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Liberalism and Its Discontents
An audiobook about the challenges to liberalism from the right and the left by the bestselling author of The Origins of Political Order.
Classical liberalism is in a state of crisis. Developed in the wake of Europe's wars over religion and nationalism, liberalism is a system for governing diverse societies, which is grounded in fundamental principles of equality and the rule of law. It emphasizes the rights of individuals to pursue their own forms of happiness free from encroachment by government.
It's no secret that liberalism didn't always live up to its own ideals. In America, many people were denied equality before the law. Who counted as full human beings worthy of universal rights was contested for centuries, and only recently has this circle expanded to include women, African Americans, LGBTQ+ people, and others. Conservatives complain that liberalism empties the common life of meaning. As the renowned political philosopher Francis Fukuyama shows in Liberalism and Its Discontents, the principles of liberalism have also, in recent decades, been pushed to new extremes by both the right and the left: neoliberals made a cult of economic freedom, and progressives focused on identity over human universality as central to their political vision. The result, Fukuyama argues, has been a fracturing of our civil society and an increasing peril to our democracy.
In this clear account of our current political discontents, Fukuyama offers an essential defense of a revitalized liberalism for the twenty-first century.
A Macmillan Audio production from Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Classical liberalism is in a state of crisis. Developed in the wake of Europe's wars over religion and nationalism, liberalism is a system for governing diverse societies, which is grounded in fundamental principles of equality and the rule of law. It emphasizes the rights of individuals to pursue their own forms of happiness free from encroachment by government.
It's no secret that liberalism didn't always live up to its own ideals. In America, many people were denied equality before the law. Who counted as full human beings worthy of universal rights was contested for centuries, and only recently has this circle expanded to include women, African Americans, LGBTQ+ people, and others. Conservatives complain that liberalism empties the common life of meaning. As the renowned political philosopher Francis Fukuyama shows in Liberalism and Its Discontents, the principles of liberalism have also, in recent decades, been pushed to new extremes by both the right and the left: neoliberals made a cult of economic freedom, and progressives focused on identity over human universality as central to their political vision. The result, Fukuyama argues, has been a fracturing of our civil society and an increasing peril to our democracy.
In this clear account of our current political discontents, Fukuyama offers an essential defense of a revitalized liberalism for the twenty-first century.
A Macmillan Audio production from Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Audio CD
First published May 10, 2022
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About the author
Francis Fukuyama
116 books2,225 followersYoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born 27 October 1952) is an American philosopher, political economist, and author.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
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February 11, 2022
Fukuyama illustrates how classical liberalism has come under pressure from the far right and the far left, and points out some uncomfortable similarities between the political extremes in oder to argue for more moderation and the protection of diversity. "Classical liberalism" in this context means liberal democracy, so a rule of law and a system of formal rules that restrict the powers of a democratically elected executive in order to protect individual freedom; Fukuyama explicity dismisses neoliberalism as he argues that economic efficiency shouldn't trump all other social values, and he also dismisses libertarianism as it devalues the potentially positive impact of good governance.
Then he tackles a topic that has become hip in the realm of PoliSci, and for good reason: Critical theory vs. the scientific method. When knowledge is subjective and language an arbitrary construct dominated by underlying power discourses, how can we as a society agree on an objective reality? This also points to Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, as the following proposition is pretty hard to dismiss: "It is this mutual recognition that makes possible democratic deliberation and choice." Identity politics shouldn't be a means to exclusion, but a tool to implement justice and equality as promised by classically liberal declarations.
When it comes to the division between woke progressives and the alt-right (now also featuring COVID deniers) which is particularly extreme in the US, but also rising in Europe, Fukuyama notes: "Both sides quietly entertain hopes that a large majority of their fellow citizens secretly agree with them and are prevented from expressing this agreement only through media manipulations and false consciousness propagated by various elites", and that both sides tend to dismiss government as incompetent or even illegitimate - unfortunately, there is something to that.
So while once again, many of Fukuyama's arguments can be contested (as a German, I'm frequently puzzled by US-American positions on free speech, for example), but the text is a great basis for discussion, as it questions ideological thinking.
Then he tackles a topic that has become hip in the realm of PoliSci, and for good reason: Critical theory vs. the scientific method. When knowledge is subjective and language an arbitrary construct dominated by underlying power discourses, how can we as a society agree on an objective reality? This also points to Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, as the following proposition is pretty hard to dismiss: "It is this mutual recognition that makes possible democratic deliberation and choice." Identity politics shouldn't be a means to exclusion, but a tool to implement justice and equality as promised by classically liberal declarations.
When it comes to the division between woke progressives and the alt-right (now also featuring COVID deniers) which is particularly extreme in the US, but also rising in Europe, Fukuyama notes: "Both sides quietly entertain hopes that a large majority of their fellow citizens secretly agree with them and are prevented from expressing this agreement only through media manipulations and false consciousness propagated by various elites", and that both sides tend to dismiss government as incompetent or even illegitimate - unfortunately, there is something to that.
So while once again, many of Fukuyama's arguments can be contested (as a German, I'm frequently puzzled by US-American positions on free speech, for example), but the text is a great basis for discussion, as it questions ideological thinking.
September 24, 2023
An excellent scholarly text that strives for fairness and objectivity but doesn't attempt to hide its pro-liberalism stance. This is an analysis with a clear point of view, passionate in its calm and deliberate way. It aims to provide an overview of classical liberalism and its challenges, in particular the metastasis of liberalism into neoliberalism, which in turn encouraged various attacks on the original ideology from both left and right. It counters each form of attack cited, but does not hesitate to show liberalism's challenges, blind spots, and areas of necessary refinement.
This book should be used as a learning tool for those interested in our modern political systems. It should be read by anyone who considers themselves to be a "liberal" (classical or otherwise). I prescribe one chapter nearly every day, spending perhaps a half-hour per chapter, and eventually voilà, genuine understanding of a complex and multi-leveled topic may be achieved in 10 days or less. An excellent and opinionated guidebook, written with clarity and precision, argued persuasively. Highly recommended.
Chapter 1: What Is Classical Liberalism?
It is a pragmatic model that allows diverse societies to function; it "protects human dignity by granting citizens an equal right to autonomy." It is individualist, egalitarian, universalist, and meliorist.
Chapter 2: From Liberalism to Neoliberalism
"...the neoliberal agenda was pushed to a counterproductive extreme. A valid insight into the superior efficiency of markets evolved into something of a religion, in which state intervention was opposed as a matter of principle... Even as it promoted two decades of rapid economic growth, neoliberalism succeeded in destabilizing the global economy and undermining its own success... This led to a prolonged period in which neoliberal reformers sought to cut back state sectors by ending or scaling back social programs, firing bureaucrats, or seeking to offload programs on to private sector contractors... The idea of 'personal responsibility' is a liberal concept that is built around a true insight, but one that been carried to extremes by neoliberals."
Chapter 3: The Selfish Individual
on the problem of extreme individualism within neoliberalism:
"The doctrine's defect was to carry those premises to an extreme where property rights and consumer welfare were worshipped, and all aspects of state action and social solidarity denigrated."
Chapter 4: The Sovereign Self
on the problem of always centering autonomy and self-actualization within liberal societies:
"...belief in the sovereignty of the individual deepens liberalism's tendency to weaken other forms of communal engagement, and in particular turns people away from virtues like public-spiritedness that are needed... [furthermore] Many people will never be content with the individual sovereignty they are told they are free to exercise. They will recognize that their inner selves are not sovereign... but heavily shaped by external forces like racism and patriarchy."
Chapter 5: Liberalism Turns on Itself
identity politics takes its swing against classical liberalism:
"A great deal of critical theory thus goes well beyond accusing liberalism of hypocrisy and a failure to live up to its own principles to a condemnation of the doctrine in its essence... liberal regimes are in fact not liberal at all but reflect the interests of hidden power structures that dominate and benefit from the status quo. Liberalism's association with different dominant elites, whether capitalists, men, white, or straight people, is not a contingent fact of history; rather, domination is essential to the nature of liberalism and the reason why these different groups support liberalism as an ideology."
FUKUYAMA BEGS TO DIFFER!
"But individualism is hardly a 'white' or European characteristic. One of the enduring challenges of human societies is the need to move beyond kinship as a source of social organization."
"The view that meritocracy is somehow associated with white identity or Eurocentrism reflects the parochialism of contemporary identity politics. Meritocracy and standardized examinations have clear roots in other non-Western cultures."
"The charge that liberalism inevitably leads to neoliberalism and an exploitative form of capitalism ignores the history of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this period, working-class incomes rose over several generations... Virtually all advanced liberal societies put into place extensive social protections and labor rights... Liberalism by itself is not a sufficient governing doctrine on its own; it needs to be paired with democracy so that there can be political corrections made to the inequalities produced by market economics."
Chapter 6: The Critique of Rationality
against the postmodernism of Foucault and other connected thinkers as a tool or model for how to construct healthy societies and sustainable ways of living:
"If there are no truly universal values other than power, why should one want to accept the empowerment of any marginalized group, which will simply replace one expression of power with another?"
[Liberal societies] "...cannot survive if they are unable to establish a hierarchy of factual truths."
Chapter 7: Technology, Privacy, and Freedom of Speech
an interesting sidebar:
"The attack on modern natural science and Enlightenment approaches to cognition began on the left, as critical theory exposed the hidden agendas of the elites who promoted them. This approach often denied the possibility of true objectivity, and valued instead subjective feelings and emotions as a source of authenticity. Skepticism has now drifted over to the populist right, who see elites using these same scientific cognitive modes not as techniques to marginalize minority communities, but rather to victimize the former mainstream. Progressives and white nationalists come together in valuing raw feeling and emotion over cold empirical analysis."
Chapter 8: Are There Alternatives?
answer: NO. unless you are looking for a model that does not center fairness, reason, diversity, and individual choice.
"To paraphrase what Winston Churchill once said about democracy, liberalism is the worst form of government, except for all the others."
ignore the disrespectfully brief summary of this chapter, which seriously addresses and critiques many suggested models presented by both the left and the right.
Chapter 9: National Identity
"...if national identity is based on fixed characteristics like race, ethnicity, or religious heritage, then it becomes a potentially exclusionary category that violates the liberal principle of equal dignity. So while there is no necessary contradiction between the need for national identity and for liberal universalism, there is nonetheless a powerful point of tension between the two principles... National identity is a social construct, and it can be shaped to support rather than undermine liberal values. Nations historically have been molded out of diverse populations, who can feel a strong sense of community based on political principles or ideals rather than ascriptive group categories... Liberals have tended to shy away from appeals to patriotism and cultural tradition, but they should not. National identity as a liberal and open society is something of which liberals can be justly proud."
Chapter 10: Principles for a Liberal Society
1. Acknowledge the need for an impersonal government that relates to citizens on an equal and uniform basis.
2. Economic growth should not be seen as the most important measure of success.
3. Promote federalism; allow devolvement of power to the lowest appropriate levels of government e.g. States' rights.
4. Protect freedom of speech while understanding the limits and norms of speech. Respect a zone of privacy surrounding each individual.
5. Individual rights have primacy over the rights of cultural groups. "People are never fully defined by their group memberships and continue to exercise individual agency. It may be important to understand the ways they have been shaped by their group identities, but social respect should take account of the individual choices that they make as well. Group recognition threatens not to remediate but to harden group differences."
6. "Autonomy is a basic liberal value, [but] it is not the sole human good that automatically trumps all other visions of a good life. Some folks embrace a lack of autonomy and limiting of freedom within certain cultural and religious beliefs and practices. A liberal society will always have room for such individuals and groups.
This book should be used as a learning tool for those interested in our modern political systems. It should be read by anyone who considers themselves to be a "liberal" (classical or otherwise). I prescribe one chapter nearly every day, spending perhaps a half-hour per chapter, and eventually voilà, genuine understanding of a complex and multi-leveled topic may be achieved in 10 days or less. An excellent and opinionated guidebook, written with clarity and precision, argued persuasively. Highly recommended.
Chapter 1: What Is Classical Liberalism?
It is a pragmatic model that allows diverse societies to function; it "protects human dignity by granting citizens an equal right to autonomy." It is individualist, egalitarian, universalist, and meliorist.
Chapter 2: From Liberalism to Neoliberalism
"...the neoliberal agenda was pushed to a counterproductive extreme. A valid insight into the superior efficiency of markets evolved into something of a religion, in which state intervention was opposed as a matter of principle... Even as it promoted two decades of rapid economic growth, neoliberalism succeeded in destabilizing the global economy and undermining its own success... This led to a prolonged period in which neoliberal reformers sought to cut back state sectors by ending or scaling back social programs, firing bureaucrats, or seeking to offload programs on to private sector contractors... The idea of 'personal responsibility' is a liberal concept that is built around a true insight, but one that been carried to extremes by neoliberals."
Chapter 3: The Selfish Individual
on the problem of extreme individualism within neoliberalism:
"The doctrine's defect was to carry those premises to an extreme where property rights and consumer welfare were worshipped, and all aspects of state action and social solidarity denigrated."
Chapter 4: The Sovereign Self
on the problem of always centering autonomy and self-actualization within liberal societies:
"...belief in the sovereignty of the individual deepens liberalism's tendency to weaken other forms of communal engagement, and in particular turns people away from virtues like public-spiritedness that are needed... [furthermore] Many people will never be content with the individual sovereignty they are told they are free to exercise. They will recognize that their inner selves are not sovereign... but heavily shaped by external forces like racism and patriarchy."
Chapter 5: Liberalism Turns on Itself
identity politics takes its swing against classical liberalism:
"A great deal of critical theory thus goes well beyond accusing liberalism of hypocrisy and a failure to live up to its own principles to a condemnation of the doctrine in its essence... liberal regimes are in fact not liberal at all but reflect the interests of hidden power structures that dominate and benefit from the status quo. Liberalism's association with different dominant elites, whether capitalists, men, white, or straight people, is not a contingent fact of history; rather, domination is essential to the nature of liberalism and the reason why these different groups support liberalism as an ideology."
