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7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting
The first full analysis of the second Nagorno-Karabakh War―the first war in history won primarily by unmanned systems.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh war—fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan between September 24 and November 10, 2020—was the first war in history won primarily by unmanned systems.
This 44-day war resulted in a decisive military victory for Azerbaijan. Armenia was outfought, outnumbered, and outspent and lost even though they controlled the high ground in a mountainous region that favored traditional defense. Azerbaijan’s alliance with Turkey, and close technological support from Israel, strategically isolated Armenia. In addition, Turkey’s posturing influenced the Russians not to intervene to support Armenia. That Azerbaijan attacked Armenia during the pandemic was an additional factor. The fact that Azerbaijan won the war is not extraordinary, considering the correlation of forces arrayed against Armenia. What is exceptional is that this was the first modern war primarily decided by unmanned weapons. In this war the Turkish-made BAYRAKTAR TB2 Unmanned Air Combat Vehicle (UCAV) and the Israeli-made HAROP Loitering Munition (LM) dominated the fighting and provided Azerbaijan with a war-winning advantage.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Background and overview of war
2. The Domains of 21st-Century War
3. Top Attack
4. The Transparent Battlespace
5. The Desperate Need for Masking
6. The Information War
7. Training and Equipping for the Coming Drone Wars
8. Conclusion – Lessons Learned
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh war—fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan between September 24 and November 10, 2020—was the first war in history won primarily by unmanned systems.
This 44-day war resulted in a decisive military victory for Azerbaijan. Armenia was outfought, outnumbered, and outspent and lost even though they controlled the high ground in a mountainous region that favored traditional defense. Azerbaijan’s alliance with Turkey, and close technological support from Israel, strategically isolated Armenia. In addition, Turkey’s posturing influenced the Russians not to intervene to support Armenia. That Azerbaijan attacked Armenia during the pandemic was an additional factor. The fact that Azerbaijan won the war is not extraordinary, considering the correlation of forces arrayed against Armenia. What is exceptional is that this was the first modern war primarily decided by unmanned weapons. In this war the Turkish-made BAYRAKTAR TB2 Unmanned Air Combat Vehicle (UCAV) and the Israeli-made HAROP Loitering Munition (LM) dominated the fighting and provided Azerbaijan with a war-winning advantage.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Background and overview of war
2. The Domains of 21st-Century War
3. Top Attack
4. The Transparent Battlespace
5. The Desperate Need for Masking
6. The Information War
7. Training and Equipping for the Coming Drone Wars
8. Conclusion – Lessons Learned
160 pages, Paperback
First published February 22, 2022
123 people are currently reading
335 people want to read
About the author
John Antal
21 books12 followersColonel John Antal, US Army (Retired)served 30 years in the US Army as a leader, senior staff officer and commander. He commanded tank and combined arms combat units at platoon, company, battalion and regimental level. He is Airborne and Ranger qualified. He has served in sensitive joint, combined Army staff assignments in the US and overseas. He also served as the Special Assistant to the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Since his retirement from the US Army in 2003, he has become a successful author, speaker, magazine editor, film adviser and personality, mass-market video game developer, explainer-integrator, journalist, and leadership expert.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 41 reviews
April 18, 2024
Anybody who's been following the news for the past couple years or decades knows that we're on the cusp of one of those terrifying revolutions in military affairs, where the hard-won skills of previous generations gets shredded by new technologies, along with the flower of whatever generation has the misfortune to be on the frontlines. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is clearly the first major action, but before that, there was the almost forgotten 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. This book, written in 2021 and published a few weeks before Russian columns headed towards Kiev and were turned back by Bayraktar drones and Javelin missiles, is a mixed bag: a decent summary of a conflict not much covered in the west, breathless and naive transcription of defense industry brochures, and a muddled sketch towards a futurism of the "kill web".
But first, some music!
"Atəş" - a music video released by the Azerbaijani military on the eve of the war, which 'unfortunately slaps' according to a Vice article on the dueling songs of the conflict
First the war. Nagorno-Karabakh was an ethnically Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, which had been an autonomous region since Armenia won the first war in the 90s after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, flush with oil wealth, spent years preparing for a rapid war of conquest, investing in Turkish and Israeli drones and loitering munitions. In the runup to the war, Azerbaijan's military budget was comparable to Armenia's GDP. Armenia's strategy rested on the strength of traditional defense in mountainous terrain, and hopes of intervention from Russia. At the end of September 2020, Azerbaijan provoked a casus belli and attacked. The coordinated effort involved a wave of obsolete An-2 biplanes converted into flying bombs to activate the Armenian air defense network, which was then comprehensively destroyed by Bayraktars and loitering munitions. With Armenian air defenses degraded and destroyed (and notably, the Soviet-era SAM systems seemed totally unable to deal with relatively low and slow flying Bayraktars), Azerbaijani drones worked down the target list of artillery, command, tanks, and infantry bunkers. Meanwhile, conventional armored forces made attacks through the mountain passes, and Azerbaijani special forces infiltrated and seized the strategic town of Shusha, which dominated the M-12 highway. After 44 days, Russia negotiated a ceasefire. Armenia suffered a crushing defeat, both sides sustained real casualties, approximately 3000 out of 17000 soldiers for Azerbaijan, and 4000 casualties out of an unpublished force for Armenia, and tens of thousands of civilians of both ethnicities were forced from their home.
