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Power is real, but it does not always prevail. This book explores how disparity structures international relationships. Beginning at the bilateral level, the relationship between the smaller side and the larger side can be normal as long as the smaller does not feel threatened and the larger can assume that its capabilities are respected. However, the smaller can be tempted to brinksmanship, while the larger can be tempted to bully. Asymmetric conflicts are often stalemated because the limited commitment of the larger side is met by the smaller's mortal resistance. In multilateral situations, asymmetry shapes patterns of uncertainty and attention. In global systems, how hegemons treat their subjects is the unobserved sand shifting beneath their feet as they look toward their challenger. Since 2008, the US has retained primacy but not dominance. The management of asymmetric relationships in a multinodal world will determine how power matters in the current era.
- GenresInternational Relations
448 pages, Unknown Binding
First published November 30, 2015
About the author
Brantly Womack
16 books3 followersBrantly Womack is Professor of Foreign Affairs and holds the Miller Center’s C K Yen Chair at the University of Virginia. He received his BA in politics and philosophy from the University of Dallas and his PhD in political science from University of Chicago.
He is the author of Asymmetry and International Relationships (Cambridge University Press, 2016), China Among Unequals: Asymmetric International Relationships in Asia (World Scientific Press 2010), and of China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge 2006), as well as over a hundred articles and book chapters. He co-edited with Prof. Hao Yufan Rethinking the Triangle: Washington, Beijing, Taipei (University of Macau Press, 2016), China’s Rise in Historical Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield 2010) and Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 1991).
In 2011 Womack received the China Friendship Award for his work with Chinese universities. He holds honorary positions at Jilin University, East China Normal University, and Zhongshan (Sun Yat-Sen) University. He has been a visiting research professor at the East Asia Institute of National University of Singapore and at East China Normal University.
He is the author of Asymmetry and International Relationships (Cambridge University Press, 2016), China Among Unequals: Asymmetric International Relationships in Asia (World Scientific Press 2010), and of China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge 2006), as well as over a hundred articles and book chapters. He co-edited with Prof. Hao Yufan Rethinking the Triangle: Washington, Beijing, Taipei (University of Macau Press, 2016), China’s Rise in Historical Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield 2010) and Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 1991).
In 2011 Womack received the China Friendship Award for his work with Chinese universities. He holds honorary positions at Jilin University, East China Normal University, and Zhongshan (Sun Yat-Sen) University. He has been a visiting research professor at the East Asia Institute of National University of Singapore and at East China Normal University.
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March 24, 2016
If science is the accurate description of nature, then this book is science, as van Leeuwenhoek's work was science and Newton's work was science and Linnaeus's work was science and Einstein's work was science. To me it doesn't matter that "international relations" fall under the category of "social science." Science is science. Excluding human behavior from the field of "true" science is folly. Human nature is a subset of nature, or a feature of nature.
Womack's mixture of analytic tools comprises logic and history. His logic is unassailable. Relations between states always imply asymmetry in economic, demographic, and scientific (productive) capacity. That being the case, history shows us that greater states are less attentive to lesser states but more demanding while lesser states are compliant with said demands to the extent that their autonomy and identity are acknowledged. In other words, a greater state's policy preference prevails as long as it does not damage the self-regard of the lesser state, in which case the lesser state is willing to fight harder over an issue than the greater state finds worthwhile. And this can impose unacceptable costs on the greater state, as in the Vietnam war.
Simply put, Womack's core thesis is that war is abnormal. Now, saying that war is abnormal can be an exercise in counting the days when war transpires versus the days when peace transpires. But more importantly, it is saying that the prevailing paradigm of realism's insistence on "power rules" makes for marketable journalism but overlooks the facts of state behavior. History shows us that the location of adversaries, often neighbors, mandates a dance of identity, autonomy and deference. Peace is more perpetual than war. This works on the bilateral plane and in exponential ways on the regional and global planes.
As a diplomat for three decades, I cannot think of an instance where Womack's description of state, regional, and global dynamics is inaccurate. He accounts for deviations from peace through two principal phenomena--the self-interest of powerful domestic constituencies and the failure of "intelligence" to assess an adversary's goals from the adversary's perspective. At times domestic constituencies are more powerful than neighboring states. And generally, great powers and lesser powers see things differently. That's what leads to war: narrow self-interest and bad intelligence.
Full disclosure: I read and commented on portions of this book while Womack was writing it. He generously acknowledges this, but the truth is that I had no idea the final work would be so good.
At times, this book reads like a grand master's chess manual. That's unfortunate because it likely will restrict its readership to the academic and expert communities. The next step has to be some kind of popularization and simplification that makes the idiocy of "carpet bombing" and "beautiful walls" (between the U.S. and Mexico) instantly emetic (vomit causing.)
Any US diplomat anywhere knows that he/she is dealing with a lesser power that seeks greater recognition from the US. And any US diplomat knows how difficult it is to provide that recognition from the Executive or Legislative branches. But at the same time, if US diplomats are to help the US achieve its objectives, recognition and respect have to be made manifest, whether through state visits or exchange programs or specific acts of Congress.
Womack accounts for this. He does not say that the US always will make the right choice, and he does not say that China is not the next global rival to the US. Of course it is. But as a China expert, Womack recognizes that Chinese per capita income will peak at about 50% of US per capita income (over the next fifty years) and Chinese science (productivity and innovation) will lag US science and productivity. Thus, the concept of a new Cold War, or a battle of two hegemons, is a journalistic and ideological misperception.
Can the US coexist with China? In the evolving, globalized world, it has little choice. Of course it can.
Here's an academic book, philosophical and scientific in nature, that needs to become a commonplace of thought. We still are not easy with Einstein. This general theory of state relations will take a while to sink in.
Womack's mixture of analytic tools comprises logic and history. His logic is unassailable. Relations between states always imply asymmetry in economic, demographic, and scientific (productive) capacity. That being the case, history shows us that greater states are less attentive to lesser states but more demanding while lesser states are compliant with said demands to the extent that their autonomy and identity are acknowledged. In other words, a greater state's policy preference prevails as long as it does not damage the self-regard of the lesser state, in which case the lesser state is willing to fight harder over an issue than the greater state finds worthwhile. And this can impose unacceptable costs on the greater state, as in the Vietnam war.
Simply put, Womack's core thesis is that war is abnormal. Now, saying that war is abnormal can be an exercise in counting the days when war transpires versus the days when peace transpires. But more importantly, it is saying that the prevailing paradigm of realism's insistence on "power rules" makes for marketable journalism but overlooks the facts of state behavior. History shows us that the location of adversaries, often neighbors, mandates a dance of identity, autonomy and deference. Peace is more perpetual than war. This works on the bilateral plane and in exponential ways on the regional and global planes.
As a diplomat for three decades, I cannot think of an instance where Womack's description of state, regional, and global dynamics is inaccurate. He accounts for deviations from peace through two principal phenomena--the self-interest of powerful domestic constituencies and the failure of "intelligence" to assess an adversary's goals from the adversary's perspective. At times domestic constituencies are more powerful than neighboring states. And generally, great powers and lesser powers see things differently. That's what leads to war: narrow self-interest and bad intelligence.
Full disclosure: I read and commented on portions of this book while Womack was writing it. He generously acknowledges this, but the truth is that I had no idea the final work would be so good.
At times, this book reads like a grand master's chess manual. That's unfortunate because it likely will restrict its readership to the academic and expert communities. The next step has to be some kind of popularization and simplification that makes the idiocy of "carpet bombing" and "beautiful walls" (between the U.S. and Mexico) instantly emetic (vomit causing.)
Any US diplomat anywhere knows that he/she is dealing with a lesser power that seeks greater recognition from the US. And any US diplomat knows how difficult it is to provide that recognition from the Executive or Legislative branches. But at the same time, if US diplomats are to help the US achieve its objectives, recognition and respect have to be made manifest, whether through state visits or exchange programs or specific acts of Congress.
Womack accounts for this. He does not say that the US always will make the right choice, and he does not say that China is not the next global rival to the US. Of course it is. But as a China expert, Womack recognizes that Chinese per capita income will peak at about 50% of US per capita income (over the next fifty years) and Chinese science (productivity and innovation) will lag US science and productivity. Thus, the concept of a new Cold War, or a battle of two hegemons, is a journalistic and ideological misperception.
Can the US coexist with China? In the evolving, globalized world, it has little choice. Of course it can.
Here's an academic book, philosophical and scientific in nature, that needs to become a commonplace of thought. We still are not easy with Einstein. This general theory of state relations will take a while to sink in.
Displaying 1 of 1 review