FUKUYAMA BEGS TO DIFFER!
"But individualism is hardly a 'white' or European characteristic. One of the enduring challenges of human societies is the need to move beyond kinship as a source of social organization."
"The view that meritocracy is somehow associated with white identity or Eurocentrism reflects the parochialism of contemporary identity politics. Meritocracy and standardized examinations have clear roots in other non-Western cultures."
"The charge that liberalism inevitably leads to neoliberalism and an exploitative form of capitalism ignores the history of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this period, working-class incomes rose over several generations... Virtually all advanced liberal societies put into place extensive social protections and labor rights... Liberalism by itself is not a sufficient governing doctrine on its own; it needs to be paired with democracy so that there can be political corrections made to the inequalities produced by market economics."
Chapter 6: The Critique of Rationality
against the postmodernism of Foucault and other connected thinkers as a tool or model for how to construct healthy societies and sustainable ways of living:
"If there are no truly universal values other than power, why should one want to accept the empowerment of any marginalized group, which will simply replace one expression of power with another?"
[Liberal societies] "...cannot survive if they are unable to establish a hierarchy of factual truths."
Chapter 7: Technology, Privacy, and Freedom of Speech
an interesting sidebar:
"The attack on modern natural science and Enlightenment approaches to cognition began on the left, as critical theory exposed the hidden agendas of the elites who promoted them. This approach often denied the possibility of true objectivity, and valued instead subjective feelings and emotions as a source of authenticity. Skepticism has now drifted over to the populist right, who see elites using these same scientific cognitive modes not as techniques to marginalize minority communities, but rather to victimize the former mainstream. Progressives and white nationalists come together in valuing raw feeling and emotion over cold empirical analysis."
Chapter 8: Are There Alternatives?
answer: NO. unless you are looking for a model that does not center fairness, reason, diversity, and individual choice.
"To paraphrase what Winston Churchill once said about democracy, liberalism is the worst form of government, except for all the others."
ignore the disrespectfully brief summary of this chapter, which seriously addresses and critiques many suggested models presented by both the left and the right.
Chapter 9: National Identity
"...if national identity is based on fixed characteristics like race, ethnicity, or religious heritage, then it becomes a potentially exclusionary category that violates the liberal principle of equal dignity. So while there is no necessary contradiction between the need for national identity and for liberal universalism, there is nonetheless a powerful point of tension between the two principles... National identity is a social construct, and it can be shaped to support rather than undermine liberal values. Nations historically have been molded out of diverse populations, who can feel a strong sense of community based on political principles or ideals rather than ascriptive group categories... Liberals have tended to shy away from appeals to patriotism and cultural tradition, but they should not. National identity as a liberal and open society is something of which liberals can be justly proud."
Chapter 10: Principles for a Liberal Society
1. Acknowledge the need for an impersonal government that relates to citizens on an equal and uniform basis.
2. Economic growth should not be seen as the most important measure of success.
3. Promote federalism; allow devolvement of power to the lowest appropriate levels of government e.g. States' rights.
4. Protect freedom of speech while understanding the limits and norms of speech. Respect a zone of privacy surrounding each individual.
5. Individual rights have primacy over the rights of cultural groups. "People are never fully defined by their group memberships and continue to exercise individual agency. It may be important to understand the ways they have been shaped by their group identities, but social respect should take account of the individual choices that they make as well. Group recognition threatens not to remediate but to harden group differences."
6. "Autonomy is a basic liberal value, [but] it is not the sole human good that automatically trumps all other visions of a good life. Some folks embrace a lack of autonomy and limiting of freedom within certain cultural and religious beliefs and practices. A liberal society will always have room for such individuals and groups.
July 14, 2022
Francis Fukuyama, a giant among contemporary political scientists/theorists, has penned a brief and eloquent defense of liberalism, Liberalism and Its Discontents, which also includes a summary of the criticisms that have been leveled at this political philosophy from both the left and right. On the left, a belief in extreme individual autonomy, an assault on rationality, and cultural intolerance with a deference to the tribal ids of historically marginalized groups threaten the culture of liberalism. On the right, the weaponization of a post-rationality information space and an interest in rolling back elements of democratic and cultural liberation threaten to destabilize the order and legitimacy of liberal democracy.
Due to the current usage of the word “liberalism,” Fukuyama is careful to define his titular term. His usage is aligned with what many often refer to as "Classical Liberalism" but given that this term has also become freighted with new meaning, he also invokes Deirdre McCloskey's term "humane liberalism." He asserts his term refers to the doctrine that emerged in the latter half of the 1600s, during the Enlightenment, and argued for the primacy of individual rights ensured by an effective yet limited government. Fukuyama builds upon this minimalistic definition throughout the early portions of the book, sketching out the meaning of the components of liberal tradition: individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism, and then providing the practical, moral, and economic basis for liberalism's superiority to other governing doctrines. Essentially, Fukuyama views liberalism as the best way to protect human life and dignity, promote prosperity, and navigate the tensions created by diverse interests. However, the catch is that liberalism must remain neutral on conceptions of the good, meaning it must tolerate diverse ethical and political frameworks within its big tent; this refers to an idea called subsidiarity, meaning to distribute political power to solve particular problems to those closest to those problems. To complete his beautiful defense, he parries critiques of liberalism by arguing that most of the failures of liberal governance have stemmed from a failure of moderation - either liberal ideas were overextended (i.e. neoliberalism and progressivism) or ignored.
Although Fukuyama ultimately rejects many of the criticism of liberalism, he is sympathetic with certain point even echoing some of them. For instance, Fukuyama dedicates a chapter to a discussion of the excesses and dangers of neoliberalism by which he means an overly eager embrace of free market economics and intense hostility towards governmental regulation and intervention. This countenances left-of-center economic concerns about inequality as within the bounds of liberalism, while also defending the moral importance of private property and the practical efficiency of markets. He also incisively dissects the flaws of Rawlsian conceptions of justice, critical theory, and features of progressive activism like identity-based politicking, which make for some of the most insightful portions of the work. He also skewers more governmental approaches to enforcing conceptions of a moral life, which lands punches against both the left and right but more so on the "common good" conservatives of the new right.
Despite the merits of Fukuyama's claims, there are some apparent limitations, which he mostly glosses over. First, his claim that liberalism and liberal democracy can function without a shared ethical system or moral vision is dubious given that many ideas in the liberal tradition are de facto imbued with moral valence. In fact, the very act of making normative claims about a political doctrine is forwarding a particular moral vision. Moreover, his conception of liberalism seems inevitably to lend itself to conflicts of moral vision among competing factions - conflict that a liberal state is unlikely to definitively resolve given its largely neutral stance. Thus, the purported crisis of liberalism today - I'm dubious about whether there is such a crisis but Fukuyama is not - will continue indefinitely until our government turns to illiberal modes. Second, his defense of liberalism borders on an appeal to purity (aka the No True Scotsmen fallacy) because he dismisses failures of liberalism as misapplications rather than externalities. It is difficult to confidently assess how the application of political ideas actually results in particular outcomes given the confluence of factors that control sociological events. I have some other quibbles and disagreements with Fukuyama, but they sit outside his descriptive claims about liberalism, having more to do with normative and empirical claims about particular political programs. Finally, I think Fukuyama overestimates the importance of ideas. His narrative is almost completely invested in the premise that our political ideas have an almost perfect correlation with the actual realities of human sociopolitical dynamics. I am somewhat skeptical about this. I think many of the purported outgrowths of liberalism may be some of the causes of liberalism itself and that they may be the result of certain material processes beyond the influence of ideology and discourse.
Ultimately, what makes this book such an excellent read is that Fukuyama's descriptions of liberal and contra-liberal ideas are amazingly pithy and well-organized. He writes propulsively about abstractions, which is quite an accomplishment. The clarity and power of his mind make for a dazzling display. I recommend this book unreservedly.
Podcast Interviews
https://remnant.thedispatch.com/p/mak...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEDHf...
https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0...
Piece that Inspired the Book
https://www.americanpurpose.com/artic...
Due to the current usage of the word “liberalism,” Fukuyama is careful to define his titular term. His usage is aligned with what many often refer to as "Classical Liberalism" but given that this term has also become freighted with new meaning, he also invokes Deirdre McCloskey's term "humane liberalism." He asserts his term refers to the doctrine that emerged in the latter half of the 1600s, during the Enlightenment, and argued for the primacy of individual rights ensured by an effective yet limited government. Fukuyama builds upon this minimalistic definition throughout the early portions of the book, sketching out the meaning of the components of liberal tradition: individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism, and then providing the practical, moral, and economic basis for liberalism's superiority to other governing doctrines. Essentially, Fukuyama views liberalism as the best way to protect human life and dignity, promote prosperity, and navigate the tensions created by diverse interests. However, the catch is that liberalism must remain neutral on conceptions of the good, meaning it must tolerate diverse ethical and political frameworks within its big tent; this refers to an idea called subsidiarity, meaning to distribute political power to solve particular problems to those closest to those problems. To complete his beautiful defense, he parries critiques of liberalism by arguing that most of the failures of liberal governance have stemmed from a failure of moderation - either liberal ideas were overextended (i.e. neoliberalism and progressivism) or ignored.
Although Fukuyama ultimately rejects many of the criticism of liberalism, he is sympathetic with certain point even echoing some of them. For instance, Fukuyama dedicates a chapter to a discussion of the excesses and dangers of neoliberalism by which he means an overly eager embrace of free market economics and intense hostility towards governmental regulation and intervention. This countenances left-of-center economic concerns about inequality as within the bounds of liberalism, while also defending the moral importance of private property and the practical efficiency of markets. He also incisively dissects the flaws of Rawlsian conceptions of justice, critical theory, and features of progressive activism like identity-based politicking, which make for some of the most insightful portions of the work. He also skewers more governmental approaches to enforcing conceptions of a moral life, which lands punches against both the left and right but more so on the "common good" conservatives of the new right.
Despite the merits of Fukuyama's claims, there are some apparent limitations, which he mostly glosses over. First, his claim that liberalism and liberal democracy can function without a shared ethical system or moral vision is dubious given that many ideas in the liberal tradition are de facto imbued with moral valence. In fact, the very act of making normative claims about a political doctrine is forwarding a particular moral vision. Moreover, his conception of liberalism seems inevitably to lend itself to conflicts of moral vision among competing factions - conflict that a liberal state is unlikely to definitively resolve given its largely neutral stance. Thus, the purported crisis of liberalism today - I'm dubious about whether there is such a crisis but Fukuyama is not - will continue indefinitely until our government turns to illiberal modes. Second, his defense of liberalism borders on an appeal to purity (aka the No True Scotsmen fallacy) because he dismisses failures of liberalism as misapplications rather than externalities. It is difficult to confidently assess how the application of political ideas actually results in particular outcomes given the confluence of factors that control sociological events. I have some other quibbles and disagreements with Fukuyama, but they sit outside his descriptive claims about liberalism, having more to do with normative and empirical claims about particular political programs. Finally, I think Fukuyama overestimates the importance of ideas. His narrative is almost completely invested in the premise that our political ideas have an almost perfect correlation with the actual realities of human sociopolitical dynamics. I am somewhat skeptical about this. I think many of the purported outgrowths of liberalism may be some of the causes of liberalism itself and that they may be the result of certain material processes beyond the influence of ideology and discourse.
Ultimately, what makes this book such an excellent read is that Fukuyama's descriptions of liberal and contra-liberal ideas are amazingly pithy and well-organized. He writes propulsively about abstractions, which is quite an accomplishment. The clarity and power of his mind make for a dazzling display. I recommend this book unreservedly.
Podcast Interviews
https://remnant.thedispatch.com/p/mak...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEDHf...
https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0...
Piece that Inspired the Book
https://www.americanpurpose.com/artic...
November 14, 2024
Megmondom az őszintét: ha valahol megemlítik az értékeléseimet – még ha negatív kontextusban is -, az valamiféle elégedettséggel tölt el. Mert ugye ez azt jelzi, hogy akárhogy is, de valaki szerint vagyok valaki. Nem tudom, talán Orbán Viktor is így van ezzel, amikor kinyitja ezt a könyvet, és látja, hogy egy nála lényegesen nagyobb volumenű gondolkodó vele példálódzik, mint az autoriter tendenciák képviselőjével. Ilyenkor – lehet – elégedetten sóhajt egy nagyot: lám, nem telt el hiába a nap! Még a Johns Hopkins Egyetemről is látszik, mekkora tényező vagyok én!
Amúgy meg ez a könyv pont azért született, mert Fukuyama professzor úgy látta, az Orbán-félék bandába verődve folyamatosan zaklatják szegény liberalizmust, és igazából nincs senki, aki megvédje. Na de majd ő! Úgyhogy előkapja az alsóneműs szekrény aljából a vibránium pajzsát, és beleveti magát a küzdelembe. Azzal kezdi (és itt kicsit elcsúszik a metafora az áldozathibáztatás felé, szóval kezeljétek helyén), hogy összeszedi, mennyiben oka maga a liberalizmus a zaklatásnak. Hát, picit. Egyfelől ugyanis ott van a tény, hogy amit a liberalizmus klasszikus célként tűzött ki (az egyén autonómiájának védelme az emberi jogok rendszerén keresztül), az Nyugaton tulajdonképpen megvalósult, sőt olyannyira alapvetővé vált, hogy természetesnek vesszük, akár a levegőt. Elfelejtettük, hogy ezek nélkül a jogok nélkül a hatalom lenyelne minket keresztbe. Kvázi üres lózunggá vált a „szabadság” szó, kisajátították azok, akik a mások szabadságának megnyirbálásának jogát értik alatta, és kiveri a víz őket attól, hogy a vele járó személyes felelősséget is vállalják.
