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Ontologia do Ser Social #1
Ψευδής και αληθινή οντολογία του Χέγκελ, Περί της οντολογίας του κοινωνικού είναι
A study of essential philosophical categories in Hegel
216 pages
First published January 1, 1960
4 people are currently reading
254 people want to read
About the author
György Lukács
452 books404 followersGyörgy Lukács was a Hungarian Marxist philosopher, aesthetician, literary historian and critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism, an interpretive tradition that departed from the Marxist ideological orthodoxy of the Soviet Union. He developed the theory of reification, and contributed to Marxist theory with developments of Karl Marx's theory of class consciousness. He was also a philosopher of Leninism. He ideologically developed and organised Lenin's pragmatic revolutionary practices into the formal philosophy of vanguard-party revolution.
His literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.
His literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.
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July 6, 2012The Ontology of Social Being was posthumously published. Lukacs was trying to revive Marxism, in a time when Stalinsm was no longer in vogue, and he felt the right philosophical moment had sprung forward. Moreover, with the death of Stalin, Marxism was losing its footing, and Lukacs is convinced that its footing had been standing on untenable ontological grounds. Stalin made Marxism a teleological process, that fit a rigid epistemological pattern. Marxism needed to be revived, on an ontological basis.
Three volumes have been posthumously published, and unfortunately their titles are misnomers. Volume I: Hegel, is actually more like Volume III, or at least section three of the book. The first section, which has not been published, deals with Wittgenstein, and neo-positivism, and the second section deals with ontology in general.
It's really not possible to rate this book, since it's taken out of context, and unpolished. It's clear Lukacs is using the section on Hegel to build upon an already established scaffolding, which the reader has no access too. It's also clear in places that he didn't have time to tidy up the book, and some of the coherence is lost. I'll read volumes II and III as well, and then perhaps offer a broader review that applies to all three books conjoined; after all, that was Lukacs publishing intentions.
Three volumes have been posthumously published, and unfortunately their titles are misnomers. Volume I: Hegel, is actually more like Volume III, or at least section three of the book. The first section, which has not been published, deals with Wittgenstein, and neo-positivism, and the second section deals with ontology in general.
It's really not possible to rate this book, since it's taken out of context, and unpolished. It's clear Lukacs is using the section on Hegel to build upon an already established scaffolding, which the reader has no access too. It's also clear in places that he didn't have time to tidy up the book, and some of the coherence is lost. I'll read volumes II and III as well, and then perhaps offer a broader review that applies to all three books conjoined; after all, that was Lukacs publishing intentions.
May 3, 2025
In his Ontology of Social Being, Lukacs locates as the basis of Marxist philosophy the realm of ontology, but a specialized ontology which rejects the traditional philosophical category in favor of Marxist analysis of the fundamental structures of social existence—how human praxis, labor, and historical processes constitute reality. Through this lens, Lukacs articulates a new critique of the dialectic of nature instead of abandoning it entirely, and calls for a focus on praxis and human activity as the core of social being. He repeats his lifelong calls for reorientation of Marxist philosophy towards the concept of totality.
Lukacs lays out his late view of Hegelian philosophy and dialectics, seeking to elaborate on the dualism within Hegel’s thought noted by all Marxist philosophy back to Marx. Lukacs sees the Hegelian dialectic as divided into two: 1) a false, idealist dialectic; and 2) a genuine, historical-practical dialectic. The “false” Hegel is hyper-logical, the dialectical movement an abstract logical process detached from concrete history and practice, which makes history itself teleological and mystifies social relations. The genuine Hegel is historical and practical, which prefigures alienation and social praxis, recognizes totality, and allows for social historical development through the negation. His most important contribution is the “reflection determinations,” establishing philosophically the dialectical interaction between subjective perception of reality and its dynamic objective reality. Hegel is a battleground, not to be rejected, but reclaimed.
In reviewing the dialectic of nature, Lukacs argues that while contradiction and development does exist in nature, the dialectical category of nature cannot be applied to it because natural process lack human intent, the teleological dimension of development which accompanies labour and human praxis. In Lukacs’ view, true negation can only apply to the social dialectic, requiring human agency/choice, social totality, and social praxis. Even the most famous of natural dialectical negations, namely evolution, cannot be considered negation, for example, because they lack immanence, are driven by external pressure, and don’t reach a higher stage through teleology. I still cannot agree, though I think this critique succeeds at marking a qualitative difference between the dialectics of society and nature. Nature lacks purpose, but there is praxis and environmental development among life forms with teleological intent, even if just instinctual or adaptive. Additionally, I find him assigning far too great a role to individual consciousness and intent. Social processes can occur that lead to qualitative leaps without teleological intent on the part of mankind. Perhaps I am too Althusserian or non-humanist in that regard, but it is a line I cannot conceivably cross. Lukacs also seems to be ignoring that both Hegel and Marx accepted the dialectic of nature with negation as a feature, as Hegel did in several places and Marx does in Capital. If one was to be intellectually honest, we would emphasize that this was not an “Engelsian” distortion, but a Marxist inheritance from Hegelianism. Like with Lenin’s tumultuous relationship with the Soviets he ignores in The Process of Democratization, Lukacs cannot bring himself to criticize Marx where he differs with him. Lukacs simply redefines negation as only social, and proceeds from there. He would be accurate to argue that natural negation is simply more mechanical or bereft of labour teleology than deny it outright.
