Mark Stille’s Pacific Carrier Wars has the virtues and the main flaw of the “one-volume operational survey.” It’s energetic, packed with dates, ship and air group details, and a brisk march through the big carrier actions. If you want a fast, competent orientation to how the carrier war unfolded, it gives you that.
But it’s also too ambitious for its own page count and format. The Pacific War is not a single story arc with a clean through-line. It’s multiple overlapping campaigns, industrial and logistical asymmetries, shifting doctrine, intelligence coups, and human attrition, all changing month by month. When you try to compress that into one carrier-centered volume, you either drown in summary or you flatten the most important causal links. This book sometimes does both: lots of “what happened,” less “why it happened this way,” and even less on second-order effects (pilot quality erosion, sortie generation limits, damage control culture, replenishment at sea, repair pipeline, and the slow but decisive U.S. industrial ramp).
So the takeaway is basically what you said: the project definition is the problem. It reads like a capable digest. Useful as a primer or refresher, or a decent scaffold for further reading. However this is not the sort of single book that can make the Pacific carrier war feel comprehensible in its full strategic and operational depth.