Az is tény, hogy a liberalizmust, miután elérte minimális céljait, saját szélsőségesei olyan irányba vitték el, ami finoman szólva sem tette vonzóvá a nevét. A jobboldali szélsőségesek megfosztották erkölcsi tartalmától, és pőre gazdasági eszmévé torzították. Ez a fajta neoliberalizmus azt állítja, hogy az államnak semmi köze ahhoz, ki lesz gazdag és ki lesz szegény, szóval a gazdag hadd gazdagodjon nyugodtan, a szegény meg legyen még szegényebb*. A gond ezzel az, hogy szélsőséges vagyoni egyenlőtlenségeket hoz létre, ahol a liberalizmus egyik fő célja (az emberi méltóság védelme) tulajdonképpen értelmét veszti. Hisz aki kénytelen a kukából enni, az aligha tudja megőrizni a méltóságát. Ugyanakkor balszélről is torzult a liberalizmus, amikor egyes képviselői az egyéni autonómiát a társadalmi kontextusból totálisan kiragadva önmagában való értéknek kiáltották ki, ignorálva a vele járó sokszintű felelősséget.
A liberalizmus kritikája tehát jogos és szükségszerű – tulajdonképpen az egész rendszer kulcsa az, hogy életre hívja saját kritikáját, ezzel biztosítva a folyamatos megújulást. A probléma abból fakad, amikor a kritika már nem a rendszer elemeit korrigálná a rendszer meggyógyítás érdekében, hanem magát a rendszert támadja. Ebben a baloldali kritika volt az úttörő, ami (Foucault-tól kezdve) a liberalizmusban a fehér, kapitalista gyarmatosító törekvések szekértolóját ismerte fel, amit meg kell semmisíteni és amin túl kell lépni. Tagadták a liberalizmus azon alapkövét, hogy a társadalom alapja az egyének sajátos identitása, és elkezdtek csoportidentitásokban gondolkodni, ahol az embereket azért illetik meg többletjogok, mert bizonyos elnyomott kisebbségek tagjai – törekvésük pedig eljutott odáig, hogy magát a nyelvet is kriminalizálták, mint az elnyomás eszközét. De amikor a tettek helyett a szavak világát tették harctérré, azzal egyfelől a szólás- és gondolatszabadságot tették zárójelbe, másfelől pedig muníciót szolgáltattak a liberalizmus jobboldali kritikájának. No most a jobboldali kritika mindig is létezett, és arra épült, hogy a liberalizmus az egyén piedesztálra állításával olyan hagyományos értékeket erodál, mint a család, a nemzet vagy a vallás, ezzel pedig a társadalom sírásója. Ugyanakkor az egy darab Carl Schmitten kívül (aki amúgy is náci volt, és nem picit) nem nagyon volt olyan gondolkodója, aki rendszerbe tudta szedni az érveket. Kapóra jöttek tehát az olyan baloldali filozófusok, akiknek a mondatai aztán a jobboldaliak ajkán bukkantak fel, csak épp nem a kisemmizett kisebbségekre vonatkoztatva, hanem a fehér többségre, aki a jobboldal szemében maga vált veszélyeztetett csoporttá, és ezért saját védelme érdekében jogosult korlátozni a demokráciát. Amíg a baloldal azért bírálta a liberalizmus igényét az univerzalizmusra, mert abban a fehér elnyomás eszközét látta, addig a jobboldal azért, mert az univerzalizmus felszámolásával megtagadhatta felelősségét a világ többi részével szemben. És külön vicces, hogy miközben kisajátította vette a baloldali kritika eszköztárát, ugyanezt a baloldali kritikát összemosta magával a liberalizmussal, megtalálva benne azt a démoni entitást, ami akarata ellenére meleg afroamerikaiakká operálna át minden óvodást.
Szerintem ez egy nagyszerű esszé, méltó ahhoz a csávóhoz, aki valószínűleg a legtöbbet félreértett zseni a politikatudomány területén – ami pedig nem kis szó. Nagyszerű azért, mert remekül ragadja meg a liberalizmusban azt, amit védeni érdemes, amit védeni kell. És nagyszerű azért is, mert megmutatja, a riválisok kritikái mennyire nem ezt a lényeget érintik, és hogy az általuk nyújtott alternatívák mennyire homályosak és vészjóslóak. Nyilván nem vállalkozhat arra, hogy biztos tippeket adjon arra nézve, hogy lehetne kihúzni az illiberalizmusok méregfogát – megelégszik annak körvonalazásával, miért fontos projekt ez. Gondolom, innentől nálunk pattog a labda.
* Ironikus, hogy a neoliberalizmus nagyon jól megfér a populizmussal, ami technikailag azt jelenti, hogy a Trumphoz és Orbánhoz hasonló gusztustalanul gazdag emberek a legszegényebbek szavazataira támaszkodva őrzik meg hatalmukat. Snyder ezt a típust nevezi „szadopopulistának” – a politikust, akinek tevékenysége arra irányul, hogy saját választói legsérülékenyebb rétegeinek ártson.
Amúgy meg ez a könyv pont azért született, mert Fukuyama professzor úgy látta, az Orbán-félék bandába verődve folyamatosan zaklatják szegény liberalizmust, és igazából nincs senki, aki megvédje. Na de majd ő! Úgyhogy előkapja az alsóneműs szekrény aljából a vibránium pajzsát, és beleveti magát a küzdelembe. Azzal kezdi (és itt kicsit elcsúszik a metafora az áldozathibáztatás felé, szóval kezeljétek helyén), hogy összeszedi, mennyiben oka maga a liberalizmus a zaklatásnak. Hát, picit. Egyfelől ugyanis ott van a tény, hogy amit a liberalizmus klasszikus célként tűzött ki (az egyén autonómiájának védelme az emberi jogok rendszerén keresztül), az Nyugaton tulajdonképpen megvalósult, sőt olyannyira alapvetővé vált, hogy természetesnek vesszük, akár a levegőt. Elfelejtettük, hogy ezek nélkül a jogok nélkül a hatalom lenyelne minket keresztbe. Kvázi üres lózunggá vált a „szabadság” szó, kisajátították azok, akik a mások szabadságának megnyirbálásának jogát értik alatta, és kiveri a víz őket attól, hogy a vele járó személyes felelősséget is vállalják.
Az is tény, hogy a liberalizmust, miután elérte minimális céljait, saját szélsőségesei olyan irányba vitték el, ami finoman szólva sem tette vonzóvá a nevét. A jobboldali szélsőségesek megfosztották erkölcsi tartalmától, és pőre gazdasági eszmévé torzították. Ez a fajta neoliberalizmus azt állítja, hogy az államnak semmi köze ahhoz, ki lesz gazdag és ki lesz szegény, szóval a gazdag hadd gazdagodjon nyugodtan, a szegény meg legyen még szegényebb*. A gond ezzel az, hogy szélsőséges vagyoni egyenlőtlenségeket hoz létre, ahol a liberalizmus egyik fő célja (az emberi méltóság védelme) tulajdonképpen értelmét veszti. Hisz aki kénytelen a kukából enni, az aligha tudja megőrizni a méltóságát. Ugyanakkor balszélről is torzult a liberalizmus, amikor egyes képviselői az egyéni autonómiát a társadalmi kontextusból totálisan kiragadva önmagában való értéknek kiáltották ki, ignorálva a vele járó sokszintű felelősséget.
A liberalizmus kritikája tehát jogos és szükségszerű – tulajdonképpen az egész rendszer kulcsa az, hogy életre hívja saját kritikáját, ezzel biztosítva a folyamatos megújulást. A probléma abból fakad, amikor a kritika már nem a rendszer elemeit korrigálná a rendszer meggyógyítás érdekében, hanem magát a rendszert támadja. Ebben a baloldali kritika volt az úttörő, ami (Foucault-tól kezdve) a liberalizmusban a fehér, kapitalista gyarmatosító törekvések szekértolóját ismerte fel, amit meg kell semmisíteni és amin túl kell lépni. Tagadták a liberalizmus azon alapkövét, hogy a társadalom alapja az egyének sajátos identitása, és elkezdtek csoportidentitásokban gondolkodni, ahol az embereket azért illetik meg többletjogok, mert bizonyos elnyomott kisebbségek tagjai – törekvésük pedig eljutott odáig, hogy magát a nyelvet is kriminalizálták, mint az elnyomás eszközét. De amikor a tettek helyett a szavak világát tették harctérré, azzal egyfelől a szólás- és gondolatszabadságot tették zárójelbe, másfelől pedig muníciót szolgáltattak a liberalizmus jobboldali kritikájának. No most a jobboldali kritika mindig is létezett, és arra épült, hogy a liberalizmus az egyén piedesztálra állításával olyan hagyományos értékeket erodál, mint a család, a nemzet vagy a vallás, ezzel pedig a társadalom sírásója. Ugyanakkor az egy darab Carl Schmitten kívül (aki amúgy is náci volt, és nem picit) nem nagyon volt olyan gondolkodója, aki rendszerbe tudta szedni az érveket. Kapóra jöttek tehát az olyan baloldali filozófusok, akiknek a mondatai aztán a jobboldaliak ajkán bukkantak fel, csak épp nem a kisemmizett kisebbségekre vonatkoztatva, hanem a fehér többségre, aki a jobboldal szemében maga vált veszélyeztetett csoporttá, és ezért saját védelme érdekében jogosult korlátozni a demokráciát. Amíg a baloldal azért bírálta a liberalizmus igényét az univerzalizmusra, mert abban a fehér elnyomás eszközét látta, addig a jobboldal azért, mert az univerzalizmus felszámolásával megtagadhatta felelősségét a világ többi részével szemben. És külön vicces, hogy miközben kisajátította vette a baloldali kritika eszköztárát, ugyanezt a baloldali kritikát összemosta magával a liberalizmussal, megtalálva benne azt a démoni entitást, ami akarata ellenére meleg afroamerikaiakká operálna át minden óvodást.
Szerintem ez egy nagyszerű esszé, méltó ahhoz a csávóhoz, aki valószínűleg a legtöbbet félreértett zseni a politikatudomány területén – ami pedig nem kis szó. Nagyszerű azért, mert remekül ragadja meg a liberalizmusban azt, amit védeni érdemes, amit védeni kell. És nagyszerű azért is, mert megmutatja, a riválisok kritikái mennyire nem ezt a lényeget érintik, és hogy az általuk nyújtott alternatívák mennyire homályosak és vészjóslóak. Nyilván nem vállalkozhat arra, hogy biztos tippeket adjon arra nézve, hogy lehetne kihúzni az illiberalizmusok méregfogát – megelégszik annak körvonalazásával, miért fontos projekt ez. Gondolom, innentől nálunk pattog a labda.
* Ironikus, hogy a neoliberalizmus nagyon jól megfér a populizmussal, ami technikailag azt jelenti, hogy a Trumphoz és Orbánhoz hasonló gusztustalanul gazdag emberek a legszegényebbek szavazataira támaszkodva őrzik meg hatalmukat. Snyder ezt a típust nevezi „szadopopulistának” – a politikust, akinek tevékenysége arra irányul, hogy saját választói legsérülékenyebb rétegeinek ártson.
November 16, 2022
Rereading November 2022 for the Sunday Philosophers. It should be a great discussion!
4++
Liberalism and its Discontents is a provocative title that may attract the attention of right-wing populists who think they see an ally as well as leftwing progressives spoiling for a fight. Those who have read Francis Fukuyama’s earlier writing, though, will know what to expect, and Fukuyama provides a well-reasoned examination and critique of how the political left and right have both done damage to the classical liberalism that emerged during the seventeenth century to limit the powers of governments and protect the rights of diverse people living under those governments.
The book examines the foundational classical liberal ideas of economic liberalism and personal autonomy, including free speech, and explores the core ideas of today’s contemporary liberalism. It also discusses the critique of modern scientific thinking, a critique that both the right and left seem to share. Fukuyama describes how populists on the right and progressives on the left are both unhappy with the way classical liberalism has evolved but states that this is not because of any fundamental flaw in liberalism but because, for example, conservatives see the emphasis on personal autonomy to be a threat to their deeply held religious and cultural beliefs and progressives object to how the rules protect existing elites, which tends to increase economic inequalities and social justice. These manifest themselves in things like calls for book bans and cancel culture. While Fukuyama acknowledges the legitimate “discontents” of both sides, he also recognizes the resulting threats to liberalism’s basic foundations. As an intelligent, rational being, Fukuyama does not try to offer a panacea but states some principles for a modern liberal society and (SPOILER ALERT! ) concludes with a call for moderation from all sides.
Liberalism and Its Discontents is aimed at an intelligent general reader, and the style is generally clear and not overly pedantic. There are a number of highlights in my ebook and notes like “Well put” and “Too true!”. As a good scholar, Fukuyama cites his sources carefully and has given me several titles to add to my TBR stack as well as an urge to reread some classics. However, it could be improved by defining terms like Overton Window that most people would not know and also by defining more clearly and precisely important terms like neoliberalism. And while I am pleased he did not turn the book into a tome, I would have liked somewhat longer exploration of some topics like the economic elements of alternatives to today and perhaps less stress on identity politics.
Many people today are concerned about the state of our society, but those who care enough to write about it usually have an axe to grind. This is one of the most well-balanced books of its type that I have read in a long time and is worth the attention of anyone who cares about our future.
4++
Liberalism and its Discontents is a provocative title that may attract the attention of right-wing populists who think they see an ally as well as leftwing progressives spoiling for a fight. Those who have read Francis Fukuyama’s earlier writing, though, will know what to expect, and Fukuyama provides a well-reasoned examination and critique of how the political left and right have both done damage to the classical liberalism that emerged during the seventeenth century to limit the powers of governments and protect the rights of diverse people living under those governments.
