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Getting China Wrong
The West's strategy of engagement with China has failed. More than three decades of trade and investment with the advanced democracies have left that country far richer and stronger than it would otherwise have been. But growth and development have not caused China's rulers to relax their grip on political power, abandon their mercantilist economic policies, or accept the rules and norms of the existing international system. To the contrary: China today is more repressive at home, more aggressive abroad, and more obviously intent on establishing itself as the world's preponderant power than at any time since the death of Chairman Mao. What went wrong?
Put simply, the democracies underestimated the resilience, resourcefulness, and ruthlessness of the Chinese Communist Party. For far too long, the United States and its allies failed to take seriously the Party's unwavering determination to crush opposition, build national power, and fulfill its ideological and geopolitical ambitions. In this timely and powerfully argued study, Aaron Friedberg identifies the assumptions underpinning engagement, describes the counterstrategy that China's Communist Party rulers devised in order to exploit the West's openness while defeating its plans, and explains what the democracies must do now if they wish to preserve their prosperity, protect their security, and defend their common values.
Put simply, the democracies underestimated the resilience, resourcefulness, and ruthlessness of the Chinese Communist Party. For far too long, the United States and its allies failed to take seriously the Party's unwavering determination to crush opposition, build national power, and fulfill its ideological and geopolitical ambitions. In this timely and powerfully argued study, Aaron Friedberg identifies the assumptions underpinning engagement, describes the counterstrategy that China's Communist Party rulers devised in order to exploit the West's openness while defeating its plans, and explains what the democracies must do now if they wish to preserve their prosperity, protect their security, and defend their common values.
380 pages, Kindle Edition
Published March 14, 2022
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April 14, 2022
My annual intake of reactionary anti-China, pro-US global strategy book turned out to be a novel version of Kennan's "Long Telegram" for the 21st century.
Friedberg thinks that the Western governments underestimated Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) resilience to liberalism. The expectation was that the country would slowly but surely evolve into a liberal, democratic "partner" of the Western alliance. In Marxist jargon we rather call it a dependent society, a neocolony destined to forever supply the imperialist capital with cheap labour power, mid-level engineering, raw materials and a market.
In many senses, Friedberg's book is a requiem for a miserably failed attempt to neocolonise a country that after 40 years of engagement, ironically managed to become a great power itself.
The author's analysis of how the CCP lured the Western capital into a honey trap of lucrative investments and markets, just to gradually transfer the technology, promote growth and shut the Western criticism against its non-liberal methods while keeping the Party’s rule and vision intact, was really interesting.
Friedberg then proceeds to analyse the transformation that China’s domestic and international economic/political strategies underwent in the last 40 years. These chapters are well-researched but contaminated with many pro-imperialist prejudices and a neocolonial gaslighting (“why are the Chinese rulers so aggressive and skeptic towards US, while so far we have been nothing but friendly, democratic, liberal and generous?”) His Kissinger-ish sense of superiority, entitlement and self-legitimacy is terrifying.
The book becomes “red in tooth and claw” in the final chapter. Friedberg says,
He brazenly recommends that China must be represented as “the other against whom [the western] societies must now rally in self-defense” because “strengthening feelings of solidarity and national identity among Americans … will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries”.
Seems like a new “red-scare” is on the making, not only to stop China’s rise but also to oppress the brewing domestic turmoil that the crisis of capitalism is destined to cause.
This is an important book, because I believe the ideas in it have already become a blueprint of the US-led Western alliance’s policies against China, and it will only get worse in the coming years.
Friedberg thinks that the Western governments underestimated Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) resilience to liberalism. The expectation was that the country would slowly but surely evolve into a liberal, democratic "partner" of the Western alliance. In Marxist jargon we rather call it a dependent society, a neocolony destined to forever supply the imperialist capital with cheap labour power, mid-level engineering, raw materials and a market.
In many senses, Friedberg's book is a requiem for a miserably failed attempt to neocolonise a country that after 40 years of engagement, ironically managed to become a great power itself.
The author's analysis of how the CCP lured the Western capital into a honey trap of lucrative investments and markets, just to gradually transfer the technology, promote growth and shut the Western criticism against its non-liberal methods while keeping the Party’s rule and vision intact, was really interesting.
