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Materialist Phenomenology: A Philosophy of Perception
Bringing together phenomenology and materialism, two perspectives seemingly at odds with each other, leading international theorist, Manuel DeLanda, has created an entirely new theory of visual perception. Engaging the scientific (biology, ecological psychology, neuroscience and robotics), the philosophical (idea of 'the embodied mind') and the mathematical (dynamic systems theory) to form a synthesis of how to see in the 21st century.
A transdisciplinary and rigorous analysis of how vision shapes what matters.
A transdisciplinary and rigorous analysis of how vision shapes what matters.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
286 pages, Kindle Edition
Published September 23, 2021
16 people are currently reading
233 people want to read
About the author
Manuel DeLanda
30 books186 followersManuel DeLanda (b. in Mexico City, 1952), based in New York since 1975, is a philosopher, media artist, programmer and software designer. After studying art in the 1970s, he became known as an independent filmmaker making underground 8mm and 16mm films inspired by critical theory and philosophy. In the 1980s, Manuel De Landa focused on programing, writing computer software, and computer art. After being introduced to the work of Gilles Deleuze, he saw new creative potential in philosophical texts, becoming one of the representatives of the 'new materialism'.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 5, 2022
The title of this book is quite deceptive. Although on the first page DeLanda announces his intention to be bringing materialism and phenomenology into dialogue, there is no discussion of phenomenology at all in here. A more honest title would be 'Physicalism and Systems Theory.' This marks DeLanda's final, decisive break with continental philosophy, and his wholesale adoption into the fold of analytic philosophy of mind.
The book also concludes with the proposal that the hard problem of consciousness can be dissolved into three more easily tractable problems - namely the problems of the emergence of protoselves, core selves, and autobiographical selves. However, the problem of the emergence of protoselves simply is the hard problem of consciousness, since it is about how mindless systems first develop sentience. Additionally, DeLanda's suggestions concerning the emergence of protoselves are rather disappointing, and are unlikely to satisfy anyone who already thinks that the hard problem is a real issue.
The book also concludes with the proposal that the hard problem of consciousness can be dissolved into three more easily tractable problems - namely the problems of the emergence of protoselves, core selves, and autobiographical selves. However, the problem of the emergence of protoselves simply is the hard problem of consciousness, since it is about how mindless systems first develop sentience. Additionally, DeLanda's suggestions concerning the emergence of protoselves are rather disappointing, and are unlikely to satisfy anyone who already thinks that the hard problem is a real issue.
February 8, 2022
Is the hard problem of consciousness solved in a thousand plateaus? Probably
May 5, 2025
DeLanda is a realist/materialist philosopher and so most of his arguments are very much pulling more from that then phenomenology (which is fine with me cause that is my position too). Nevertheless, he makes a strong case for the physical interconnectivity of outside input impacting consciousness by comparing it to neural mapping networks. In other words, abolishing mind/body dualism for body entirely (without disavowing the role of thought as part of the process).
January 18, 2025
Brilliant. I am so glad I encountered this book. It is really dense, in a good way. It is a really laborious read but not because it is deliberately obscure but because of the density of content. The analytical style makes it much easier to follow, though. There are summaries of the argument every few pages, and it reads like a series of lemmas. Being familiar with semiotics and neuroscience helps. Here is a rough summary of the argument:
The text is structured as a proof by construction; it argues that conscious processes emerge from interactions between multiple mindless agents, this is what he labels the multi-humuncular model. The point of departure is the pre-existence of natural signs that can be exploited by agents. This exploitation is made possible by certain properties of our world, like the predominance of solids and the existence of other statistical regularities. This is the contribution of our world. Next, it employs neural nets, computational models that autonomously process paterns and develop associations between inputs and outputs. He argues in a lot of detail why and how neural nets can exploit these natural signs and transform them into internal signs, which means that they can be employed to model these mindless cognitive agents from which more complex agents will emerge. (Emergence is a key term here, this is a non reductive materialist account, so it relies on emergent properties: autonomous cooperation between mindless agents leads to increasing levels of complexity). The next chapter deals with the contributions of the body. First he notes that the command of the body is aided by the fact that it can be said to have attractor states, so only a small number of parameters within a given range have to be specified by cognitive agents. The stream of signs from the body then results in two forms of subjective states, interoception (monitoring visceral environment, e.g., hunger, heart rate) and proprioception (body awareness of body posture). (You can have one and not the other under certain medical conditions -- can only use your body if you are looking at it, i.e, no proprioception). These come about through the formation of physical structures in the brain (somatic maps & neural circuits), whose existence has been proved for the body and for the emotional reactions, e.g. fear. The causality goes from practice to cognition, where "the execution of successful causal interventions in the world make us feel that the body is responsive to our willed actions and, hence, give us a sense of agency." Similarly, experiments with tools show that active involvement with them leads to their inclusion in body maps, evidencing the role of practice. (See also The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language, and Human Culture).