The book examines the foundational classical liberal ideas of economic liberalism and personal autonomy, including free speech, and explores the core ideas of today’s contemporary liberalism. It also discusses the critique of modern scientific thinking, a critique that both the right and left seem to share. Fukuyama describes how populists on the right and progressives on the left are both unhappy with the way classical liberalism has evolved but states that this is not because of any fundamental flaw in liberalism but because, for example, conservatives see the emphasis on personal autonomy to be a threat to their deeply held religious and cultural beliefs and progressives object to how the rules protect existing elites, which tends to increase economic inequalities and social justice. These manifest themselves in things like calls for book bans and cancel culture. While Fukuyama acknowledges the legitimate “discontents” of both sides, he also recognizes the resulting threats to liberalism’s basic foundations. As an intelligent, rational being, Fukuyama does not try to offer a panacea but states some principles for a modern liberal society and (SPOILER ALERT! ) concludes with a call for moderation from all sides.
Liberalism and Its Discontents is aimed at an intelligent general reader, and the style is generally clear and not overly pedantic. There are a number of highlights in my ebook and notes like “Well put” and “Too true!”. As a good scholar, Fukuyama cites his sources carefully and has given me several titles to add to my TBR stack as well as an urge to reread some classics. However, it could be improved by defining terms like Overton Window that most people would not know and also by defining more clearly and precisely important terms like neoliberalism. And while I am pleased he did not turn the book into a tome, I would have liked somewhat longer exploration of some topics like the economic elements of alternatives to today and perhaps less stress on identity politics.
Many people today are concerned about the state of our society, but those who care enough to write about it usually have an axe to grind. This is one of the most well-balanced books of its type that I have read in a long time and is worth the attention of anyone who cares about our future.
May 20, 2022
Very provocative, and insightful. Challeniging to both right and left as we may find the need to adjust our particular points of view in order to find a more civic communal life together.
April 4, 2022
Fukuyama provides a very nuanced and well-balanced account of what liberalism, as in classic liberalism, means today and how it has evolved over time and explains why to a large extent is the victim of its own success. He carefully explains why there is no alternative to a liberal democracy, but that it will have to accommodate its evil twin offspring: rightwing ethno-liberalism and leftwing identity politics by addressing the legitimate concerns of people that have led to up rise. This is necessary if our western societies are to survive the onslaughts of illiberal autocratic societies such as China, Russia and to a lesser degree Turkey and Hungary. The book is really well written and highly recommendable.
November 30, 2022
Francis Fukuyama means well, and he writes well. I find myself frequently agreeing with him, and yet I can't help coming away from this book feeling that he is a bit of a douche bag, hawking old ideas as the solutions for problems for which they have been weighed, measured and found wanting. He's an apologist for an idealized old system that never really existed in the way that he would like us to think. Bleh!
But because he is a good writer, I keep reading. There really were a lot of good ideas in the old style liberalism that came out of the Enlightenment. And without those ideas we might not have prospered as we did. We might not have developed more modern ideas about inclusiveness and equality that were implicit in the older concepts developed by people who too often failed to practice what they preached. And when we start throwing out the old stuff, we have to be careful to not throw out the good with the bad and to not destroy the social homeostasis that keeps us humming along at a pretty reasonable level of general prosperity and freedom. I'm way not sold on the Fukuyama perspective. We definitely need more innovative thinking than Mr. Fukuyama is able to deliver. We have some serious problems that will require bold leadership and radical rethinking of old ideas and structures to solve, but perhaps we need to make haste slowly.
But because he is a good writer, I keep reading. There really were a lot of good ideas in the old style liberalism that came out of the Enlightenment. And without those ideas we might not have prospered as we did. We might not have developed more modern ideas about inclusiveness and equality that were implicit in the older concepts developed by people who too often failed to practice what they preached. And when we start throwing out the old stuff, we have to be careful to not throw out the good with the bad and to not destroy the social homeostasis that keeps us humming along at a pretty reasonable level of general prosperity and freedom. I'm way not sold on the Fukuyama perspective. We definitely need more innovative thinking than Mr. Fukuyama is able to deliver. We have some serious problems that will require bold leadership and radical rethinking of old ideas and structures to solve, but perhaps we need to make haste slowly.
June 3, 2024
It's interesting to see neo liberals talk so much about democracy while having a track record of promoting policies that have put democracy in a perilous position. Promoting endless offensive war operations, economic policies that have proven to be disastrous and still portray themselves as bastions of democracy.
Fukuyama, describes the Russian Ukraine war as "This war can save liberalism". This argument that neo cons and establishment politicians have been repeating for years has lead to foreign policy disasters all across the globe. These rationals have been applied to Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan. Even though the author himself opposed the Iraq war, many who hold the ideology that the U.S should intervene in all countries use the same argument.
These wars have turned into unmitigated disasters, wasted trillions, have destabilized the region and have made us less safe. The notion that the United States is a savior of democracy and is in these wars to promote "Human rights" is practically a fairy tale that is as evidence based as the tooth fairy. Notice to "Save Liberalism" we have to spend hundreds of billions over seas while cost of living soars in the united states, housing is unaffordable and healthcare costs have exploded. There is never any call by neo liberals to invest in the poorest citizens, to make sure access to health care is a right to all citizens regardless of the number of zeros in ones bank account. To promote "democracy" we need to fund wars for trillions of dollars and ignore our own domestic population. Just look how quickly aid is tied together for war, look how easily both parties agree on funding foreign wars that bring no value to the lives of its citizens but make a small sliver of people fantastically rich in Washington. Washington has solely ignored the desires of its citizens creating economic instability which has lead to political instability. You need idiots like this author to make it seem like your tax dollars are going to some noble cause rather than a military ideology that has failed for over 25 years.
Btw, US overthrew the democratically elected leader in 2014 in Ukraine and replaced the position with a more favorable leader. Notice the author doesn't mention that to protect democracy the U.S has to overthrow it.
Fukuyama, describes the Russian Ukraine war as "This war can save liberalism". This argument that neo cons and establishment politicians have been repeating for years has lead to foreign policy disasters all across the globe. These rationals have been applied to Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan. Even though the author himself opposed the Iraq war, many who hold the ideology that the U.S should intervene in all countries use the same argument.
These wars have turned into unmitigated disasters, wasted trillions, have destabilized the region and have made us less safe. The notion that the United States is a savior of democracy and is in these wars to promote "Human rights" is practically a fairy tale that is as evidence based as the tooth fairy. Notice to "Save Liberalism" we have to spend hundreds of billions over seas while cost of living soars in the united states, housing is unaffordable and healthcare costs have exploded. There is never any call by neo liberals to invest in the poorest citizens, to make sure access to health care is a right to all citizens regardless of the number of zeros in ones bank account. To promote "democracy" we need to fund wars for trillions of dollars and ignore our own domestic population. Just look how quickly aid is tied together for war, look how easily both parties agree on funding foreign wars that bring no value to the lives of its citizens but make a small sliver of people fantastically rich in Washington. Washington has solely ignored the desires of its citizens creating economic instability which has lead to political instability. You need idiots like this author to make it seem like your tax dollars are going to some noble cause rather than a military ideology that has failed for over 25 years.
Btw, US overthrew the democratically elected leader in 2014 in Ukraine and replaced the position with a more favorable leader. Notice the author doesn't mention that to protect democracy the U.S has to overthrow it.
February 23, 2023
Fukuyama offers a concise and insightful analysis of the contemporary challenges facing liberal democracies. Despite some references to Rawlsian Theory that may be challenging for those unfamiliar with political science (including myself), the book is generally accessible.
The book is both relevant and timely, especially given the waning trust in liberal principles. However, as already mentioned, the writing tone is inconsistent, every so often assuming a scholarly audience and, occasionally, appearing geared towards a less academic readership.
Overall, it is a worthwhile read. Courage will be needed, but I'll move on to Fukuyama's "The Origins of Political Order".
The book is both relevant and timely, especially given the waning trust in liberal principles. However, as already mentioned, the writing tone is inconsistent, every so often assuming a scholarly audience and, occasionally, appearing geared towards a less academic readership.
Overall, it is a worthwhile read. Courage will be needed, but I'll move on to Fukuyama's "The Origins of Political Order".
September 10, 2022
Fukuyama se hace socialdemócrata. Un ensayo ameno que analiza el liberalismo (como doctrina política y no económica), cuál es su estado actual en el mundo, sus críticas y sus fortalezas. Me ha interesado bastante su visión porque muestra muy bien cómo el neoliberalismo es una perversión del liberalismo clásico y cuáles son los retos que afronta en las democracias actuales. Me ha interesado bastante.
June 15, 2022
Uma perspectiva muito interessante sobre o Liberalismo, os seus excessos e os ataques de que tem sido alvo, tanto à esquerda (politicas identitárias) como à direita (populismos). Leio muito poucas obras de não ficção por quase sempre me saberem a pouco mas este livro de Fukuyama aproxima-se muito de uma obra completa (ainda que curta), que lança as bases para pensar melhor e mais fundo sobre a sociedade em que vivemos.
Talvez venha a pegar noutras obras do autor mas para quem se interessa pela vertigem do tempo que vivemos e por olhar e pensar o mundo em constante transformação, esta é uma óptima introdução.
Talvez venha a pegar noutras obras do autor mas para quem se interessa pela vertigem do tempo que vivemos e por olhar e pensar o mundo em constante transformação, esta é uma óptima introdução.
May 17, 2022
This is a relatively short and excellent summary of contemporary problems facing liberal democracies. The rise of identity politics and postmodernism; the far right nonsense under the guises of Trump and Brexit. He also goes against what he describes 'neoliberalism' but in the sense of buying free market ideas on ideological grounds rather than practical policy. And the ongoing dilemma of global social media conglomerates such as Facebook and Twitter that are worsening the problem of civil discourse.
Fukuyama is able to provide readers with sensible and practical guides to fighting against the extremes of the far left and far right. He concludes the book suggesting moderation as they key solution.
An excellent read for those that believe in liberal values over the world.
Fukuyama is able to provide readers with sensible and practical guides to fighting against the extremes of the far left and far right. He concludes the book suggesting moderation as they key solution.
An excellent read for those that believe in liberal values over the world.
Read
April 28, 2022The tolerance-based approach that Fukuyama describes is not modern liberalism but Christian liberty as introduced by Locke, who was a Christian and not secular thinker. Locke copied this from the Islamic concept of tolerance for multiple schools, sects and even religions, which had been completely unknown in Christians Catholic Europe. This tolerance indeed made no prescriptions regarding values but it was meant to function within the context of Christian society and government. This is because society and government must be established on a particular value system and cannot be neutral to them all.
The secular liberalism that replaced Christianity is not a system of tolerance but a distinct ideology that has its own values, based not on liberty (ie tolerance) but based on freedoms and sovereignty for man. Fukuyama is not being honest at all by conflating this secular liberalism with the earlier Christian liberty but then that is what everyone in the West has been made to think. It is this value system of secular liberalism, extending deeply into social and economic norms that were previously based on Christianity, that is forcing Christian communities in the West to reject secular liberalism, through what the liberals refer to as populist leaders.
Under Christian liberty, it should not have been a problem for Muslim women to take that niqab. But under secular liberalism, the niqab contradicts basic freedoms so must be rejected.
The secular liberalism that replaced Christianity is not a system of tolerance but a distinct ideology that has its own values, based not on liberty (ie tolerance) but based on freedoms and sovereignty for man. Fukuyama is not being honest at all by conflating this secular liberalism with the earlier Christian liberty but then that is what everyone in the West has been made to think. It is this value system of secular liberalism, extending deeply into social and economic norms that were previously based on Christianity, that is forcing Christian communities in the West to reject secular liberalism, through what the liberals refer to as populist leaders.
Under Christian liberty, it should not have been a problem for Muslim women to take that niqab. But under secular liberalism, the niqab contradicts basic freedoms so must be rejected.
July 25, 2023
We are all centrists :P ;)
Let me start with what centrism is not - it is not the mean of 2 opposing or extreme political positions. Too often people who are non-partisan like to think of themselves as centrists. Ofcourse partisans are at the lowest ladder, but too often, an honest commitment to an ideology which appeals to one's own conscience is considered centrism. To me, Centrism is recognising the inevitable conflicts between liberty, equality and fraternity. And seeking to balance them..
To me, Francis Fukiyama is a great centrist and this book is as incisive and thoughtful as it gets.
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He starts by defining and explaining classical liberalism. And then he explains what the Right-Wing (AKA "libertarians"/Conservatives) and the Left-Wing (AKA "left-liberals"/Communists) have made it to be. The former turned into an advocacy of minimum government and free-market neoliberalism. The latter turned it into advocacy of equality of outcomes and identity politics. The great thing is that he explains why the two factions evolved as they did. And the good, the bad and the ugly about their ideologies as of today (the book was written in 2021).
In conjunction with The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad this is an excellent understanding of the flaws of liberal democracy and the growing illiberalism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
"Reader Moshay, kitaab badi honi chahiye lambi nahi" :P :)
For an author who wrote a 300+ page (acclaimed) book on a one-line idea - that liberal democracy was the best form of government - this was one of the best books on political theory. Half the length and not a word out-of-place.
This was my 4th book by the author and the best so far.
PS:- When a person self-identifies as a centrist, i feel like “forgive them father…”. The perfect balance of conflicting ideals and making public policy on them is extremely extremely tough. For evidence, plz look at today’s politics on urgent issues.
Let me start with what centrism is not - it is not the mean of 2 opposing or extreme political positions. Too often people who are non-partisan like to think of themselves as centrists. Ofcourse partisans are at the lowest ladder, but too often, an honest commitment to an ideology which appeals to one's own conscience is considered centrism. To me, Centrism is recognising the inevitable conflicts between liberty, equality and fraternity. And seeking to balance them..
To me, Francis Fukiyama is a great centrist and this book is as incisive and thoughtful as it gets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
He starts by defining and explaining classical liberalism. And then he explains what the Right-Wing (AKA "libertarians"/Conservatives) and the Left-Wing (AKA "left-liberals"/Communists) have made it to be. The former turned into an advocacy of minimum government and free-market neoliberalism. The latter turned it into advocacy of equality of outcomes and identity politics. The great thing is that he explains why the two factions evolved as they did. And the good, the bad and the ugly about their ideologies as of today (the book was written in 2021).
In conjunction with The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad this is an excellent understanding of the flaws of liberal democracy and the growing illiberalism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
"Reader Moshay, kitaab badi honi chahiye lambi nahi" :P :)
For an author who wrote a 300+ page (acclaimed) book on a one-line idea - that liberal democracy was the best form of government - this was one of the best books on political theory. Half the length and not a word out-of-place.
This was my 4th book by the author and the best so far.
PS:- When a person self-identifies as a centrist, i feel like “forgive them father…”. The perfect balance of conflicting ideals and making public policy on them is extremely extremely tough. For evidence, plz look at today’s politics on urgent issues.
April 8, 2025
What I have learned is classical liberalism is not quite what I thought it was, and I'm not a liberal. Overall, this read like an apology for liberalism and its shortcomings, and how easy it is to usurp and twist. At times this book felt like it was telling the left to capitulate to the right because all this fuss is upsetting the right and liberalism is about not upsetting 'anyone'... but apparently the right has the right of way when it comes to social progression? There was a moment when it talked about the zone of privacy and how people have the right to have controversial thoughts and opinions that they should not share with the public that shone brighter than the rest of the book but it didn't seem to acknowledge the reason the zone of privacy isn't respected is because a person's inner thoughts and feelings often drive their actions and if someone is thinking badly about a person or a specific group of people privately - it makes sense that they'd publicly behave antagonistically towards said person or specific group.
It was well written; I'll give it that. But mostly didn't agree with a lot of the content.
It was well written; I'll give it that. But mostly didn't agree with a lot of the content.
January 15, 2023
This book was riveting, something I never thought I'd ever say about a political volume. It was short, sweet, and to the point (which was likewise unexpected). The author provides a brief but clear outline of how we got to where we are. I found it helpful -- like a fish learning to understand water. For the first time I actually understood the position that "Boomers ruined it for everyone who followed."
The author is a radical centrist, which is refreshing. Most people are probably moderate, more or less, but staking out a moderate position doesn't get much press these days.
This book tells you just enough to either make a fool of yourself or direct you to further research. In the spirit of the former, it can help you become obnoxious in online debates. "Oh, I see you ascribe to Rawlian theory on individual choice. But has it occurred to you that my not be an accurate or universal theory of justice?" Or "Oh Foucault! How cute. Did you learn that in Deconstructionism 101 or on Tumblr?"
As you can see, this book can teach you great things.
The author is a radical centrist, which is refreshing. Most people are probably moderate, more or less, but staking out a moderate position doesn't get much press these days.
This book tells you just enough to either make a fool of yourself or direct you to further research. In the spirit of the former, it can help you become obnoxious in online debates. "Oh, I see you ascribe to Rawlian theory on individual choice. But has it occurred to you that my not be an accurate or universal theory of justice?" Or "Oh Foucault! How cute. Did you learn that in Deconstructionism 101 or on Tumblr?"
As you can see, this book can teach you great things.
March 3, 2024
черезмірне зациклення індивідів на собі руйнує соціальні зв'язки, тонка матерія спільнот розсипається, що призводить до поляризації суспільств та відсутності бачення спільного горизонту.
"...суспільство зосереджених на собі індивідів, зацікавлених лише в максимізації власного споживання, взагалі не буде суспільством..."
переход до більш агресивного неолібералізму, відмова або повне заперечення державних інституцій, національних спільнот та суспільного контролю призводить до занепаду самої ідеї класичного лібералізму, який крізь століття показав себе найефективнішою політичною моделлю.
"...тож якщо ліберальні суспільства хочуть конкурувати зі світовими авторитарними потугами, що зростають, вони мусять скоригувати свій курс..."
але як часто буває з подібними роботами, книжка більш спрямована на американську внутрішню проблематику і аудиторію, побіжно виходячи за її межі.
"...суспільство зосереджених на собі індивідів, зацікавлених лише в максимізації власного споживання, взагалі не буде суспільством..."
переход до більш агресивного неолібералізму, відмова або повне заперечення державних інституцій, національних спільнот та суспільного контролю призводить до занепаду самої ідеї класичного лібералізму, який крізь століття показав себе найефективнішою політичною моделлю.
"...тож якщо ліберальні суспільства хочуть конкурувати зі світовими авторитарними потугами, що зростають, вони мусять скоригувати свій курс..."
але як часто буває з подібними роботами, книжка більш спрямована на американську внутрішню проблематику і аудиторію, побіжно виходячи за її межі.
June 1, 2022
Fukuyama makes a brief but solid defense of liberalism in this book. With little to no exposure to political science, I found this pretty easy to read except when he talks about Rawlsian Theory. A solid and timely read, given the waning trust in liberal principles.
October 14, 2024
Interesting book about the current challenges liberalism faces. Far left, populists, neo-liberalism, capitalism. Gave me a lot of insights. Might be a bit conservative in the sense of how to face these problems but it was an interesting read.
July 17, 2022
In this book Fukuyama analyses liberalism, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses, and discusses the backlash that it has received from various fronts in recent times. He concludes that liberal principles should be followed in order to effectively organize politics in a diverse population, and that liberalism is preferable to all the proposed alternatives. However, he calls for a moderate version of liberalism, in which concerns about promoting a sense of community and social assistance by the state have comparable importance to protecting individual freedom.
This is an interesting, yet flawed, book. A major weakness of it, from the analytical point if view, is that it uses a rather vague and sometimes contradictory notion of liberalism. At times, he seems to refer to the rule of law, together with limitation of powers: “Liberalism in the sense that I am using it refers to the rule of law, a system of formal rules that restrict the power of the executive, even if that executive is democratically legitimated through an election” (p. 3), other times, he seems to have in mind what in Europe is known as social democracy: “A basic principle of liberalism should be that individuals are expected to be responsible for their own happiness and life outcomes, but that the state is fully justified in stepping in to support them when they are subject to adverse circumstances beyond their control” (p. 28, emphasis added). The rule of law does not define liberalism; a government that strictly follows and rules by laws will be illiberal if those laws violate individual freedom (the Nazi regime could, in some respects, be offered as an example). Similarly, we might argue whether or not the idea of the sate supporting individuals in need is consistent with liberal principles, but it certainly is not a basic principle of liberalism. In my view, the core of liberalism is the idea that individual freedom is fundamental and the government should be articulated in the way that best respects it. Fukuyama’s book then, should be seen as an analysis and defense not of liberalism, but of what we could call well-functioning status quo western political system (separation of powers, rule of law, democracy and big government, mostly respecting individual freedoms).
Fukuyama does present an interesting particular critique of liberalism (which applies to liberalism conceived as I proposed above). I would describe it is as follows. While freedom is a good, there are other goods, such as sociability, labor or social respect. The later might be goods even if achieved without the free action of everyone. While they might be better, more “genuine” if achieved by free action of all, the key is that they are goods even if achieved without freedom. In this sense, freedom would not be the only good and absence or limitation of it would not invalidate the other goods. This idea would indicate that liberal principles should not be seen as absolute but rather as a subset of a larger set of principles (some advancing goods other than freedom) among which trade-offs should be found when they conflict.
Fukuyama offers a brief political-economic history of the last 150 years, and argues that “Economic policy in the developed world has swung between extremes in the past century and a half” (p. 20). It should be noted, however, that the mayor development during this period is a continuous increase in the size of the state (as measured, for example, by government spending as a fraction of GDP, most of which is social spending, see, eg., https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/hi...) with the “neoliberal revolution” of the 1980’s leading primarily to a stop in the spending growth rather than to a decrease (except in the UK, where a modest decrease, since reversed, was seen).
Fukuyama then goes on to describe the reasons of the current discontent with liberalism. He argues that both on the right and the left the problem was taking liberal principles to extremes. The idea that “neoliberalism” (understood as denigrating “the role of the state in the economy and emphasiz[ing] free markets as spurs to growth and efficient allocators of resources” (p.19)) took liberalism to the extreme is defensible. However, the idea that “liberalism on the left evolved into modern identity politics” (p. 47) seems to me completely mistaken. Identity politics largely negates the principles of individual freedom which are core to liberalism, and its much better understood as steaming from tribalism, a strong tendency in human nature which is largely opposed to liberalism, leveraged by the left “critical” tradition.
Fukuyama also claims that Liberalism is associated to natural science “From its earliest beginnings, modern liberalism was strongly associated with a distinct cognitive mode, that of modern natural science. This mode assumes that there is an objective reality outside the human mind, which human beings can gradually understand and ultimately come to manipulate” (p.85). This association seems circumstantial, more that fundamental, and it is not developed or explored. The discussion on postmodernism that follows is, therefore, not clearly related to liberalism itself.
Fukuyama correctly highlights that freedom of speech is crucial in a liberal system, and considers that it can be threatened by the state, private interests controlling communication media, and the seer volume of speech that exists nowadays. His analysis, however, has some problems. For example, the problem of “the seer volume of speech that the internet has made possible” (p. 101) is about how a society can make sense of events in a cohesive way, and while important, it is different to the question of freedom of speech. Threats to freedom of speech arising from concentrated control of communication media are also rather different to those posed by the sate (which still has the practical monopoly on the legitimate use of force), and are more related to the right to be able to reach a large audience rather than to the exercise of speech itself. Nonetheless Fukuyama correctly (in my view) identifies that problems arising from the private control of communication media are better tackled by antitrust and competition laws than by regulating what media companies cannot or have to allow. He also highlights the importance of privacy to enable genuine debate. I tend to agree with this importance, but it is only related to freedom of speech in the sense that without privacy not only public speech but also private speech can be threatened.
Fukuyama examines criticism of liberalism from the left and the right and concludes that there are some valid points which could be addressed by a more “moderate” form of liberalism, but ultimately neither the left nor the right offer a viable alternative.
Fukuyama offers an interesting proposal which could sore up the support for liberalism: “identity as a liberal and open society is something of which liberals can be justly proud, and their tendency to downplay national identity has allowed the extreme right to claim this ground. […] Citizenship should convey a two-way bargain conveying acceptance of the social contract, and should be a point of pride.” (p. 137). I interpret this as suggesting to make liberalism “identitarian”. In this way, the strong human tendency for tribalism could be leveraged to promote liberalism (which itself limits the negative aspects of tribalism). However, basing support for liberalism on identitarian claims in a sense subverts liberal principles, and might be a weaker basis than rational conviction. Still, rational conviction could perhaps be compatible with personal identification, and could aid reaching a wider audience (and to some extent is inevitable to some extent).
To sum up, this is an interesting (and relatively brief) read, but cannot be considered an important book on liberalism. It nevertheless offers some stimulating reflections on an important topic.
Let me also point out that Fukuyama’s rendition of Rawls seems deeply flawed. He claims that for Rawls justice is prior to the good, and that his derived rules “were not based on a substantive theory of human nature or empirical observations of the ends that human beings actually seek” (p. 53) but actually Rawls needs a “narrow theory of the good” to reach his principles of justice. Fukuyama goes on to claim “In the case of Rawls, the problem lies in the absolutization of autonomy, and the elevation of choice over all other human goods” (p. 54). This seems rather removed from Rawl’s theory, as he only cares about choice of an abstract being in the “Original Position”, while choices of actual individuals in a “Rawlsian society” are often heavily restricted. Fukuyama also indicates “Rawlsian liberalism enjoins non-judgmentalism regarding other people’s life choices” (p. 57). However, to the extent that this is true (and it largely is not, since Rawls theory allows for heavily restricting indidvidual’s choices) this is because Rawls’ is a theory of justice, not a full fledged moral theory; i.e. the charge is irrelevant.
This is an interesting, yet flawed, book. A major weakness of it, from the analytical point if view, is that it uses a rather vague and sometimes contradictory notion of liberalism. At times, he seems to refer to the rule of law, together with limitation of powers: “Liberalism in the sense that I am using it refers to the rule of law, a system of formal rules that restrict the power of the executive, even if that executive is democratically legitimated through an election” (p. 3), other times, he seems to have in mind what in Europe is known as social democracy: “A basic principle of liberalism should be that individuals are expected to be responsible for their own happiness and life outcomes, but that the state is fully justified in stepping in to support them when they are subject to adverse circumstances beyond their control” (p. 28, emphasis added). The rule of law does not define liberalism; a government that strictly follows and rules by laws will be illiberal if those laws violate individual freedom (the Nazi regime could, in some respects, be offered as an example). Similarly, we might argue whether or not the idea of the sate supporting individuals in need is consistent with liberal principles, but it certainly is not a basic principle of liberalism. In my view, the core of liberalism is the idea that individual freedom is fundamental and the government should be articulated in the way that best respects it. Fukuyama’s book then, should be seen as an analysis and defense not of liberalism, but of what we could call well-functioning status quo western political system (separation of powers, rule of law, democracy and big government, mostly respecting individual freedoms).
Fukuyama does present an interesting particular critique of liberalism (which applies to liberalism conceived as I proposed above). I would describe it is as follows. While freedom is a good, there are other goods, such as sociability, labor or social respect. The later might be goods even if achieved without the free action of everyone. While they might be better, more “genuine” if achieved by free action of all, the key is that they are goods even if achieved without freedom. In this sense, freedom would not be the only good and absence or limitation of it would not invalidate the other goods. This idea would indicate that liberal principles should not be seen as absolute but rather as a subset of a larger set of principles (some advancing goods other than freedom) among which trade-offs should be found when they conflict.