Regardless, this work is very important. Every work which brings Marxism closer to a true reckoning with Hegel and wider explication of dialectical materialism is a positive contribution to Marxism, even when coming from flawed Althusserian Spinozism or (better, in that regard) Lukacsian Marxist humanism.
Lukacs lays out his late view of Hegelian philosophy and dialectics, seeking to elaborate on the dualism within Hegel’s thought noted by all Marxist philosophy back to Marx. Lukacs sees the Hegelian dialectic as divided into two: 1) a false, idealist dialectic; and 2) a genuine, historical-practical dialectic. The “false” Hegel is hyper-logical, the dialectical movement an abstract logical process detached from concrete history and practice, which makes history itself teleological and mystifies social relations. The genuine Hegel is historical and practical, which prefigures alienation and social praxis, recognizes totality, and allows for social historical development through the negation. His most important contribution is the “reflection determinations,” establishing philosophically the dialectical interaction between subjective perception of reality and its dynamic objective reality. Hegel is a battleground, not to be rejected, but reclaimed.
In reviewing the dialectic of nature, Lukacs argues that while contradiction and development does exist in nature, the dialectical category of nature cannot be applied to it because natural process lack human intent, the teleological dimension of development which accompanies labour and human praxis. In Lukacs’ view, true negation can only apply to the social dialectic, requiring human agency/choice, social totality, and social praxis. Even the most famous of natural dialectical negations, namely evolution, cannot be considered negation, for example, because they lack immanence, are driven by external pressure, and don’t reach a higher stage through teleology. I still cannot agree, though I think this critique succeeds at marking a qualitative difference between the dialectics of society and nature. Nature lacks purpose, but there is praxis and environmental development among life forms with teleological intent, even if just instinctual or adaptive. Additionally, I find him assigning far too great a role to individual consciousness and intent. Social processes can occur that lead to qualitative leaps without teleological intent on the part of mankind. Perhaps I am too Althusserian or non-humanist in that regard, but it is a line I cannot conceivably cross. Lukacs also seems to be ignoring that both Hegel and Marx accepted the dialectic of nature with negation as a feature, as Hegel did in several places and Marx does in Capital. If one was to be intellectually honest, we would emphasize that this was not an “Engelsian” distortion, but a Marxist inheritance from Hegelianism. Like with Lenin’s tumultuous relationship with the Soviets he ignores in The Process of Democratization, Lukacs cannot bring himself to criticize Marx where he differs with him. Lukacs simply redefines negation as only social, and proceeds from there. He would be accurate to argue that natural negation is simply more mechanical or bereft of labour teleology than deny it outright.
Regardless, this work is very important. Every work which brings Marxism closer to a true reckoning with Hegel and wider explication of dialectical materialism is a positive contribution to Marxism, even when coming from flawed Althusserian Spinozism or (better, in that regard) Lukacsian Marxist humanism.
June 27, 2021
This is In my opinion, Luckacs BEST work. The ontology of social being offers whats probably the clearest and most intresting take on marx's method ive ever read.
The basic theme of the book is that historicaly specific forms of human labour generate historicaly specific ontological frameworks (ways of categorising the world). These ontological frameworks go on to shape the field of possible discourse in any perticuler moment of history.
Its like foucalt who snorted a whole bag of dialectical materialism.
11/10
Ps: because this book is an unfinished manuscript its volumes published in a wierd order. Start with volume two, then three then one.
The basic theme of the book is that historicaly specific forms of human labour generate historicaly specific ontological frameworks (ways of categorising the world). These ontological frameworks go on to shape the field of possible discourse in any perticuler moment of history.
Its like foucalt who snorted a whole bag of dialectical materialism.
11/10
Ps: because this book is an unfinished manuscript its volumes published in a wierd order. Start with volume two, then three then one.
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December 25, 2023I like Lukács, his writing is lucid and detailed without being overwrought with information for its purpose. This volume presents a critical reading of Hegel and his two ontologies (one false ontology). It's pretty overtly Marxist, and some of the reading is probably one-sided, (as it tends to always be with Lukács but he never hides it) which I will have to evaluate over time, but this was great.
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