From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right

by Michael Colborne

From its roots in revolution and war, Ukraine’s Azov movement has grown from a militia of fringe far-right figures and football hooligans fending off Russian-backed forces into a multipronged social movement that has become the envy of the global far right. In this first English-language book on the Azov movement, Michael Colborne explains how Azov came to be and continues to exploit Ukraine’s fractured social and political situation―including the only ongoing war on European soil – to build one of the most ambitious and dangerous far-right movements in the world.

Genres: Ukraine, Politics, Nonfiction, History, Current Affairs

200 pages, Paperback

Published January 1, 2022

Reviews

[Fernando Pestana da Costa · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is an excellent overview of the Azov Movement, the set of related and interdependent extreme right wing Ukrainian organizations that includes the infamous Azov Regiment and also a myriad of other political, social, youth, cultural, and paramilitary organizations that constitute one of the most formidably dangerous far-right (some can be called neo-Nazis) movements in the world. Written before the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022 (and so with some parts of the last chapter on the future of Azov probably in need of revision) this book is extremely helpful for anyone wanting to understand the complicated and chaotic Ukrainian political live and the influence in it of far-right movements (not only Azov), and also to remind us all of the dangers awaiting not only normal Ukrainians but also Europe as an whole if the arms being delivered by the West to Ukrainian armed forces (of which the Azov Regiment is a part) will be kept in these nationalist fascist-like movements hands’ after the end of the conflict, as several (although sadly few western commentators) have alerted.

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Довольно неоднозначное впечатление произвела на меня эта книга. Сначала я воспринял её как очередную пропаганду Кремля, так как стиль книги очень агрессивный, что очень свойственно для пропагандистских книг. Однако я решил глянуть, кем же является автор. Как сказано на сайте Amazon, «...has been part of the Bellingcat Monitoring Project team at the investigative journalism website Bellingcat». Тот факт, что автор работал в Bellingcat, заставило меня по-другому посмотреть на эту книгу. Я не знаю, является ли это заказом или автор действительно исследует праворадикальные организации в Европе, поэтому всё нижеследующее может быть искажённой картиной реальности принятой мною за независимое исследование. Однако об Азове и других правых организациях на территории Украины я читал у многих авторов, многие из которых были настроены проукраински. Да, такие авторы предпочитали не акцентировать внимание читателей на украинских праворадикальных группах. Тем не менее, я не нашёл сильных противоречий между тем что пишет автор этой книги и что пишут другие иностранные авторы.

Конечно, больше всего меня напрягает обобщения, которые так свойственны любой пропаганде. Я всё же склонен думать, что УПА и Бандера не являются любимыми героями современной Украины. Тем не менее, автор считает, что именно не разрешение этого исторического вопроса в отношении Бандеры, привело к созданию многих праворадикальных групп на территории современной Украины.

Still, the legacy of the OUN and particularly the image of Stepan Bandera, assassinated by a KGB agent in 1959, remains an in-credibly divisive one in Ukraine. It is the consensus of contemporary historians that, in addition to the organization’s explicitly far-right roots, at least some members of the OUN-UPA participated in violent atrocities, including the Holocaust. Despite this, a considerable portion of Ukrainian civil society and parts of the Ukrainian diaspora continue to downplay or outright deny the OUN’s crimes, and often accuse critics as dupes or agents of the Kremlin. Certainly over-the-top Soviet and subsequent Russian propaganda condemning seemingly almost anyone expressing their Ukrainian identity as a banderivets’ has contributed to this defensiveness, but a full and proper reckoning of the OUN’s legacy, “with no omissions and apologism” (Portnov, 2016) is yet to take place in Ukraine.

Однако мне кажется, что автор слишком сильно «сгущает тучи», представляет реальность в слишком тёмных тонах. В более политически нейтральной книге в отношении праворадикалов я читал, что к Бандере положительно относятся не больше 15-20% населения. Конечно, сегодня эти цифры заметно выше, но как мне кажется, это временное явление. Тем не менее я всё же считаю важным отметить этот неразрешённый вопрос в отношении того как относиться к УПА и Бандере (в Европе к нему явно относятся отрицательно).

Во многих книга, в которых затрагиваются украинские националисты начала XX века, приводятся разнообразные цитаты, суть который всегда сводится к тоталитарной сущности украинского крайнего национализма. В основном эти цитаты любят использовать пророссийски настроенные авторы. Мне трудно оценить истинность подобных цитат, но если принять во внимание, что подобные цитаты можно встретить и в среде российских националистов, то в таком случаи я вполне допускаю их реальность. Обычно особо безумные цитаты украинских националистов появляются чуть ли не в каждой пророссийской книге иностранного автора, и в каком-то смысле я их уже запомнил, однако нижеследующую цитату я ещё ни разу не встречал. Я нахожу её очень прелестной и забавной. Впрочем, у меня никогда не было иллюзий по поводу любых националистов.