The strategic narrative that Antal pushes is the kill web, a distributed, automated, rapid and precise expansion of the kill chain that links detection of a target to a weapon system and its destruction. In particular, drones like the Bayraktar enable a low-cost combined reconnaissance-strike package, where a single platform can spot targets, fire missiles at them, and accurately evaluate the results. But this seems like a jargon laden excuse to note that traditional infantry and armor have limited range, undirected artillery is random, and jet pilots are notorious for overclaiming the effects of bombing. The defensive counterpart to the kill web is masking, an all spectrum use of camouflage and mobility to prevent the enemy from acquiring your own weapon systems.
The tech is a read of drones and electronic warfare circa the late 2019s, at about the level that you might get from skimming a Lockheed Martin press release. Antal is obsessed with active camouflage systems, everything from hexagon panels of Peltier junctions to scramble IR silhouettes to metamaterial cloaks that would bend light around soldiers. Plato wrote about Gyges' ring as a cautionary tale, but it would be strategically useful.
My critical take is that we are definitely moving towards a new fighting of war, but kill webs and masking are insufficient theories. Some serious questions I have are:
1) Kill webs rely on high-bandwidth video transmission, while masking requires minimizing electromagnetic signatures. Who transmits and under what circumstances? How can jammers survive against home-on-jam anti-radiation missiles?
2) War is economic. A $10,000 drone is not worth shooting with a $100,000 interceptor, unless firing would protect a $1,000,000 tank or similar asset (and scale for more sophisticated weapons and strategic targets). What is the economic balance of offense and defense?
3) Guided weapons stocks run out very rapidly in most recorded conflicts. How can Western militaries ensure both adequate munitions stockpiles and the ability to rapidly replenish them?
4) What level of command proper for integration of various drone forces? Platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division. Should drones be organic to fire/maneuver units, or a supporting enabler, or both?
5) Are FPV drones the future, or is there a hard counter in terms of jamming, directed energy weapons, or just old fashioned airburst shells?
But first, some music!
"Atəş" - a music video released by the Azerbaijani military on the eve of the war, which 'unfortunately slaps' according to a Vice article on the dueling songs of the conflict
First the war. Nagorno-Karabakh was an ethnically Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, which had been an autonomous region since Armenia won the first war in the 90s after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, flush with oil wealth, spent years preparing for a rapid war of conquest, investing in Turkish and Israeli drones and loitering munitions. In the runup to the war, Azerbaijan's military budget was comparable to Armenia's GDP. Armenia's strategy rested on the strength of traditional defense in mountainous terrain, and hopes of intervention from Russia. At the end of September 2020, Azerbaijan provoked a casus belli and attacked. The coordinated effort involved a wave of obsolete An-2 biplanes converted into flying bombs to activate the Armenian air defense network, which was then comprehensively destroyed by Bayraktars and loitering munitions. With Armenian air defenses degraded and destroyed (and notably, the Soviet-era SAM systems seemed totally unable to deal with relatively low and slow flying Bayraktars), Azerbaijani drones worked down the target list of artillery, command, tanks, and infantry bunkers. Meanwhile, conventional armored forces made attacks through the mountain passes, and Azerbaijani special forces infiltrated and seized the strategic town of Shusha, which dominated the M-12 highway. After 44 days, Russia negotiated a ceasefire. Armenia suffered a crushing defeat, both sides sustained real casualties, approximately 3000 out of 17000 soldiers for Azerbaijan, and 4000 casualties out of an unpublished force for Armenia, and tens of thousands of civilians of both ethnicities were forced from their home.
The strategic narrative that Antal pushes is the kill web, a distributed, automated, rapid and precise expansion of the kill chain that links detection of a target to a weapon system and its destruction. In particular, drones like the Bayraktar enable a low-cost combined reconnaissance-strike package, where a single platform can spot targets, fire missiles at them, and accurately evaluate the results. But this seems like a jargon laden excuse to note that traditional infantry and armor have limited range, undirected artillery is random, and jet pilots are notorious for overclaiming the effects of bombing. The defensive counterpart to the kill web is masking, an all spectrum use of camouflage and mobility to prevent the enemy from acquiring your own weapon systems.
