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A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps #5
Classical Indian Philosophy
Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri present a lively introduction to one of the world's richest intellectual the philosophy of classical India. They begin with the earliest extant literature, the Vedas, and the explanatory works that these inspired, known as Upaniṣads. They also discuss other famous texts of classical Vedic culture, especially the Mahābhārata and its most notable section, the Bhagavad-Gīta , alongside the rise of Buddhism and Jainism. In this opening section, Adamson and Ganeri emphasize the way that philosophy was practiced as a form of life in search of liberation from suffering.
Next, the pair move on to the explosion of philosophical speculation devoted to foundational texts called 'sutras,' discussing such traditions as the logical and epistemological Nyd=aya school, the monism of Advaita Vedānta, and the spiritual discipline of Yoga.
In the final section of the book, they chart further developments within Buddhism, highlighting Nagārjuna's radical critique of 'non-dependent' concepts and the no-self philosophy of mind found in authors like Dignāga, and within Jainism, focusing especially on its 'standpoint' epistemology. Unlike other introductions that cover the main schools and positions in classical Indian philosophy, Adamson and Ganeri's lively guide also pays attention to philosophical themes such as non-violence, political authority, and the status of women, while considering textual traditions typically left out of overviews of Indian thought, like the Cārvāka school, Tantra, and aesthetic theory as well.
Adamson and Ganeri conclude by focusing on the much-debated question of whether Indian philosophy may have influenced ancient Greek philosophy and, from there, evaluate the impact that this area of philosophy had on later Western thought.
Next, the pair move on to the explosion of philosophical speculation devoted to foundational texts called 'sutras,' discussing such traditions as the logical and epistemological Nyd=aya school, the monism of Advaita Vedānta, and the spiritual discipline of Yoga.
In the final section of the book, they chart further developments within Buddhism, highlighting Nagārjuna's radical critique of 'non-dependent' concepts and the no-self philosophy of mind found in authors like Dignāga, and within Jainism, focusing especially on its 'standpoint' epistemology. Unlike other introductions that cover the main schools and positions in classical Indian philosophy, Adamson and Ganeri's lively guide also pays attention to philosophical themes such as non-violence, political authority, and the status of women, while considering textual traditions typically left out of overviews of Indian thought, like the Cārvāka school, Tantra, and aesthetic theory as well.
Adamson and Ganeri conclude by focusing on the much-debated question of whether Indian philosophy may have influenced ancient Greek philosophy and, from there, evaluate the impact that this area of philosophy had on later Western thought.
432 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2020
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868 people want to read
About the author
Peter S. Adamson
30 books127 followersPeter Scott Adamson is an American academic who is professor of philosophy in late antiquity and in the Islamic world at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich as well as professor of ancient and medieval philosophy at Kings College London.
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
May 4, 2020
Here it is, another gem from the History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps series, this time focusing on a tradition that (arguably) didn't emerge from what the Western and Islamic worlds consider "classical" philosophy. As usual, Peter Adamson (joined here by Jonardon Ganeri) makes abstruse subjects comprehensible to a puny intellect like mine. Some reviewers gripe about Adamson's puns and jokes, but I think they're a useful pedagogical tool, a kind of verbal wink that says, "You too can understand this" and "If you think this philosophical position sounds strange...you're right!" The corresponding podcast is great, but with topics this heavy, my brain finds it most useful to move slowly through words on a page.
I can't really do this huge topic justice, so please forgive in advance the broad strokes. First came the canonical Vedas, with their emphasis upon religious sacrifices. Then came the Upanishads, essentially commentary upon the Vedas, contributing an interest in the self (atman) and its relation to, even identity with, the cosmos (brahman). These, along with epics like the Mahabharata and its most famous section, the Bhagavad Gita, as well as seminal works of grammar and medicine, form the intellectual raw material out of which several orthodox schools arose. Each school was anchored in a work of aphorisms, or sutras, which invited elaboration in subsequent commentaries: hence, this period is known as the "age of the sutra." All of the schools adhered to philosophies of "path and purpose," offering followers a way out of the inevitable suffering of life. But the Vedic schools weren't the only game in town: a more ascetic srmana movement, primarily consisting of Buddhism, Jainism, and Ajivika, denied the efficacy of ritual and the existence of an unchanging atman and offered their own solution to the problem of suffering. Once these groups began writing in the same language as their Vedic counterparts, Sanskrit, an era of contention and debate was inaugurated. With the revolutionary thought of the Buddhist Dignaga, as interpreted by Dharmakirti, an age of intellectual borrowing commenced. This is where the narrative trails off, but the authors give us hope that another volume may be on the way.
If you were to ask a classical Indian sage from one of the Vedic schools a big philosophical question, say, about the existence of God or the origin of the universe, you'd probably get a yes or no answer, depending upon the school's particular tenets. If you asked a classical Buddhist, you might get silence, since Buddhism views certain questions as misleading or inappropriate. And if you asked a Jain, you could expect a yes and no answer (!), since Jains believe that many perspectives make up the truth. Interesting, no?
The details of the philosophical positions are the meat of this book, so please go and read it. Adamson mentions that a totally different perspective from a different culture can be as eye-opening and thought-clarifying as when we find a clear parallel between the Indian and "classical" traditions. So either way, you'll win. :)
I can't really do this huge topic justice, so please forgive in advance the broad strokes. First came the canonical Vedas, with their emphasis upon religious sacrifices. Then came the Upanishads, essentially commentary upon the Vedas, contributing an interest in the self (atman) and its relation to, even identity with, the cosmos (brahman). These, along with epics like the Mahabharata and its most famous section, the Bhagavad Gita, as well as seminal works of grammar and medicine, form the intellectual raw material out of which several orthodox schools arose. Each school was anchored in a work of aphorisms, or sutras, which invited elaboration in subsequent commentaries: hence, this period is known as the "age of the sutra." All of the schools adhered to philosophies of "path and purpose," offering followers a way out of the inevitable suffering of life. But the Vedic schools weren't the only game in town: a more ascetic srmana movement, primarily consisting of Buddhism, Jainism, and Ajivika, denied the efficacy of ritual and the existence of an unchanging atman and offered their own solution to the problem of suffering. Once these groups began writing in the same language as their Vedic counterparts, Sanskrit, an era of contention and debate was inaugurated. With the revolutionary thought of the Buddhist Dignaga, as interpreted by Dharmakirti, an age of intellectual borrowing commenced. This is where the narrative trails off, but the authors give us hope that another volume may be on the way.
If you were to ask a classical Indian sage from one of the Vedic schools a big philosophical question, say, about the existence of God or the origin of the universe, you'd probably get a yes or no answer, depending upon the school's particular tenets. If you asked a classical Buddhist, you might get silence, since Buddhism views certain questions as misleading or inappropriate. And if you asked a Jain, you could expect a yes and no answer (!), since Jains believe that many perspectives make up the truth. Interesting, no?
The details of the philosophical positions are the meat of this book, so please go and read it. Adamson mentions that a totally different perspective from a different culture can be as eye-opening and thought-clarifying as when we find a clear parallel between the Indian and "classical" traditions. So either way, you'll win. :)
March 24, 2023
Fifth volume of the ongoing "History of philosophy without any gaps" series that is the brainchild of the excellent Peter Adamson (also check the podcast by the same title!). The book is a comprehensive exploration of the first millennium and a half of documented philosophical thought in India, an impressive feat by any standards. The three major traditions, which constantly fed back into each other throughout that period, were the Vedic, Buddhist, and Jainist ones. They all began as we today call philosophies of life, analogous to Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism and so forth in the Greco-Roman tradition. Afterwards, the scope of philosophical inquiry expanded to include language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, among others. The book, co-written by Jonardon Ganeri, concludes with three highly informative chapters, respectively on Indian influence on Greek thought (though, strangely, the authors don't consider that such influence could have gone both ways), Indian influence on Islamic and European thought (again, with little attention to the flow also going the other way), and a preview of what happened after the period covered by this volume, which ends with the Buddhist scholar Dignāga, who lived between the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th century. A must read if you have any interest in Indian philosophy. Which of course you should!
August 18, 2021
Loved this book. Exactly what I was looking as an overview / introduction to Indian philosophy.
As a reader and lover philosophy, I felt I've read so much western philosophy, even eastern (Tao Te Ching, Art of War, Li Chi: Book of Rights), I felt like I need more South Asian (beyond the Bhagavad Gita) philosophy.
From the start, the book mentions the title is a misnomer as much of "Indian Philosophy" was developed before philosophy was really even a word. Many of the texts, cultures, traditions, were being passed on before The Republic was even written. The authors do a good job laying out a groundwork and evolution of important Indian texts and their meanings / implications over time.
A great read if you're looking for a jumping off point for Indian "philosophy".
As a reader and lover philosophy, I felt I've read so much western philosophy, even eastern (Tao Te Ching, Art of War, Li Chi: Book of Rights), I felt like I need more South Asian (beyond the Bhagavad Gita) philosophy.
From the start, the book mentions the title is a misnomer as much of "Indian Philosophy" was developed before philosophy was really even a word. Many of the texts, cultures, traditions, were being passed on before The Republic was even written. The authors do a good job laying out a groundwork and evolution of important Indian texts and their meanings / implications over time.
A great read if you're looking for a jumping off point for Indian "philosophy".
August 23, 2020
Informative and amusing
It's a good read. I got a better overall picture of Indian Philosophy, though definitely felt I'd only skimmed the surface of the many subjects dealt with. That's to be expected in a single book. Concepts are explained in interesting and amusing ways. I liked the references to modern cultural phenomena, which scattered humour throughout the book.
It's a good read. I got a better overall picture of Indian Philosophy, though definitely felt I'd only skimmed the surface of the many subjects dealt with. That's to be expected in a single book. Concepts are explained in interesting and amusing ways. I liked the references to modern cultural phenomena, which scattered humour throughout the book.
February 10, 2026
The tone is aimed at teenagers, in a world where no teenager is going to read (this). The jokes are cringe, but one landed contiguously: Like the United States, Gautama has a friendly neighbor in the shape of Kaṇāda. Overall, good historian and bad logician, everything Nyaya/Vaisesika/Madhyamaka related is terrible.
Notes
An̄vık̄ṣikı - method of rational investigation
Panini’s Ashtadhyayi were sutras - short aphorisms meant to be memorized, later grammarians add vartikkas (supplementary comments deemed to be absent) and bhasya (detailed exegesis that unfold the teaching - Patanjali’s Mahabhasya - to explain but sometimes challenge).
Central role not for subject/predicate but for action. Nouns as contributory factors for the action - six case roles (declension): agent, patient (recipient/object), instrument, donor, target, locus.
Buddhist departure from Vedic atman (permanent persistent entity) through impermanent aggregates or khandas - but then postulation of an underlying subject (of rebirth) pudgala in the pudgala-vada school.
The habit of pairing sutra and bhasya (commentary) is so deeply ingrained that a single author might write both. A good bhasya weaves the threads of the sutra into a unified conceptual web, called the tantra - warp.
Sutras not as canonical, but the oldest surviving texts that came to be recognized as canonical - compilations of earlier lost literature.
Gautama’s Nyaya-sutra: all knowledge based on 3 sources: perception, inference, and testimony.
2 branches of Mimamsa: Jaimini’s Mimamsa-sutra (investigation into ritual, dharma) and Badrayana’s Vedanta-sutra aka Brahma sutra (investigation of brahman, self) 400BC. 700AD split into rival factions of 2 interpreters: Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara Misra. Jaimini - there is no duty to perform Vedic rites, without the desire to perform it (codana) the ritual does not apply. What has ultimate value is the ritual, which uses the human agent.
The Veda has no author, only compilers/transmitters. A human can never be conduit between god and man, only a conduit between the past and the future.
Though Vedanta-sutra doubles as philosophical cosmology and exegesis of Upanishads, more Upanishads are concurrently produced during this period, so it is focused mainly on the Chandogya and Brihadaranyakas. It rarely identifies the Upanishad being explained, a single keyword is all the clue we are given, hence the need for commentaries
In both sutras, Jaimini and Badarayana are in dialogue, but in Mimamsa sutra, Jaimini gets the last word/triump, in Vedanta sutra Badarayana.
Split within Mimamsa on the permanence of language - Kumarila’s abhitanvaya-vada (theory of connection of what has been expressed - word has an inherent meaning that is modified by connection in a sentence) vs Prabhakara’s anvitabhadana-vada (theory of expression through what has been connected - no meaning until connected in a sentence).
The 4 kinds of statement in the veda - codana (injunction), mantra, statement that indicates a name, and commendation of the goal to pursued in ritual.
A full millennium after Panini, Bhartrhari in 500s AD writes exegesis on grammar vakyapadiya (treatise on words and sentences), elevating grammar to door to liberation - study of language is just philosophy. Meaning, sphota, is not subject to time, only the verbal utterances need to be spoken one word after the other whereas meaning is represented in the mind all at once.
Just as individual giraffes both divide, and are one with, the universal ‘giraffe’, so do all universals divide while being one with, the brahman.
Samkhya, meaning counting or enumeration, loves numbers - 25 tattvas (principles) that constitute self/cosmos, eight bhavas (tendencies) that guide human behavior, and fifty types of results (5 misunderstandings, 9 contentments etc) in the lists of Isvarakrsna’s samkhya karika (verse, not sutra), one of the oldest of the vedas - Mahabharata says Yoga and Samkhya share a single teaching.
Samkhya, in contrast with vedanta brahmin, is dualist, purusha (witnesses, remains inactive) and prakrti (unintelligent, ever-developing complex transformation) - a blind man cooperating with a lame man. The other 23 tattvas are evolutes, modifications of these 2. The 3 forces of change responsible for evolution of things from prakrti (gunas). The immediate product of prakrti is buddhi (intellect) - acquires a sense of identity (ahamkara) - thinking mind (manas)
3 kinds of debate - vada (honest debate to ascertain the truth), jalpa (tricky debate to defeat the opponent at all costs), vitanda (refute doctrine without putting forth any positive claim - Nagarjuna’s general skepticism).
7 ingredients of vada: samsaya (doubt that launches investigation), prayojana (purpose for inquiry), siddhanta (background principles), drstanta (empirical data - the facts), five-limbed argumentation (1. Thesis to be proved: There is fire 2. Reason: I see smoke; 3. Universal: there is always fire with smoke; 4: There is smoke 5. Hence there is fire).
Uddyatokara’s commentary on Vatsyayana’s commentary on Gautama’s nyayasutra - 6 types of perceptual connection: 1. I see a pot 2. Its blue color (something that inheres in the object) 3. Blueness (universality of that which inheres) 4,5 are dubiously explained. 6 is connection between object and absence - perceiving there is no pot
Gautama vs Buddhist insistence that there are no whole-entities, only collections of parts (Nagasena argues in Milinda–panha, there is no chariot, only its parts) - skandhas: there is indeed a whole, like a universal giraffe that is present in, or inheres in each of its parts.
The Sanskrit term for “fallacy” is hetvab̄has̄a, that has merely the appearance of being a sign.
Gautama’s five fallacies the deviating (savyabhicar̄a - not universal) the incoherent (viruddha - doesn’t account for exceptions), the indecisive (prakaraṇasama - withhold judgment if both cases are possible), the same predicament (sad̄hyasama - sign is not distinguished from the signifier), and the mistimed(kal̄at̄ıt̄a -
Sankara dismisses the Vaisesikas as semi-niihlists ardhavainas̄íkas - for their atomism: classifying reality. Kanada’s master-list has 6 items: substance (dravya - including atoms, akasha, time, 5 elements bhutas), quality (guna), motion (karma), universals (samanya, jati), distinguisher (visesa - principle of individuation), inherence (samavaya).
Vaisesikas interested in the question of how wholes relate to the parts of which they are made - an owl is real even if it is made of atoms, but different from the atoms - inherence.
Carvaka theory of mind emergentism - middle ground between idealism and materialism: like two stones rubbed together produces spark, that becomes a fire giving heat, not a simple byproduct of stone.
Vasubandhu writes abhidharma-kosa commentary during his Sarvastivada days, then influenced by brother Asanga towards Mahayana, writes a commentary on his commentary arguing against it. Samghabhadra then writes commentary defending his original commentary against his new one.
2 schools of Mahayana - Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka (sunyata from dependent origination. Middle between permanence of things and non existence), and Vasubandhu/Asanga’s Yogacara, a complement to madhyamaka, focusing on spiritual practices .
Sunyata’s connection with zero not as nothing, but as a placeholder, like in 307 - no absolute value, but from relative position to something else.
Nagarjuna on motion (all points on the line of motion are either not-yet-traversed or to-be-traversed) recalls his rival peer Gautama’s theory of time (past and future don’t exist, and the present has no duration - merely a dividing point between past and future).
Unlike Vedics who defended single point of view concerning soul/liberation, and unlike Buddhists who rejected this as incoherent, the jains accepted all points of view - anekan̄tavad̄a - the theory of standpoints, the teaching of non-onesidedness.
Buddhist tradition mentions 10 Qs the Buddha refused to answer - avyak̄ṛta - as if asking where does a flame go when extinguished - instead pointing out presupposition of Q is faulty. Mahavira chose to answer 3rd and 4th - is world finite or infinite, finite in size but infinite in time and properties. Soul is eternal, but also not-eternal because it reincarnates, changing form.
Vasubandhu’s radical non-duality: 3 kinds of independent nature (svabhava) - 1. Constructed (parakalpita - things in external environment), 2. Interdependent (parantara - an act fo sight and that which is seen), 3. Perfected (parinispanna - even the mind is not an object of itself).
Buddhaghosa’s major revision of ancient Buddhist theory (a sixth sense of mind, with its own physical basis - the heart-base hadaya-vatthu) - mind is not another sense faculty but a range of functions associated with sensory perception: 4 types 1. King’s attendant who allows objects to reach the king 2. Receiving without classifying 3. Classification 4. Organization and unification
Dharmakirti’s types of reason that link properties: 1. karya-hetu that links cause and effect 2. Svabhava-hetu, the essence of a thing, identity 3. Anupalabdhi hetu non-observation, reason by counter-factual
Nyaya theory - the mind performs the function of inner apperception, anuvyavasaya, so it becomes aware of the perception that the sense organ is picking up. Awareness is a second order phenomenon. Dignaga counters this with svapaksha view (self-illumination), reflexive awareness which is built into the perception itself. As a phenomenalist, he says we don’t perceive outer objects, but internal representations of them, and awareness of this representation is part of the perception.
Difference between rasa and emotion: the poet feels an emotion (bhava), then represented by actors through good dramatical technique (bhavayan), which arouses rasa.
Notes
An̄vık̄ṣikı - method of rational investigation
Panini’s Ashtadhyayi were sutras - short aphorisms meant to be memorized, later grammarians add vartikkas (supplementary comments deemed to be absent) and bhasya (detailed exegesis that unfold the teaching - Patanjali’s Mahabhasya - to explain but sometimes challenge).
Central role not for subject/predicate but for action. Nouns as contributory factors for the action - six case roles (declension): agent, patient (recipient/object), instrument, donor, target, locus.
Buddhist departure from Vedic atman (permanent persistent entity) through impermanent aggregates or khandas - but then postulation of an underlying subject (of rebirth) pudgala in the pudgala-vada school.
The habit of pairing sutra and bhasya (commentary) is so deeply ingrained that a single author might write both. A good bhasya weaves the threads of the sutra into a unified conceptual web, called the tantra - warp.
Sutras not as canonical, but the oldest surviving texts that came to be recognized as canonical - compilations of earlier lost literature.
Gautama’s Nyaya-sutra: all knowledge based on 3 sources: perception, inference, and testimony.
2 branches of Mimamsa: Jaimini’s Mimamsa-sutra (investigation into ritual, dharma) and Badrayana’s Vedanta-sutra aka Brahma sutra (investigation of brahman, self) 400BC. 700AD split into rival factions of 2 interpreters: Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara Misra. Jaimini - there is no duty to perform Vedic rites, without the desire to perform it (codana) the ritual does not apply. What has ultimate value is the ritual, which uses the human agent.
The Veda has no author, only compilers/transmitters. A human can never be conduit between god and man, only a conduit between the past and the future.
Though Vedanta-sutra doubles as philosophical cosmology and exegesis of Upanishads, more Upanishads are concurrently produced during this period, so it is focused mainly on the Chandogya and Brihadaranyakas. It rarely identifies the Upanishad being explained, a single keyword is all the clue we are given, hence the need for commentaries
In both sutras, Jaimini and Badarayana are in dialogue, but in Mimamsa sutra, Jaimini gets the last word/triump, in Vedanta sutra Badarayana.
Split within Mimamsa on the permanence of language - Kumarila’s abhitanvaya-vada (theory of connection of what has been expressed - word has an inherent meaning that is modified by connection in a sentence) vs Prabhakara’s anvitabhadana-vada (theory of expression through what has been connected - no meaning until connected in a sentence).
The 4 kinds of statement in the veda - codana (injunction), mantra, statement that indicates a name, and commendation of the goal to pursued in ritual.
A full millennium after Panini, Bhartrhari in 500s AD writes exegesis on grammar vakyapadiya (treatise on words and sentences), elevating grammar to door to liberation - study of language is just philosophy. Meaning, sphota, is not subject to time, only the verbal utterances need to be spoken one word after the other whereas meaning is represented in the mind all at once.
Just as individual giraffes both divide, and are one with, the universal ‘giraffe’, so do all universals divide while being one with, the brahman.
Samkhya, meaning counting or enumeration, loves numbers - 25 tattvas (principles) that constitute self/cosmos, eight bhavas (tendencies) that guide human behavior, and fifty types of results (5 misunderstandings, 9 contentments etc) in the lists of Isvarakrsna’s samkhya karika (verse, not sutra), one of the oldest of the vedas - Mahabharata says Yoga and Samkhya share a single teaching.
Samkhya, in contrast with vedanta brahmin, is dualist, purusha (witnesses, remains inactive) and prakrti (unintelligent, ever-developing complex transformation) - a blind man cooperating with a lame man. The other 23 tattvas are evolutes, modifications of these 2. The 3 forces of change responsible for evolution of things from prakrti (gunas). The immediate product of prakrti is buddhi (intellect) - acquires a sense of identity (ahamkara) - thinking mind (manas)
3 kinds of debate - vada (honest debate to ascertain the truth), jalpa (tricky debate to defeat the opponent at all costs), vitanda (refute doctrine without putting forth any positive claim - Nagarjuna’s general skepticism).
