Warranted Christian Belief

Warrant #3

by Alvin Plantinga

This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, thus, insofar as they are warranted, Christian beliefs are knowledge if they are true.

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Religion, Christianity, Christian, Nonfiction, Faith

528 pages, Paperback

First published January 27, 1999

About the author

He is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.

Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.

He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"

Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the third, and hence final, book in "the warrant trilogy." Here Plantinga begins by looking into the de jure question, viz., is it rational, reasonable, justified, warranted, to accept Christian belief. Or, is the Christian epistemologically negligible for accepting such beliefs - belief in God, belief in the great truths of the Gospel, etc?

Plantinga concludes (after much rigorous philosophical investigation) that all such objections depend on the de facto question, viz., does God exist? This obviously takes the wind out of the sails of many objections to the Christian's faith. That is, the non-Christian is assuming that God does not exist in order for his blows to have the desired force. So, if a detractor wants to engage himself in that debate first, he's free to do so. But, we've been debating the de facto question for millennia. So a good inductive bet is that the non-Christian won't succeed here, and hence he won't succeed with the de jure question. But, there is one such de jure objection that comes close to hitting what it is aiming for (actually, Plantinga credits others with this kind of argument too). This is the Freud-Mark complaint (Freud and Marx get the credit, but Plantinga finds the objection in men like Nietzsche, Rousseau, Hume, &c.). Christianity is something like "wish fulfillment." Thus, what produces belief in God is a cognitive faculty not aimed at truth, but aimed at some other non-epistemic outcome, say, comfort. Thus we have a belief that is produced by a cognitive faculty not aimed at truth, even if it is properly functioning (which is why proper function isn't sufficient for warrant). If true, we have a successful de jure objection.

Plantinga then spends all of part III developing a possible account of how, if Christianity is true, Christian belief is warranted. Building off some of the work in his previous two volumes, he concludes that the Christian's belief in God, the great things of the Gospel, etc., are properly basic. God made us with a certain design plan, and knowing him, knowing about salvation, is important for us. Thus belief in God B can be the product of properly functioning cognitive faculties, functioning in a congenial epistemic environment, and according to a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs; and B is subject to no undefeated-defeaters.

Plantinga spends part IV discussing the nature of defeaters (which is an interesting subject in and of itself, Plantinga just hits the tree tops), and then specific defeaters to the Christian faith. This is because a non-Christian might make the move that accepts Plantinga's claim that if Christianity were true the believer would be warranted, but since there are defeaters for the Christian's belief, this takes away their warrant.

Plantinga, I think, succeeds in showing that objections to Christianity rely on the de facto question. He succeeds in providing a model (he calls it the Aquinas/Calvin model) which, if Christianity is true, shows that Christian belief can be rational, warranted, epistemically permissible, etc., and, not only that, but it would be rational to believe in God without evidence for that belief, given the proper basicality of theistic belief.

The main complain I have is that I don't follow Plantinga in his understanding of A/C. He says humans have a knowledge producing faculty, the sensus divinitatis. But, I think that both A/C, and the Bible! (cf. Romans 1), teach that all men have knowledge, not just a knowledge-producing faculty. But this is easily overcome. All in all, I find Plantinga's book here, indeed the entire trilogy, to be extremely successful. Much future work will no doubt build off the very strong basic foundation he laid. Even if Plantinga is wrong about the specifics, then, as he says, something like his model is true.

[Genni · Rating 5 out of 5]

Warranted Christian Belief is highly relevant to today's intellectual climate and covers a lot of ground. Everywhere there are charges of irrationality or charges that Christian belief is not justified. This is not an apologetic work. Plantinga sets out to show that Christian belief is warranted, that there is not anything irrational about believing it, even in a basic way. Whether are not it is actually true is left up to others to argue.

I did not interact very much with part I. He basically argues that there are two main interpretations of Kant and that neither one shows that our concepts or language cannot refer to God. I will have to come back and read this again after I finally make it through my chronological readings to Kant.

Part II is definitional. What exactly do people mean when they throw out words like “irrational” or “justification”? How exactly are people flouting their epistemic duties in believing Christianity? And, as the main point of the book, what is warrant? It is the difference between true belief and knowledge. A belief has warrant “if and only if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief”. If there is no such environment, then charges of irrationality make no sense.

All of that is of interest to both theists and non-theists, I think. Part III is geared a little more toward the believer as he begins to give an epistemic account of Christian belief based on a Calvin/Aquinas model. (While he is at it, he references Danny Kaye which made me smile happily:There are models of many different kinds: model airplanes, artists' models, models in the sense of exemplars, models of a modern major general.”) He argues that this belief is properly basic by showing the similarities with other cognitive processes we believe in a basic way such as memory or perception.

He deals with defeaters in Part IV, choosing Historical Biblical Criticism, Postmodernism, Pluralism, and of course, the big problem of Evil and showing that none of these constitutes as a defeater for Christian belief.

It was an interesting exercise throughout to apply the arguments to atheism. I definitely think Christians fall into the same trap atheists do in their charges (i.e. a sort of reverse “wish-fulfillment” a laFreud where the atheist believes God does not exist because he does not “wish” him to so he can live his life however he wants).

In closing, just a quick note on writing style: although some of the material is difficult, Plantinga writes in a conversational way that aids understanding, but is not terribly “dumbed down”. Furthermore, he writes with humility and does not treat his opponents abrasively, demonstrating a sympathetic understanding of his opponent's view.

[Felipe Sabino · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excelente do ponto de vista filosófico. Se quiser boa filosofia com boa teologia, então vá ler Gordon Clark. :)

[David M]

Reading philosophy means learning about one's own ignorance. There may still be a few things in life of which I am fairly certain, but atheism is no longer one of them. To be dissuaded from holding atheism as true, however, is obviously not to be convinced of theism; still less is it to be converted to any particular religious faith. If I'm making any intellectual progress at all it's of a wholly negative variety. Alvin Plantinga has been a great help in this respect.

