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Cunningham: The Greatest Admiral Since Nelson
Cunningham's active duty career stretched from the Boer War to the end of World War II, where his attacks on Italian fleets at Taranto and Cape Matapan influenced planners at both Pearl Harbor and Midway.
673 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 1, 1997
124 people are currently reading
90 people want to read
About the author
John Winton
57 books12 followersA former officer in the Royal Navy, John Pratt was the author of a variety of fiction and non-fiction works published under the pen name John Winton. Pratt also served for 14 years as an obituarist for The Daily Telegraph.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
October 18, 2020
Cunningham, popularly known as ABC, is regarded by many as "the greatest admiral since Nelson". The title on the jacket of Winton’s book reminds us of this and Winton's well researched book provides evidence to support this claim with accounts from both British and Italian naval officers present at key naval engagements of World War 2 at Taranto, Matapan and Crete. Ironically, Winton also helps to refute the claim as he highlights some of ABC's weaknesses.
With its gripping minute by minute analysis of the action at Taranto and Matapan, Winton brings alive for the reader both the action that occurred and the 'fog of war'. However, repeatedly Winton’s description of Cunningham’s actions fails to probe deeply enough, and glosses over some of the mistakes Cunningham made.
Initially when, on 17 June 1940, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, suggested evacuating Malta, Winton notes that Cunningham ‘replied the same day with his suggestions’, but then quickly continues, almost as an apology for Cunningham’s actions, but without any sources, that all Cunningham’s ‘instincts rebelled against such suggestions.’ (p90). What he does not explore is why Cunningham did not have the courage of his convictions to protest Pound’s proposal immediately, but instead waited 24 hours before sending another signal ‘lest his previous signal had “sounded somewhat acquiescent”.’ (page 90) Because Cunningham ducked difficult decisions which included a political dimension, he made it more difficult for the Army’s Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General Wavell.
In July 1940, Churchill instructed his Admirals to secure the French Fleet. Admiral Somerville, based in Gibraltar, fired on the French fleet in Oran on 3 July 1940 resulting in over 1,000 French casualties. Winton praises Cunningham’s diplomacy in avoiding this outcome in Alexandria. He quotes one of Cunningham’ Staff Officers who described is as “truly Nelsonic” (page 89). However the situation could have been very different. As Winton notes, as the morning of 4 July 1940 broke in Alexandria, ‘the French ships were raising steam and clearing their guns for action. The very crisis ABC had tried so hard to avert had arrived…’ (page 88) By turning a Nelsonian blind eye to London’s orders, or at the very least interpreting these orders liberally, and failing to secure the French Fleet on 3 July, Cunningham risked ‘a pitched naval battle inside Alexandria harbour.’ (page 88) Cunningham was lucky when the French admiral backed down.
Just four days later, Cunningham took his fleet in search of the Italians. They ‘were found by Italian aircraft from the Dodecanese and were attacked by high-level bombers. Heavy, persistent and accurate bombing went on for most of that day. The bombers were mostly too high for the fleet’s guns to reach them and were virtually invisible.’ (page 91) Cunningham himself acknowledged (later) that the Italian “reconnaissance was highly efficient, and seldom failed to find and report our ships at sea. The bombers invariably arrived within an hour or two. They carried out high-level attacks from about 12,000 feet, pressed home in formation in the face of the heavy anti-aircraft fire of the fleet, and for this type of attack their accuracy was very good”. (page 92)
Winton does not adequately explore Cunningham’s slowness to appreciate the risks associated with aerial attack, nor how this blinded him to the danger in which he was placing his fleet. Had the Italians used torpedo- and dive-bombing attacks in addition to their high-level bombing raids, they could have crippled Cunningham’s fleet at a critical stage in the campaign.