Fukuyama offers a brief political-economic history of the last 150 years, and argues that “Economic policy in the developed world has swung between extremes in the past century and a half” (p. 20). It should be noted, however, that the mayor development during this period is a continuous increase in the size of the state (as measured, for example, by government spending as a fraction of GDP, most of which is social spending, see, eg., https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/hi...) with the “neoliberal revolution” of the 1980’s leading primarily to a stop in the spending growth rather than to a decrease (except in the UK, where a modest decrease, since reversed, was seen).
Fukuyama then goes on to describe the reasons of the current discontent with liberalism. He argues that both on the right and the left the problem was taking liberal principles to extremes. The idea that “neoliberalism” (understood as denigrating “the role of the state in the economy and emphasiz[ing] free markets as spurs to growth and efficient allocators of resources” (p.19)) took liberalism to the extreme is defensible. However, the idea that “liberalism on the left evolved into modern identity politics” (p. 47) seems to me completely mistaken. Identity politics largely negates the principles of individual freedom which are core to liberalism, and its much better understood as steaming from tribalism, a strong tendency in human nature which is largely opposed to liberalism, leveraged by the left “critical” tradition.
Fukuyama also claims that Liberalism is associated to natural science “From its earliest beginnings, modern liberalism was strongly associated with a distinct cognitive mode, that of modern natural science. This mode assumes that there is an objective reality outside the human mind, which human beings can gradually understand and ultimately come to manipulate” (p.85). This association seems circumstantial, more that fundamental, and it is not developed or explored. The discussion on postmodernism that follows is, therefore, not clearly related to liberalism itself.
Fukuyama correctly highlights that freedom of speech is crucial in a liberal system, and considers that it can be threatened by the state, private interests controlling communication media, and the seer volume of speech that exists nowadays. His analysis, however, has some problems. For example, the problem of “the seer volume of speech that the internet has made possible” (p. 101) is about how a society can make sense of events in a cohesive way, and while important, it is different to the question of freedom of speech. Threats to freedom of speech arising from concentrated control of communication media are also rather different to those posed by the sate (which still has the practical monopoly on the legitimate use of force), and are more related to the right to be able to reach a large audience rather than to the exercise of speech itself. Nonetheless Fukuyama correctly (in my view) identifies that problems arising from the private control of communication media are better tackled by antitrust and competition laws than by regulating what media companies cannot or have to allow. He also highlights the importance of privacy to enable genuine debate. I tend to agree with this importance, but it is only related to freedom of speech in the sense that without privacy not only public speech but also private speech can be threatened.
Fukuyama examines criticism of liberalism from the left and the right and concludes that there are some valid points which could be addressed by a more “moderate” form of liberalism, but ultimately neither the left nor the right offer a viable alternative.
Fukuyama offers an interesting proposal which could sore up the support for liberalism: “identity as a liberal and open society is something of which liberals can be justly proud, and their tendency to downplay national identity has allowed the extreme right to claim this ground. […] Citizenship should convey a two-way bargain conveying acceptance of the social contract, and should be a point of pride.” (p. 137). I interpret this as suggesting to make liberalism “identitarian”. In this way, the strong human tendency for tribalism could be leveraged to promote liberalism (which itself limits the negative aspects of tribalism). However, basing support for liberalism on identitarian claims in a sense subverts liberal principles, and might be a weaker basis than rational conviction. Still, rational conviction could perhaps be compatible with personal identification, and could aid reaching a wider audience (and to some extent is inevitable to some extent).
To sum up, this is an interesting (and relatively brief) read, but cannot be considered an important book on liberalism. It nevertheless offers some stimulating reflections on an important topic.
Let me also point out that Fukuyama’s rendition of Rawls seems deeply flawed. He claims that for Rawls justice is prior to the good, and that his derived rules “were not based on a substantive theory of human nature or empirical observations of the ends that human beings actually seek” (p. 53) but actually Rawls needs a “narrow theory of the good” to reach his principles of justice. Fukuyama goes on to claim “In the case of Rawls, the problem lies in the absolutization of autonomy, and the elevation of choice over all other human goods” (p. 54). This seems rather removed from Rawl’s theory, as he only cares about choice of an abstract being in the “Original Position”, while choices of actual individuals in a “Rawlsian society” are often heavily restricted. Fukuyama also indicates “Rawlsian liberalism enjoins non-judgmentalism regarding other people’s life choices” (p. 57). However, to the extent that this is true (and it largely is not, since Rawls theory allows for heavily restricting indidvidual’s choices) this is because Rawls’ is a theory of justice, not a full fledged moral theory; i.e. the charge is irrelevant.
November 3, 2022
சமூக வலைத்தங்கள் எங்கிலும் சபிக்கப்படும் ஜீவன்களில் லிபரல்கள் முக்கியமானவர்கள். வலதுசாரிகளிடமும் இடதுசாரிகளிடமும் சம அளவிலான விமர்சனங்களை வாங்கி கட்டிக்கொள்பவர்களும் லிபரல்கள் தான். இப்படிப்பட்ட சூழலில் லிபரலிசம்(தமிழில்: தாராளவாதம், சுதந்திரவாதம் ) பற்றியும் அது சந்திக்கும் சிக்கல்கள் பற்றியும் அதன் எதிர்கால நோக்கங்கள் பற்றியும் பேசும் நூல் தான் Francis Fukuyama எழுதி சமீபத்தில் வெளியாகி இருக்கும் “Liberalism and Its Discontents”.
தீவிரத்தன்மை கொண்ட சித்தாந்தங்கள் வலது மட்டும் இடது ஆகிய இரண்டு துருவங்களிலும் தலைதூக்கி வரும் இக்காலகட்டத்தில் நெகிழ்வுத்தன்மை கொண்ட ஒரு தத்துவத்தின் விழுமியங்களை தூக்கிப்பிடிப்பதும் பாதுகாப்பதும் அவசியமாகும். இந்நூல் பேசும் கரு என்பது லிபரலிசம் சந்தித்துவரும் விமர்சனங்களை பட்டியலிட்டு அதற்கான தீர்வுகளை பரிந்துரைக்கும் ஒன்றாகவே அமைந்துள்ளது.
நவதாராளவாதம்(Neoliberalism) என்று சொல்லப்படும் பொருளாதார கொள்கைக்கு மாற்றாக செவ்வியல் தாராளவாதம்(classical Liberalism ) என்ற அரசியல் தத்துவத்தை நிறுவும் ஒன்றாக தான் இந்நூல் அமைந்திருக்கிறது. நிதி மற்றும் பொருளாதார மேலாண்மையிலும் திட்டமிடலில் அரசின் தலையீடு அவசியம் , மக்களுக்கான அடிப்படை தேவைகளை அரசே பூர்த்திசெய்ய வேண்டும், பேச்சு சுதந்திரம் எந்த வகையிலும் பாதிக்கப்பட கூடாது, அதிகார பரவலாக்கம் அனைத்து துறைகளிலும் நடைபெறவேண்டும் , தனிமனித உரிமைகளுக்கு முக்கியத்துவம் அளிக்கப்படவேண்டிய அதே நேரத்தில் வரம்புகளை மதிக்கும் ஒன்றாகவும் அவை இருக்க வேண்டும் போன்ற இந்நூல் கூறும் பல பரிந்துரைகள் மிதவாத சோசியலிஸ்டுகளுக்கும் ஏற்புடைய ஒன்றாகவே இருக்கிறது. அதுபோலவே இந்நூல் பல போதாமைகளையும் கொண்டுள்ளது.
கத்தோலிக்க கிறித்துவத்தை எதிர்த்த சீர்திருத்த இயக்கத்தின் தோற்றம் லிபேரலிசம் என்ற தனிமனித தத்துவத்தை அடிப்படையாக கொண்டிருந்தது, பின்னர் ஏற்பட்ட புத்தொளி இயக்கமும் தொழிற்துறை வளர்ச்சியும், இந்த தத்துவத்தை மதத்தின் பிடியில் இருந்து பிரித்து மதசார்பற்ற அரசியல் தத்துவமாக ஆகியது. அமெரிக்காவின் உருவாக்கத்தில் இந்த அரசியல் தத்துவம் பெரும் தாக்கத்தை செலுத்தியது, பிரெஞ்சு புரட்சியின் அடிப்படையாக லிபெர்ட்டி அமைந்திருந்தது. இந்த இடத்தில தான் லிபேரலிசம் என்ற தத்துவம் ஜனநாயகம் என்ற அரசாங்க முறைக்கு மிக நெருங்கிய ஒன்றாக தன்னை தகவமைத்து கொண்டது.
அமெரிக்காவில் 13 வது சட்டத்திருத்தம் அடிமைத்தனத்தை ஒழித்து கட்டியது, ஐரோப்பாவில் தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக(Liberal Democracy) நாடுகளின் உருவாக்கம் வீரியமாக நடைபெற்றது. பெண்களுக்கு வாக்குரிமை என்பது 20ஆம் நூற்றாண்டின் முதல் பாதியில் ஐரோப்பா முழுவதும் நடைமுறைக்கு வந்தது. காலனியத்தின��� விளைவாக இது மற்ற நாடுகளுக்கும் பரவியது, முதல் உலகோப்போரை தொடர்ந்து ஏற்பட்ட பெருமந்தம் திட்டமிடலில் அரசாங்கத்தின் பிடியை இறுக்கியது, ஹிட்லர் முசோலினி போன்ற சர்வாதிகார கொடுங்கோலாட்சிக்கு இது வித்திட்டது, இதன் விளைவாக நடந்த இரண்டாம் உலகப்போர் பல்வேறு மாற்றங்களுக்கு தொடக்கமாக அமைந்தது . ஐக்கிய நாடுகள் சபை(UN) உருவாக்கப்பட்டது. IMF , உலக வாங்கி போன்ற அமைப்புகளும் இச்சமயத்தில் உருவானவையே.
அனைத்து தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக அரசுகளின் ஒரு பகுதியாக திட்டமிடல்(State Planning) ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டது, சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தின் அபார வளர்ச்சியும் இதற்கு ஒரு காரணம் எனலாம், ஆசியா மற்றும் ஆஃப்ரிக்க கண்டங்களில் காலனிய ஆதிக்கம் முடிக்குவந்தது, 1960களில் அமெரிக்காவில் நடந்த மனித உரிமை செயல்பாடுகள் விடுபட்டவர்களையும் ஒன்றிணைத்தது, திட்டமிடல் அதிகரிக்க அதிகரிக்க அதற்கு எதிரான பொருளாதார தத்துவங்களும் அறிவுப்புலத்தில் வளர்ச்சியடைய தொடங்கின, வளர்ச்சி குன்றிய சமயத்தில் ரொனால்ட் ரெகன் மற்றும் மார்க்கரெட் தச்சர் ஆகியோரின் வருகை அமெரிக்காவிலும் இங்கிலாந்திலும் நடந்தேறியது. அவர்களது நவதாராளவாத பொருளாதார கொள்கை முற்றிலுமாக அரசின் பிடியை பொருளாதார துறையில் நீக்க வேண்டுமென்றது.
1990 களில் நடந்த சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தின் சிதைவு பொருளாதார புலத்தில் நவதாராளவாத கொள்கை பரவலுக்கு மேலும் வித்திட்டது. 2008 இல் ஏற்பட்ட பொருளாதார தேக்கம் நவதாராளவாத பொருளியல் தத்துவத்தின் மீதான விமர்சனங்களை அதிகரித்தது, உலகம் முழுக்கவே அசமத்துவம் என்பதும் மூலதன குவிப்பு என்பதும் அதிகரித்தது. பொருளாதார துறையில் நவதாராளவாத கொள்கை பல சிக்கலுக்கு வித்திட்டது, அரசியல் மற்றும் சமூக சூழலில் லிபரலிசத்துக்கு எதிரான சிந்தனை போக்கு உலகெங்கும் எழுச்சி அடைத்தது. டொனால்ட் டிரம்ப், ஜைர் பால்சோனரோ, நரேந்திர மோடி, செர்ஜியோ மேட்டரெல்லா போன்ற வலதுசாரி தத்துவ தலைமைகளுக்கு வித்திட்டது.
லிபரலிசம் என்ற தத்துவம் பரிணமித்த விதத்தை இப்படியாக சுருக்கமாக சொல்லலாம்.
1970 களுக்கு பிறகான சீனாவின் எழுச்சி என்பதை லிபரலிசை பொருளாதார கொள்கையான சந்தை திறப்பால் ஏற்பட்ட ஒன்றே ஆகும். மூன்றாம் உலக நாடுகளில் வசிக்கும் மக்களில் அன்றாட வாழ்க்கையில் இந்த தத்துவம் பெரும் மாற்றத்தை நிகழ்த்தி இருக்கிறது என்பதை மறுப்பதற்கில்லை, இன்றைக்கு நாம் புழங்கும் தொழில்நுட்ப சாதனங்கள் அதற்கு உதாரணமாக சொல்லலாம். 1990களுக்கு பிறகு நடைபெற்ற பொருளியல் வளர்ச்சிக்கு சந்தையும் தாராளவாத பொருளாதார கொள்கையும் முக்கியமானவையாக இருந்தன. அதே நேரத்தில் இந்த வளர்ச்சி அசமத்துவங்களும் அதிகரித்தது. உளவியல் ரீதியான சிக்கல்களையும் இவை அதிகரித்தன. உழைப்புக்கும் - உழைப்பாளிக்கும் இடையிலான தொடர்பு அற்று போய், உழைப்பின் அந்நியமாதல் நடைபெற்றது.
கலாச்சார புலத்தில் தேசியவாதம் என்ற தத்துவம் மதம் இனம் நிறம் போன்ற பிறப்பு சார்ந்த ஒன்றன் அடிப்படையில் எழுச்சி பெற்றது, இது பன்மைத்துவத்திற்கு எதிராக நின்றது. உலகமயமாக்களை எதிர்த்தது, புலம்பெயர்ந்த அயல்நாட்டவருக்கு எதிரான மனநிலை பூர்விக மக்களிடத்தில் அதிகரிக்க தொடங்கியது.