The tech is a read of drones and electronic warfare circa the late 2019s, at about the level that you might get from skimming a Lockheed Martin press release. Antal is obsessed with active camouflage systems, everything from hexagon panels of Peltier junctions to scramble IR silhouettes to metamaterial cloaks that would bend light around soldiers. Plato wrote about Gyges' ring as a cautionary tale, but it would be strategically useful.
My critical take is that we are definitely moving towards a new fighting of war, but kill webs and masking are insufficient theories. Some serious questions I have are:
1) Kill webs rely on high-bandwidth video transmission, while masking requires minimizing electromagnetic signatures. Who transmits and under what circumstances? How can jammers survive against home-on-jam anti-radiation missiles?
2) War is economic. A $10,000 drone is not worth shooting with a $100,000 interceptor, unless firing would protect a $1,000,000 tank or similar asset (and scale for more sophisticated weapons and strategic targets). What is the economic balance of offense and defense?
3) Guided weapons stocks run out very rapidly in most recorded conflicts. How can Western militaries ensure both adequate munitions stockpiles and the ability to rapidly replenish them?
4) What level of command proper for integration of various drone forces? Platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division. Should drones be organic to fire/maneuver units, or a supporting enabler, or both?
5) Are FPV drones the future, or is there a hard counter in terms of jamming, directed energy weapons, or just old fashioned airburst shells?
April 9, 2023
Meh. An ok summary of the war, albeit lacking in primary documentation. The technology discussion had some useful points, but the capturing of the lessons seemed so generic as to be commonplace.
August 29, 2022
A "book" about a war I vaguely heard about but knew nothing about. It does go through the short conflict with concise detail and for that alone it's worth reading but it is not truly about this conflict this is a brief designed to pull and extrapolate facts and lessons from this conflict for use in others.
This is written in your standard flag level briefing style that you hear a thousand times in any higher level military schools or seminars. It is full of jargon and acronyms that if you are not used to reading will just leave you blank. For this reason and for it's obvious, based on the Ukraine, over assessment of the Russian military and it's equipment I almost gave it 3 stars but the authors argument is well thought out and presented in a very convincing way so I can't fault him for writing how the military writes and for not knowing the future.
A good book that might be a difficult read for those not use to this style of brief..
This is written in your standard flag level briefing style that you hear a thousand times in any higher level military schools or seminars. It is full of jargon and acronyms that if you are not used to reading will just leave you blank. For this reason and for it's obvious, based on the Ukraine, over assessment of the Russian military and it's equipment I almost gave it 3 stars but the authors argument is well thought out and presented in a very convincing way so I can't fault him for writing how the military writes and for not knowing the future.
A good book that might be a difficult read for those not use to this style of brief..
April 7, 2023
This book expertly merges the historical account of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war with lessons learned and predictions of future warfare. Serious military practitioners should read this timely book.
April 12, 2023
Fascinating book for those who enjoy the history of warfare and/or future planning. Being a former Army officer, I was well aware of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as its CGSC’s main area of operations for several planning exercises. This book, however, provides exceptional history and analysis of the conflict in late 2020 in that region. Unfortunately, most of the world was distracted by the COVID pandemic and didn’t pay much attention to this conflict. If you’re currently working in the Pentagon for the Army, this book is a must read. Key thoughts below.
- Foresight is the ability to fix problems in the short term and develop solutions for the long run. P1.
- … as Ernest Hemingway once stated, “defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in war.” P43.
- Courage is useless in the face of educated bullets, and the Azerbaijani top-attack munitions hit their targets with brilliant accuracy. P 59. PJK. So true. I’ve used my own courage and that of my teams to accomplish key missions, but if you’re up against a well-rehearsed robotic adversary, you must be careful of expending your human capital against such a foe.
- A UAS is the complete package that consists of the unmanned aircraft, a payload, a radio receiver as a means of control and data transfer, and a human operator, whereas the UAV is simply an unmanned aircraft. P62.
- The modern weapons of war are thirsty for electrical power. P73. PJK. Very accurate statement; EVERYTHING needs a power connection in today’s world thus logistics planners must consider this.
- The history of warfare shows that whenever fires dominate the battlespace, the battlespace area expands and becomes empty as soldiers and systems go to ground for protection. P85.
- Masking is the full-spectrum, multi-domain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting. P102. PJK. While the Army has been training this for a couple years, much more needs to be done… and with the right technology vs simple camouflage netting, etc.
- With the Russians deploying arguably the best air defense systems in the world, including the S-400 Triumph, S-500, etc, etc. P102. PJK. I believe most of this book was written just before the Russians invaded Ukraine in early 2022; wonder if the author has a different assessment of the S-400 now.
- If future war can be considered analogous to a five-dimensional chess game, then the Russians and Chinese are playing the white pieces and thus have the first move. P102. PJK. This is the challenging part; our politics tend to put us on the defensive to start most wars. Oddly, I was part of a team that was a first strike in Iraq in early 2003. It’s always better to throw the first punches.