*

According to the Aquinas/Calvin model, this natural knowledge of God is not arrived at by inference or argument (for example, the famous theistic proofs of natural theology) but in a much more immediate way. The deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are not quick and sotto voce inferences from the circumstances from the circumstances that trigger its operation. It isn't that one beholds the night sky, notes that it is grand, and concludes that there must be such a person as God: an argument like that would be ridiculously weak. - pp 175

I checked the index but found no references to Husserl or Merleau-Ponty (there are a few to Heidegger, but these seem to be throwaway lines about 'postmodern' authors). I think that's a shame, since phenomenology provides an extremely important resource for understanding this sort of experience. Famously, in the the fourth Cartesian meditation, Husserl endeavored to show something quite similar about intersubjectivity: that we do not infer the existence of other minds from external evidence but intuit them directly.

Plantinga is extremely good at propositional arguments, but the point of all his arguments seems to be that arguments ultimately don't matter very much when it comes to believing in God; or at least that the atheist doesn't have any definitive arguments that should sway the believer. I think I am willing to accept that, but then I also wonder about vice versa. He also seems to acknowledge that the believer doesn't have any definitive arguments to sway the agnostic or atheist. What then ? Are we just at an impasse? A lot seems to depend on this sensus divinitatis, but even if it's fairly widespread it still seems very far from being universal (otherwise there wouldn't be so many non-believers; I'm not sure I recognize anything like it from my own life and experiences). It's not enough to simply invoke it, which unfortunately is what Plantinga tends to do. This is where a phenomenology of religious experience could be pertinent.

*
In Plantinga's scheme sin occupies the opposite pole from the sensus divinitatis. Sin is what keeps God's presence from being clear and obvious to all of us in the manner of, say, the existence of the world or other minds. This requires a concept of not just sin but original sin, to account for our universally fallen condition - a fallenness that's as much cognitive as ethical.

Though his system requires it, I don't think Plantinga does a paritcularly good job selling original sin. As a concept it seems both cruel and absurd - one of the least attractive aspects of our Christian inheritance. At the same time, I'd grant that it does have a certain intuitive resonance; that is, I think I recognize what it means to speak of our 'fallen' state. Plantinga's reliance on clear propositional arguments is in many ways a strength, but here I think it fails him. Perhaps there are aspects of human existence that just are inherently ambiguous or paradoxical. Philosophy may still have something to say about these things, but it won't be a philosophy of logic and propositions.

From the essay 'Original Sin: A Study in Meaning,' collected in The Conflict of Interpretations, behold the great Paul Ricoeur

We must not make the transition from myth to mythology. It will never be said enough what evil has been done to Christianity by the literal interpretation, the 'historicist' interpretation, of the Adamic myth. This interpretation has plunged Christianity into the profession of an absurd history and into pseudo-rational speculations on the quasi-biological transmissions of a quasi-juridical guilt for the fault of an other man, back into the night of time, somewhere between Pithecanthropus and Neanderthal man. At the same time, the treasure hidden in the Adamic symbol has been squandered. The strong mind, the reasonable man, from Pelagius to Kant, Feuerbach, Marx, or Nietzsche, will always be right against mythology, although beyond any reductive critique the symbol will always invite thought.

The Adamic myth reveals at the same time this mysterious aspect of evil, namely that if any one of us initiates evil, inaugurates it - something Pelagius saw very well - each of us also discovers evil , finds it already there, in himself, outside himself, and before himself. For every consciousness which awakens when responsibility is taken, evil is already there.

There is something desperate here from the viewpoint of conceptual representation and something very profound from the metaphysical viewpoint. It is in the will itself that there is a kind of quasi-nature. Evil is a kind of involuntariness at the heart of the voluntary, no longer facing the voluntary but within the voluntary; and it is this which is the servile will.

(This, I think, would constitute a phenomenology of religious experience. God damn, if the above doesn't give you chills, well there's not much else I can say)


*
Hm, well I have to give Plantinga credit for his discussion of sexual longing as a pathway to God. Maybe he's not quite as square and dry as I thought

Human love is a sign of something deeper, something so deep that it is uncreated, an original and permanent and necessarily present feature of the universe. Eros undoubtedly characterizes many creatures other than human beings; no doubt much of the living universe shares this characteristic. More important, all of us creatures with eros reflect and partake in this profound divine property. So the most fundamental reality here is the love displayed by and in God: love within the trinity. - pp 321 (my emphasis)

For me, that word uncreated immediately calls to mind Mlle Weil and her notorious spiritual practice of 'decreation.' In her own writings she never gives it a specifically sexual meaning, but, pervert that I am, I always considered that a possibility .

Also, this is an interpretation of the trinity I wasn't taught in Sunday school. I'm not sure I completely understand it, but I think I like it. The classical, Thomisitic line of Christian theology actually has an excessively Aristotelian conception of God; that is, a philosopher's god who is disinterested and unchanging. Plantinga, departing here from his intellectual forefathers, argues that this downplays what is most poignant in the Christian revelation.

[Manuel Alfonseca · Rating 4 out of 5]

ENGLISH: It's unfair to try to summarize a 600-page book in a few paragraphs, but I'll try anyway. If my words look unconvincing, read Plantinga's book in their stead.

In the first chapter, Plantinga deals with Kant's supposed assertion that we can know nothing about God (and about all the noumena). In summary, his argument say that a) we are not sure that Kant ever intended to say this; and b) if he did, this assertion is self-contradictory, for with this assertion we are knowing something about God (that we can know nothing about God). In fact, if this reasoning is taken to its natural end, the conclusion would be that we can know nothing about anything.

One excellent quote that puts David Hume and Kant in their place: The British philosopher David Hume writes with a certain surface clarity that disappointingly disappears on closer inspection. With Kant, there is good news and bad news: the good news is that we don't suffer that disappointment; the bad news is that it's because there isn't any surface clarity to begin with.

In chapter 3 he attacks what he calls the "classical package" (a combination of evidentialism, deontologism, and foundationalism), which was proposed first by John Locke, and through David Hume and Kant came to us. According to that “package”, in order to believe that something is true, our moral duty is this: either what we believe should be basic and fundamental (axiomatic) or else it can be obtained from basic and fundamental principles by deduction, induction or abduction. If that does not happen, our moral duty is not to believe it. Well then (says Plantinga): is the classical package a basic and fundamental belief? Obviously not. Can it be deduced, induced or abducted from some basic principle? As far as he knows, no (perhaps it's possible, but he hasn't found any valid deduction): Ergo, if we apply that principle, it is our duty not to believe in the basic package, which leads to a contradiction. Although Plantinga does not mention it, his argument resembles Gödel's first theorem.

In chapter 5 he debunks what he calls the Freud-Marx Complaint. I have written a post for my blog about this. When it is published, I'll put the address here.

The last four chapters analyze potential "defeaters" against Christian belief, including the problem of evil, and finds none of them presents a serious challenge to the warrant of Christian belief. The really important question is whether Christian belief is in fact true, but this is beyond the competence of philosophy.

ESPAÑOL: No es lógico tratar de resumir un libro de 600 páginas en unos pocos párrafos, pero en cualquier caso lo intentaré. Si mis palabras parecen poco convincentes, aconsejo al lector que lea el libro de Plantinga.

En el primer capítulo, Plantinga se ocupa de la supuesta afirmación de Kant: que no podemos saber nada de Dios (y de todos los noúmenos). En resumen, dice que a) no estamos seguros de que Kant quisiera decir esto; y b) si era esa su intención, esta afirmación es auto-contradictoria, porque con ella sabemos algo acerca de Dios (que no podemos saber nada acerca de Dios). De hecho, si este razonamiento se lleva hasta el extremo, la conclusión sería que no podemos saber nada sobre nada.
Una cita excelente que pone a David Hume y a Kant en su sitio: El filósofo británico David Hume escribe con cierta claridad superficial que de forma decepcionante desaparece cuando se examina más de cerca. Con Kant, hay una buena noticia y una mala noticia: la buena noticia es que no sufrimos esa decepción; la mala noticia es que se debe a que no tiene ninguna claridad superficial.

En el capítulo 3 ataca lo que llama “paquete clásico” (una combinación de evidencialismo, deontologismo y fundacionalismo), que se remonta a John Locke, y que a través de David Hume y Kant llega hasta nuestros días. Según ese “paquete”, para creer que algo es verdad, es nuestra obligación moral que lo que creemos sea básico y fundamental (axiomático) o bien se pueda obtener de principios básicos y fundamentales mediante deducción, inducción o abducción. Si no ocurre eso, nuestro deber moral es no creerlo. Pues bien (dice Plantinga): ¿acaso el paquete clásico es una creencia básica y fundamental? Es evidente que no. ¿Se puede deducir, inducir o abducir de algún principio básico? Que él sepa, no (quizá se pueda, pero no ha encontrado ninguna deducción válida): Luego, si aplicamos ese principio, es obligación nuestra no creer en el paquete básico, con lo que llegamos a una contradicción. Aunque Plantinga no lo menciona, su argumento se parece al primer teorema de Gödel.

En el capítulo 5 desacredita lo que llama la queja de Freud-Marx. He escrito un artículo para mi blog sobre esta cuestión. Cuando se publique, pondré aquí la dirección.

Los cuatro últimos capítulos analizan posibles "destructores" de la creencia cristiana, incluido el problema del mal, y llega a la conclusión de que ninguno de ellos plantea un desafío serio a la credibilidad del cristianismo. La cuestión realmente importante es si las creencias cristianas son verdaderas, pero esta cuestión está fuera del alcance de la filosofía.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Plantinga sets out in this book to answer the de jure objections to Christian faith which are arguments that, apart from whether Christianity is true or not (de facto objections), argue that Christian belief is unjustifiable, irrational or not intellectually respectable. After discussing whether we can speak of God anyway (Part 1), the second part of the book seeks to discover just what the de jure objection is. Plantinga is an excellent philosopher and this book is filled with philosophical jargon and extended arguments. Thus, it is no easy read. Plantinga discusses justification and rationality before concluding that the only promising candidate for a decent objection is the Freud/Marx complaint (mostly Freud) that Christian knowledge lacks warrant because it is merely a sort of wish fulfillment.

Over the course of two previous books (which I have not read and are not necessary to read to get this book), Plantinga defined warrant: "a belief has warrant if and only if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief" (498). What Plantina points out in regard to the Freud is that the objection that Christianity is merely wish-fulfillment assumes that Christianity is false. Thus, the objection that Christianity is irrational is not independent of whether Christianity is true. So really, if Christian belief is false than perhaps Freud is right. But if Christianity is true, then Freud is wrong and believing Christianity certainly does have warrant.

What this all really demonstrates is that the refrain: "I have no idea whether Christian belief is true, but I do know that it is irrational" cannot be defended. If it is true, believing it is rational; if it is not true, believing it is not rational.

In part three of the book Plantinga presents a model for warranted belief in God based on John Calvin and Thomas Aquinas, which he (obviously) calls the Aquinas/Calvin model. He argues that the sensus divinitatis (sense of God) operates in humans to automatically produce belief in God. Thus, belief in God is a basic belief (akin to memory or perception). It is not a belief held on the basis of other beliefs (I do not need evidence to prove it). Throughout the rest of part three he shows how the great truths of the Christian faith, beyond simple belief in God, can be warranted.

Finally, in part four Platinga considers four possible defeaters for Christian belief. Defeaters are beliefs that, once held, make other beliefs no longer possible. Upon examination Platinga concludes that none of these (projection, sorts of biblical scholarship, religious pluralism and evil) constitute a defeater for Christian faith.

He closes the book by again stating that Christian belief is warranted. Is it true? Plantinga says: "And here we pass beyond the competence of philosophy, whose main competence, in this area, is to clear away certain objections, impedances, and obstacles to Christian belief. Speaking for myself and of course not in the name of philosophy, I can only say it does, indeed, seem to me to be true, and to be the maximally important truth" (499).

Overall, this is a heavy and difficult read. Plantinga presents a strong argument from a Reformed Apologetic position, although I think his argument is applicable to all sorts of Christian belief. Or at least, I am not picky enough to try to see why a Catholic or Methodist could not be grateful for this work. Plantinga probably will not, and does not really intend to, convince anyone of the truth of Christian belief. But his work serves to show that Christian belief is warranted as opposed to many charges. Plantinga's work has had great influence in philosophy departments and among academics. I recommend this book for Christian leaders as the arguments can answer Christians' questions and provide fodder for discussion with skeptics. Again I note though, this book is very difficult. I am sure I missed much, despite my best efforts! But I believe the effort in grasping Plantinga, and I may return to this book often, is worth it!

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

I want to say right out of the gate that this is a preliminary review, and I hope to chew on Plantinga's theory like the cud, sending it through all seven of my mental stomachs. So I wouldn't burn at the stake for anything I say below (right now), but here goes anyway...

"But is it true? This is the really important question. And here we pass beyond the competence of philosophy, whose main competence in this area, is to clear away certain objections, impedance, and obstacles to Christian belief..." (pg. 499)

Thus Plantinga ends his 499 page tome, nicely summarizing his book's strengths and limitations. What Plantinga displays is that any Christian, even those who don't know much (or care to know much) about epistemology/philosophy not only can be, but generally are warranted on a hobbit level.

When most people set out to write a tome on philosophy, they set up tall, lego skyscrapers of propositions upon which the belief sits. This really is helpful in its own right, but most people obviously don't actually think like this on a regular day to day basis. Plantinga, by contrast, is an observant philosopher who parks at this level arguing that Christian belief is likely warranted as a basic belief (if Christianity is true. If it isn't, it probably isn't warranted).

Of course, granting the truth of Christianity for argument's sake is a tough sell in a work like this, but Plantinga shows that our understanding of how our minds are supposed to work (the teleology of the human mind), is very much informed but what we believe to be the nature of the world. At times, this sounds very much like presuppositionalism, but it really isn't because of his idea of how the sensus divinitatis would provide external warrant (assuming we really have this sense). This means that most Christians think presuppositionally most of the time, and they are warranted in doing so because this is how we have been designed by God.

I'm inclined to agree with Plantinga that the sensus divinitatis (or something similar to it) does provide warrant for Christian belief, but most atheists would be unwilling to concede the point. So, as his above quote indicates, he does a good job of weed-whacking away at sloppy atheistic thinking, but it is beyond the scope his work to prove that they are wrong. More is needed, and as he would point out, that more is the instigation Holy Spirit

[Christian Barrett · Rating 5 out of 5]

Plantinga’s argument for a rational Christian belief merges the depths of logic, epistemology, and theology. He does not shy away from dealing with the difficult challenges made to “faith” and illustrates that a Christian faith is justified when approached logically. A beautiful articulation of how the worlds of philosophy and theology merge to encourage the believer and challenge the skeptic.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Few books in a genre can lay claim to the title of “game changer.” This one just might (or any of his “Warrant” books).

Thesis: A belief B has warrant for one if and only if B is produced by one's properly functioning cognitive faculties in circumstances to which those faculties are designed to apply; in addition those faculties must be designed for the purpose of producing true beliefs (Plantinga 498). The goal of warrant, as opposed to simple epistemic justification, is that one can rationally hold to a belief without having to meet evidence upon evidence for that belief. Plantinga’s famous analogy is to other minds. There really isn’t good evidence for the existence of other minds, yet people are (generally) not considered irrational for believing in other minds.

Plantinga places this thesis in the background and the examines Freud’s and Marx’s critique (F&M) of theism. the section on Freud was actually quite fun. Reading Freud’s hypothesis of religious origins is actually very moving fiction. AP demonstrates that F&M have not shown that belief in God isn’t warranted.

Plantinga’s most important section is the Aquinas-Calvin (A/C) model. Per this, we have a special belief-producing faculty called “the sensus divinitatis.” But Plantinga rightly goes beyond this. We do not merely have this knowledge in our hearts, but as believers the Holy Spirit has sealed them on our hearts. (And while he doesn’t develop this point, this is a crucial insight into the doctrine of assurance. We can be warranted in believing we are “sons of God, and if sons, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ” even if we can’t meet evidentialist demands for assurance: e.g., “how do you really, like really really know you are elect?” Plantinga hints towards a response: given what else I know and read in the gospels, and given God’s promise of salvation in Christ, I am fully rational in holding to this belief).

Criticisms

I understand that in reading this book last that I might have missed where Plantinga outlines key points which he takes for granted. Still, I think the section on “defeaters” went by too quickly. Further, I don’t think he fully showed how the Great Pumpkin (SGP) objection misses his position. He seemed to assert that a believer in SGP doesn’t have warrant for that position. Perhaps, but I must have missed it.

Some of Plantinga’s students have told me that the more robust an account of warranted belief is, the harder it is to find a defeater. I agree, except it really wasn’t developed here.

Further, while I appreciate the section on the A/C model, and as many reviewers have pointed out, Calvin (and Paul!) does not say that the sensus divinitatis is a knowledge-producing faculty, but that it is in fact knowledge (Calvin’s Institutes, I.3).

His rebuttal to Biblical Higher Criticism is not enough, as he perhaps realizes. He is merely responding to the claim that Christian belief is irrational in the face of liberal critiques, not whether the critique is actually true. I don’t think this can work. If the liberal critique of the historicity holds, then we must say with the Apostle Paul “that we of all men are most to be pitied” (1 Corinthians 15:19). We must face the liberal charge head on and destroy it, not merely aim for mutual respectability (I’m not imputing this to Plantinga, but merely observing Evangelical institutional tendencies).