The next chapter attempts to move from the neural nets models to an actual model of the brian. It shows how perception actually happens, and how the insights we gained from neural nets apply. For instance, he reviews how different cortical areas (V1-V6) synchronize, forming coalitions to bring properties together if they apply to the same object. A few other neural feedback loops, including those linking perception and action (AIP-F5 loop), are also described. But at what point do we go from mindless to mindful (his version of the hard problem of consciousness)? He breaks down this problem into three steps, the formation of protoselves, core selves, and autobiographical selves. Protoselves are cognitive agents whose consumption of signs result in phenomenological experiences ('a speedometer that can feel the effect of moving fast')(They probably arise due to the consistency of internal metabolic mechanisms). Core selves are more complex cognitive agents (presumably the result of coalitions of protoselves) that are able to perceive the opportunities and risks of objects, which assumes a level of ownership and protagonism (though their temporality is limited to the present moment). Finally, autobiographical selves are producers of narratives created to make sense of his past history and future projects, and it reports how it feels through language. (These levels are distinct in reality because they have been separated experimentally in subjects). Delanda speculates that sociality is a prerequisite for the formation of autobiographical selves. How do we go from one level to another? Naturally, the author has no definite answer, but believes that transient assemblies may be the key, because they are the work of the brain monitoring itself, they are combinatorial, and attention plays a role in their formation.
Finally, the author explores how cognitive agents deal with the perception of properties, of objects, and situations (where all the aforementioned levels come together). The perception of properties is compared to an act of measuring. In the case of color, for instance, will involve contributions from the world (reflectances), from the body (sensory-motor dependencies), and from the brain (detecting spectral ranges; producing and consuming signs representing contrasts between these ranges). The perception of objects is characterized by the separation of the perspectival from the factual (for example, by assigning properties to an object that endure through time, e.g., color or shape).
Now, with this rough summary, a few points.
1. This is an evolutionary account of consciousness, where every new level of the model includes a mechanism that explains how it would have appeared through natural selection. Even if we do not know a lot of the 'hows' we know many of the 'why's' (because it was useful in the natural world).
2. The extensive use of dynamic systems theory throughout the book (particularly in chapter 2) is very appropriate. I wish philosophers used this framework more, it is an extremely useful analytical tool.
3. Finally someone has dared to defend the idea that concepts are not necessary for most forms of perception. Many in the continental tradition will surely find this ludicrous, but that is their problem. Of course this is not true of more complex forms of intellectual production, but it puts objectivity on solid footing.
4. Though the author claims that he is establishing a dialogue between materialism and phenomenology, this is not true, at least if by phenomenology we mean the Husserlian tradition. He consistently argues that introspection cannot be trusted to provide insights about consciousness. The clearest example is his discussion of the number of autobiographical selves. Though we feel like we have only one, this is not likely, as laboratory experiments with lobotomized patients have shown. This has important implications for the debate on free will. The feeling of agency may be an illusion, just as hypnotized subjects spontaneously make up the reasons why they do things they were told to do. This feeling may be the result of the brain monitoring itself, and it may be false. This reminds me of Graziano's Attention Schema Theory (though it is not cited). Some may think this is an issue, I think it is a strength. I do not think there is much of use in the field phenomenology.
The text is structured as a proof by construction; it argues that conscious processes emerge from interactions between multiple mindless agents, this is what he labels the multi-humuncular model. The point of departure is the pre-existence of natural signs that can be exploited by agents. This exploitation is made possible by certain properties of our world, like the predominance of solids and the existence of other statistical regularities. This is the contribution of our world. Next, it employs neural nets, computational models that autonomously process paterns and develop associations between inputs and outputs. He argues in a lot of detail why and how neural nets can exploit these natural signs and transform them into internal signs, which means that they can be employed to model these mindless cognitive agents from which more complex agents will emerge. (Emergence is a key term here, this is a non reductive materialist account, so it relies on emergent properties: autonomous cooperation between mindless agents leads to increasing levels of complexity). The next chapter deals with the contributions of the body. First he notes that the command of the body is aided by the fact that it can be said to have attractor states, so only a small number of parameters within a given range have to be specified by cognitive agents. The stream of signs from the body then results in two forms of subjective states, interoception (monitoring visceral environment, e.g., hunger, heart rate) and proprioception (body awareness of body posture). (You can have one and not the other under certain medical conditions -- can only use your body if you are looking at it, i.e, no proprioception). These come about through the formation of physical structures in the brain (somatic maps & neural circuits), whose existence has been proved for the body and for the emotional reactions, e.g. fear. The causality goes from practice to cognition, where "the execution of successful causal interventions in the world make us feel that the body is responsive to our willed actions and, hence, give us a sense of agency." Similarly, experiments with tools show that active involvement with them leads to their inclusion in body maps, evidencing the role of practice. (See also The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language, and Human Culture).
The next chapter attempts to move from the neural nets models to an actual model of the brian. It shows how perception actually happens, and how the insights we gained from neural nets apply. For instance, he reviews how different cortical areas (V1-V6) synchronize, forming coalitions to bring properties together if they apply to the same object. A few other neural feedback loops, including those linking perception and action (AIP-F5 loop), are also described. But at what point do we go from mindless to mindful (his version of the hard problem of consciousness)? He breaks down this problem into three steps, the formation of protoselves, core selves, and autobiographical selves. Protoselves are cognitive agents whose consumption of signs result in phenomenological experiences ('a speedometer that can feel the effect of moving fast')(They probably arise due to the consistency of internal metabolic mechanisms). Core selves are more complex cognitive agents (presumably the result of coalitions of protoselves) that are able to perceive the opportunities and risks of objects, which assumes a level of ownership and protagonism (though their temporality is limited to the present moment). Finally, autobiographical selves are producers of narratives created to make sense of his past history and future projects, and it reports how it feels through language. (These levels are distinct in reality because they have been separated experimentally in subjects). Delanda speculates that sociality is a prerequisite for the formation of autobiographical selves. How do we go from one level to another? Naturally, the author has no definite answer, but believes that transient assemblies may be the key, because they are the work of the brain monitoring itself, they are combinatorial, and attention plays a role in their formation.
Finally, the author explores how cognitive agents deal with the perception of properties, of objects, and situations (where all the aforementioned levels come together). The perception of properties is compared to an act of measuring. In the case of color, for instance, will involve contributions from the world (reflectances), from the body (sensory-motor dependencies), and from the brain (detecting spectral ranges; producing and consuming signs representing contrasts between these ranges). The perception of objects is characterized by the separation of the perspectival from the factual (for example, by assigning properties to an object that endure through time, e.g., color or shape).
Now, with this rough summary, a few points.
1. This is an evolutionary account of consciousness, where every new level of the model includes a mechanism that explains how it would have appeared through natural selection. Even if we do not know a lot of the 'hows' we know many of the 'why's' (because it was useful in the natural world).
2. The extensive use of dynamic systems theory throughout the book (particularly in chapter 2) is very appropriate. I wish philosophers used this framework more, it is an extremely useful analytical tool.
3. Finally someone has dared to defend the idea that concepts are not necessary for most forms of perception. Many in the continental tradition will surely find this ludicrous, but that is their problem. Of course this is not true of more complex forms of intellectual production, but it puts objectivity on solid footing.
4. Though the author claims that he is establishing a dialogue between materialism and phenomenology, this is not true, at least if by phenomenology we mean the Husserlian tradition. He consistently argues that introspection cannot be trusted to provide insights about consciousness. The clearest example is his discussion of the number of autobiographical selves. Though we feel like we have only one, this is not likely, as laboratory experiments with lobotomized patients have shown. This has important implications for the debate on free will. The feeling of agency may be an illusion, just as hypnotized subjects spontaneously make up the reasons why they do things they were told to do. This feeling may be the result of the brain monitoring itself, and it may be false. This reminds me of Graziano's Attention Schema Theory (though it is not cited). Some may think this is an issue, I think it is a strength. I do not think there is much of use in the field phenomenology.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews