є, то мінімальна.
На мій погляд цей твір - це буквально кілька більш-менш розумних тез, роздмуханих до масштабу книги за допомогою наукоподібних велемовностей, занадто частих посилань та цитувань авторитетів і відвертої графоманії. Певно у автора і у видавців української версії мета стояла суто комерційна.
Свєчін якось змістовніше писав.
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