[Chris Via]

This is a superb epistemological argument for the de jure (as opposed to de facto) validity of warranted Christian belief. Plantinga's main goal is to determine whether it is rational, intellectually acceptable, to hold Christian belief. Using a hybrid Aquinas/Calvin model, Plantinga defines what exactly he means by Christian belief (teaser: the crux of the model is what Calvin terms the sensus divinitatis). Turning to Freud and Marx on the other side, Plantinga distills all opposition to warranted theistic belief since Epicurus's eloquent paradox (what we call today the argument from evil) into two strains: fantasy or illusion that stems from our wish-fulfillment faculties; and external pressure (e.g. societal, parental, etc.). In 500 pages, this book covers more ground and turns more stones than any other book I've read, and uses a mix of analytical philosophy and dialectics. Before reading, I would get at least a working knowledge of probability calculus, Freud's FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, Hume's ENQUIRY, Kant's PURE REASON, and the main positions of more contemporary individuals like Rorty, Dawkins, and Dennett. (Marx is unnecessary, as he didn't write much on religion, and most know the common quip about religion being the opiate of the people). After setting up the models of the sides of the arguments, the de jure question of warrant is raised in the context of Enlightenment, scientific reason, atheism, agnosticism, postmodernism, pluralism, and, as I said, the argument from evil. Through it all,
Plantinga hunts for defeaters to the stance that Christian belief does not imply lack of intellectual warrant. No matter one's position on the topic, this is a masterwork of scholarship worthy of careful reading and consideration. Yes, it will take quite some time and effort to work through, but it is the worth the journey.

[David Jakobsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I surmise that this is the most important book on apologetics in the 20th century even though it was published in the year 2000. It stands as the climax of his important trilogy on warrant and proper function as that which makes true beliefs knowledge. A must read!

[Michael Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alvin Plantinga’s magisterial Warranted Christian Belief is such a wide-ranging and philosophically dense work that analyzing it in any meaningful way in a review is not feasible. So, I will instead summarize the overall argument of the book as best I can.

The question Plantinga seeks to answer is, “is it rational, reasonable, justifiable, warranted to accept Christian belief …. Or is there something epistemically unacceptable in so doing…?” The question is pressing because, since the Enlightenment, there has been a demand among philosophers to expose all beliefs to the strict standards of reason, imposing an epistemic duty on us to accept beliefs only on a sufficient rational basis. Plantinga examines this alleged duty and the basis for it, then proposes his own understanding of which beliefs are warranted (or justified) and why.

He begins by criticizing classical foundationalism which posited the following noetic structure: basic beliefs (those that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible); and non-basic beliefs which are inferred by logic from our basic beliefs. Since, according to the foundationalists, God does not fit within the categories of basic beliefs (belief in Him is not self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigibly true), belief in God is non-basic, and we should only believe in Him if we can infer that belief from basic beliefs. Without sufficient evidence, we should not believe. And, of course, they insist there is insufficient evidence to believe.

Plantinga points out that this type of foundationalism cannot meet its own demands since it is not inferred from basic beliefs (it is self-referentially incoherent). Also, while some beliefs do require evidence, not all do. If we think of all the beliefs we hold, many do not meet the demand for evidence. Many beliefs we hold simply because we are told they are true by authorities we trust (we are epistemically dependent by necessity). We must start somewhere, why not with God? We believe in other minds, the past, continuity with the future (induction), truths of logic and mathematics, an external world, a self, etc. None of which meet the foundationalist requirements for proper basicality or logical inference from properly basic beliefs.

Which beliefs may we properly include among the foundations of a rational noetic structure (i.e., which beliefs are properly basic)? Is belief in God properly basic (meaning we have good reason for accepting Him as basic and not by logical inference)? Plantinga argues that its proper to accept belief in God without need for argument because belief in God is a species of belief in other minds (which is proper) and He has given us an awareness of himself that is not dependent on theistic arguments (Calvin’s Sensus divinitatis). As long as our mental faculties are working as designed, we should believe their deliverances.

Later in the book, Plantinga deals with several objections (purported Defeaters) to the faith. The problem of evil is perhaps the most difficult and the one most Christians find the most formidable. Plantinga refutes the charge that it is logically impossible for a good, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God to exist and for evil to also exist.

I thoroughly enjoyed the precise, logical progression of Plantinga’s thought. While it makes for a lengthy read, it is clear and thought provoking. Portions of it can be a bit of slog, especially those dense with (Bayesian) probability calculations.

One of my primary criticisms of Plantinga’s work is that rational believability is a pretty weak apologetic claim for us to make for Christian theism. Saying, “We have warrant for our belief in God as a properly basic belief,” doesn’t seem to be much of an apologetic. Not only that, but our warranted beliefs might be false – we can have properly basic beliefs that are not true (e.g., mistaken memories). In the end, he proves Christians are rational for believing in God (we are not shirking our epistemic duty when we do so), not that our beliefs are true. To be fair to Plantinga, that was his quest from the beginning – prove that it is rationally justifiable to believe Christian theism. And through hundreds of densely argued pages, he did so. We must remember though, that was all he was attempting to prove and all he did prove.

[Stephen Hiemstra · Rating 5 out of 5]

Part 3 of my Longfield review ended with a rather frustrating assessment:

“The weakness in the evangelical position is philosophical: very few PCUSA pastors and theologians today subscribe to Scottish Common Sense Realism. If to be postmodern means to believe that scripture can only be interpreted correctly within its context, then we are all liberals in a Machen sense. A strong, confessional position requires philosophical warrant—a philosophical problem requires a philosophical solution—which we can all agree upon. In the absence of philosophical warrant and credibility, the confessions appear arbitrary—an act of faith.” [1]

For most of the period since 1925, evangelicals have had a bit of a philosophical inferiority complex—having to take on faith that the confessional stance of the church since about the fourth century was not defensible in a rigorous philosophical sense. It is at this point that Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief becomes both an important and interesting read.

The philosophical problem is more specifically found in epistemology—how do we know what we know? Because Christianity is a religion based on truth claims, epistemology is not just nice to know—it is core tenant of the faith. For example, Jesus said:

"If you abide in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free." (John 8:31-32 ESV)

Being unable after 1925 to agree on the core confessions of the denomination, the Presbyterian Church (USA) and evangelicals more general were placed on the defensive. Faith increasingly became private matter as more and more the denomination withdrew from public life, from active evangelism and missions, and from teaching about morality. Later, unable to meet the modern challenge, the denomination came to be coopted by postmodern philosophies—if faith is simply a strongly held value, then it will crumble when confronted with more deeply held beliefs.

Into this crisis of faith, Plantinga defines his work in these terms:

“This book is about the intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. When I speak here of Christian belief, I mean what is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the Christian church.” (vii)

Notice that Plantinga has to both specify that he is writing about epistemology (theory of knowledge)—“intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief”— and specify what Christianity is—“what is common to the great creeds”. Plantinga expands on this problem saying:

“Is the very idea of Christian belief coherent?...To accept Christian belief, I say, is to believe that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good person (a person without a body) who has created us and our world, who loves us and was willing to send his son into the world to undergo suffering, humiliation, and death in order to redeem us.” (3)

In other words, in his mind the measure of the depth of this crisis of faith extends to the very definition of the faith.

Alvin Plantinga wrote Warranted Christian Belief while working as the John A O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame [2]. He writes in 14 chapters divided into 4 parts:

Part 1: Is There a Question? (pages 1-66)
Kant
Kaufman and Hicks

Part 2: What is the Question? (67-166)
Justification and the Classical Picture
Rationality
Warrant and the Freud-and-Marx Compliant

Part 3: Warranted Christian Belief (167-356)
Warranted Belief in God
Sin and Its Cognitive Consequences
The Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model: Revealed in Our Minds
The Testimonial Model: Sealed in Our Hearts
Objections

Part 4: Defeaters (356-499)
Defeaters and Defeat
Two (or More) Kinds of Scripture Scholarship
Postmodernism and Pluralism
Suffering and Evil

Plantinga lays out his argument in a lengthy preface and follows his chapters with an index.

Plantinga’s book focuses on two main points which he describes as:

“An exercise in apologetics and philosophy of religion” where he answers a “range of objections to the Christian belief”; and

“An exercise in Christian philosophy…proposing an epistemological account of Christian belief from a Christian perspective.” (xiii)

In other words, Plantinga responds to objections the faith and lays out a model for understanding the philosophical acceptability of faith—an idea that he calls “warrant”. Plantinga defines warrant as:

“warrant is intimately connected with proper function. More fully, a belief has warrant just it is produced by cognitive process or faculties that are functioning properly, in a cognitive environment that is propitious for the exercise of cognitive powers, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at the production of true belief.” (xi)

The core discussion of warrant lays out what he refers to as the Aquinas/Calvin model of faith. He writes: “Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin concur on the claim that there is a kind of natural knowledge of God.” (170). This innate knowledge of God given at birth he refers to as a “sensus divinitatis” which is triggered by external conditions or stimuli, such as a presentation of the Gospel (173).

Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief is an important contribution to epistemology because he meets the objections to faith head on and others a plausible explanation for why Christian faith is reasonable, believable, and true. Christians need to be aware of these arguments both to know that their faith is defensible and to share this defense when questions arise.

Part of this argument is that if the existence of God cannot be logically proven and cannot be logically disproven then it is pointless to talk about logical proofs—the modern challenge to faith is essentially vacuous—empty without philosophically based merit. Faith rests on what is more reasonable and more consistent with experience—what beliefs are warranted, not mathematical proofs[3]. From Plantinga’s perspective, we accordingly do need not be defensive about our faith.

In this review, I have outlined Plantinga’s basic presentation. In part 2, I will review the arguments against faith and, in part 3, I will look at Plantinga’s model of faith in greater depth.

This review will post during the week of June 1 to 8 2015 on T2Pneuma.net.


[1] Longfield Chronicles the Fundamentalist/Liberal Divide in the PCUSA, Part 3 (http://wp.me/p3Xeut-11i)

[2] http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/alvin....

[3]In financial modeling of complex firms, the rule of thumb is that it takes a model to kill a model—managing the firm without a model threats firm profitability and ultimate survival.

[Caleb Watson · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am on record in stating that Alvin Plantinga is the single greatest living Christian philosopher. I should clarify that, in my estimation, this places him among the greatest living philosophers *period*. “Warranted Christian Belief” is a powerful attestation to this claim.

Plantinga has made enormous contributions in various areas of philosophy, whether it be theodicy, or modal logic. In WCB, he reaches the culmination of his contribution to the field of epistemology, and the result is a tour de force.

This volume is technically the final installment in a trilogy of books(the first 2 mapping out preliminary considerations), however it is written in such a way that it can be read in isolation. Plantinga sets out to propose that Christian Belief is not only rational, but also he presents a model by which Christian Belief is “Warranted.” Warrant being that property which differentiates knowledge from mere true belief.

This book is at times very technical, and could be very challenging for someone who has no background in epistemology, or analytic philosophy. Having said that, Plantinga writes in a style that is approachable, and charming. His humor, and congeniality softens what may otherwise be stale, and monotonous subject matter.

Not only are Plantinga’s arguments rigorously logical, but his approach is thoroughly biblical. I was both persuaded by his reasoning, and inspired by his commitment to “the great things of the gospel.” The reader of “Warranted Christian Belief”, will undoubtedly receive a full blooded account of Christian Knowledge.

[A · Rating 5 out of 5]

For someone who needs philosophy as a gateway to faith, this book is here for you. What Plantinga does is to provide a structure of how the Christian Faith (through the Aquinas-Calvin Model) is *warranted*: which is to say that Christian Faith is formed with one's mental capacities working correctly, in an environment they were meant for, for their teleological purpose of reaching the Truth. Note that naturalism (which says that the mind was formed *completely from matter*) has no hold on the last condition: if the mind was formed so, then why would it be formed for truth? Why not survival? Or reproduction? The naturalist destroys his own capability to have warrant for his beliefs by being a naturalist.

Check this book out. It is really not that dense (compared to say, Hud Hudson's The Fall and Hypertime). It gives you a framework (with the help of Aquinas and Calvin) of how to think about God and how He works in you.

[Andreas F · Rating 5 out of 5]

Terceiro livro da trilogia "avalizada", este livro é de uma riqueza e dificuldades fenomenais. Apesar da maestria com que Plantinga desenvolve e explica o conteúdo, este é u livro para ser lido e estudado de maneira bem lenta, pois envolve raciocínios que necessitam algum conhecimento prévio de lógica e de epistemologia. É um livro para quem já tem algum conhecimento nessas áreas, mas extremamente enriquecedor.

[Will Poole · Rating 5 out of 5]

I still do not agree with Plantinga on many issues and in certain ways I dislike his approach to the philosophy of religion. But his ability to challenge views that I held as quite comfortably true, or as reasonable, or as what 21st century rational thinkers should believe, is unrivalled. The greatest living theistic philosopher of religion.

[Luis Claudio · Rating 5 out of 5]

Muito bom, mas extremamente pesado pra quem não é acostumado com linguagem filosófica. Não é um livro que dá pra ler em um mês, eu demorei 7 pra ler tudo, mas valeu a pena, Plantinga é simplesmente genial.

[Joshua · Rating 5 out of 5]

Here's a Warranted Christian Belief reading plan. It will take you through the book in 3 months by reading roughly 20-30 minutes a day, Monday-Saturday.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/...

[Jared Russell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Compelling and thought-provoking. Plantinga helped me in a time when I experienced great doubt; his book is not only enlightening, but edifying. This book will no doubt he discussed for a long time to come.

[Reagan Manis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Don’t listen to Reddit, Plantinga is the man and this book is a stellar exploration of belief, its formation and objections.
Plantinga is even and fair to difficulties, but nonetheless provides a very well reasoned case for the rationality of religious, and particularly Christian belief.

[Lara Ryd · Rating 3 out of 5]

(Selections)

[Michael Kenan Baldwin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alvin Plantinga at his best. Christian philosophy at its best.

[Kelvin Yu]

recommended by Eddy Chen (studied w/ Plantinga). His magnus opus. Unique model of Christian apolegetics

[Jake Ruefer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Required reading for any would be critic of Christianity.

[Kristian Gao · Rating 5 out of 5]

The greatest analytic philosophy book in our age

The sharpest brain God gives this world! Love Plantinga so much! Anyone who is seeking the truth honestly will agree with the conclusion! May God bless everyone who reads this book and analyze it with a sober and humble heart !

[Rachael · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this last book of a trilogy Plantinga lays down an argument for the defense of the warrant and rationality of Christian belief. He first argues that warrant is conferred to beliefs obtained via properly functioning faculties working according to some design plan in an environment congenial to their aiming at truth. He then argues for a sensus divinitatus, an interpretation of Calvin's theology, as a primary source for belief formation about God. Akin to a perception or experience, beliefs formed this way he argues to be properly basic and fully warranted. Plantinga explains that the only way to attack Christian belief then is to address the de facto (is it true) question rather than the de jure (even if it is true could beliefs about it be justified, warranted, rational). Given what he called the Aquinas-Calvin model beliefs about God are likely to be warranted if Christianity is true. The prime example he presented of a possible defeater in a de jure way, Freud, who argues that our faculties are not actually aimed at truth, he dismisses. He adds in the instigation of the Holy Spirit to testify about more particular Christian doctrines.

The last several chapters of the book deal with possible defeaters to the de facto question. First he discusses postmodernism and the possibility of truth, then Biblical criticism, the problem of religious pluralism, and the evidential problem of evil.

Plantinga makes a decent case that lacking a defeater Christians are generally warranted in their basic claims. As he argues, if Christianity is true then it is likely that God would communicate with people the basic facts of the situation in some manner. Likewise, this isn't true of just any worldview. For instance, he brings up his argument against naturalistic evolution in his chapter on the noetic effects of sin as a sort of anti-example. I think this argument ultimately fails, (the best that could be determined is that the probability that our faculties are reliable is inscrutable, not low, and I am not sure if this good grounds for a defeater by itself), but the point is taken. All that then leads to possible defeaters to Christian belief to threaten its warrant/rationality/justification for belief. So how is his case against the primary argues he presented?

I agree with him that the problem of religious pluralism doesn't need to present a strong case against Christianity but I don't think he dealt with the second tier of the problem, which is, Christianity generally assigns those who disbelieve to hell. So rather than asserting that people disagree, they disagree over all kinds of objective facts (i.e. some people are racists, they are obviously wrong) Christianity attaches special significance to disagreement that he did not comment on. Likewise with his treatment of Biblical historical criticism. He argues that since historical critics as a matter of method (or in stronger terms) dismiss the possibility of miracles Christians needn't pay attention to their conclusions as possible defeaters for Christianity. Granted, it's true, a historical critic is very unlikely to conclude that Jesus could have been resurrected for that reason, however, that is not where a lot of the main challenge issues from. For instance, how can the Bible be considered the word of God in a meaningful sense if it is discovered that it is riddled with historical inconsistencies, factual contradictions and the like? Or can Titus be considered inspired if it is discovered using linguistic analysis that it is very very unlikely to have been written by Paul? Though he did mention possible inconsistencies he insisted that these could be dealt with using traditional commentary, but the inconsistencies he mentioned were theological in nature, not the sort of outright, factual historical contradictions found between the gospels as an example.

Overall, I'd agree that Christians have a prima facie warrant based in their experience via positing some kind of sensus divinitatus. Likewise I'd have to grant people of other religions that could come up with a parallel model the same thing. However I think Plantinga, at least in his treatment in this book, does not fully grant the strength of possible defeaters to Christian belief.

There is then the secondary issue of what I'd take as warrant. I am not sure if I fully buy into his notion or not. But as that is not the primary focus of this book I suppose at some point I will have to turn to another in his trilogy to investigate that matter.

