The book's most prominent point, although understated, is the need for people from all sections in the US to agree on China as a strategic rival. The book is less about China - real or imaginary - and threats it poses - again real or imaginary - than about the author's frustrations with the inability of factions to come together.
Superficially, the book is about China as the US's prime threat from now on. The author tries to provide an ethical and moral logic, but what he deems inevitable is more borne out of the unease that China can now compete with the US on a large number of economic, geopolitical, and technological fields where the US lead earlier was unassailable. At multiple points, the author could not contain himself in blaming China for the US-like ambitions it harbors in influence and affluence.
Unlike the US's past enemies - in Japan, Russia, and radical Islam - China is more a rival and competitor. China refuses to play by US rules which is not merely frustrating but also destabilizing for the US, as the author highlights indirectly. Let's examine this closely.
As the author writes, China should be blamed on suppressing political dissent, avoiding democratic reforms, human rights, trade protectionism, IP pilferage, capital subsidies, low wages, territorial expansionism, rampant nationalism, religious suppression, and a host of others. Whether true or not, and whether the US likes it or not, China will not change its current ways for the sake of the US.
The more significant point is that many factions within the US, like in the Trump administration, as shown in the book, do not agree on squashing China for what the author sees as proven infringements or violations. For the US to have all major parts of the society work together in fighting China, many of its own rules on freedom of expression, business practices, market norms, and engagements need to change.
The author may feel that there is a legal or moral ground to do most of it - like forcing the US market to stop listing China companies or helping the anti-China political causes - but none of this is possible without top-down edicts given the rules of US society. Without the categorical top-down directives to reduce the engagement with China, effectively declaring the start of a clear cold war 2, the US individuals and corporates will have many reasons to work in ways that will displease China-bashers like the author.
In its single-handed China-is-bad context setting, the book plays fast and loose with facts. The sections on capital markets reveal the ignorance - if not the bias - more to this reviewer than anyone else, with the things turning laughable in the discussions on index providers. Frequent "hacking" claims - as indicators of most China successes being a result of IP stealing - are ignorant of how innovations truly happen. The author has his own ideas on how large firms from Wall Street to Silicon Valley, industrial and mineral, real estate to universities should be behaving, based on alleged wrong done to or through them.
In conclusion, the US and China strategic rivalry is the new reality for everyone for the coming decades. We are beyond the point where one could ask whether this is needed, as is clear in this book. The US policymakers will need to embrace offensive realism to hold their competitive ground. Its partisan setting will lead to both sides having their own version of truths and righteousness. This book will go down as one of the early efforts asking for disparate US political factions to come together by showing how unfocussed efforts of the previous years, and particularly the Trump administration, have handed over the advantage to China. Will these factions actually come together even in the slightest? It would have been far more unlikely except for the Covid origination theory discussed at the end.