One of the stranger contemporaries of Dontsov was Yurii Lypa, a poet and medical doctor who was part of the OUN-UPA. In a 1936 essay called “The Ukrainian Race,” Lypa argued that all Ukrainian women needed to be married and give birth for the good of the Ukrainian nation. In one particularly cringeworthy passage (quoted in Rudling, 2019), Lypa wrote that “the 300 ovulations of every Ukrainian woman, as well as 1,500 ejaculations of every Ukrainian man are the same sort of national resources, as, say, its energy supplies and iron, coal, or oil deposits.” To this end, Lypa argued that a dictatorial state needed to set up “sexual courts and tribunals” to regulate Ukrainians’ sex lives.

Всё вышесказанное касалось исторических фигур украинского национализма, однако большая часть книги посвящена современным националистам и в особенности такой организации как «Азов». Трудно сказать имеет ли к этой организации тот «Азов», который держал оборону на территории Азовсталь или это другая организация. В любом случаи автор большую часть времени уделяет именно этой организации. Рисует автор «Азов» как типичную нео-нацискую организацию, в связи с чем, возникает множество вопросов, как например, как соотнести их славу в народе и их, мягко говоря, странные поступки и высказывания. Ответ на данный вопрос мы сможем получить только после того как закончится военное противостояние между Россией и Украиной. Однако я не исключаю реализацию драматических событий связанных с этой организацией. Война всегда ожесточает людей, а если это ещё и идейные люди и не просто идейные, а с радикальными тоталитарными воззрениями, то всё вообще может в итоге валится в очень неприятные события. Тем не менее, я соглашусь с автором в том, что любые радикальные движение, особенно которые прошли через боевые действия, в будущем будут представлять угрозу демократии и её институтам. Конечно, возможно автор ошибается и «Азов» не станет крупным политическим игроком в Украине, но мы можем вспомнить не радикальные организации, но просто военные, как например организации бывших военнослужащих прошедших через афганскую войну и Приднестровье. Все эти организации имели очень тёмное прошлое в 90-х в России (не знаю, как дела обстояли в другие постсоветских странах, но думаю что не лучше). Так что нижеследующие цитаты, одни из немногих утверждений этого автора с которыми я согласен.

Paired with the constant mentions of the word ‘veteran’ and ‘volunteer’, underscoring that the Regiment’s fighters willingly went to war in 2014, it was yet another example of how the Azov movement continues to position itself in Ukrainian public discourse: not as extremists, not as criminals, but solely as ‘patriots’ who have defended and continue to defend Ukraine from its enemies.
<…>
This has led to a media environment where anyone domestic or international who writes critically about the far right in Ukraine can find themselves slandered as a ‘Kremlin agent’ by at least a few Ukrainians and international defenders online.
<…>
One of the primary ways Azov has managed to exploit Ukraine’s wartime media environment is by what seems like an exercise in repeating a word over and over again: veteran. Some of the most admired and trusted people in contemporary Ukraine are, not surprisingly, the several hundred thousand veterans of the war.
<…>
For many in Ukraine, it doesn’t matter what Azov believes, whether they’re far-right, neo-Nazis, fascists or otherwise — what matters to them is that they fought against Russian aggression and are on their side (Umland, quoted in Montague, 2020). There’s a ton of political capital at stake in being a veteran in Ukraine. Azov knows that and has made a heavy investment in it.

Тем не менее, автор упускает очень важную вещь – количество этих самых правых радикалов. Книга даёт такое представление как будто правых радикалов, замешанных в криминальных делах, великое множество в Украине. С моей точки зрения, их не так и много. Всё же стоит помнить, что радикальные организации есть в каждой стране и в каждой стране они часто (но не всегда) связаны с криминалом, бандитами, ОПГ и пр. Поэтому я всё же не думаю что «Азов» является такой важной проблемой, как это хочет показать автор. Более того я считаю политику Ющенко, которую он проводил с 2004 года, намного более опасной чем сотни членов «Азова». С моей точки зрения все правые радикалы являются пешками в руках украинских политиков, которые за неимением возможности и/или желания бороться с коррупцией и строить современное государство европейского образца, обращаются к теме украинского национализма, Бандере и УПА именно с целью отвлечь внимание народа от по-настоящему важных тем. Другими словами, то о чём пишет автор, является вторичным. Сегодня принято называть «Правый Сектор» и прочих украинских националистов как главную причину начала военного противостояния между Россией и Украиной. Но с моей точки зрения праворадикалы сыграли в этой драме роль пешек. Главными фигурами были именно украинские политики, а также региональные политические элиты Украины, с одной стороны и природа авторитарного российского режима, с другой. «Азов», «Правый Сектор», Гиркин с его людьми и «Русская весна» с сепаратистами Донбасса, это всё пешки, в большой геополитической игре стран.

This book made a rather ambiguous impression on me. At first, I perceived it as another propaganda of the Kremlin, as the style of the book is very aggressive, which is very typical for propaganda books. However, I decided to look at who the author is. As it says on Amazon's website, "...has been part of the Bellingcat Monitoring Project team at the investigative journalism website Bellingcat". The fact that the author worked for Bellingcat made me look at this book differently. I don't know if this is a commission or if the author really researches right-wing radical organizations in Europe, so the following may be a distorted picture of reality that I have taken as an independent study. However, I have read about Azov and other right-wing organizations in Ukraine from many authors, many of whom were pro-Ukrainian. Yes, such authors preferred not to emphasize Ukrainian right-wing radical groups to their readers. Nevertheless, I did not find any strong contradictions between what the author of this book writes and what other foreign authors write.

Of course, the thing that worries me the most is the generalizations that are so typical of any propaganda. I still tend to think that the UPA and Bandera are not the favorite heroes of modern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the author believes that it was the failure to resolve this historical question regarding Bandera that led to the creation of many right-wing radical groups in modern Ukraine.

Still, the legacy of the OUN and particularly the image of Stepan Bandera, assassinated by a KGB agent in 1959, remains an in-credibly divisive one in Ukraine. It is the consensus of contemporary historians that, in addition to the organization’s explicitly far-right roots, at least some members of the OUN-UPA participated in violent atrocities, including the Holocaust. Despite this, a considerable portion of Ukrainian civil society and parts of the Ukrainian diaspora continue to downplay or outright deny the OUN’s crimes, and often accuse critics as dupes or agents of the Kremlin. Certainly over-the-top Soviet and subsequent Russian propaganda condemning seemingly almost anyone expressing their Ukrainian identity as a banderivets’ has contributed to this defensiveness, but a full and proper reckoning of the OUN’s legacy, “with no omissions and apologism” (Portnov, 2016) is yet to take place in Ukraine.

However, it seems to me that the author puts a dark cloud and presents the reality in too dark colors. In a more politically neutral book about right-wing radicals, I read that no more than 15-20% of the population had a favorable attitude towards Bandera. Of course, today, these numbers are noticeably higher, but it seems to me that this is a temporary phenomenon. Nevertheless, I still think it is important to point out this unresolved issue regarding how the UPA and Bandera are viewed (in Europe, he is clearly viewed negatively).

Many books that deal with Ukrainian nationalists of the early twentieth century contain a variety of quotations, the essence of which always boils down to the totalitarian nature of Ukrainian extreme nationalism. These quotes are mostly used by pro-Russian authors. It is difficult for me to assess the veracity of such quotes, but if we take into account that such quotes can also be found among Russian nationalists, then in this case, I quite admit their reality. Usually, particularly crazy quotes from Ukrainian nationalists appear in almost every pro-Russian book by a foreign author, and, in a way, I have already memorized them, but I have never seen the following quote before. I find it very charming and amusing. However, I have never had any illusions about any nationalists.

One of the stranger contemporaries of Dontsov was Yurii Lypa, a poet and medical doctor who was part of the OUN-UPA. In a 1936 essay called “The Ukrainian Race,” Lypa argued that all Ukrainian women needed to be married and give birth for the good of the Ukrainian nation. In one particularly cringeworthy passage (quoted in Rudling, 2019), Lypa wrote that “the 300 ovulations of every Ukrainian woman, as well as 1,500 ejaculations of every Ukrainian man are the same sort of national resources, as, say, its energy supplies and iron, coal, or oil deposits.” To this end, Lypa argued that a dictatorial state needed to set up “sexual courts and tribunals” to regulate Ukrainians’ sex lives.

All of the above has dealt with historical figures of Ukrainian nationalism, but most of the book is devoted to modern nationalists and, especially, to such an organization as Azov. It is difficult to say whether Azov, which held the defense on the territory of Azovstal, has anything to do with this organization or whether it is a different organization. In any case, the author devotes most of his time to this organization. The author portrays Azov as a typical neo-Nazi organization, which raises many questions, such as how to correlate their fame among the people and their, to put it mildly, strange actions and statements. We will be able to get an answer to this question only after the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is over. However, I do not exclude the realization of dramatic events related to this organization. War always hardens people, and if they are also ideological people and not just ideological, but with radical totalitarian views, then everything can end up in very unpleasant events. Nevertheless, I agree with the author that any radical movements, especially those that have gone through hostilities, will pose a threat to democracy and its institutions in the future. Of course, maybe the author is wrong, and Azov will not become a major political player in Ukraine, but we can recall not radical organizations, but just military organizations, such as organizations of former servicemen who went through the Afghan war and Transnistria. All these organizations had a very dark past in the 90's in Russia (I don't know how things were in other post-Soviet countries, but I think not better). So, the following quotes are some of the few statements of this author that I agree with.

Paired with the constant mentions of the word ‘veteran’ and ‘volunteer’, underscoring that the Regiment’s fighters willingly went to war in 2014, it was yet another example of how the Azov movement continues to position itself in Ukrainian public discourse: not as extremists, not as criminals, but solely as ‘patriots’ who have defended and continue to defend Ukraine from its enemies.
<…>
This has led to a media environment where anyone domestic or international who writes critically about the far right in Ukraine can find themselves slandered as a ‘Kremlin agent’ by at least a few Ukrainians and international defenders online.
<…>
One of the primary ways Azov has managed to exploit Ukraine’s wartime media environment is by what seems like an exercise in repeating a word over and over again: veteran. Some of the most admired and trusted people in contemporary Ukraine are, not surprisingly, the several hundred thousand veterans of the war.
<…>
For many in Ukraine, it doesn’t matter what Azov believes, whether they’re far-right, neo-Nazis, fascists or otherwise — what matters to them is that they fought against Russian aggression and are on their side (Umland, quoted in Montague, 2020). There’s a ton of political capital at stake in being a veteran in Ukraine. Azov knows that and has made a heavy investment in it.