Cunningham was an impulsive leader, always anxious to engage the enemy. On 15 July 1940, he had his opportunity. The British, with three battleships and 5 cruisers, encountered a strong Italian force comprising two battleships, 16 cruisers and 32 destroyers, escorting a convoy. The Italian battleships were newer, faster and had a greater gun range than Cunningham’s. (p91)
In what became known as the Battle of Calabria, Cunningham decided to engage the Italian force, despite being close to the coast which exposed his ships to Italian air attacks and despite two of his three battleships being old and unmodernised. He then sent his ships, ‘which were well spread out’, in separately, risking them ‘coming under fire piecemeal and being defeated in detail by a superior force’; only one of the British battleships, Warspite, managed to get within firing range, but the Italian ‘battleships and 8-inch cruisers straddled [the British] comfortably at 26,000 yards and more’, albeit they failed to score any hits; in the end, the British fleet was saved by a ‘single long-range hit on the Italian flagship’ which caused the Italians to retire.
Winton notes that Cunningham ‘was disappointed, because the main Italian battle felt had not been properly brought to battle.’ (page 97) What he should have noted was that Cunningham had, for a second time in a week, risked significant losses to the British fleet. Had it not been for a single long-range lucky shot by Cunningham’s ship, Warspite, and ‘an unwillingness to take favourable opportunities for attack’ by the Italians, the stronger Italian force could have devastated the British fleet by engaging each of the British ships in turn.
Three chapters are devoted to the naval action off Cape Matapan. This is often seen as a significant Allied victory over the Italian fleet, and it certainly was. Winton’s narrative highlights the litany of errors on both sides that occurred leading up to the final engagement. The Italians confused the British aircraft carrier Illustrious, ‘which was still in Alexandria, having not yet sailed for the United States’ with the carrier Formidable, which had left Alexandria and was on its way to join Cunningham’s fleet. On leaving Alexandria, Warspite hit a mudbank, reducing its speed to 20 knots; Cunningham, incorrectly, assumed that a reconnaissance report of ten enemy ships was a mistake. Ironically, the Italian Admiral then repeated this mistake on receiving ‘as up-to-date a description of Cunningham’s fleet’s strength, position, course and speed as any fleet commander could possibly have wished for’; A fleet of seven Greek destroyers being sent to support Cunningham’s force was left waiting when the word ‘orders’ was incorrectly cyphered as ‘oilers’; When Formidable launched its Albacore striking force ‘they were vigorously taken under fire by every one of the [British] cruisers as they flew past.’ (p145) Incredibly, the Italians also mistook the Albacores for Italian aircraft and did not fire on them until they were in the final stages of their attack. (p145) When a second wave of aircraft was sent to attack the Italian fleet, they spent some time avoiding aircraft sent from Maleme to support them in the mistaken belief that they were Italian bi-planes. An intercepted British message which would have disclosed the position of the British fleet, was not passed to the Italian Admiral until days after the battle. (p161); When the British opened fire on the Italian cruisers, a salvo from Cunningham’s ship, Warspite, straddled one of the British destroyers, almost sinking her. Later that night, an officer from Cunningham’s ship, misidentified the British aircraft carrier Formidable as an Italian cruiser. Only quick action by Cunningham, prevented the Warspite opening fire on the carrier at point-blank range; then a confusing signal from Cunningham, who ignored and abused officers who tried to correct him, resulted in the British cruisers breaking contact with the Italian battleship and allowing it to escape. His overbearing manner was noted by his subordinates, one of whom is quoted as saying “If he was not stood up to he could become unbearable”.
Two key issues, critical to an assessment of Winton’s claim of Cunningham’s greatness, are left unanswered. One is why the Italian fleet, which was larger than the British, failed to dominate the Mediterranean, particularly after the Fall of France. The second is why the Italian Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica, failed to exact a heavier price against an opponent who, at least initially, was blind to the way that air power had changed naval warfare.
Winton fails to adequately address either of these issues. Other authors, such as Robert Conway, provide a more informative critique: ‘The real faults [with the Italian Navy] lay in poor strategic thought, misdirection from high levels and, on the part of many officers afloat, an unwillingness to take favourable opportunities for attack if they conflicted with their operational orders. There were also lesser problems in that the Italians were entering a war without recent combat experience …Despite her paper advantage the Italian strategic approach seems to have been based on the necessity to keep her fleet intact as far as possible. The Navy was charged with the passive role of protecting the supply lines to North Africa, and the main battle fleet was ordered to avoid action with the British for its own sake. Thus the battle fleet took up a defensive role in the central Mediterranean where it could be protected from interference by shore-based aircraft while offensive action was to be taken by aircraft and submarines.’ (Robert Conway (ed), 1980, p281) By trying to save his Navy for the peace, Mussolini lost it in the war.
Cunningham's journey in transitioning from the primacy of sea-power to air-power is implicit, but left underexplored, in Winton's biography. Winton also highlights that when Cunningham was being considered for the position of Admiral of the Fleet in 1943, Churchill had challenged the proposed appointment noting that “[Cunningham] is an officer of the old school and the pre-air age. ... We must move forward to younger men.” Notwithstanding that Churchill acquiesced to the appointment, his criticism was valid. Time and again, particularly in 1940 and early 1941, Cunningham underestimated the dangers of air-power and was saved from disaster by luck and Italian naval ineptitude.
Of the books 399 pages of narrative, 308 of those are devoted to Cunningham’s experiences in the Second World War. The reader is left eager to understand more about the people and experiences which shaped Cunningham before the outbreak of World War 2.
In addition, Winton draws heavily on Cunningham's autobiography which contributes to the less than critical assessment of some of Cunningham's decisions.
However with a narrative that captures both the events and the person shaping those events, Winton has written a well-researched and eminently readable book, albeit, as much a history of the naval war in the Mediterranean in WW2 as about the colourful character of Cunningham.
As Cunningham himself summed up in his memoirs: “Fortune favoured me at every turn”.
With its gripping minute by minute analysis of the action at Taranto and Matapan, Winton brings alive for the reader both the action that occurred and the 'fog of war'. However, repeatedly Winton’s description of Cunningham’s actions fails to probe deeply enough, and glosses over some of the mistakes Cunningham made.
Initially when, on 17 June 1940, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, suggested evacuating Malta, Winton notes that Cunningham ‘replied the same day with his suggestions’, but then quickly continues, almost as an apology for Cunningham’s actions, but without any sources, that all Cunningham’s ‘instincts rebelled against such suggestions.’ (p90). What he does not explore is why Cunningham did not have the courage of his convictions to protest Pound’s proposal immediately, but instead waited 24 hours before sending another signal ‘lest his previous signal had “sounded somewhat acquiescent”.’ (page 90) Because Cunningham ducked difficult decisions which included a political dimension, he made it more difficult for the Army’s Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General Wavell.
In July 1940, Churchill instructed his Admirals to secure the French Fleet. Admiral Somerville, based in Gibraltar, fired on the French fleet in Oran on 3 July 1940 resulting in over 1,000 French casualties. Winton praises Cunningham’s diplomacy in avoiding this outcome in Alexandria. He quotes one of Cunningham’ Staff Officers who described is as “truly Nelsonic” (page 89). However the situation could have been very different. As Winton notes, as the morning of 4 July 1940 broke in Alexandria, ‘the French ships were raising steam and clearing their guns for action. The very crisis ABC had tried so hard to avert had arrived…’ (page 88) By turning a Nelsonian blind eye to London’s orders, or at the very least interpreting these orders liberally, and failing to secure the French Fleet on 3 July, Cunningham risked ‘a pitched naval battle inside Alexandria harbour.’ (page 88) Cunningham was lucky when the French admiral backed down.
Just four days later, Cunningham took his fleet in search of the Italians. They ‘were found by Italian aircraft from the Dodecanese and were attacked by high-level bombers. Heavy, persistent and accurate bombing went on for most of that day. The bombers were mostly too high for the fleet’s guns to reach them and were virtually invisible.’ (page 91) Cunningham himself acknowledged (later) that the Italian “reconnaissance was highly efficient, and seldom failed to find and report our ships at sea. The bombers invariably arrived within an hour or two. They carried out high-level attacks from about 12,000 feet, pressed home in formation in the face of the heavy anti-aircraft fire of the fleet, and for this type of attack their accuracy was very good”. (page 92)
Winton does not adequately explore Cunningham’s slowness to appreciate the risks associated with aerial attack, nor how this blinded him to the danger in which he was placing his fleet. Had the Italians used torpedo- and dive-bombing attacks in addition to their high-level bombing raids, they could have crippled Cunningham’s fleet at a critical stage in the campaign.
Cunningham was an impulsive leader, always anxious to engage the enemy. On 15 July 1940, he had his opportunity. The British, with three battleships and 5 cruisers, encountered a strong Italian force comprising two battleships, 16 cruisers and 32 destroyers, escorting a convoy. The Italian battleships were newer, faster and had a greater gun range than Cunningham’s. (p91)
In what became known as the Battle of Calabria, Cunningham decided to engage the Italian force, despite being close to the coast which exposed his ships to Italian air attacks and despite two of his three battleships being old and unmodernised. He then sent his ships, ‘which were well spread out’, in separately, risking them ‘coming under fire piecemeal and being defeated in detail by a superior force’; only one of the British battleships, Warspite, managed to get within firing range, but the Italian ‘battleships and 8-inch cruisers straddled [the British] comfortably at 26,000 yards and more’, albeit they failed to score any hits; in the end, the British fleet was saved by a ‘single long-range hit on the Italian flagship’ which caused the Italians to retire.
Winton notes that Cunningham ‘was disappointed, because the main Italian battle felt had not been properly brought to battle.’ (page 97) What he should have noted was that Cunningham had, for a second time in a week, risked significant losses to the British fleet. Had it not been for a single long-range lucky shot by Cunningham’s ship, Warspite, and ‘an unwillingness to take favourable opportunities for attack’ by the Italians, the stronger Italian force could have devastated the British fleet by engaging each of the British ships in turn.
Three chapters are devoted to the naval action off Cape Matapan. This is often seen as a significant Allied victory over the Italian fleet, and it certainly was. Winton’s narrative highlights the litany of errors on both sides that occurred leading up to the final engagement. The Italians confused the British aircraft carrier Illustrious, ‘which was still in Alexandria, having not yet sailed for the United States’ with the carrier Formidable, which had left Alexandria and was on its way to join Cunningham’s fleet. On leaving Alexandria, Warspite hit a mudbank, reducing its speed to 20 knots; Cunningham, incorrectly, assumed that a reconnaissance report of ten enemy ships was a mistake. Ironically, the Italian Admiral then repeated this mistake on receiving ‘as up-to-date a description of Cunningham’s fleet’s strength, position, course and speed as any fleet commander could possibly have wished for’; A fleet of seven Greek destroyers being sent to support Cunningham’s force was left waiting when the word ‘orders’ was incorrectly cyphered as ‘oilers’; When Formidable launched its Albacore striking force ‘they were vigorously taken under fire by every one of the [British] cruisers as they flew past.’ (p145) Incredibly, the Italians also mistook the Albacores for Italian aircraft and did not fire on them until they were in the final stages of their attack. (p145) When a second wave of aircraft was sent to attack the Italian fleet, they spent some time avoiding aircraft sent from Maleme to support them in the mistaken belief that they were Italian bi-planes. An intercepted British message which would have disclosed the position of the British fleet, was not passed to the Italian Admiral until days after the battle. (p161); When the British opened fire on the Italian cruisers, a salvo from Cunningham’s ship, Warspite, straddled one of the British destroyers, almost sinking her. Later that night, an officer from Cunningham’s ship, misidentified the British aircraft carrier Formidable as an Italian cruiser. Only quick action by Cunningham, prevented the Warspite opening fire on the carrier at point-blank range; then a confusing signal from Cunningham, who ignored and abused officers who tried to correct him, resulted in the British cruisers breaking contact with the Italian battleship and allowing it to escape. His overbearing manner was noted by his subordinates, one of whom is quoted as saying “If he was not stood up to he could become unbearable”.
Two key issues, critical to an assessment of Winton’s claim of Cunningham’s greatness, are left unanswered. One is why the Italian fleet, which was larger than the British, failed to dominate the Mediterranean, particularly after the Fall of France. The second is why the Italian Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica, failed to exact a heavier price against an opponent who, at least initially, was blind to the way that air power had changed naval warfare.
Winton fails to adequately address either of these issues. Other authors, such as Robert Conway, provide a more informative critique: ‘The real faults [with the Italian Navy] lay in poor strategic thought, misdirection from high levels and, on the part of many officers afloat, an unwillingness to take favourable opportunities for attack if they conflicted with their operational orders. There were also lesser problems in that the Italians were entering a war without recent combat experience …Despite her paper advantage the Italian strategic approach seems to have been based on the necessity to keep her fleet intact as far as possible. The Navy was charged with the passive role of protecting the supply lines to North Africa, and the main battle fleet was ordered to avoid action with the British for its own sake. Thus the battle fleet took up a defensive role in the central Mediterranean where it could be protected from interference by shore-based aircraft while offensive action was to be taken by aircraft and submarines.’ (Robert Conway (ed), 1980, p281) By trying to save his Navy for the peace, Mussolini lost it in the war.
Cunningham's journey in transitioning from the primacy of sea-power to air-power is implicit, but left underexplored, in Winton's biography. Winton also highlights that when Cunningham was being considered for the position of Admiral of the Fleet in 1943, Churchill had challenged the proposed appointment noting that “[Cunningham] is an officer of the old school and the pre-air age. ... We must move forward to younger men.” Notwithstanding that Churchill acquiesced to the appointment, his criticism was valid. Time and again, particularly in 1940 and early 1941, Cunningham underestimated the dangers of air-power and was saved from disaster by luck and Italian naval ineptitude.
Of the books 399 pages of narrative, 308 of those are devoted to Cunningham’s experiences in the Second World War. The reader is left eager to understand more about the people and experiences which shaped Cunningham before the outbreak of World War 2.
In addition, Winton draws heavily on Cunningham's autobiography which contributes to the less than critical assessment of some of Cunningham's decisions.
However with a narrative that captures both the events and the person shaping those events, Winton has written a well-researched and eminently readable book, albeit, as much a history of the naval war in the Mediterranean in WW2 as about the colourful character of Cunningham.
As Cunningham himself summed up in his memoirs: “Fortune favoured me at every turn”.
December 27, 2021
A man for all Sea sons
As I was born in Malta 1942-this book tells how I survived and who was responsible for that. Cunningham , a supreme human being.
As I was born in Malta 1942-this book tells how I survived and who was responsible for that. Cunningham , a supreme human being.
June 13, 2022
An Admiral of the fleet.
I have long been aware of this man. This book however enables one to see not only what kept us going especially after May 1940, as it is not only the story of a very great man and the forces that wrought him, but also how the Royal Navy saved us from defeat until until, once more, we had shrugged off the self indulgence of peacetimeu and readied ourselves for a life and death struggle.
I have long been aware of this man. This book however enables one to see not only what kept us going especially after May 1940, as it is not only the story of a very great man and the forces that wrought him, but also how the Royal Navy saved us from defeat until until, once more, we had shrugged off the self indulgence of peacetimeu and readied ourselves for a life and death struggle.
February 24, 2022
Sapere Books have reissued the late John Winton's biography of Andrew Cunningham the Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet during the Second World War. The Mediterranean Fleet at the time was the most active as well as the most prestigious command in the Royal Navy. Winton, much like previous biographers of World War Two Flag Officers straddles the line between critic and admirer ably.
April 11, 2023
Great Leaders Come To The Fore When Needed
Cunningham’s story is an exceptional read about an exceptional man.
Would he have shone in a peace time Navy, yes I believe he would.
Being in the right place at the right time helps but you have to have the ability as well.