- Done right, a “first strike” is decisive. The first to move in multiple domains, and to integrate and synchronize fires and maneuver into a unifying concept, gains a tremendous advantage. P 129.
- What can the U.S. do to prepare for the next war? Adopt masking in everything; train rigorously to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting; rapidly field air defense systems that can kill drones, etc, etc. p145.
- Foresight is the ability to fix problems in the short term and develop solutions for the long run. P1.
- … as Ernest Hemingway once stated, “defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in war.” P43.
- Courage is useless in the face of educated bullets, and the Azerbaijani top-attack munitions hit their targets with brilliant accuracy. P 59. PJK. So true. I’ve used my own courage and that of my teams to accomplish key missions, but if you’re up against a well-rehearsed robotic adversary, you must be careful of expending your human capital against such a foe.
- A UAS is the complete package that consists of the unmanned aircraft, a payload, a radio receiver as a means of control and data transfer, and a human operator, whereas the UAV is simply an unmanned aircraft. P62.
- The modern weapons of war are thirsty for electrical power. P73. PJK. Very accurate statement; EVERYTHING needs a power connection in today’s world thus logistics planners must consider this.
- The history of warfare shows that whenever fires dominate the battlespace, the battlespace area expands and becomes empty as soldiers and systems go to ground for protection. P85.
- Masking is the full-spectrum, multi-domain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting. P102. PJK. While the Army has been training this for a couple years, much more needs to be done… and with the right technology vs simple camouflage netting, etc.
- With the Russians deploying arguably the best air defense systems in the world, including the S-400 Triumph, S-500, etc, etc. P102. PJK. I believe most of this book was written just before the Russians invaded Ukraine in early 2022; wonder if the author has a different assessment of the S-400 now.
- If future war can be considered analogous to a five-dimensional chess game, then the Russians and Chinese are playing the white pieces and thus have the first move. P102. PJK. This is the challenging part; our politics tend to put us on the defensive to start most wars. Oddly, I was part of a team that was a first strike in Iraq in early 2003. It’s always better to throw the first punches.
- Done right, a “first strike” is decisive. The first to move in multiple domains, and to integrate and synchronize fires and maneuver into a unifying concept, gains a tremendous advantage. P 129.
- What can the U.S. do to prepare for the next war? Adopt masking in everything; train rigorously to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting; rapidly field air defense systems that can kill drones, etc, etc. p145.
March 20, 2024
John Antal uses the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war as a case study to template the changing landscape of warfare in the 21st Century. With emerging technologies, the use of AI and UAVs in particular, military leaders are provided with a new option to identify targets, prosecute them, and assess effects at speeds quicker than have ever been seen. Not only will the advancement of military equipment shorten the "kill chain," it will also open doors to new sensing capabilities on the battlefield.
While these developments will further enable offensive operations, we must also consider how we will counter threats who possess the same capabilities. Our effectiveness in offensive tactics will be for naught if we cannot deter our enemy's ability to employ the same technologies. We must, therefore, also invest heavily in Counter UAS (CUAS) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets.
While Antal did a great job of assessing how the United States can employ emerging technologies in a future ground war, it largely focusses on a battle space that may already be occupied by large ground forces like the US Army. Thus, the question remains, how will AI, UAVs, and CUAVs be employed in support of units at the fore who do not operate with an array of supporting assets? I specifically have SOF, the Marine Corps, and any others who may be employed to gain a foothold in a contested environment.
While these developments will further enable offensive operations, we must also consider how we will counter threats who possess the same capabilities. Our effectiveness in offensive tactics will be for naught if we cannot deter our enemy's ability to employ the same technologies. We must, therefore, also invest heavily in Counter UAS (CUAS) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets.
While Antal did a great job of assessing how the United States can employ emerging technologies in a future ground war, it largely focusses on a battle space that may already be occupied by large ground forces like the US Army. Thus, the question remains, how will AI, UAVs, and CUAVs be employed in support of units at the fore who do not operate with an array of supporting assets? I specifically have SOF, the Marine Corps, and any others who may be employed to gain a foothold in a contested environment.
April 13, 2022
Absolutely superb!! If you are interested in the Future of Warfare, looking at your personal thoughts on our current capabilities and enemy threat possibilities - READ this book now.
As students of strategy, equipment capabilities - ours and what is off the shelf, and what the future can look like, this is for you. The war in these two countries directly illustrates what the future bodes. If we refuse to study, read and be introspective - our assumptions and ignorance will be our downfall.
John Antal gives us a glimpse of the future in an objective, knowledgable study of current real world history. Here is your opportunity to learn and become more aware of "what is out there", and to consider - how do we stack up?
As students of strategy, equipment capabilities - ours and what is off the shelf, and what the future can look like, this is for you. The war in these two countries directly illustrates what the future bodes. If we refuse to study, read and be introspective - our assumptions and ignorance will be our downfall.
John Antal gives us a glimpse of the future in an objective, knowledgable study of current real world history. Here is your opportunity to learn and become more aware of "what is out there", and to consider - how do we stack up?
November 17, 2024
A very mediocre overview of an important and under-reported topic -- the first major use of low-end drones in war, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. This war basically showed what was going to happen in Ukraine (and how WW3 will be fought), in the same ways as the Boer Wars and Russo-Japanese war predicted WW1 conflicts.
Very focused on specific (dumb) military terminology and acronyms, which is all totally artificial, rather than the comparative technological advances. Already outdated by much better primary sources from Ukraine, and never actually useful due to lack of insights during the brief period before Ukraine. Would probably skip.
Very focused on specific (dumb) military terminology and acronyms, which is all totally artificial, rather than the comparative technological advances. Already outdated by much better primary sources from Ukraine, and never actually useful due to lack of insights during the brief period before Ukraine. Would probably skip.
April 19, 2022
This is a timely think-piece on how Azerbaijan defeated Armenia in 44 days. The 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh war is confirmation that technology, in the right innovative hands, can and did defeat conventional armored forces. The author clearly explains the Azerbaijan embrace of modern technology and how it overwhelmed the Armenians who prepared their forces with conventional training and conventional equipment. This book is well researched and is a great start to pondering and planning the future of warfare. Tomorrow has arrived.
November 15, 2022
Foresight
As the geopolitical landscape becomes increasing complicated, rethinking what a military competitive advantage may be comprised of takes on increasing necessity. This book makes you think.
As the geopolitical landscape becomes increasing complicated, rethinking what a military competitive advantage may be comprised of takes on increasing necessity. This book makes you think.
June 26, 2022
Author manages to put lots of items and warnings in this rather small book.
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was a conflict taking place in a period of international tension (pandemic (and economical problems throughout the world), EU/US standoff with Russia, escalation of tension in Asia (China, India etc)). From the information available (and author also notes it) Azerbaijan was long time in planning of the war and Turkey was (and remains) region super-power that backed Azerbaijan back in 1990's and in this conflict. Author explains the advantages of Azerbaijan military at the beginning, new technology, weapons and most importantly tactics and warfare methods used (developed by Turkey in Lybia and Syria). All of this definitely had impact but in my opinion major contributors to the Armenian defeat were space satellites (Turkish and Azerbaijan), decades used to map the static Armenian defenses and build up military, introduce new weaponry and tactics and train soldiers. Once these activities were completed execution of actual strike missions was relatively routine (as they say sweat saves blood, and it was proved here).
Although UAVs and loitering ammunition were the hype of the conflict (and used by Turkish and Israeli weapon manufacturers ad nauseam) I like how author points out to artillery/missile (high precision and standard) weapon system and highly trained infantry and mechanized forces as elements that must not be overlooked and that actually played important role in the conflict (missile cannot occupy the ground).
While I agree with all of the items and required steps as proscribed by the author (on how to prepare for the next war and what elements to take into account for both attack use and defence) I think author is missing out on a very specific point - logistics and ammunition capacity. As recent conflict shows ammunition (artillery, rocket, personal) expenditure can reach wild levels per day when conflict includes large armies with sufficient reserves and beyond the war-theater supplies. While quick war sounds seductive and all that sexy, conflict involving larger militaries with reserves, capable air-defense and generally able to cover all fields of operations it is very likely it will be prolongated and deadly in terms of overall use of indirect (highly-precise or not) missile and artillery. Attrition of key components like satellites and off-shore observation platforms would render lots of sexy autonomous weapons not inoperable but acting behind the lines in isolated manner. Logistics will continue to play very important role. I wish author gave more insights on this subject besides concentrating on actual direct fire new types of munitions and platforms, because logistic and planning was definitely executed on top level by Azerbaijan and Turkey military commanders.
All in all very interesting book, showing how unexpected use of high end military technology against unprepared opponent (that lost touch with military development for too long) can prove to be deadly and win wars. True problems will come about when equal forces (both technically and in command) collide.
Excellent read, highly recommended to all interested in questions about military technology and application of the same.
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was a conflict taking place in a period of international tension (pandemic (and economical problems throughout the world), EU/US standoff with Russia, escalation of tension in Asia (China, India etc)). From the information available (and author also notes it) Azerbaijan was long time in planning of the war and Turkey was (and remains) region super-power that backed Azerbaijan back in 1990's and in this conflict. Author explains the advantages of Azerbaijan military at the beginning, new technology, weapons and most importantly tactics and warfare methods used (developed by Turkey in Lybia and Syria). All of this definitely had impact but in my opinion major contributors to the Armenian defeat were space satellites (Turkish and Azerbaijan), decades used to map the static Armenian defenses and build up military, introduce new weaponry and tactics and train soldiers. Once these activities were completed execution of actual strike missions was relatively routine (as they say sweat saves blood, and it was proved here).
Although UAVs and loitering ammunition were the hype of the conflict (and used by Turkish and Israeli weapon manufacturers ad nauseam) I like how author points out to artillery/missile (high precision and standard) weapon system and highly trained infantry and mechanized forces as elements that must not be overlooked and that actually played important role in the conflict (missile cannot occupy the ground).
While I agree with all of the items and required steps as proscribed by the author (on how to prepare for the next war and what elements to take into account for both attack use and defence) I think author is missing out on a very specific point - logistics and ammunition capacity. As recent conflict shows ammunition (artillery, rocket, personal) expenditure can reach wild levels per day when conflict includes large armies with sufficient reserves and beyond the war-theater supplies. While quick war sounds seductive and all that sexy, conflict involving larger militaries with reserves, capable air-defense and generally able to cover all fields of operations it is very likely it will be prolongated and deadly in terms of overall use of indirect (highly-precise or not) missile and artillery. Attrition of key components like satellites and off-shore observation platforms would render lots of sexy autonomous weapons not inoperable but acting behind the lines in isolated manner. Logistics will continue to play very important role. I wish author gave more insights on this subject besides concentrating on actual direct fire new types of munitions and platforms, because logistic and planning was definitely executed on top level by Azerbaijan and Turkey military commanders.
All in all very interesting book, showing how unexpected use of high end military technology against unprepared opponent (that lost touch with military development for too long) can prove to be deadly and win wars. True problems will come about when equal forces (both technically and in command) collide.
Excellent read, highly recommended to all interested in questions about military technology and application of the same.
November 20, 2024
While the rest of the world's attention was focused on the Covid pandemic and the American Presidential election, a war was fought in the Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan that proved consequential. For all practical purposes, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was the first war in which robotic weapons played a decisive role. I remember at the time that this war was worth studying to see what lessons can be learned that would be beneficial in future wars. Now there's a book that does just that - 7 Seconds to Die, by John Antal. (I borrowed this book from the library and read it on my Libby app.)
According to the author, the title of this book "was derived from a comment made by an anonymous Armenian soldier who said that, when they heard the enemy's Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions flying overhead, they had seven seconds to run or die."
This book is definitely worth reading for those who wish to learn lessons from this six-week war. This books highlights these lessons, including the need to strike first in any war that relies heavily on drones and other unmanned aerial weapons; the need to learn to operate at hyper-speeds in conflicts where weapons are autonomous and therefore make decisions at machine speeds; the need to dominate as many different domains as possible, including cyberspace and the information war; the need to mask one's own weapon systems and soldiers in an environment where hiding is now exceedingly difficult to accomplish; the need to provide protection against aerial attacks from unmanned aerial vehicles; and many more.
I would add one more lesson: While autonomous weapons are fundamentally transforming the battlespace (the term "battlefield" is now obsolete, since the modern battlespace is fully three-dimensional and also encompasses cyberspace and social media), boots on the ground are still needed to capture real estate. This was demonstrated when Azerbaijani special forces soldiers literally climbed up mountains to take the town of Shusha, which proved to be a decisive moment in the war, since Armenia sued for peace once Azerbaijan gained control of Shusha. The Kosovo War in 1998-1999 also proved the importance of ground troops, because while NATO dominated the skies over Kosovo, it still took Kosovar soldiers to actually win the ground war against Serbia.
I know my Armenian friends will not enjoy this book, but it is definitely worth reading so they can be better prepared for any future conflict with Azerbaijan or any other potentially hostile neighbor.
According to the author, the title of this book "was derived from a comment made by an anonymous Armenian soldier who said that, when they heard the enemy's Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions flying overhead, they had seven seconds to run or die."
This book is definitely worth reading for those who wish to learn lessons from this six-week war. This books highlights these lessons, including the need to strike first in any war that relies heavily on drones and other unmanned aerial weapons; the need to learn to operate at hyper-speeds in conflicts where weapons are autonomous and therefore make decisions at machine speeds; the need to dominate as many different domains as possible, including cyberspace and the information war; the need to mask one's own weapon systems and soldiers in an environment where hiding is now exceedingly difficult to accomplish; the need to provide protection against aerial attacks from unmanned aerial vehicles; and many more.
I would add one more lesson: While autonomous weapons are fundamentally transforming the battlespace (the term "battlefield" is now obsolete, since the modern battlespace is fully three-dimensional and also encompasses cyberspace and social media), boots on the ground are still needed to capture real estate. This was demonstrated when Azerbaijani special forces soldiers literally climbed up mountains to take the town of Shusha, which proved to be a decisive moment in the war, since Armenia sued for peace once Azerbaijan gained control of Shusha. The Kosovo War in 1998-1999 also proved the importance of ground troops, because while NATO dominated the skies over Kosovo, it still took Kosovar soldiers to actually win the ground war against Serbia.
I know my Armenian friends will not enjoy this book, but it is definitely worth reading so they can be better prepared for any future conflict with Azerbaijan or any other potentially hostile neighbor.
April 14, 2023
Pretty good, but not great. The author uses a lot of jargon and aspirational concepts. My personal take on the references to Musk were a bit far fetched. He’s not a genius nor the only one working future thinking spaces. The references to other modern science were enlightening, but must be tempered with resource constraints and practical application on the battlefield. Maneuver too was touted, but must be taken in balance with winning battles vs. winning wars and what’s required of one is not necessarily a guarantor of the other.
That being said, it is an important review of warfare in the current times and pulls forward some important lessons that would otherwise be lost. The other positive thing is the linkages to historical themes. In that light this war may be viewed in a similar way that the Crimean or Russo-Japanese or Spanish Civil wars in the late 1800s. They were formative to the development of theory and practice leading up to the Great War. The second Nagorno-Karabakh war will be important to the way countries adapt for future warfare. Taken into account with other conflicts, especially the Russo-Ukraine war, the trends and concepts are powerful.
This is a good starting point and should spark further, deeper study and research.
That being said, it is an important review of warfare in the current times and pulls forward some important lessons that would otherwise be lost. The other positive thing is the linkages to historical themes. In that light this war may be viewed in a similar way that the Crimean or Russo-Japanese or Spanish Civil wars in the late 1800s. They were formative to the development of theory and practice leading up to the Great War. The second Nagorno-Karabakh war will be important to the way countries adapt for future warfare. Taken into account with other conflicts, especially the Russo-Ukraine war, the trends and concepts are powerful.
This is a good starting point and should spark further, deeper study and research.
May 31, 2022
Good overview of the Second Nagorno-Karabagh Wat of 2020. Makes a good case that the war demonstrated the first decisive use of drones and AI in cementing the victory of the Azeris. The book first covers the background and the essentials of the campaign, highlighting the use of various drones to dismantle the Armenian air defense network and C4/ISR capabilities. The rest of the book discusses the drone technology used and its state of the art, along with various US drone and counter-drone projects.
The main question is whether this is really revolutionary or merely evolutionary. There have been signposts along the way such as the Israeli campaign against the Syrians in the Bekaa valley. There is also the overlooked point that the Armenian defense was largely based on fixed trench lines with no camouflage or concealment, which didn't work even in 1917.
Recommended.
The main question is whether this is really revolutionary or merely evolutionary. There have been signposts along the way such as the Israeli campaign against the Syrians in the Bekaa valley. There is also the overlooked point that the Armenian defense was largely based on fixed trench lines with no camouflage or concealment, which didn't work even in 1917.
Recommended.
November 8, 2022
3.49 stars for this book about the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020. This is a better book than might by suggested by my rating. It’s timely and informative, particularly on the capabilities UAVs offer even mid tier and lower militaries, but also quite repetitive and digressive. It’s also a bit credulous when reporting various claimed innovations forthcoming by Elon Musk as fact (eg “new brain hardware will cure depression” !!! Etc). That’s why I dinged it to three stars, but it’s still an important quick read for students of warfare past and future. Available on Scribd at this writing.
January 5, 2023
Badly in need of an editor; sentences are repeated verbatim. Citing Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu in the first 2 pages is a bad sign of things to come. Everyone in the military has read those; you don't need to reference them so often.
This feels like a paper written by a panicking cadet with a deadline that they started the night before. The analysis is very poor and half the "technical" portions are just copy/pasted from public affairs releases.
Could have been a decent article in a military magazine at 10-15 pages, but a full book? He clearly didn't have enough material and it is painfully stretched.
Disappointing.
This feels like a paper written by a panicking cadet with a deadline that they started the night before. The analysis is very poor and half the "technical" portions are just copy/pasted from public affairs releases.
Could have been a decent article in a military magazine at 10-15 pages, but a full book? He clearly didn't have enough material and it is painfully stretched.
Disappointing.
May 14, 2024
I heard about this author on the Squaring the Circle podcast. He discusses the history of the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, a conflict that received scanty news coverage in the US with Covid and the 2020 election dominating coverage.
In the Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory over Armenia, using emerging methods of warfare, including widespread drone warfare, social media exploitation, and top attack. The effectiveness of these methods is continuing to be seen in the Ukraine War. Antal discusses how our military should utilize and combat these methods in future warfare. An interesting read on the future of warfare.
In the Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory over Armenia, using emerging methods of warfare, including widespread drone warfare, social media exploitation, and top attack. The effectiveness of these methods is continuing to be seen in the Ukraine War. Antal discusses how our military should utilize and combat these methods in future warfare. An interesting read on the future of warfare.
April 10, 2025
Antal has penned an incredibly insightful analysis on the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the future of multi-domain operations in modern warfare.
The lessons and questions he poses should be a clarion call for all “modern” militaries - and should glean some insight on how Ukraine has become so adept at fighting an unconventional, asymmetric campaign against a conventionally superior force in Russia.
Antal asks the right questions and makes some substantive suggestions for how a modern military might combat a multi-domain onslaught like the one Azerbaijan mounted against Armenia.
The field commanders and flag officers of the civilized world should heed his advice.
The lessons and questions he poses should be a clarion call for all “modern” militaries - and should glean some insight on how Ukraine has become so adept at fighting an unconventional, asymmetric campaign against a conventionally superior force in Russia.
Antal asks the right questions and makes some substantive suggestions for how a modern military might combat a multi-domain onslaught like the one Azerbaijan mounted against Armenia.
The field commanders and flag officers of the civilized world should heed his advice.
April 21, 2024
This book explores the new generation of war. The Nagorno-karabakh war was the first of its kind. To no fault of the author, the book is almost out dated already, even though it just came out. Technology is advancing at a very rapid pace. The book overall was very very repetitive and hard to follow. The author jumped from one subject to the next. A better title for the book would have been “an exploration of UAV influenced warfare on the future of battle.” Much of the narrative was shallow and generic. There wasn’t enough detail “meat” when talking about the war.
August 23, 2024
An insightful read of the neo-war model utilizing recent events of history. The application and dependency of unmanned systems within conflict creates numerous avenues of untapped potential uses; John Antal reiterates the necessity of foresight to counter these threats.
Overall, I necessary military read to add to the wealth of knowledge needed to lead and be better prepared for future or current conflicts.
Overall, I necessary military read to add to the wealth of knowledge needed to lead and be better prepared for future or current conflicts.
March 17, 2025
A well crafted master piece on the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict … Gives deep insight into the changing character of warfare and methods of war fighting… A must read for all modern military leaders and commanders which will tingle the brain to think that we must come out of the shell , adapt and embrace the technological changes and incorporate them in own war fighting concepts …. The lessons given in last chapter summarises the entire book ….. A well articulated and refined work by the author….
June 10, 2023
An interesting book to be sure, but the analysis is a bit lacking. While the book incorporates some in depth statistics and specific examples of disruptive tactics and technology, the analysis and recommendations are rather broad and don't provide a lot of specifics. Overall an informative book, but it could have been better.
December 31, 2023
The book provides a overview of one of the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan wars. It is most useful as a journalistic project and source of ancedata. It is lighter on the analysis and comprehensive picture, but I also felt that it was aware of its limitations, despite maybe the title-writer's grandiose hopes.
October 4, 2024
3.5★ rounded up due to the dearth of literature on NKW2. the info on the war was welcome, if brief, and Antal is a professional, not a journo. the rest of it - reads like some of the professional literature (or SF) from the early '60-s: a mix of sensible projections that panned out and flying cars stuff, in a roughly 50/50 proportion. IMO, natch.
November 16, 2024
Interesting study of an all but forgotten war, that could be seen as a precursor to the current war in Ukraine.
But badly written and edited insofar that the salient points are hammered ad nauseam at the expense of more operational detail. Perhaps the available sources do not support such an approach?
But badly written and edited insofar that the salient points are hammered ad nauseam at the expense of more operational detail. Perhaps the available sources do not support such an approach?
December 17, 2022
A good analysis of what can be learned from the 21rst Centuries' most decisive and well planned war. But beware that much of the text is not about the war itself but rather the logistical and technological changes it means for others.
March 25, 2023
Solid analysis of the emergent threats on the modern battlefield and that of tomorrow, but much less on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict than I’d anticipated. Still well done and well excellent timeline of events for the conflict.
November 4, 2023
Great work. Insightful look at the changing face of war. And, by extension, how American leaders should be thinking about, and preparing for the Next War. BTW, Antal just released his new book “The Next War”. Also a very great read
November 20, 2023
Ցավացնող գիրք էր, որտեղ պատմում էր Արցախյան երկրորդ պատերազմի ու մեր պարտությունների պատճառի մասին։ Կարդում ու գժվում ես։ Չգիտեմ էլ խորհուրդ տամ կարդալ, թե ոչ, ըստ ցանկության։ Գրքում նաև շատ է խոսվում նոր սերունդների պատերազմների մասին
January 8, 2024
7 Seconds to Die
- January 6th pages 1-25
- January 7th pages 25-136(end)
I wonder how the the author would react to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, heavy emphasis is on military drones, not cheap civilian ones
- January 6th pages 1-25
- January 7th pages 25-136(end)
I wonder how the the author would react to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, heavy emphasis is on military drones, not cheap civilian ones
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