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RePresentations Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science
A collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, Representations convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research.
One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophical approach to ontology of the mental.
The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes which emerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in the remaining essays.
Not all of these essays are re-presentations . The new introductory essay seeks to present an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalism makes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previously published, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure of concepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositional attitudes", a critical examination of some of D. C. Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewritten for this volume.
A Bradford Book.
One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophical approach to ontology of the mental.
The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes which emerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in the remaining essays.
Not all of these essays are re-presentations . The new introductory essay seeks to present an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalism makes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previously published, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure of concepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositional attitudes", a critical examination of some of D. C. Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewritten for this volume.
A Bradford Book.
- GenresPhilosophy
352 pages, Paperback
First published May 28, 1981
1 person is currently reading
84 people want to read
About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
26 books87 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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February 8, 2013
The book really is a relic in philosophy of mind. It needs to be read in the context of its time, when AI was the hot-button issue and theories of language were central to understand the relationship between natural languages, thought, and computation. Fodor spends an enormous amount of time commenting on those issues. Some of the discussion is still relevant, but because the conversation has changed so much in the subsequent decades, much of the language and many of the concepts have evolved well beyond what Fodor is using. As a result, those interested in contemporary philosophy of mind are probably best looking elsewhere even for the commentaries on language-of-thought; Fodor's more recent work, along with some of his allies in the discussion, is available other places, and prefaces that much better.
Fodor is not my bag, in terms of content, either. He is very committed, even now, to a view of mind and language that seems to me to be enormously antiquated [which just means twenty or thirty years old, really] and he doesn't do a particularly good job at considering the alternatives outside of the conventional debate that this book and some of his more famous work came to prominence during.
That said, Fodor is funny, and while some of the writing is hard to digest and clunky, he does maintain a distinct voice and entertaining sense of humor. He pokes fun at Heidegger, as well as many contemporary theorists, and it makes the last few essays in the book much easier to read. He doesn't do as much joking around or playing with structure during the beginning of the book, so those philosophers who take this review as claiming the entire thing is funny, don't read too much into it. But I do think that is one of the better features of Fodor's writing, along with his impeccable organization and honesty during, especially, the last few papers.
Fodor is not my bag, in terms of content, either. He is very committed, even now, to a view of mind and language that seems to me to be enormously antiquated [which just means twenty or thirty years old, really] and he doesn't do a particularly good job at considering the alternatives outside of the conventional debate that this book and some of his more famous work came to prominence during.
That said, Fodor is funny, and while some of the writing is hard to digest and clunky, he does maintain a distinct voice and entertaining sense of humor. He pokes fun at Heidegger, as well as many contemporary theorists, and it makes the last few essays in the book much easier to read. He doesn't do as much joking around or playing with structure during the beginning of the book, so those philosophers who take this review as claiming the entire thing is funny, don't read too much into it. But I do think that is one of the better features of Fodor's writing, along with his impeccable organization and honesty during, especially, the last few papers.
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