மத்திய கிழக்கு நாடுகளிலும் இந்தியா போன்ற தெற்காசிய பகுதிகளிலும் இந்த கலாச்சார தேசியவாதத்தின் எழுச்சி மதத்தை அடிப்படையாக கொண்டிருந்தது. இந்தியாவில் இந்துத்துவமாக அது வெளிப்பட்டது. லிபரலிசத்துக்கு எதிரான தன்மைகளை கொண்டிருக்கும் இந்த வலதுசாரி தத்துவத்தின் எழுச்சியை லிபரலிசம் எப்படி எதிர்கொள்ளப்போகிறது என்பது நம்முன் இருக்கும் கேள்வி, அதற்கு பதிலை இந்நூல் வழங்க முயல்கிறது.
தொழில்நுட்ப வளர்ச்சி லிபரலிச தத்துவத்திற்கு எதிரான மற்றுமொரு சிக்கலை உருவாக்கி இருக்கிறது, சமூக ஊடகமும், பத்திரிக்கை துறையும் பெருமுதலீட்டும் அரசுக்கு நெருக்கமான நிறுவனங்களின் கையில் சென்று சேர்ந்துள்ளது, இதற்கு எதிரான சட்டங்கள் ஏற்பட்டால் ஒழிய பேச்சுரிமை, பிரைவசி, தனிமனித உரிமை ஆகியவற்றை பாதுகாக்க முடியாது . இதையும் முக்கிய சமகால பிரச்சனையாக சுட்டிக்காட்டுகிறார் Fukuyama.
செவ்வியல் தாராளவாதத்தின் முக்கிய அம்சங்களாக சிலவற்றை பட்டியலிடலாம் 1. தனிமனித உரிமைக்கும், சுயமரிதைக்குமான முக்கியத்துவம் 2 . யதார்த்தத்தை ஒத்த பகுத்தறிவு பார்வை 3 . சொத்துரிமை மற்றும் பரிவர்த்தனை செய்யும் உரிமை. Individualism என்பது லிபரலிசத்தின் அடிப்படையாக இருந்தாலும், சமூகத்துடனான தொடர்பும் முக்கியமான ஒன்று, மனிதனின் பக்குவப்படுத்தலுக்கு இது இன்றியமையா ஒன்றாகும். அவன் அந்நியமாகாமல் இருக்க இந்த தொடர்பு அவசியமான ஒன்று. தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக நாடுகளில் தனிமனிதவியமும் கூட்டுவாதமும் சேர்ந்தே இயங்குகின்றன, லிபரலிசம் என்ற அரசியல் கொள்கைக்கு அத்தகைய நெகிழ்வு தன்மை இயல்பிலேயே இருப்பதாகவும் பலதரப்பட்ட பார்வையை அரவணைக்கும் பண்பை அது கொண்டுள்ளதாகவும் சொல்கிறார் Fukuyama.
நாளுக்கு நாள் உலகமயமாக்கலின் விளைவாக பன்மையான மக்கள் திரள் அனைத்து ஜனநாயக நாடுகளிலும் உருவாகி வருகிறது. இத்தகைய பன்மைத்துவத்திற்கு எதிரான குரல்களும் ஒருபுறம் வலுக்க தொடங்கி இருக்கிறது. இந்த குரல்கள் எல்லாம் ஜனநாயகம் என்ற அரசியல் தத்துவத்திற்கு எதிராக செயல்பட தொடங்கியும் இருக்கிறது. ஜனநாயகத்தை வலுப்படுத்த லிபரலிசம் அவசியமான ஒன்று என்றும் அதை பாதுகாப்பது அவசியம் என்று சொல்கிறார் நூல் ஆசிரியர்.
மேற்கத்திய அரசுகள் மேற்கொண்ட காலனிய நடவடிக்கைகள் குறித்தும் அதனால் நிகழ்த்தப்பட்ட வன்முறைகள் குறித்தும் இந்நூல் பெரிதாக பேசவில்லை. CIA ,NIA போன்ற லிபரல் அமைப்புகள் மற்றும் நிறுவனங்கள் ஏற்படுத்திய சீரழிவுகளும் இந்த தத்துவம் வெறுக்கப்பட முக்கிய காரணமாக இருக்கையில் அதை பற்றிய எந்த குறிப்பும் இல்லாமல் இருப்பது போதாமையே. இடஒதுக்கீடு குறித்து இவர் கொண்டிருக்கும் பார்வை மீண்டும் பொருளாதார காரணி மற்றும் தகுதி என்ற அம்சத்தின் அடிப்படையில் தான் அனைத்தும் அமையவேண்டும் என்ற ரீதியில் உள்ளது. (Michael J. Sandel இதுகுறித்து விரிவாக எழுதி இருக்கிறார்)
சமகால ஜனநாயக அரசுகள் நிகழ்த்திவரும் போர்களும் அதற்கான உதவிகளையும் விமர்சனத்துடன் தான் பார்க்கவேண்டி இருக்கிறது, ஆனால் இந்நூல் அதனை முற்றிலுமாக புறக்கணித்துள்ளது.
இப்படி நிறைகளையும் குறைகளையும் கொண்டுள்ள இந்நூல் சமகாலத்தின் அரசியல் சிக்கலை பேசுகிறது. அந்த வகையில் அனைவராலும் வாசிக்கப்படவேண்டிய ஒன்று. Francis Fukuyamaவின் முந்தைய நூலான Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment மிக சிறந்த ஒன்றாக இருந்தது, அதனோடு ஒப்பிடுகையில் இந்நூல் ஏமாற்றமளிக்கும் ஒன்றாகவே இருக்கிறது. இருந்தாலும் அரசியல் ஆர்வலர்கள் தவறவிடக்கூடாத ஒரு நூலாக இதை சொல்லலாம்.
தீவிரத்தன்மை கொண்ட சித்தாந்தங்கள் வலது மட்டும் இடது ஆகிய இரண்டு துருவங்களிலும் தலைதூக்கி வரும் இக்காலகட்டத்தில் நெகிழ்வுத்தன்மை கொண்ட ஒரு தத்துவத்தின் விழுமியங்களை தூக்கிப்பிடிப்பதும் பாதுகாப்பதும் அவசியமாகும். இந்நூல் பேசும் கரு என்பது லிபரலிசம் சந்தித்துவரும் விமர்சனங்களை பட்டியலிட்டு அதற்கான தீர்வுகளை பரிந்துரைக்கும் ஒன்றாகவே அமைந்துள்ளது.
நவதாராளவாதம்(Neoliberalism) என்று சொல்லப்படும் பொருளாதார கொள்கைக்கு மாற்றாக செவ்வியல் தாராளவாதம்(classical Liberalism ) என்ற அரசியல் தத்துவத்தை நிறுவும் ஒன்றாக தான் இந்நூல் அமைந்திருக்கிறது. நிதி மற்றும் பொருளாதார மேலாண்மையிலும் திட்டமிடலில் அரசின் தலையீடு அவசியம் , மக்களுக்கான அடிப்படை தேவைகளை அரசே பூர்த்திசெய்ய வேண்டும், பேச்சு சுதந்திரம் எந்த வகையிலும் பாதிக்கப்பட கூடாது, அதிகார பரவலாக்கம் அனைத்து துறைகளிலும் நடைபெறவேண்டும் , தனிமனித உரிமைகளுக்கு முக்கியத்துவம் அளிக்கப்படவேண்டிய அதே நேரத்தில் வரம்புகளை மதிக்கும் ஒன்றாகவும் அவை இருக்க வேண்டும் போன்ற இந்நூல் கூறும் பல பரிந்துரைகள் மிதவாத சோசியலிஸ்டுகளுக்கும் ஏற்புடைய ஒன்றாகவே இருக்கிறது. அதுபோலவே இந்நூல் பல போதாமைகளையும் கொண்டுள்ளது.
கத்தோலிக்க கிறித்துவத்தை எதிர்த்த சீர்திருத்த இயக்கத்தின் தோற்றம் லிபேரலிசம் என்ற தனிமனித தத்துவத்தை அடிப்படையாக கொண்டிருந்தது, பின்னர் ஏற்பட்ட புத்தொளி இயக்கமும் தொழிற்துறை வளர்ச்சியும், இந்த தத்துவத்தை மதத்தின் பிடியில் இருந்து பிரித்து மதசார்பற்ற அரசியல் தத்துவமாக ஆகியது. அமெரிக்காவின் உருவாக்கத்தில் இந்த அரசியல் தத்துவம் பெரும் தாக்கத்தை செலுத்தியது, பிரெஞ்சு புரட்சியின் அடிப்படையாக லிபெர்ட்டி அமைந்திருந்தது. இந்த இடத்தில தான் லிபேரலிசம் என்ற தத்துவம் ஜனநாயகம் என்ற அரசாங்க முறைக்கு மிக நெருங்கிய ஒன்றாக தன்னை தகவமைத்து கொண்டது.
அமெரிக்காவில் 13 வது சட்டத்திருத்தம் அடிமைத்தனத்தை ஒழித்து கட்டியது, ஐரோப்பாவில் தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக(Liberal Democracy) நாடுகளின் உருவாக்கம் வீரியமாக நடைபெற்றது. பெண்களுக்கு வாக்குரிமை என்பது 20ஆம் நூற்றாண்டின் முதல் பாதியில் ஐரோப்பா முழுவதும் நடைமுறைக்கு வந்தது. காலனியத்தின��� விளைவாக இது மற்ற நாடுகளுக்கும் பரவியது, முதல் உலகோப்போரை தொடர்ந்து ஏற்பட்ட பெருமந்தம் திட்டமிடலில் அரசாங்கத்தின் பிடியை இறுக்கியது, ஹிட்லர் முசோலினி போன்ற சர்வாதிகார கொடுங்கோலாட்சிக்கு இது வித்திட்டது, இதன் விளைவாக நடந்த இரண்டாம் உலகப்போர் பல்வேறு மாற்றங்களுக்கு தொடக்கமாக அமைந்தது . ஐக்கிய நாடுகள் சபை(UN) உருவாக்கப்பட்டது. IMF , உலக வாங்கி போன்ற அமைப்புகளும் இச்சமயத்தில் உருவானவையே.
அனைத்து தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக அரசுகளின் ஒரு பகுதியாக திட்டமிடல்(State Planning) ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டது, சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தின் அபார வளர்ச்சியும் இதற்கு ஒரு காரணம் எனலாம், ஆசியா மற்றும் ஆஃப்ரிக்க கண்டங்களில் காலனிய ஆதிக்கம் முடிக்குவந்தது, 1960களில் அமெரிக்காவில் நடந்த மனித உரிமை செயல்பாடுகள் விடுபட்டவர்களையும் ஒன்றிணைத்தது, திட்டமிடல் அதிகரிக்க அதிகரிக்க அதற்கு எதிரான பொருளாதார தத்துவங்களும் அறிவுப்புலத்தில் வளர்ச்சியடைய தொடங்கின, வளர்ச்சி குன்றிய சமயத்தில் ரொனால்ட் ரெகன் மற்றும் மார்க்கரெட் தச்சர் ஆகியோரின் வருகை அமெரிக்காவிலும் இங்கிலாந்திலும் நடந்தேறியது. அவர்களது நவதாராளவாத பொருளாதார கொள்கை முற்றிலுமாக அரசின் பிடியை பொருளாதார துறையில் நீக்க வேண்டுமென்றது.
1990 களில் நடந்த சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தின் சிதைவு பொருளாதார புலத்தில் நவதாராளவாத கொள்கை பரவலுக்கு மேலும் வித்திட்டது. 2008 இல் ஏற்பட்ட பொருளாதார தேக்கம் நவதாராளவாத பொருளியல் தத்துவத்தின் மீதான விமர்சனங்களை அதிகரித்தது, உலகம் முழுக்கவே அசமத்துவம் என்பதும் மூலதன குவிப்பு என்பதும் அதிகரித்தது. பொருளாதார துறையில் நவதாராளவாத கொள்கை பல சிக்கலுக்கு வித்திட்டது, அரசியல் மற்றும் சமூக சூழலில் லிபரலிசத்துக்கு எதிரான சிந்தனை போக்கு உலகெங்கும் எழுச்சி அடைத்தது. டொனால்ட் டிரம்ப், ஜைர் பால்சோனரோ, நரேந்திர மோடி, செர்ஜியோ மேட்டரெல்லா போன்ற வலதுசாரி தத்துவ தலைமைகளுக்கு வித்திட்டது.
லிபரலிசம் என்ற தத்துவம் பரிணமித்த விதத்தை இப்படியாக சுருக்கமாக சொல்லலாம்.
1970 களுக்கு பிறகான சீனாவின் எழுச்சி என்பதை லிபரலிசை பொருளாதார கொள்கையான சந்தை திறப்பால் ஏற்பட்ட ஒன்றே ஆகும். மூன்றாம் உலக நாடுகளில் வசிக்கும் மக்களில் அன்றாட வாழ்க்கையில் இந்த தத்துவம் பெரும் மாற்றத்தை நிகழ்த்தி இருக்கிறது என்பதை மறுப்பதற்கில்லை, இன்றைக்கு நாம் புழங்கும் தொழில்நுட்ப சாதனங்கள் அதற்கு உதாரணமாக சொல்லலாம். 1990களுக்கு பிறகு நடைபெற்ற பொருளியல் வளர்ச்சிக்கு சந்தையும் தாராளவாத பொருளாதார கொள்கையும் முக்கியமானவையாக இருந்தன. அதே நேரத்தில் இந்த வளர்ச்சி அசமத்துவங்களும் அதிகரித்தது. உளவியல் ரீதியான சிக்கல்களையும் இவை அதிகரித்தன. உழைப்புக்கும் - உழைப்பாளிக்கும் இடையிலான தொடர்பு அற்று போய், உழைப்பின் அந்நியமாதல் நடைபெற்றது.
கலாச்சார புலத்தில் தேசியவாதம் என்ற தத்துவம் மதம் இனம் நிறம் போன்ற பிறப்பு சார்ந்த ஒன்றன் அடிப்படையில் எழுச்சி பெற்றது, இது பன்மைத்துவத்திற்கு எதிராக நின்றது. உலகமயமாக்களை எதிர்த்தது, புலம்பெயர்ந்த அயல்நாட்டவருக்கு எதிரான மனநிலை பூர்விக மக்களிடத்தில் அதிகரிக்க தொடங்கியது.
மத்திய கிழக்கு நாடுகளிலும் இந்தியா போன்ற தெற்காசிய பகுதிகளிலும் இந்த கலாச்சார தேசியவாதத்தின் எழுச்சி மதத்தை அடிப்படையாக கொண்டிருந்தது. இந்தியாவில் இந்துத்துவமாக அது வெளிப்பட்டது. லிபரலிசத்துக்கு எதிரான தன்மைகளை கொண்டிருக்கும் இந்த வலதுசாரி தத்துவத்தின் எழுச்சியை லிபரலிசம் எப்படி எதிர்கொள்ளப்போகிறது என்பது நம்முன் இருக்கும் கேள்வி, அதற்கு பதிலை இந்நூல் வழங்க முயல்கிறது.
தொழில்நுட்ப வளர்ச்சி லிபரலிச தத்துவத்திற்கு எதிரான மற்றுமொரு சிக்கலை உருவாக்கி இருக்கிறது, சமூக ஊடகமும், பத்திரிக்கை துறையும் பெருமுதலீட்டும் அரசுக்கு நெருக்கமான நிறுவனங்களின் கையில் சென்று சேர்ந்துள்ளது, இதற்கு எதிரான சட்டங்கள் ஏற்பட்டால் ஒழிய பேச்சுரிமை, பிரைவசி, தனிமனித உரிமை ஆகியவற்றை பாதுகாக்க முடியாது . இதையும் முக்கிய சமகால பிரச்சனையாக சுட்டிக்காட்டுகிறார் Fukuyama.
செவ்வியல் தாராளவாதத்தின் முக்கிய அம்சங்களாக சிலவற்றை பட்டியலிடலாம் 1. தனிமனித உரிமைக்கும், சுயமரிதைக்குமான முக்கியத்துவம் 2 . யதார்த்தத்தை ஒத்த பகுத்தறிவு பார்வை 3 . சொத்துரிமை மற்றும் பரிவர்த்தனை செய்யும் உரிமை. Individualism என்பது லிபரலிசத்தின் அடிப்படையாக இருந்தாலும், சமூகத்துடனான தொடர்பும் முக்கியமான ஒன்று, மனிதனின் பக்குவப்படுத்தலுக்கு இது இன்றியமையா ஒன்றாகும். அவன் அந்நியமாகாமல் இருக்க இந்த தொடர்பு அவசியமான ஒன்று. தாராளவாத ஜனநாயக நாடுகளில் தனிமனிதவியமும் கூட்டுவாதமும் சேர்ந்தே இயங்குகின்றன, லிபரலிசம் என்ற அரசியல் கொள்கைக்கு அத்தகைய நெகிழ்வு தன்மை இயல்பிலேயே இருப்பதாகவும் பலதரப்பட்ட பார்வையை அரவணைக்கும் பண்பை அது கொண்டுள்ளதாகவும் சொல்கிறார் Fukuyama.
நாளுக்கு நாள் உலகமயமாக்கலின் விளைவாக பன்மையான மக்கள் திரள் அனைத்து ஜனநாயக நாடுகளிலும் உருவாகி வருகிறது. இத்தகைய பன்மைத்துவத்திற்கு எதிரான குரல்களும் ஒருபுறம் வலுக்க தொடங்கி இருக்கிறது. இந்த குரல்கள் எல்லாம் ஜனநாயகம் என்ற அரசியல் தத்துவத்திற்கு எதிராக செயல்பட தொடங்கியும் இருக்கிறது. ஜனநாயகத்தை வலுப்படுத்த லிபரலிசம் அவசியமான ஒன்று என்றும் அதை பாதுகாப்பது அவசியம் என்று சொல்கிறார் நூல் ஆசிரியர்.
மேற்கத்திய அரசுகள் மேற்கொண்ட காலனிய நடவடிக்கைகள் குறித்தும் அதனால் நிகழ்த்தப்பட்ட வன்முறைகள் குறித்தும் இந்நூல் பெரிதாக பேசவில்லை. CIA ,NIA போன்ற லிபரல் அமைப்புகள் மற்றும் நிறுவனங்கள் ஏற்படுத்திய சீரழிவுகளும் இந்த தத்துவம் வெறுக்கப்பட முக்கிய காரணமாக இருக்கையில் அதை பற்றிய எந்த குறிப்பும் இல்லாமல் இருப்பது போதாமையே. இடஒதுக்கீடு குறித்து இவர் கொண்டிருக்கும் பார்வை மீண்டும் பொருளாதார காரணி மற்றும் தகுதி என்ற அம்சத்தின் அடிப்படையில் தான் அனைத்தும் அமையவேண்டும் என்ற ரீதியில் உள்ளது. (Michael J. Sandel இதுகுறித்து விரிவாக எழுதி இருக்கிறார்)
சமகால ஜனநாயக அரசுகள் நிகழ்த்திவரும் போர்களும் அதற்கான உதவிகளையும் விமர்சனத்துடன் தான் பார்க்கவேண்டி இருக்கிறது, ஆனால் இந்நூல் அதனை முற்றிலுமாக புறக்கணித்துள்ளது.
இப்படி நிறைகளையும் குறைகளையும் கொண்டுள்ள இந்நூல் சமகாலத்தின் அரசியல் சிக்கலை பேசுகிறது. அந்த வகையில் அனைவராலும் வாசிக்கப்படவேண்டிய ஒன்று. Francis Fukuyamaவின் முந்தைய நூலான Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment மிக சிறந்த ஒன்றாக இருந்தது, அதனோடு ஒப்பிடுகையில் இந்நூல் ஏமாற்றமளிக்கும் ஒன்றாகவே இருக்கிறது. இருந்தாலும் அரசியல் ஆர்வலர்கள் தவறவிடக்கூடாத ஒரு நூலாக இதை சொல்லலாம்.
April 29, 2025
Fabulously organized and strongly centrist defense of classical liberal democracy.
There’s so much good in this book, but I am left with a tinge of disappointment. In some ways, Fukuyama’s defense of liberalism exposes its fundamental paradox: it requires norms which it cannot prescribe. For example, Fukuyama rightly recognizes that liberal democracies require tolerance of people from diverse viewpoints on what the good life is. However, this requirement is itself a viewpoint of what the good life is. What if someone disagrees that a peaceable society of diversity in which we all compromise to some degree is in fact the good life? Well, liberalism requires we cannot tolerate such a viewpoint. Otherwise it falls apart.
This paradox is part of the reason (in my uneducated opinion) liberalism struggles to take hold in fundamentalist cultures. Today that culture is the Islamic world. Originally it was the Christian world of 17th century Europe. To embrace liberalism is to embrace a new worldview—at least to some extent. It is probably possible for traditionalist cultures to find ways to accommodate, but this process isn’t easy or natural.
And if our contemporary democracy is seeing the population split into polarizing directions that—while not overtly religious all the time—are nevertheless dogmatic and worldview shaping, then we are going to have this fight all over again.
This does not mean liberalism is a failure, in my opinion. It just means it is not an absolute framework of life. It is a pragmatic compromise which is probably the best we can do. I think Fukuyama is sensitive to this, but still, this fundamental paradox is going to require some apologetic messaging if we are to return to classical liberalism from the far-left and far-right.
There’s so much good in this book, but I am left with a tinge of disappointment. In some ways, Fukuyama’s defense of liberalism exposes its fundamental paradox: it requires norms which it cannot prescribe. For example, Fukuyama rightly recognizes that liberal democracies require tolerance of people from diverse viewpoints on what the good life is. However, this requirement is itself a viewpoint of what the good life is. What if someone disagrees that a peaceable society of diversity in which we all compromise to some degree is in fact the good life? Well, liberalism requires we cannot tolerate such a viewpoint. Otherwise it falls apart.
This paradox is part of the reason (in my uneducated opinion) liberalism struggles to take hold in fundamentalist cultures. Today that culture is the Islamic world. Originally it was the Christian world of 17th century Europe. To embrace liberalism is to embrace a new worldview—at least to some extent. It is probably possible for traditionalist cultures to find ways to accommodate, but this process isn’t easy or natural.
And if our contemporary democracy is seeing the population split into polarizing directions that—while not overtly religious all the time—are nevertheless dogmatic and worldview shaping, then we are going to have this fight all over again.
This does not mean liberalism is a failure, in my opinion. It just means it is not an absolute framework of life. It is a pragmatic compromise which is probably the best we can do. I think Fukuyama is sensitive to this, but still, this fundamental paradox is going to require some apologetic messaging if we are to return to classical liberalism from the far-left and far-right.
July 17, 2023
A very nice, brief intro to the threats to liberalism from both sides of the political spectrum. Frank does an excellent job weighing both the pragmatic *and* moral importance of each flavor of discontent, and while I actually think that some of his conclusions are a bit too simplistic, the analysis is outstanding, balancing theory, history, and empirics. Having just finished GEB, I was also struck by the Gödelian problem of liberal democracy, exemplified by free speech rights contradictions. The tangled hierarchies of intersecting rights and outcome/process dichotomies (parallel to use/mention and data/program dichotomies) pose a deep challenge, not in theory, but in practice are a fundamental issue to maintain.
May 20, 2022
A very interesting and important book. As a conservative who disagrees with the populist right - Trump, QANON - as well as with the Woke and the libertarians (market purists) - I want to make a point:
According to Fukuyama both conservatives and the Woke people want to have something thicker than the thin values classical liberalism is providing. Conservatives want to find them from the past and the Woke from "antiracism" etc. There will always be some conflict between individualism and collectivism / the sociability of humans.
The conflict will never be solved except in a temporal way - it is a wave motion between individualism and collectivism. I think Jonathan Haidt made the best effort to understand that conflict and how to solve it. Haidt talks about durheimian utilitarism:
"we live most of our lives in the ordinary (profane) world, but we achieve our greatest joys in those brief moments of transit to the sacred world, in which we become “simply a part of a whole.”...
Durkheim said: “What is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces man to … regulate his actions by something other than … his own egoism.”
... a Durkheimian version of utilitarianism would recognize that human flourishing requires social order and embeddedness. It would begin with the premise that social order is extraordinarily precious and difficult to achieve. A Durkheimian utilitarianism would be open to the possibility that the binding foundations—Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity—have a crucial role to play in a good society."
Haidt talks about the "hive switch" when people temporarily move to a more social/communal mindset. I mean what is happening in Ukraine today - people coming together for a common cause. This hive switch is happening because they really objectively HAVE a common cause - not because of some idiotic ideology. They find solidarity which will probably last for many years after the war. That happened in Finland also after WWII.
Based on that solidarity they will solve many other problems than the Russian invasion - say corruption, and inequality.
According to Fukuyama both conservatives and the Woke people want to have something thicker than the thin values classical liberalism is providing. Conservatives want to find them from the past and the Woke from "antiracism" etc. There will always be some conflict between individualism and collectivism / the sociability of humans.
The conflict will never be solved except in a temporal way - it is a wave motion between individualism and collectivism. I think Jonathan Haidt made the best effort to understand that conflict and how to solve it. Haidt talks about durheimian utilitarism:
"we live most of our lives in the ordinary (profane) world, but we achieve our greatest joys in those brief moments of transit to the sacred world, in which we become “simply a part of a whole.”...
Durkheim said: “What is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces man to … regulate his actions by something other than … his own egoism.”
... a Durkheimian version of utilitarianism would recognize that human flourishing requires social order and embeddedness. It would begin with the premise that social order is extraordinarily precious and difficult to achieve. A Durkheimian utilitarianism would be open to the possibility that the binding foundations—Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity—have a crucial role to play in a good society."
Haidt talks about the "hive switch" when people temporarily move to a more social/communal mindset. I mean what is happening in Ukraine today - people coming together for a common cause. This hive switch is happening because they really objectively HAVE a common cause - not because of some idiotic ideology. They find solidarity which will probably last for many years after the war. That happened in Finland also after WWII.
Based on that solidarity they will solve many other problems than the Russian invasion - say corruption, and inequality.
April 30, 2024
This is the first book of Fukuyama’s I’ve read, and I’m glad I picked it up. It gave me a new lens for viewing our polarized and often contradictory political and social trends. It helped me look beyond the rhetoric and reactions to underlying principles and how they’ve evolved over time.
I’m looking forward to reading more of Fukuyama’s work.
I’m looking forward to reading more of Fukuyama’s work.
May 22, 2024
This is the best book on a contemporary political topic I’ve read in my entire life. Fukuyama hits the nail on the head chapter after chapter in addressing the threats that the contemporary Right and Left pose to Liberalism along with suggesting solutions to placate critiques from both sides. Objectively, informative, and much needed, I cannot recommend this book enough!!!
July 28, 2022
Practically unflawed
September 15, 2022
Best intressant hoor maar heel saai geschreven.
February 17, 2023
He means liberalism as in liberal democracy, not liberal as in lefty. He reviews the arguments against democracy and then answers them. A very interesting and concise read among MANY books I've read this year about the failures and hopes of democracy. If you liked "How Democracy Dies" or anything by Larry Diamond, you will like this.
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