The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now. In Commanding the Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory. Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals. Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.
Before reading Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, I’d never fully appreciated how little I knew about the Marine Corps generals of World War II. I recognized names like Vandegrift, Holland Smith, and Geiger, but beyond that my familiarity was superficial. Stephen R. Taaffe succeeds in his central mission: to bring into focus the senior Marine leadership in the Pacific Theater, and to provide accessible, well-judged sketches of each general’s background, performance, and challenges.
The book works best for readers with at least a passing knowledge of the Pacific War. While not absolutely necessary, having some sense of the overall American strategy and key island battles helps place the descriptions of amphibious operations in context. One of the book’s strengths is its depiction of how Marine generals interacted not only with each other but with Navy admirals, giving a fuller picture of American leadership dynamics in the Pacific. Taaffe also highlights how the Marine Corps’ institutional need to carve out its place among the Services shaped both doctrine and behavior. His discussion of how this need made Marine generals hesitant to criticize poor operational decisions by the Navy or Army was particularly thought-provoking.
Taaffe is even-handed in his treatment of individuals. He points out strengths and weaknesses, showing how these shaped not only battlefield outcomes but also the relationships surrounding each general. He does not shy away from criticism—Rupertus’s costly decisions on Peleliu and Holland Smith’s harshness toward subordinates receive scrutiny—yet his assessments are never gratuitously harsh. The result is a set of balanced leadership portraits, where successes and failings are weighed with care.
If the book has a limitation, it lies in its brevity. By focusing on general officers, it leaves out the contributions of colonels and lieutenant colonels who were vital to Marine leadership in the Pacific, and readers looking for detailed operational studies may find it a little light. Still, Taaffe’s prose is clear and concise, making the book both approachable and insightful. For readers curious about the overlooked Marine Corps generals of World War II, Commanding the Pacific offers a compact but rewarding introduction, one that illuminates not just individuals but the institutional pressures and joint dynamics that shaped America’s Pacific war.
A stolid overview of US Marine Corps combat leadership - by which Professor Taaffe means division and corps commanders - during World War II in the Pacific theaters. The Marines started the war with a pretty small leadership manpower pool, and its own school system wasn't highly thought of. Nonetheless, six divisions and two corps would eventually be formed, and 11 men would go on to command these large units with varying degrees of success. Taaffe considers Roy Geiger the best of the lot, somewhat surprising in that Geiger was an airman. Alexander Vandegrift (pictured on the cover with his subordinates and staff on the 'Canal') commanded the First Division at Guadalcanal and the First Corps' landing at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville when he was recalled to Washington to become the Commandant. One needs to keep in mind that the battles fought by the USMC were mostly on small islands which didn't permit the sort of sweeping maneuvers some better-known Army generals could employ in Europe and while not all went smoothly - consider the "Smith vs Smith" imbroglio with the Army on Saipan or the unnecessary and bloody assault on Peleliu - the USMC did well enough to ensure its permanence and an expansion after the war. The book lacks pictures of the generals and the maps are rudimentary.
The book I should have written but couldn’t as I’m a Marine. It takes an unbiased outsider to do the truth telling. So much of Marine Corps history is hagiography and the repeated trumpeting of the tales of a few. The men who commanded the Marine divisions and corps in the Pacific toiled in anonymity. Everyone knows Iwo Jima but who were the corps and division commanders?
Well, Taaffe introduces us to them. He leads us from the prewar days to the very end of the war battle by battle. He explains how the Marine Corps officer corps was a good ole boys club. Everyone knew everyone as it was such a small force. Credit goes to the two commandants, Holcomb and Vandegrift, for selecting the right man for the right job. It certainly was not a faultless process but overall competency prevailed. At the start of World War II there were only 13 general officers and 70 colonels who would be the pool to draw from. Twenty six men served overseas as commanders of corps and divisions.
Just a fascinating account of the inter service rivalry, cooperation, and disharmony between the Marine Corps, Navy, and the Army. The army actually had more men and took fewer casualties in the Pacific Theater. Roy Geiger, a Marine aviator, is probably the best commander of the bunch.
This is an important book for understanding the Marine Corps’ role in WW I I. While not ignoring the various battles and campaigns in the Pacific War, Taafe concentrates on the senior Marine Corps leaders - their backgrounds, how and why they were selected, and how well they performed. Interestingly, of the 16 generals who commanded the 6 Marine Divisions and 2 Amphibious Corps, he rates Roy Geiger, an aviator, as the most successful. My only minor criticisms are 1) he did not address the leaders of the Marine Air Wings, 2) he did not discuss how the Corps adapted its organizational structure during the war to address the changes necessary to better fight the Japanese. Highly recommended.
When I grabbed this book off the "new" shelf at library I wasn't paying that close attention to what I was actually getting, apart from having a fair amount of respect for Taaffe. My expectation was that this was going to be a series of capsule biographies, but Taaffe had more ambitious plans, and provides an in-depth examination of how the USMC stable of flag-grade officers evolved through the course of the war; pretty much warts and all. One thing is for sure, Arch Vandegrift, commander of the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal, and eventually Commandant of the Marine Corps, was an indispensable man. Despite having embraced amphibious warfare as their mission there was no guarantee that the Marines would become a paragon of achievement had they not made their doctrine work, and Vandegrift was a man who made things work, with as little organizational conflict as could be avoided.
One irony that stands out to me is that the Marine emphasis on speed of execution perhaps came to tell against them as the war progressed, and battles in the Pacific became the case of prolonged sieges, not smash and grab operations to snare a port or an airfield. The more methodical approach of the U.S. Army was probably more appropriate. It is telling that Holland "Howling Mad" Smith, the senior USMC operational commander for much of the war, looked at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as bad deals from the perspective of casualties, even before the battles commenced, but that's why the U.S. Navy liked the Marines; they'd follow orders whether or not it made sense.
Taaffe's book, Commanding the Pacific, is a work that has finally given the Marine Corps generals of World War II their place in history. As he aptly points out, Army generals such as Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton, along with Navy admirals such as King, Nimitz, and Halsey have overshadowed the Marine Corps generals in the history of World War II.
Taaffe does a thorough job of explaining why the Marine generals have taken a back seat due to several factors such as: the great distances involved in the Pacific Ocean, topography of the islands being assaulted, Naval dominance, no seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other reasons.
I recently finished reading, Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific. I believe Mastering the Art of Command and Commanding the Pacific make good companions to read.
Commanding the Pacific is a book that should be added to the Marine Corps Commandant's Reading List as Taaffe provides fantastic insight into the men who led the fight in the Pacific for the Marines.
This is a good overview of Marine activities in WW2 Pacific action. My problems with it were more of the feeling of getting author commentary/opinions sprinkled in to the text. One of the parts I really wanted to delve into was in regard to Chesty Puller, the most decorated Marine in history. He was a very minor part of the book. And that is understandable to the extent that he was not a General at the time of the Palau amphbious landings and battle where he is discussed. The author almost seems to cast him off as an overly aggressive commander more intent on fighting and sacrificing his troops than anything else. It seemed like a slight and disservice to one of the Marine's finest. The better points are the way the author shows the development of the Marines as the elite fighting force and amphibious experts for which they are famously known -- despite inter service rivalries and playing second fiddle to the Navy (to whom they reported) and to McArthur's army command (to whom they also often reported or were assigned).
Another well written tome on WWII well worth the time to read and be grateful such men served our great country in it's time of need. While the Marine Corps was small during this time in history it had more than it's fair share of great leaders.
Dr. Taaffe provides invaluable analysis of the Marine Corp commanders in the Pacific Theatre of War during the Second World War. Mr. Taaffe does a very good job of introducing many of us to the smallest branch of the armed services in the Second World War.