Using an eclectic mix of battles and campaigns, Freedman drives home the point that effective command is difficult,, problematic, and hostage to a vari3ety of often conflicting factors and influences – political, military, strategic, tactical, individual. Egos, competences, preconceived ideas, ideologies – not to mention actual realities on the ground – all come into play, positively, more often negatively. Starting in Korea with the dismissal of MacArthur, and proceeding into the modern day with the campaigns against ISIS inside Syria, Freedman lays out a tapestry of examples of command successes (some) and difficulties, if not outright failures (most). The best part of the book is just that – a reacquaintance with a series of conflicts, in brief, across the years from Korea to now. The Congo, Kosovo, Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Chechnya... and more. I found his brief recaps of the conflicts, coupled with perceptive insights into the personalities, the realities and the contexts in which they occurred, to be very interesting. His diagnoses of command issues are astute, although often obvious, and the book is mostly observational in content, not prescriptive or instructive for those looking to avoid command failures in the future. However, as a guide to understanding what went specifically wrong in each of his selected examples of conflicts, it is excellent.