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Ideology in Practice: What Does Ideology Do?
An account of ideology in terms of social meanings. Such meanings – constituting a cultural technē – are public, conflicting, and fragmented; yet because they guide our practices, they frame our agency and identities. A cultural technē is ideological when it perpetuates unjust subordination, but ideology critique offers liberating alternatives.
81 pages, Hardcover
Published November 1, 2021
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About the author
Sally Haslanger
15 books26 followersSally Haslanger is Professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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December 11, 2025
Ideology In Practice -- Sally Haslanger In Milwaukee
Beginning in 1937, the Philosophy Department of Marquette University, Milwaukee, has sponsored an annual Aquinas Lecture given by a distinguished philosopher. The lectures have been preserved in small uniform volumes published by Marquette University Press, and they offer the opportunity to learn about many philosophical subjects.
In October, 2021, Sally Haslanger, Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at MIT gave the 2021 Aquinas Lecture, titled "Ideology in Practice: What does Ideology Do"? Her lecture delves deeply into Critical Theory. Haslanger has written broadly on issues involving philosophy and social justice and feminism, among other matters. Her books include "Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique" (2012), and "Critical Theory and Practice" (2017), the lectures she gave in 2015 as the Spinoza Professor at the University of Amsterdam.
Haslanger's Aquinas Lecture, "Ideology in Practice" offers a provocative view of her understanding of critical theory. The printed edition includes a bibliography together with detailed footnotes setting forth some of the nuances of her position. The book is complex, with a broad scope for a single lecture. The book draws heavily on Critical Theory philosophers including Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, William Sewell, and others that are discussed while Haslanger develops her own position.
In her Introduction, Haslanger asks the question her lecture attempts to answer: "why is it that most of us, most of the time, act in ways that perpetuate injustice"? (9) She answers this question by developing an understanding of ideology. She develops concepts of ideology defined as "the framework of meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their lives" (11) that are descriptive and pejorative. She is concerned largely with the pejorative concept of ideology because it "shapes our interactions so that they perpetuate domination and submission. Frameworks of this sort are morally and politically bad." (12) In the early part of her book, Haslanger works to explain how ideology shapes people, institutions and social interactions, both through force and more subtly through persuasion leading to inequities of power involving capitalism, feminism, race, and other matters.
This is followed by perhaps the most interesting section of the lecture in which Haslianger raises three issues that have been raised against critical theory and this use of ideology and attempts to answer them. (p. 37 et seq) The first issue is that ideology is committed to an unacceptable form of structural or economic determinism. Interestingly, Haslanger denies the deterministic character of her view of ideology, arguing that her position is consistent with a degree of independent human agency. The second issue is that ideology is internally inconsistent because it denies the possibility of a truth independent of ideology (43). Haslanger rejects this argument in part by equating it with Cartesian skepticism. She also argues and develops the point that ideology is a matter for action and for materiality and does not rely primarily on concepts of truth and falsehood. This becomes a strong theme in her position. The third issue Haslanger titles "epistemic disrespect" (48). By this she means that critical theorists attack some people for being ignorant, the victims of ideology, while they themselves somehow escape ideology's clutches. In other words, critical theory involves elitism. Here Haslanger admits that sometimes there is a degree of elitism in how the position is developed. She argues that it is unneccsary and avoidable, Part of her answer lies in her response to the first two issues. She also argues that ideology is structural and materialistic more than cognitive. Thus, it does not invole disrespect for individuals and their opinions but focuses instead on social structure and social action.
In the latter part of her lecture, Haslanger develops her own understanding of ideology which relies on its impact on practice more than on language or thought. It is a way of action, or the interaction of several ways of acting which can be countered by cooperation and by changes in activity. She develops examples based on broadening the view of love to allow same sex marriage and examples involving viewing household activities to see how women are typically subordinated unjustly in marriage. She argues for changes in practice to counter the influence of ideology. Again, her position is non-deterministic and allows for human agency. In conclusion, Haslanger writes:
"Social structures are enacted by individuals within conditions of constrained choice. We are constrained by our basic human needs (for food, shelter, engagement with others, and so on), the material conditions of our situation, and the social meanings that enable us to coordinate with each other. Such constraints are usually organized unjustly though not intentionally so. Many practices we engage in fluently but not deliberately; and the fallout of interactions between practices is hard to notice, much less predict. To see structural injustice, we need to step back from out self-conscious agency and consider how we are molded (socially, physically,historically) by our environments to participate in practices that present themselves as worthwile and meaningful, yet result in often broad and deep injustice. Fortunately, we can modify or change unjust constraints on agency, if we think and act together." (71)
As Haslanger writes, much remains to be said in developing this position beyond that possible in a lecture.