However, the author omits a very important thing - the number of these right-wing radicals. The book makes it seem as if there are a great number of right-wing radicals involved in criminal cases in Ukraine. From my point of view, there are not so many. Still, it is worth remembering that radical organizations exist in every country, and in every country, they are often (but not always) connected with criminals, gangsters, organized crime groups, etc. So, I still don't think Azov is as important a problem as the author wants to show. Moreover, I think that Yushchenko's policy since 2004 is much more dangerous than hundreds of Azov members. From my point of view, all right-wing radicals are pawns in the hands of Ukrainian politicians who, for lack of opportunity and/or desire to fight corruption and build a modern European-style state, turn to the topic of Ukrainian nationalism, Bandera and the UPA in order to divert people's attention from really important topics. In other words, what the author writes about is secondary. Today, it is common to name the Right Sector and other Ukrainian nationalists as the main reason for the beginning of the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. But from my point of view, the right-wing radicals played the role of pawns in this drama. The main figures were precisely Ukrainian politicians, as well as regional political elites of Ukraine, on the one hand, and the nature of the authoritarian Russian regime, on the other. "Azov," "Right Sector," Girkin and his men, and "Russian Spring" with the separatists of Donbass are all pawns in a big geopolitical game of countries.

[Christopher Iacovetti]

'In 965 the pagan Sviatoslav conquered the Khazars, an empire whose rulers and at least some of its population were Jewish. Sviatoslav, as a result, has become lauded as a “hero” by the region’s anti-Semites and the far right (Grinberg, 2021). Sviatoslav may not be a household name in Ukraine, “a barely remembered figure out of school history textbooks” (Petik and Gorbach, 2016). Sviatoslav was nonetheless a man important enough for Azov for them, under Biletsky’s watch, to erect a statue in the city of Mariupol in 2015 where one of Vladimir Lenin used to stand.'

'In 1654, in a move which continues to echo in Russia- Ukraine relations to this day, the Treaty of Pereyaslav was signed that saw the Cossacks swear loyalty to the Russian Tsar ... The quest, however, for a fully independent Cossack state continued ... Over the next few decades Cossack autonomy would be slowly restricted under the thumb of the Russian Empire, with Catherine II of Russia abolishing the institution of Hetman in 1764 and in 1775 ordering the Zaporizhian Sich destroyed. The Cossacks have left an enormous imprint on contemporary Ukraine, often seen as “the embodiment of [Ukrainian] national values” (TRAFO, 2019). Cossack myth and imagery, centred on individualism, patriotism and bravery, has been utilized by forces as disparate as mainstream liberals, Soviet propagandists and Ukrain- ian nationalists, right up to the present day. For their part, Azov constantly evokes the Cossacks, even framing themselves as the Cossacks’ “descendants [who] are also defending Ukraine from the invasion of the East.”'

'The 19th century would prove to be an uphill and uneven journey for Ukrainians looking to assert a national identity. In the Russian Empire, where most Ukrainians lived, the Ukrainian language was banned as a subject and language of instruction from 1804, a ban which was not lifted until 1917. The Ems Ukaz of 1876 even banned Ukrainian in print, save for reprinted historical texts. ... Still, when the chaos of the First World War came to the territories home to millions of ethnic Ukrainians, some of them tried to make an independent Ukraine a reality. The Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) was declared in January 1918, in the wake of the Russian Revolution. The UNR had a haphazard existence during the chaos of the war, at one time overthrown by a pro-German “Hetmanate” in 1918 that itself held power for just over eight months. By 1921, however, the war for an independent Ukraine was lost. Ukrainians, once split in two, were now divided in four. Most lands occupied by Ukrainians became part of Soviet Ukraine, while Galicia and part of Volhynia went to newly-independent Poland; parts of Bukovyna went to Romania, while Transcarpathia went to the newly-formed Czechoslovakia.'

'In 1929 in Vienna, Konovalets used his organizational and leadership skills to unite a number of radical nationalist Ukrainian activists into a single organization—the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). At its foundation, the OUN was an explicitly far-right organization, willing to use violence and terror to meet its goal of an independent Ukraine. Fascists like the Union of Ukrainian Fascists played a central role in the OUN. ... The OUN also spent the 1930s becoming close to Nazi Germany, with the OUN even having a representative at an inter- national ‘National Socialist’ conference in 1937 ... [But] to the OUN(b)’s apparent surprise, the Nazis had no interest in the Ukrainians as equal partners, and rounded up OUN(b) leaders, including leader Stepan Bandera, who soon found himself in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin. Even with their leader imprisoned, the OUN carried on. Some OUN members, in conjunction with Nazi forces, took part in pog- roms that killed tens of thousands of Jews in 1941 (Rossoliński- Liebe, 2011; Himka, 2010; Himka, 2013; Rudling, 2016). The OUN formed and led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1942; in 1943 a campaign of anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volhynia killed tens of thousands of Poles (McBride, 2016). Between these and more ethnic cleansing in Galicia in 1944, it is estimated that the OUN- UPA killed upwards of 100,000 people. As the outcome of the war became apparent in 1943 and 1944, the OUN began to scrub itself of openly fascist, anti-Semitic elements of its past, hoping to present itself as a tolerable face for the eventually victorious allies even as members continued to carry out ethnic cleansing. Its trademark red and black flag, evoking spilled blood on black soil, remained. ... The Nazis released Bandera in 1944, who promptly resumed collaboration with them.'

'After the war, there were varying degrees of Russification and repression of Ukrainian language and culture, repression which was particularly pronounced under Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi’s tenure as Communist Party leader in Ukraine in the 1970s and 1980s.'

Post-Cold War: 'The challenge, however, was just beginning for Ukraine. As Wilson (1996) observes, an independent Ukraine had only existed in the late 1600s (the Cossack Hetmanate) and from 1917 to 1920 (UNR), neither of which had “firm control [or...] control over territories of modern-day Ukraine.” The challenge for Ukraine’s new leaders was to form not only a modern state, but a modern nation. How was this nation going to be formed?'

2014: 'It was also on December 1 when the far right began to make its mark on the burgeoning protests. At Ukraine’s presidential ad- ministration building an estimated 200 members of far-right groups—including Patriot of Ukraine members wearing yellow armbands emblazoned with its Wolfsangel logo—attacked riot police. With a commandeered bulldozer charging at the line of police and even a football hooligan who would later become a soldier in the Azov Regiment swinging a long metal chain, some speculated the attacks might even have been a pro-Russian provocation in- tended to discredit the protests (Risch, 2021). Nonetheless, the day would be played up by the Azov movement in the following years as den’ provokatora—Provocateur’s Day.'

Azov's ascendancy in 2014: ' Unlike what would become Azov, Right Sector chose a path of confrontation rather than cooperation with Kyiv’s post-Maidan authorities—a confrontation they lost. By 2015 Right Sector had already become a collapsing, fragmented movement; today Right Sector and its few hundred members cooperate often with the Azov movement, including as part of the same electoral coalition in 2019.'

'The exact nature of the relationship between [former Interior Minister] Avakov and Azov has long remained an opaque one. Some observers have suggested that, far from Biletsky and Azov being some sort of puppet or private army acting on Avakov’s orders, the relationship is more one of “mutually beneficial cooperation” (Ishchenko, quoted in Deprez, 2019), one where the movement can act with relative autonomy yet still on occasion be tasked to work in the interests of Ava- kov and his allies. The relationship extends to family: Oleksandr Avakov, the former minister’s son, arrested and charged with embezzlement in 2017 but released without bail (Sukhov, 2018), has been known to be close with Azov’s Sergei Korotkikh. Under Avakov’s reign there has been a form of “rapprochement” (Likhachev, 2018) between law enforcement and the far right, helping create an environment where the far right has been able to operate with relative impunity. Thanks to Avakov allegedly sabotaging attempts at police reform (Bezruk, 2021), attacks on activists—including but not limited to attacks carried out by the far right—are seldom properly investigated.'

'He may be the leader of a violent far-right movement and have a long, documented history of violence and hateful rhetoric, but Andriy Biletsky has a platform in Ukraine most of his ideological brethren across Europe and beyond would love to have. Biletsky has his own blog, as do many mainstream politicians and public figures, on Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), one of Ukraine’s most respected online media outlets. He is often invited on popular political talk shows on Ukraine’s main (oligarch-owned) TV net- works, including at least a dozen appearances since 2019 alongside swathes of other guests on Freedom of Speech with Savik Shuster, one of the most popular talk shows in the country. While it’d be a stretch to say Biletsky is some sort of omnipresent, super-popular figure in Ukrainian media, there are few if any far-right leaders around the world—particularly ones who lead movements as extreme and, ironically, electorally insignificant—who have the level of mainstream exposure Biletsky does.'

'After the fall of communism this led to a backlash, a “strong rejection of anti-fascism as a solely Russian creation” (Hajdari, 2020) and a corresponding embrace of some of the nationalist he- roes of old, including Nazi collaborators, as a source of inspiration for these newly-independent countries’ processes of nation-build- ing. The consequence of this in Ukraine, especially after 2014, is an environment where the act of speaking out against groups like Azov can be painted as little more than a superficial Soviet and thus pro-Russian carry-over. ... Sometimes the far right can exert enough pressure to shut down media coverage it doesn’t like. In 2021, a state-funded televi- sion channel that broadcasts in Russian to eastern Ukraine, Dom TV, put out a YouTube video that critically discussed the far right in Ukraine. Figures like popular blogger and former Right Sector member Serhiy Sternenko, as well as Azov senior figure Maksym Zhorin, reacted angrily online and demanded that Dom TV remove the clip; a few days later, Dom TV did just that. The fact that the far right was able to successfully demand a state-funded broadcaster remove critical coverage about them is indicative not only of the influence that the far right really has in Ukraine, but of why there’s relatively little critical coverage of the far right in the country. Multiple Ukrainian journalists I’ve spoken to over the last several years, including those who have written about Azov and other far-right groups, freely admit that they and their colleagues have been afraid to write about them. ... Given unsolved murders of journalists like Pavel Sheremet, not to mention a number of assaults on journalists for which no one has ever been punished, this is certainly a legitimate fear for a journalist in Ukraine to have.'

Written in 2020/21: 'Watching Azov, one appears to see different elements of the movement pushing in different directions. The movement’s leaders, particularly Andriy Biletsky, seem content to try and continuously mainstream themselves and become—or at least appear to be—a less extreme version of what they used to be, eschewing open violence and downplaying revolutionary change, at least in the short term. On the other hand, some elements within Azov seem partic larly impatient. For example, those who once preached metapolitics have moved to serving at the front lines to gain at least some ‘real world’ military experience (and, not coincidentally, are Ordine Nuovo fanboys) ... Still, the Azov movement’s leadership, particularly under National Corps, is not inevitably prone to drift away from its roots as a matter of course. The opportunity, in Biletsky and company’s mind, may well come where radical action is necessary—think, for example, of a full-scale Russian invasion, something increasingly feared in Ukraine—where some of the niceties of the less-extreme-seeming frontstage can be discarded. Azov was built on the inebriating rush of war; it needs war, whether metaphorical, rhetorical or literal, in order to survive.'

'Demystifying, deconstructing and delegitimizing Azov’s key narratives, their motivating sentiments, requires doing the same to the narratives and sentiments that exist in mainstream Ukrainian discourse. Bluntly put, however, none of this is likely to happen anytime soon in Ukraine. A country still at war, a country with polarized discourse between so-called ‘pro-European’ and ‘pro-Russian’ elements, a country still plagued by many of the same issues that led to the 2014 revolution and, above all, a country wrestling with its very identity is not exactly fertile ground for questioning ‘patriotic’ mainstream assumptions.'

'The Azov Regiment is probably the only official military unit in the world that was born from a core of far-right extremists and continues to be connected to a broader far-right social movement. Despite unconvincing efforts to separate the two, it’s clear that the Azov Regiment is part of the broader Azov movement and should not be treated as something distinct from it. A military unit like the Azov Regiment has no place in a democratic country’s armed forces and should be disbanded.
This is no doubt an unpopular position to take in Ukraine— where the Regiment itself is thought of highly because of its efforts during the heights of war in 2014 and 2015—and certainly an un- popular one with the Azov movement, who have spat back vociferously at those who have dared suggest it. But the broader movement derives its legitimacy from the Regiment itself, a Regiment which still honours its fallen soldiers with a ceremony every September, one that Biletsky always plays a lead role, that with its spotlights and chants and torches more than slightly resembles the Lichtdom of Nazi rallies in the 1930s.'

[Edz · Rating 5 out of 5]

A much awaited exposé of one of the most notorious far right movements that Europe has yet to witness, whose ambitious goals are not solely restricted to Ukrainian borders.

The book starts off with tracing the roots of Azov by offering a short history of Ukraine spanning the reign of the Scythians until the Euromaidan and subsequent civil war in 2014, highlighting the role of the far right in some historical episodes (e.g. OUN-UPA). It then follows by analyzing the various strains of thought that make up the Azov movement, ranging from domestic influence of Ukrainian nationalism to the metapolitics of the “Nouvelle Droite” and outright neo-Nazism, thus earning it the label of an “extreme right” movement. Afterwards, we get a look at the internal structures of Azov, composed of both official and unofficial groups as well as independent organizations who nevertheless maintain ties with the National Corps (i.e. the official party of Azov). This ties in with the shady world of alleged involvement in criminal activity that Azov has been associated with, ranging from robberies and raids to outright murder of political opponents. The subsequent chapter analyzes how Azov got itself to be accepted as part of the mainstream political discourse in Ukraine, highlighting its role in providing veterans a voice and setting up organizations which cater to their needs, thus projecting themselves as true patriots ready to serve the nation. Following that, we get an idea of Azov’s international ambitions, spearheaded by the likes of Olena Semenyaka, who dreams of reconstructing a pan-European nationalist movement known as the Intermarium stretching from the Baltics to the Adriatic Sea, and how that dream swiftly came to an end (or a pause?). Finally, the author ruminates about the future of Azov and its place in Ukrainian society, proposing that reforms in the political structures should be accompanied with crackdowns on the far right movement with encouragement from Ukraine’s allies, and that while it may be long past its heyday, Azov isn’t going away anytime soon.

Anyone wanting to know more about this oft-mentioned yet severely misunderstood movement should grab this book and give it a try, especially considering how it’s been given an overly positive portrayal in mainstream media during the war in Ukraine.

[Muruacus · Rating 3 out of 5]

Everyone knows about the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. What they do not know is that one of the major reasons why Ukraine has been able to thwart off one of the most powerful military forces in the world is not because of donations from NATO or oligarchs, but because of a volunteer group that began in 2014, the Azov Battalion. Azov has since grew from a humble squad of “hooligans” and “neo-Nazis” to an international cultural phenomenon. But according to Colborne, this surge in mainstream popularity and recognition is dangerous. Azov is “a movement that has served and will continue to serve as a model and inspiration for other far-right movements around the world”. There is no other far-right group around in any part of the world that has been able to accomplish what Azov has, and for that reason, Colborne found it necessary to document the rise of such a group to counter the “downplaying” of the mainstream media.

The book starts off by giving giving a brief history of Ukraine through the lens of Azov members and supporters. From the Proto-Indo-Europeans, to the Kurgans, to the Scythians, many Ukrainians trace their lineage to the Cossacks, and many Azov members to this day identify as such. This ethnic group fought against Khazars, Mongols, and Crimean Tatars, and this history of battle and hardship testify to the warrior spirit of the modern Ukrainian. However, when the Cossacks had failed in their rebellion against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they turned to Russia and signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav in which the Cossacks swore loyalty to the Russian Tsar in exchange for help in battle. Despite this treaty, Ukrainians still wanted independence. Fast forward to our modern age and the Azov Battalion was born in 2014 to liberate Mariupol from separatist forces. This volunteer battalion of 100-200 men was led by the infamous Sergei Korotkikh. Where official Ukrainian military and police personal failed, Azov succeeded and quickly grew in popularity, especially among the youth.

Continuing with its founding and origins, Colborne also dedicates much of the first half of the book to highlighting the philosophical influences among Azov and its allies. Men like Mykola Kravchenko and Dmytro Dontsov were against democratic voting and advocated for an elite ruling, an idea they drew from Italian Fascism. Outside of traditional Fascism and National Socialism, there are more exotic and pseudo-spiritual beliefs held by its members that include Esoteric Hitlerism and Aryan-Hinduism, from which the likes of Julius Evola and Miguel Serrano are mentioned. For some members, however, a general idea of a “Conservative Revolution” is more accessible and palatable to the masses, as some Azov members are more sympathetic to the ideas of Armin Mohler and even Ernst Jung.

What Colborne focuses the most on in this book pertaining to thesis is how Azov has been able to penetrate mainstream politics so brazenly. Far-right groups are typically forced to operate under the radar and avoid exposing their political affiliations and public acts, yet as already mentioned, Azov operates within the Ukrainian political system and boasts on social media with regularity. They now have their own political party, the National Corps, as well as their own official state-sponsored paramilitary group Centuria (previously National Militia). Azov has also made cultural strides outside of the military and political sphere by creating youth camps and social centers that promote nationalism and other principles that the founding members have held to. As of writing this review, they even have a YouTube channel where they post GoPro footage of their skirmishes and interview members.

The shortcomings of the book come from the insertion of Colborne’s subjective view of the conflict and his commentary on the more macro-political situation. He falls into the same paradox that many pro-Ukrainians in the mainstream fall into, that being that he defends Ukraine’s sovereignty yet decries the forces that defend them, i.e., the far-right. When he and others say that Ukraine has a right to exist, what exactly do they mean by this? Is Ukraine simply a line drawn on a map, or does it refer to a specific people-group? It must be the latter, in which case Ukraine represents a specific ethnolinguistic group. The issue here is that when Ukrainians openly advocate for defending their ethnic group, Colborne labels them as far-right. What is the difference, and where do we draw the line?

Another major issue with Colborne’s commentary is that he accepts the mainline pro-Ukrainian narrative without any hint of skepticism. He never mentions, for example, how NATO has donated billions of dollars, as per Victoria Nuland, into pro-Western and anti-Russian media. He likewise glosses over the fact that Yanukovich was democratically elected, all the while harping throughout the book how Ukrainian nationalists are anti-democratic and that this is somehow Russia’s doing. Along the same lines, anti-Semitism is mentioned on almost every other page, and yet he also omits the fact that wealthy Ukrainian Jews, such as Ihor Kolomoyski, funded Svoboda and other anti-Russian far-right movements. When Pyotr Simonenko called into question why this was happening, the The Jewish Committee of Ukraine said that asking these provocative questions was anti-Semitic. You the reader can be the judge of why wealthy Jews were involved in this and why they shut down those drawing attention to it. None of this is to make my personal judgements about Ukraine or Russia, as this book is about Azov, but that an uninformed reader would of himself well to study the conflict as a whole outside of this work.

As a case study of the far-right in Ukraine, this is a well-documented resource that covers the origins of such groups up until the time of publication. The first chapter of the book even serves well as a brief but concise history lesson of Eastern Europe, which will perhaps exceed the expectations of many readers in drawing on the historical origins of Ukrainian nationalism. As an overview of the conflict, however, it should at the very least be compared to other writings that tackle the conflict from a more neutral and robust overview and comparison of all parties involved. Azov was born from the fires of war, but only time will tell how they will prevail or perish in the future.

[Will · Rating 4 out of 5]

From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right by Michael Colborne. 2022.

This is a topic that, somewhat understandably, has been downplayed or dismissed ever since Putin made his "denazification" argument as a pretext for invading Ukraine in 2022. The thing is, one can simultaneously oppose the invasion and oppose far-right extremist elements at the same time. There is no contradiction there. What Colborne has done with this book is to document and elaborate upon the very real threat of the Azov movement in Ukraine, frequently using their own words, shedding light on the hydra-headed sources of their ideology, and showing their connections to other far-right movements both inside Ukraine as well as internationally. A threat that has only been exasperated since the incorporation of the Azov Battalion (now Brigade) into the National Guard in 2014. The larger Azov movement continues to refer to this, as well as the actions of the Battalion in 2014 in Mariupol as part of the Donbas war, in their propaganda and public relations communications as a point of legitimizing their goals and appealing to nationalistic (and ultranationalistic) sentiments.

I strongly recommend reading this book to get an idea of what they are really about, and why they are an actual threat and not just a fictional bogeyman.

Additionally, take a look at this article from the Illiberalism Studies Program (ILLSP), which details information about Olena Semenyaka, who has been serving as the international secretary of National Corps (a far-right political party associated with the Azov movement) since 2018, and as a spokesperson for the larger Azov movement.


From the Introduction of Colborne's book:

This book is written from the position that far-right extremism should have no place in our politics and in our societies, and that no amount of far-right extremist rhetoric or actions should ever be considered acceptable. The far right shouldn't be downplayed or outright denied for the perceived good of a country at war. A failure to confront, refuse and reject the far right is a failure to stand up for those in our societies whose lives stand to be harmed most by the far right - among them women, LGBT+ individuals and members of racialized minority groups. No matter if the country is (still) at war. No matter if there are other significant if not more pressing problems governments [have] to also deal with. No matter if far-right extremism is a problem in other countries too.

--Michael Colborne

[Dominic · Rating 4 out of 5]

You see everyone posting online about the various conflicts around the world, and you want to join in. You want to end up on the right side of social justice and be the peacekeeper. Unfortunately for you, no matter which side you take, you will be labeled as a bigoted extremist.

Israel vs Palestine

If you support Israel, you are an Islamophobe that supports genocide and apartheid.

If you support Palestine, you are an anti-Semite that supports Hamas.

China vs Taiwan

If you support China, you are a neo-Maoist imperialist that deprives other nations of their sovereignty and oppresses the Uygers.

If you support Taiwan, you are a nationalistic xenophobe that supports the greedy capitalists.

Basque vs Spain

If you support the Basque Nation, you are a fascist terrorist.

If you support Spain, you are a fascist terrorist.

Russia vs Ukraine

If you support Russia, you are a neo-Stalinist imperialist that is committing genocide.

If you support Ukraine, you are a neo-Nazi that overthrows your own government for a nationalistic one that re-lives the days of genocide.

What a predicament! Be aware of those you see with Ukrainian flags in their bios and certain phrases like #standwithukraine. These are false flags and act as dog whistles for neo-Nazis, allowing them to communicate in plain sight.

[Bryan Mcquirk · Rating 3 out of 5]

Colborne's book is an excellent resource to learn about the Azov movement in Ukraine and how it manifested into the Azov battalion fighting against Russian backed separatists in the Donbas region.
As Colborne points out, Azov is mostly unique with regards to other far-right and white supremacist groups around the world. The book is a bit dry at some points, but is concise enough that this is not much of a problem.
Overall, I give it 3.75 stars. Would love to see an update post the Russian invasion as Putin has used denazification as a justification for the invasion.

[Mateo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very informative book that details how far right forces in Ukraine have risen to from the fringes to be the most cohesive and organized far right in the world. Very hard for anyone to claim biases on the part of the author.

[Rhuff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Canadian journalist Michael Colborne has delved into the history and ideas of what is arguably the most influential movement in modern Ukraine. Although rising in tandem with other far-right movements in post-Communist eastern Europe, Ukraine's institutional "flexibility" has given it a punch far exceeding its numeric weight. It also makes a mockery of western pretensions that Ukraine is a "democracy" whose "western-oriented people" yearn to break free of shameful pasts into a progressive present.

Although demonstrating its birth from the 2005 Orange Revolution, and its resurgence into a force after 2014 and the first war in the Donbas, Colborne traces its ideological linkage to the pre-WWII Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera. Building on these roots and their glorification, originally in west Ukraine and Ukrainian communities abroad, the Azov Movement and its military arm carved deep marks into the mental blank slate of a new generation anxious for "patriotic action."

Colborne's book went to press just before the current war, and concludes as the Movement is torn between "entropy" - mainstream accommodation - or further radicalization. The war has resolved this, and one must seriously consider that such was the purpose of the war from the Ukrainian side. "Some of their more radically-minded comrades 'are becoming increasingly anxious to go down a more violent path,' " he notes on p. 140. Similarly, on p. 142, he notes that "Azov was built on the inebriating rush of war; it needs war, whether metaphorical, rhetorical or literal, in order to survive."

It is no stretch of the imagination to see a provocation in Donbas, resulting in real war with Russia, would be essential for strengthening radicals within the Movement, forcing the Ukrainian government and military into sharing its apocalyptic vision. It is known that attacks in Donbas ramped up in mid-2021, fueled by Western-supplied weaponry. With its intelligence in Ukraine the West (US) had to have known these weapons would fall into the hands of Azovites with their all-or-nothing agenda. With Putin responding for his own reasons (NATO pre-emption) the apocalypse with Russia is on. Stepan Bandera's "March of the Fighters", still sung by Azovites in formation - "Our reward is the delight of struggle, it's sweeter for us to die in fight than to live in Ukraine like mute slaves in chains" - is now reality, no matter its basis in narcotic nationalism.