Friedberg then proceeds to analyse the transformation that China’s domestic and international economic/political strategies underwent in the last 40 years. These chapters are well-researched but contaminated with many pro-imperialist prejudices and a neocolonial gaslighting (“why are the Chinese rulers so aggressive and skeptic towards US, while so far we have been nothing but friendly, democratic, liberal and generous?”) His Kissinger-ish sense of superiority, entitlement and self-legitimacy is terrifying.
The book becomes “red in tooth and claw” in the final chapter. Friedberg says,
“The United States and its partners must mobilize their societies for a protracted rivalry with China and harden them against CCP influence operations; partially disengage their economies from China’s while strengthening ties among themselves; intensify military preparations and diplomatic measures to deter coercion or aggressionİ and actively challenge Beijing’s ideological narratives, both in the developing world and, to the extent possible inside China itself.”
He brazenly recommends that China must be represented as “the other against whom [the western] societies must now rally in self-defense” because “strengthening feelings of solidarity and national identity among Americans … will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries”.
Seems like a new “red-scare” is on the making, not only to stop China’s rise but also to oppress the brewing domestic turmoil that the crisis of capitalism is destined to cause.
This is an important book, because I believe the ideas in it have already become a blueprint of the US-led Western alliance’s policies against China, and it will only get worse in the coming years.
October 28, 2022
Friedberg's characterization of Xi Jinping's China as a revisionist state intent on besting the United States and dominating its region is largely valid and uncontroversial. However, a few thoughts throughout caused me to pause or scratch my head at times.
My first reaction when starting this book was that the premise and overall argument seems a little late. That's all well and good. I won't pile on my criticism due to the timing of publication, but others have been making this same exact argument (that engagement with China through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years, failed, and it's time to formulate a new containment strategy or something more assertive to push back on Beijing's revisionist agenda) for years.
But then Friedberg occasionally intersperses other subjective claims like, "China's Communist Party brooks no opposition at home." Come again? There are tens of thousands of protests every year, and Xi Jinping's neo-authoritarianism provokes countless small eruptions of dissent around the country. Just consider the latest highway banners during the 20th Party Congress, and one sees that Friedberg's blanket characterization is an overstatement. Friedberg rightly explains that China's foreign policy has been driven by three factors: insecurity, ambition, and opportunism. However, the book doesn't think critically about how to address that insecurity. He also argues that Beijing is seeking to spread its system around the globe but provides little or no evidence to back this claim up.
Friedberg argues that democracies have been inactive so China's offensive strategy has been successful. If the West does more to check China it could test Beijing's strategic acumen. He implicitly assumes China would not have felt emboldened to take the path it did had the West done more to contain China early on rather than just trust and engage (never mind the hedging bit during the Bush and Obama administrations). However, this neatly overlooks the likelihood that Beijing would have pursued the illiberal model as well as economic and security expansion that it has regardless of western efforts to "contain" China's rise. If anything, attempts at containment would have led to an even more authoritarian and reactionary China on the world stage, and we'd have a more - not less - unstable international order. Friedberg also seems to deliberately ignore the offensive policies already put in place by the Trump administration and continued under President Biden. He goes on: "A power that did not want to expand its presence and influence would be less concerned about being contained." This is both factually uncertain (or at least non-falsifiable) and misleading.
In making his case, Friedberg accuses advocates of engagement of being motivated by personal advancement and characterizes them as "vicious." This is a little far fetched and too much of a generalization. Certainly US businesses and private sector interests have benefited from decades of investment and engagement in China, but that's hardly true of the entire scholarly community - let alone policymakers.
The author concludes that western democracies "have no choice" but to seal off their economies from China's businesses and technology in order to preserve the open rules-based order, their own systems of government, and way of life. That's blatantly false. There is always a choice. Germany and EU policy choices (one notable example being their choice to allow Huawei to operate freely) belie this argument.
Anyways, an educational read, but not without its sweeping generalizations, occasional mischaracterizations or misdiagnoses of the problem and potential solutions.
My first reaction when starting this book was that the premise and overall argument seems a little late. That's all well and good. I won't pile on my criticism due to the timing of publication, but others have been making this same exact argument (that engagement with China through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years, failed, and it's time to formulate a new containment strategy or something more assertive to push back on Beijing's revisionist agenda) for years.
But then Friedberg occasionally intersperses other subjective claims like, "China's Communist Party brooks no opposition at home." Come again? There are tens of thousands of protests every year, and Xi Jinping's neo-authoritarianism provokes countless small eruptions of dissent around the country. Just consider the latest highway banners during the 20th Party Congress, and one sees that Friedberg's blanket characterization is an overstatement. Friedberg rightly explains that China's foreign policy has been driven by three factors: insecurity, ambition, and opportunism. However, the book doesn't think critically about how to address that insecurity. He also argues that Beijing is seeking to spread its system around the globe but provides little or no evidence to back this claim up.
Friedberg argues that democracies have been inactive so China's offensive strategy has been successful. If the West does more to check China it could test Beijing's strategic acumen. He implicitly assumes China would not have felt emboldened to take the path it did had the West done more to contain China early on rather than just trust and engage (never mind the hedging bit during the Bush and Obama administrations). However, this neatly overlooks the likelihood that Beijing would have pursued the illiberal model as well as economic and security expansion that it has regardless of western efforts to "contain" China's rise. If anything, attempts at containment would have led to an even more authoritarian and reactionary China on the world stage, and we'd have a more - not less - unstable international order. Friedberg also seems to deliberately ignore the offensive policies already put in place by the Trump administration and continued under President Biden. He goes on: "A power that did not want to expand its presence and influence would be less concerned about being contained." This is both factually uncertain (or at least non-falsifiable) and misleading.
In making his case, Friedberg accuses advocates of engagement of being motivated by personal advancement and characterizes them as "vicious." This is a little far fetched and too much of a generalization. Certainly US businesses and private sector interests have benefited from decades of investment and engagement in China, but that's hardly true of the entire scholarly community - let alone policymakers.
The author concludes that western democracies "have no choice" but to seal off their economies from China's businesses and technology in order to preserve the open rules-based order, their own systems of government, and way of life. That's blatantly false. There is always a choice. Germany and EU policy choices (one notable example being their choice to allow Huawei to operate freely) belie this argument.
Anyways, an educational read, but not without its sweeping generalizations, occasional mischaracterizations or misdiagnoses of the problem and potential solutions.
December 22, 2022
This book is several books in one. If you have any interest in our developing issues with China and the Communist Party of China - this is a must to read carefully. The first section is a good short history of American foreign policy mega assumptions including the attempts over several generations to link the US political history and the thoughts about improving positions of other nations by linking democratic systems and economic systems. The author does a good job about the naiveté of the proponents of engagement - we did not by putting China into the WTO get them to liberalize either their markets nor their political system. It did not work. As long as the CCP is in control we are not likely to change the assumptions that have driven Chinese leaders for several generations.
But Friedberg also points out some key ideas about what motivates Chinese policy makers. He argues that the regimes over several generations have and continue to be Leninist based systems. But he also argues that several generations of leaders have two significant sets of uneasiness - worrying about why the Soviet Union failed (and how to prevent it) an assumption that life is a set of zero sum games. Both motivate leaders in trying to think about how to counter the those issues and continue to advance the Chinese position in the world. China is a mercantilist system which relies heavily on assumptions that they can power through the uncertainties by locking the country down and by imposing costs for all those entities that want to get into the Chinese market.
Finally the book does a great job of suggesting some new ways to think about how to work with China going forward. He argues that the democracies should figure out ways to contain the Chinese impulses to force technology transfers. The democracies of the world should figure out where they want to confront the Chinese efforts to play on their own field. That will mean we need to think about what points we want to confront the CCP rule but also how we can decouple strategically from China where it is appropriate.
This book is a good counterpoint to Ray Dalio's books which argue that China is the inevitable world power for this century.
But Friedberg also points out some key ideas about what motivates Chinese policy makers. He argues that the regimes over several generations have and continue to be Leninist based systems. But he also argues that several generations of leaders have two significant sets of uneasiness - worrying about why the Soviet Union failed (and how to prevent it) an assumption that life is a set of zero sum games. Both motivate leaders in trying to think about how to counter the those issues and continue to advance the Chinese position in the world. China is a mercantilist system which relies heavily on assumptions that they can power through the uncertainties by locking the country down and by imposing costs for all those entities that want to get into the Chinese market.
Finally the book does a great job of suggesting some new ways to think about how to work with China going forward. He argues that the democracies should figure out ways to contain the Chinese impulses to force technology transfers. The democracies of the world should figure out where they want to confront the Chinese efforts to play on their own field. That will mean we need to think about what points we want to confront the CCP rule but also how we can decouple strategically from China where it is appropriate.
This book is a good counterpoint to Ray Dalio's books which argue that China is the inevitable world power for this century.
June 26, 2025
I was afraid that this book would be too "hawkish" to be informative. In the end I give it 5 stars because it would be one of the shortest book I would recommend to people to get familiar (regardless whether you agree or not) with the concerns of many western countries toward China, and to a lesser extent China's concerns.
It is succinct, well documented, well written. It provides a good history of how the US ( and the west in general) justified its engagement with China and why, in Friedberg's view, it failed. For him, the West always avoided to confront the real nature of China's political system. The key highlight for me was the decoupling of trade and human rights issues with the key decision under Kennedy to maintain China's status of "Most favored nation" despite the event of Tiananmen, and reduction over time of the expectations toward China to further curry favor and bringing China closer into global institutions and trade. This was equivalent to consistently move the goal post of the engagement.
One China's side, they were always steadfast on their overall objectives and ideology, even with reforms and changes. The West never hid its hope and intention that through liberalization, the hold of the CCP on power would eventually lessen and that the country would democratize. This openly acknowledged threat to its position consistently reminded the CCP of the need protect itself from those changes, while still taking advantage of participation in the global order and normalize its use of power by spreading it.
As a result, Friedberg seem to argue that while China's CCP never maintained illusions about the nature of its relationship with the west and worked to retain control, the US and the West didn't maintain coherent expectations from its engagement with China. In his view "Trying to incorporate a mercantilist-Leninist system into an open global economic order, treating it like an aspiring liberal state in the hopes that it would become one, has produced an array of vulnerabilities that the democracies have only recently begun to address.". It did ultimately failed.
One criticism I have would be that by speaking in broadterm, Friedberg's conclusions seems to omit the wider conundrum : how liberal democracies should engage with non liberal countries. But this book is less about the "remedy" than a description of the concerns currently shared by both sides which foster tensions, and how to mitigate the consequences of today.
It is succinct, well documented, well written. It provides a good history of how the US ( and the west in general) justified its engagement with China and why, in Friedberg's view, it failed. For him, the West always avoided to confront the real nature of China's political system. The key highlight for me was the decoupling of trade and human rights issues with the key decision under Kennedy to maintain China's status of "Most favored nation" despite the event of Tiananmen, and reduction over time of the expectations toward China to further curry favor and bringing China closer into global institutions and trade. This was equivalent to consistently move the goal post of the engagement.
One China's side, they were always steadfast on their overall objectives and ideology, even with reforms and changes. The West never hid its hope and intention that through liberalization, the hold of the CCP on power would eventually lessen and that the country would democratize. This openly acknowledged threat to its position consistently reminded the CCP of the need protect itself from those changes, while still taking advantage of participation in the global order and normalize its use of power by spreading it.
As a result, Friedberg seem to argue that while China's CCP never maintained illusions about the nature of its relationship with the west and worked to retain control, the US and the West didn't maintain coherent expectations from its engagement with China. In his view "Trying to incorporate a mercantilist-Leninist system into an open global economic order, treating it like an aspiring liberal state in the hopes that it would become one, has produced an array of vulnerabilities that the democracies have only recently begun to address.". It did ultimately failed.
One criticism I have would be that by speaking in broadterm, Friedberg's conclusions seems to omit the wider conundrum : how liberal democracies should engage with non liberal countries. But this book is less about the "remedy" than a description of the concerns currently shared by both sides which foster tensions, and how to mitigate the consequences of today.
April 21, 2023
To much time for too few ideas. Have you followed China for some time? So no need to read it.
1) The book is not fluid to read. Each idea is repeated multiple times and things that coud be expressed in one word is expressed with three expressions. It looks like the author wants to sound erudite rather than transmitting the ideas.
2) the ideas in the book are good. Basically: engagement seemed right when it was adopted, but the west was slow to understand it was not the adequate solution to deal with China. Now, the west must isolate China and revert engagement. Clear ideas, but it could be summaryzed in a few sentences and not in a book.
3) a lot of ideas and very few examples. If you follow China, you will know everything in there. It looks like written by an American-centric critic with not a lot of different views. The historical part is nice though.
1) The book is not fluid to read. Each idea is repeated multiple times and things that coud be expressed in one word is expressed with three expressions. It looks like the author wants to sound erudite rather than transmitting the ideas.
2) the ideas in the book are good. Basically: engagement seemed right when it was adopted, but the west was slow to understand it was not the adequate solution to deal with China. Now, the west must isolate China and revert engagement. Clear ideas, but it could be summaryzed in a few sentences and not in a book.
3) a lot of ideas and very few examples. If you follow China, you will know everything in there. It looks like written by an American-centric critic with not a lot of different views. The historical part is nice though.
March 6, 2023
The premise of this book is that the general assumption that China would liberalise politically due to deepening economic engagement with the West was wrong, and this should have been seen as early as the late 1980s and certainly after the Tiananmen Square massacre there was no doubt that this was wrong. The decision to keep increasing economic engagement with China after the massacre was purely driven by the greed of the business lobby and political spinelessness in the author’s view.
Friedberg also makes the point throughout that the CPC is a true Leninist party (in a way that the Soviet Politburo was not, at least after Stalin) and seeks to dominate and control every aspect of Chinese Society from the top all the way to the local Boy Scouts and Girl Guides (or whatever the Chinese equivalent is). Therefore absent a significant change in the outlook of the party elites there never was a hope of liberalisation, though he doesn’t criticise people for their early optimism.
The last part of the book sets out a strategy for containment which the author strongly advocates; though Friedberg could do more to make the case, strategically, for why this is necessary. There is an underlying assumption that the US led global liberal world order is a natural good. This part of the book needing more fleshing out in my view. The case is well made however that China is largely malevolent in its foreign policy and the CPC is absolutely malevolent in its domestic activities, but does it follow that everyone wants a US-led world order absent any strategic justification for that? I guess Friedberg is writing for a purely American audience so he doesn’t care too much about what anyone else may think, and I do think that there are good strategic reasons for Australia and other countries to not want Chinese control of the South China Sea and Taiwan, amongst other things, but the case for why is largely assumed.
Interestingly, the book was written before Russia invaded Ukraine (but released after) and contains an argument that we should cooperate with Russia to avoid Russia and China forming an alliance—in my view it’s a massive failure that this never happened and that the US effectively pushed Russia into an alliance with China when we should have allied with Russia against China…I wonder what Friedberg would say now if he could revisit this point.
The book is very USA centric—for example it makes no mention at all of the significant preponderance of China hawks in the Australian Public Service, or any real mention of Australia except in passing; the same with other allies or near allies like India.
Interestingly Friedberg doesn’t advocate full containment (absent a state of war with China) but simply advocates taking aggressive steps to curb Chinese IP theft, and curb Chinese access to certain technologies, but otherwise to keep trading with China whilst rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity. Full engagement or full containment is a false binary point in his view, and I think he is correct in that.
In all, a good book on past mistakes made in respect of China and with some interesting, if brief, thoughts on containing its further rise.
Overall: recommended.
Friedberg also makes the point throughout that the CPC is a true Leninist party (in a way that the Soviet Politburo was not, at least after Stalin) and seeks to dominate and control every aspect of Chinese Society from the top all the way to the local Boy Scouts and Girl Guides (or whatever the Chinese equivalent is). Therefore absent a significant change in the outlook of the party elites there never was a hope of liberalisation, though he doesn’t criticise people for their early optimism.
The last part of the book sets out a strategy for containment which the author strongly advocates; though Friedberg could do more to make the case, strategically, for why this is necessary. There is an underlying assumption that the US led global liberal world order is a natural good. This part of the book needing more fleshing out in my view. The case is well made however that China is largely malevolent in its foreign policy and the CPC is absolutely malevolent in its domestic activities, but does it follow that everyone wants a US-led world order absent any strategic justification for that? I guess Friedberg is writing for a purely American audience so he doesn’t care too much about what anyone else may think, and I do think that there are good strategic reasons for Australia and other countries to not want Chinese control of the South China Sea and Taiwan, amongst other things, but the case for why is largely assumed.
Interestingly, the book was written before Russia invaded Ukraine (but released after) and contains an argument that we should cooperate with Russia to avoid Russia and China forming an alliance—in my view it’s a massive failure that this never happened and that the US effectively pushed Russia into an alliance with China when we should have allied with Russia against China…I wonder what Friedberg would say now if he could revisit this point.
The book is very USA centric—for example it makes no mention at all of the significant preponderance of China hawks in the Australian Public Service, or any real mention of Australia except in passing; the same with other allies or near allies like India.
Interestingly Friedberg doesn’t advocate full containment (absent a state of war with China) but simply advocates taking aggressive steps to curb Chinese IP theft, and curb Chinese access to certain technologies, but otherwise to keep trading with China whilst rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity. Full engagement or full containment is a false binary point in his view, and I think he is correct in that.
In all, a good book on past mistakes made in respect of China and with some interesting, if brief, thoughts on containing its further rise.
Overall: recommended.
January 27, 2024
Friedberg provides a succinct and compelling account of how the U.S. failed to liberalize China’s political and economic systems by granting China’s entrance into the global economy through WTO membership. He gives appropriate credit to the CCP for thwarting liberalization within China as the country’s economy grew wildly. His reference to Deng Xiaoping’s treatment of market forces as a bird in a cage is apt. Indeed, the CCP adroitly yetvruthlessly adjusted the dimensions of the cage to keep the populace employed and just rich enough but no more. It is easy to criticize the U.S. for its naïveté in retrospect, but surely the attempt was not without some success, including economic benefits for U.S. jobs and economic growth globally. What about the lack of conflict between China and the West? All was not lost. And what about the rest of the Western world. Does it also deserve criticism? And, if so, how much and why? His recommendations are all about containing and constraining China, and many are quite good. But what about bringing about real change within China? Surely, the U.S. and other Western countries need to continue to consider new, creative ways to do this. But how? There must be ways to do this that go beyond just finding great leaders to explain the virtues of liberal democracy and market economics, as he posits. Maybe Friedberg can flesh this out in his next book. Hopefully, that book will be equally good.
August 11, 2022
If you read between the lines, there's actually a lot of useful information that can be gleaned about U.S. grand strategy. Forget other reviews.
September 13, 2023
Depressingly optimistic
July 4, 2023
This is a thought-provoking examination of the United States' approach to understanding and engaging with China. Author Aaron Friedberg challenges conventional wisdom and offers a nuanced perspective on various aspects of China's rise as a global power. While the book raises important questions and presents valuable insights, it also has some limitations that must be considered. One of the book's strengths lies in its ability to challenge prevailing narratives about China's intentions and capabilities. Friedberg argues that many policymakers and scholars have underestimated the extent of China's strategic ambitions and the potential risks it poses to global stability. His analysis of China's military modernization, territorial disputes, and political ideology provides a valuable counterpoint to those who downplay these concerns. Friedberg also highlights the shortcomings of engagement policies pursued by the United States and argues for a more robust and cautious approach. He cautions against overreliance on economic interdependence and advocates for maintaining a strong military deterrent to prevent potential aggression. These arguments serve as a reminder that policymakers must carefully balance cooperation with China while safeguarding national interests and values. Despite its merits, "Getting China Wrong" has a few limitations. One notable drawback is Friedberg's somewhat pessimistic view of China's rise. While acknowledging the challenges, he tends to present a somewhat one-sided and static portrayal of China's trajectory. This perspective overlooks the complex dynamics within Chinese society, including the potential for domestic reforms and shifts in its foreign policy approach. Moreover, the book could benefit from a deeper exploration of the economic dimension of U.S.-China relations. While Friedberg acknowledges the economic interdependence between the two countries, he primarily focuses on military and strategic concerns. A more comprehensive analysis of the economic aspects, such as trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, and the potential for economic cooperation, would provide a more well-rounded understanding of the relationship. However, it is important to approach the book with a critical eye. While Friedberg raises crucial questions, his perspective could benefit from a more comprehensive analysis that accounts for the dynamic nature of China's development. Additionally, a deeper exploration of economic dimensions would enhance the book's overall balance.
December 11, 2022
This work from Professor Friedberg was a concise audiobook to listen to and a clear reminder of the shortfalls of American engagement in the Sino-U.S. relationship that has produced the current state of affairs that finds bilateral relations at one of their lowest points in decades. Where President Xi's decade of rule moved placidly into his third five-year term following an amendment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Constitution, the 20th Party Congress also saw the very public removal of his predecessor, Hu Jintao, from the Congress which sent quite a message. Professor Friedberg describes how a policy of engagement as the Cold War wound down was always a gamble where the odds were always very long. In the present moment criticism of those firms who lobbied for Beijing to be granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status from sectors such as aerospace, energy, and the automotive industry are a well worn argument with projections that never materialized, but it is interesting to read some of the expectations leaders at the time had for the impact on China. In a March 2020 speech President Clinton supported the People's Republic of China's (PRC) entry into the W.T.O. by describing the moment as "the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970's." While in the U.S. there has been a growing consensus on the challenge that the PRC represents, enacting his recommendation that the United States, its allies, and its partners mobilize their societies for an enduring strategic competition with Beijing remains elusive in an era of sharply divided U.S. domestic politics.
January 16, 2023
Getting China Wrong by Aaron Friedberg is a good book, but it is for a more general, policy-based audience. His previous book about the contest for supremacy was prescient, showing foresight and comprehensive understanding. This work is a summary of the modern Sino-American relationship and where engagement went wrong. One might even say it is an "I told you so," if you squint a little. Odds are, if you are a close follower of the decay in the bilateral relationship, this book will not tell you much that is new. I would have preferred a bit more meat on the bone. Still, if you're thinking about a book to give a staffer, this is short, thorough, and to the point enough that this would probably be a near top choice for someone wanting to get up to speed on the new consensus view in Washington.
January 5, 2023
A succinct and comprehensive report of the history of the policy of "engagement" between the PRC and the West. A great read to get caught up to speed on the current nature of the relationship between the PRC and the liberal world, and what the future holds.
August 16, 2023
The title is unfortunate, given that the analysis is astute and succinct. Well worth reading for its astute analysis. There are limitations to his proposed solutions, but this is the weakness of most books analyzing contemporary China.
October 8, 2023
Of the many books on US / China foreign policy. This book is one of the finest that outlines the history of how both countries got here and how things might play out. And it is done in under 200pages.
August 9, 2022
I would hope all of our political and military leaders have read this important book.
July 24, 2023
Very interesting.
Why has China not liberalized?
This book tries to answer that.
Why has China not liberalized?
This book tries to answer that.
May 21, 2025
If you are interested in global politics and China
March 21, 2023
A good summary of the West’s relations with China and how China was able to achieve astonishing economic growth over the recent decades but did not not thoroughly adopt classically liberal values in the process as was anticipated. There’s a lot to say here, but if I’m to leave one comment, I’ll say that I disagree in part with Friedberg’s closing suggestions regarding how to maintain the balance of power in favor of the West amidst an increasingly rivalrous dynamic. I think he should have placed heavier emphasis on the need for the West to sort out its own sociological problems that are leading to the decay of its institutions. How ironic will it be if the West can't maintain its own prosperity and economic growth without an erosion of liberal values.. and that's probably what China is thinking.
December 22, 2024
This is a detailed history of US-China relations that makes the case for a more aggressive posture. It says that engagement has failed and that we (the US) should crack down on China's IP theft, geopolitical positioning, etc. It's a bit hawkish for my taste, in part bc I'm not convinced of the idea that China has ambitions to export its political model.
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