This lecture offers an example of philosophical thinking that is largely not my own. I found it valuable to think about ideology and critical theory with Haslanger through her Aquinas Lecture. Marquette University Press kindly sent me a copy of the lecture for review.
Robin Friedman
Beginning in 1937, the Philosophy Department of Marquette University, Milwaukee, has sponsored an annual Aquinas Lecture given by a distinguished philosopher. The lectures have been preserved in small uniform volumes published by Marquette University Press, and they offer the opportunity to learn about many philosophical subjects.
In October, 2021, Sally Haslanger, Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at MIT gave the 2021 Aquinas Lecture, titled "Ideology in Practice: What does Ideology Do"? Her lecture delves deeply into Critical Theory. Haslanger has written broadly on issues involving philosophy and social justice and feminism, among other matters. Her books include "Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique" (2012), and "Critical Theory and Practice" (2017), the lectures she gave in 2015 as the Spinoza Professor at the University of Amsterdam.
Haslanger's Aquinas Lecture, "Ideology in Practice" offers a provocative view of her understanding of critical theory. The printed edition includes a bibliography together with detailed footnotes setting forth some of the nuances of her position. The book is complex, with a broad scope for a single lecture. The book draws heavily on Critical Theory philosophers including Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, William Sewell, and others that are discussed while Haslanger develops her own position.
In her Introduction, Haslanger asks the question her lecture attempts to answer: "why is it that most of us, most of the time, act in ways that perpetuate injustice"? (9) She answers this question by developing an understanding of ideology. She develops concepts of ideology defined as "the framework of meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their lives" (11) that are descriptive and pejorative. She is concerned largely with the pejorative concept of ideology because it "shapes our interactions so that they perpetuate domination and submission. Frameworks of this sort are morally and politically bad." (12) In the early part of her book, Haslanger works to explain how ideology shapes people, institutions and social interactions, both through force and more subtly through persuasion leading to inequities of power involving capitalism, feminism, race, and other matters.
This is followed by perhaps the most interesting section of the lecture in which Haslianger raises three issues that have been raised against critical theory and this use of ideology and attempts to answer them. (p. 37 et seq) The first issue is that ideology is committed to an unacceptable form of structural or economic determinism. Interestingly, Haslanger denies the deterministic character of her view of ideology, arguing that her position is consistent with a degree of independent human agency. The second issue is that ideology is internally inconsistent because it denies the possibility of a truth independent of ideology (43). Haslanger rejects this argument in part by equating it with Cartesian skepticism. She also argues and develops the point that ideology is a matter for action and for materiality and does not rely primarily on concepts of truth and falsehood. This becomes a strong theme in her position. The third issue Haslanger titles "epistemic disrespect" (48). By this she means that critical theorists attack some people for being ignorant, the victims of ideology, while they themselves somehow escape ideology's clutches. In other words, critical theory involves elitism. Here Haslanger admits that sometimes there is a degree of elitism in how the position is developed. She argues that it is unneccsary and avoidable, Part of her answer lies in her response to the first two issues. She also argues that ideology is structural and materialistic more than cognitive. Thus, it does not invole disrespect for individuals and their opinions but focuses instead on social structure and social action.
In the latter part of her lecture, Haslanger develops her own understanding of ideology which relies on its impact on practice more than on language or thought. It is a way of action, or the interaction of several ways of acting which can be countered by cooperation and by changes in activity. She develops examples based on broadening the view of love to allow same sex marriage and examples involving viewing household activities to see how women are typically subordinated unjustly in marriage. She argues for changes in practice to counter the influence of ideology. Again, her position is non-deterministic and allows for human agency. In conclusion, Haslanger writes:
"Social structures are enacted by individuals within conditions of constrained choice. We are constrained by our basic human needs (for food, shelter, engagement with others, and so on), the material conditions of our situation, and the social meanings that enable us to coordinate with each other. Such constraints are usually organized unjustly though not intentionally so. Many practices we engage in fluently but not deliberately; and the fallout of interactions between practices is hard to notice, much less predict. To see structural injustice, we need to step back from out self-conscious agency and consider how we are molded (socially, physically,historically) by our environments to participate in practices that present themselves as worthwile and meaningful, yet result in often broad and deep injustice. Fortunately, we can modify or change unjust constraints on agency, if we think and act together." (71)
As Haslanger writes, much remains to be said in developing this position beyond that possible in a lecture.
This lecture offers an example of philosophical thinking that is largely not my own. I found it valuable to think about ideology and critical theory with Haslanger through her Aquinas Lecture. Marquette University Press kindly sent me a copy of the lecture for review.
Robin Friedman
Displaying 1 of 1 review