[Raymond Lam · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a definitive work of Plantinga's religious epistemology which expanded his previous works of reformed epistemology using the argument from warrant and proper cognitive functioning. First, he fleshed out more the notion of a belief in the existence of God being properly basic proposed in Faith and Rationality by suggesting the faculty by which one perceives God, sensus divinistatus (SV) apprehends God in a basic way being analogous to sensory perception, memory, and a priori beliefs.

Second, using the notion of warrant and proper functioning cognitive faculty in his Warrant and Proper Funtion, he offers an Aquinas/Calvin Model (A/C model) to show how Christian beliefs can have warrant. The idea is that if SV is a belief-producing faculty in human cognitive structure that is for producing true beliefs about God according to the faculty's design plan and proper functioning under appropriate environment, a belief in God as properly basic can enjoy warrant. Then he acknowledges that the noetic effects of sins and associating moral defects can affect the SV from functioning properly to perceive God and related sense data. With this acknowledgement, it is not entirely clear if Plantinga would accept the noetic effects of sin can affect the warrant of beliefs in God if malfunctioning can arise. Based on his model, that seems to follow.

Third, Plantinga develops the notion of "internal instigation of the Holy Spirit" (IIHS), and, resulting Calvinistic "faith as knowledge" for mitigating and overcoming the noetic effects of sin. According to A/C model, the Holy Spirit repairs and regenerates SV faculty from sin and instigates faith/knowledge in proper beliefs about God. The resulting IIHS faculty repair work enables SV to function properly again according to its design plan and re-acquires warrant for Christian beliefs. The faith generated by IIHS under the new repaired condition is knowledge of true beliefs. Plantinga's A/C model for warranted Christian beliefs does not claim the model reflects it is so in reality but just an entirely possible and coherent model of the way the human cognitive faculty is like. He does qualify his thesis by highlighting that the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question. If God does not exist, there is no SV and hence perception of God would not have warrant. Similarly, if God exists and there is SV, then the A/C model may well reflect reality.
Another useful section in the book is about warrant on Christian beliefs based on Scripture. He compares considering the content of Scripture as a divinely
inspired work among Christians to as mere stories written by multiple authors in Higher Biblical Criticism (HBC). Plantinga sees the anti-supernatural assumption of HBC as ad hoc though the analytical method of studying Scripture using pure historical analysis is useful for historical understanding. Further, in terms of warrant for belief in the content of scripture, IIHS and the existent intellectual investments in scripture can provide warrant for the average Christian even if he has not engaged in scholarly historical study of scripture.
This work also addresses objections from Freud and Max complaints about religious beliefs as cognitive fantasy and social condition illness, postmodernism antirealism objection, and, the problem of evil. It is definitely a remarkable original work of epistemology and philosophy of religion with tremendous depth.

[Tyler Tidwell · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fairly dense 500 pages of epistemology, theology, and general philosophy. Although the author does a great job making the majority of the content accessible to the lay reader, he occasionally runs up against topics of irreducible complexity which can be hard to fully appreciate without a lot of effort and at least a little formal training in philosophy. Nevertheless, I think it's an important and worthwhile read regardless of one's religious proclivities (so long as you have the patience to see it through). Three main points worth highlighting:

-The standard modern way of justifying one's beliefs - Classical Foundationalism ("Evidentialism") - is false (or at least not completely true in the manner typically conceived). In simplified terms, most Westerners tend to treat only "reason" (a very loaded word) as the self-justified epistemological criteria par excellence. It isn't, and we can blame John Locke that no one realizes it.

-Upon closer analysis, de jure objections to theism typically rely on an unstated de facto objection (i.e. most arguments against theism implicitly presuppose its falsity). In fact, discovering a purely de jure objection to theism that is actually independent of a de facto objection is rather difficult. No doubt this point cuts both ways though; some arguments for theism presuppose its veracity.

-Each worldview has its own "epistemic structure" (my term, not the author's). For example, IF theism is true, then things like faith and divine inspiration are warranted sources of knowledge in the same way we think of reason or empirical observation. This opens a whole new can of epistemological worms though: if voodoo were true, would a trance-like vision fueled by mind altering drugs be a warranted source of knowledge? Of course, this type of counterargument assumes a false commonality between all (or at least most) aspects of the "voodoo worldview" structure and, say, Christian theism, when in reality the two share almost nothing in common. If I could give a full exposition of this idea though, I would be writing a book right now, not a book review. I'm sure the author has covered this base somewhere in his other works.

[Luis Espinoza · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was not aware that it was the third part of a trilogy when I began the book and, considering the discussions of the first part of the book (concerning the process of the production of true beliefs), I am now really eager to go back and read the first two. The distinction between the “de jure (is it rational?)” and “de facto (is it true?)” arguments against Christian belief are really illuminating, however, I found it a little irritating that, once I finished the first part and was aware of this distinction, Plantinga focused solely on the “de jure” problem, stopping at every point when the discussion was moving necessarily towards the “de facto” part of the subject. The A/C Model (Aquinas/Calvin model) proposed by the author is really interesting, although in its extended model it hardly has any Aquinas-related material (the Aquinas-part of the book actually just consists of two quotations next to a more lengthy development of Calvin´s ideas). When Plantinga deals directly with Christianity (making use of the A/C Model to support his points) it can feel as if he´s getting kind of preachy, and for me as a Christian this all seems really stimulating, however I don´t think it would be very convincing or even controversial for someone who is not a believer. Finally, the last part of the book deals with defeaters for Christian belief, and although they´re all very engaging, I personally think he completely failed even to take serious Michael Martin´s critique of the A/C model (the proposition of belief as basic), which I found disappointing because I think it´s the most important. Nonetheless this book is worth its 500 pages, except for two brief section (together they´re no more than 15 pages in total) were he babbles some statistical exercises that don´t prove or entertain any relevant point (and by “babble” I mean they are insufferably difficult to follow, purely imaginative in content, and completely irrelevant at the end). Nonetheless, a really good book.