If you have any interest in the Royal Navy, in peace and war, I strongly recommend this book.
Cunningham’s story is an exceptional read about an exceptional man.
Would he have shone in a peace time Navy, yes I believe he would.
Being in the right place at the right time helps but you have to have the ability as well.
If you have any interest in the Royal Navy, in peace and war, I strongly recommend this book.
March 13, 2022
Great story
One of the best ad accounts of naval warfare during the second world war that I have ever read. A great story about a great Admiral and the difficulty of dealing with the
political system during the war.
One of the best ad accounts of naval warfare during the second world war that I have ever read. A great story about a great Admiral and the difficulty of dealing with the
political system during the war.
June 17, 2023
Leadership
The book gives an excellent overview of the early and middle life career of Cunningham which formed his approach to successful high command in the Royal Navy during very difficult times.
The book gives an excellent overview of the early and middle life career of Cunningham which formed his approach to successful high command in the Royal Navy during very difficult times.
November 9, 2023
Great biography of a very interesting character.
April 17, 2022
Interesting as these men were exceptional in their duties, specially in times of war. 4 Stars.
November 2, 2023
Sad to get to end of book. One hell of a read
October 21, 2025
A competent biography of an utterly brilliant Admiral.
Andrew Browne Cunningham is probably the most significant player in the Second World War you've never heard of. He led the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean theatre through the early years of the war. In late 1940 and early 1941, he scored two massive victories over the Italians at Taranto and Cape Matapan that essentially put their newly constructed navy out of the war.
Matapan in particular catches the eye. Here are a few details to savour. First up, Cunningham was present at the battle, aboard his flagship, HMS Warspite - he wasn't going to miss the action by staying in the Royal Navy's HQ in Alexandria. Secondly, the battle was fought at night. This required almost unbelievable skill and daring, given the difficulty of manoeuvring a large fleet of enormous ships in the dark, and the risk of shooting at your own side (or just running into them). But Cunningham didn't hesitate. He had a rough idea from his reconnaissance planes as to where the Italian navy was located and he pursued them into the dark.
And here comes the cherry: who do you think was the young officer aboard HMS Valiant who switched on the searchlight to reveal the Italian fleet a couple of miles distant? The Duke of Edinburgh no less.
Anyway, the material for this book is awesome and John Winton does a creditable job with it. It doesn't always flow brilliantly, but it's not bad - and books like this are a huge service to the historical record.
Andrew Browne Cunningham is probably the most significant player in the Second World War you've never heard of. He led the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean theatre through the early years of the war. In late 1940 and early 1941, he scored two massive victories over the Italians at Taranto and Cape Matapan that essentially put their newly constructed navy out of the war.
Matapan in particular catches the eye. Here are a few details to savour. First up, Cunningham was present at the battle, aboard his flagship, HMS Warspite - he wasn't going to miss the action by staying in the Royal Navy's HQ in Alexandria. Secondly, the battle was fought at night. This required almost unbelievable skill and daring, given the difficulty of manoeuvring a large fleet of enormous ships in the dark, and the risk of shooting at your own side (or just running into them). But Cunningham didn't hesitate. He had a rough idea from his reconnaissance planes as to where the Italian navy was located and he pursued them into the dark.
And here comes the cherry: who do you think was the young officer aboard HMS Valiant who switched on the searchlight to reveal the Italian fleet a couple of miles distant? The Duke of Edinburgh no less.
Anyway, the material for this book is awesome and John Winton does a creditable job with it. It doesn't always flow brilliantly, but it's not bad - and books like this are a huge service to the historical record.
February 23, 2024
Excellent Biography
The work does a great job of not just recounting Cunningham’s life, but also how he interacted with others. Although not a primary source in and of itself, the author presents very good “guideposts” on where to find said sources. Highly recommend.
The work does a great job of not just recounting Cunningham’s life, but also how he interacted with others. Although not a primary source in and of itself, the author presents very good “guideposts” on where to find said sources. Highly recommend.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews