نظریهی شهود در پدیدارشناسی هوسرل نخستین اثر امانوئل لویناس و در واقع رسالهی دکتری اوست. این نوشته نخستین کتاب مستقلی است که به زبان فرانسه در باب اندیشهی هوسرل منتشر شده است و از این حیث اهمیت تاریخی دارد. لویناس با خوانش دقیق آثار منتشرشدهی هوسرل در آن زمان و با تأکید بر جلد اول کتاب ایدهها کوشیده است، فارغ از تفاسیر رایج و بهدور از برچسبهایی چون منطقگرایی، پروژهی فلسفی هوسرل را بررسد و آفتابی کند. حضور در آخرین درسگفتارهای هوسرل در فرایبورگ و چشیدن طعم کلاسهای هایدگر به لویناس امکان داد از نص متون پدر پدیدارشنسی گام فراتر نهد و به روح اندیشهی او برسد. هرچند این اثر در درجهی اول معرفی دقیق و آموزهوار آرای هوسرل است، از نقادی خالی نیست و لویناس در جایجای کتابش غلبهی دیدگاه نظری را در آرای هوسرل به نقد کشیده و به مدد همین نقدها و نیز به یُمن همکلامی با او توانسته گامهای بعدی هوسرل را پیشبینی کند. اکنون با منتشرشدن تدریجی دستنوشتههای هوسرل، تسلط لویناس به فلسفه و دغدغههای این «مرشد» مشخص شده و روشن شده که هوسرل خود نخستین منتقد خویش بوده است. گذشته از این، رد فلسفهی خود لویناس نیز در صفحات این کتاب به چشم میخورد.
Emanuelis Levinas (later adapted to French orthography as Emmanuel Levinas) received a traditional Jewish education in Lithuania. After WWII, he studied the Talmud under the enigmatic "Monsieur Chouchani", whose influence he acknowledged only late in his life.
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
Reading Levinas's book on Husserl is really a primal-scene like experience for the "continental" ph'er. And as with any primal scene, the real revelation is not the big picture, which was known all along, but the original placement of the strictly insignificant accompaniments - the lay of arbitrary signifiers, the presence of forgotten bystanders, tiny perturbations of spin - whose persistence throughout a century of discourse, dreamily exempt from reasonable entropy, engenders a whole milieu of secondary meaning and pseudo-meaning. (Roughly: The revelation is never that your parents had sex, but that a tacit pun on the color of the wallpaper has determined your choice of breakfast cereal for fifty years.)
Other than my own personal need to understand untranslated language from French, German or Latin, this book by Levinas and translated by Orianne is readable with a previous understanding of Husserl and the ideas of phenomenology.
It sat on my shelves for roughly thirty years, so it was about time I burned my way through this text. I've read other books by Levinas. He's rather understanding of what is expected of a reader without a dissertation in philosophy. That said, the book isn't light in any way other than being full of clarity.
جایی از کتاب، لویناس نقلی از کتاب ایده ی پدیدارشناسی هوسرل میآره با این تعبیر مختصر: "وجود تجربه زیسته، معادل است با قوامیابی درونماندگار از زمان" یعنی چی؟ یعنی اینکه ما اگر چیزی به نام تجربه زیسته داریم، اگر میفهمیمش، اگر میتونیم بگیم که "زندگی" میکنیم به خاطر اینه که درکی از "زمان" داریم. این زمان ه که زندگی رو نه تنها قابل فهم، بلکه قابل تحقق کرده. به عبارت دیگه، بی زمانی یعنی نزیستن.
[البته درونمایه اصلی ایم کتاب اصلا این نکته نیست و صرفا به عنوان حاشیهای برمتن عنوانش کردم.]
شرحی جامع، عمیق و روشن از مبانی پدیدارشناسی هوسرل با ارجاعات دقیق و مفصل به پژوهشها و ایدهها ۱، به علاوه بیان چند نقد اساسی به اندیشه هوسرل که زمینهساز عبور هایدگر و لویناس از پدیدارشناسی وی شد. ترجمهی کتاب، بر خلاف ترجمههای غامض و نامفهوم پدیدارشناسی، روان و روشن بوده و معنای جملات را به خوبی ادا کرده است.