7 ingredients of vada: samsaya (doubt that launches investigation), prayojana (purpose for inquiry), siddhanta (background principles), drstanta (empirical data - the facts), five-limbed argumentation (1. Thesis to be proved: There is fire 2. Reason: I see smoke; 3. Universal: there is always fire with smoke; 4: There is smoke 5. Hence there is fire).
Uddyatokara’s commentary on Vatsyayana’s commentary on Gautama’s nyayasutra - 6 types of perceptual connection: 1. I see a pot 2. Its blue color (something that inheres in the object) 3. Blueness (universality of that which inheres) 4,5 are dubiously explained. 6 is connection between object and absence - perceiving there is no pot
Gautama vs Buddhist insistence that there are no whole-entities, only collections of parts (Nagasena argues in Milinda–panha, there is no chariot, only its parts) - skandhas: there is indeed a whole, like a universal giraffe that is present in, or inheres in each of its parts.
The Sanskrit term for “fallacy” is hetvab̄has̄a, that has merely the appearance of being a sign.
Gautama’s five fallacies the deviating (savyabhicar̄a - not universal) the incoherent (viruddha - doesn’t account for exceptions), the indecisive (prakaraṇasama - withhold judgment if both cases are possible), the same predicament (sad̄hyasama - sign is not distinguished from the signifier), and the mistimed(kal̄at̄ıt̄a -
Sankara dismisses the Vaisesikas as semi-niihlists ardhavainas̄íkas - for their atomism: classifying reality. Kanada’s master-list has 6 items: substance (dravya - including atoms, akasha, time, 5 elements bhutas), quality (guna), motion (karma), universals (samanya, jati), distinguisher (visesa - principle of individuation), inherence (samavaya).
Vaisesikas interested in the question of how wholes relate to the parts of which they are made - an owl is real even if it is made of atoms, but different from the atoms - inherence.
Carvaka theory of mind emergentism - middle ground between idealism and materialism: like two stones rubbed together produces spark, that becomes a fire giving heat, not a simple byproduct of stone.
Vasubandhu writes abhidharma-kosa commentary during his Sarvastivada days, then influenced by brother Asanga towards Mahayana, writes a commentary on his commentary arguing against it. Samghabhadra then writes commentary defending his original commentary against his new one.
2 schools of Mahayana - Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka (sunyata from dependent origination. Middle between permanence of things and non existence), and Vasubandhu/Asanga’s Yogacara, a complement to madhyamaka, focusing on spiritual practices .
Sunyata’s connection with zero not as nothing, but as a placeholder, like in 307 - no absolute value, but from relative position to something else.
Nagarjuna on motion (all points on the line of motion are either not-yet-traversed or to-be-traversed) recalls his rival peer Gautama’s theory of time (past and future don’t exist, and the present has no duration - merely a dividing point between past and future).
Unlike Vedics who defended single point of view concerning soul/liberation, and unlike Buddhists who rejected this as incoherent, the jains accepted all points of view - anekan̄tavad̄a - the theory of standpoints, the teaching of non-onesidedness.
Buddhist tradition mentions 10 Qs the Buddha refused to answer - avyak̄ṛta - as if asking where does a flame go when extinguished - instead pointing out presupposition of Q is faulty. Mahavira chose to answer 3rd and 4th - is world finite or infinite, finite in size but infinite in time and properties. Soul is eternal, but also not-eternal because it reincarnates, changing form.
Vasubandhu’s radical non-duality: 3 kinds of independent nature (svabhava) - 1. Constructed (parakalpita - things in external environment), 2. Interdependent (parantara - an act fo sight and that which is seen), 3. Perfected (parinispanna - even the mind is not an object of itself).
Buddhaghosa’s major revision of ancient Buddhist theory (a sixth sense of mind, with its own physical basis - the heart-base hadaya-vatthu) - mind is not another sense faculty but a range of functions associated with sensory perception: 4 types 1. King’s attendant who allows objects to reach the king 2. Receiving without classifying 3. Classification 4. Organization and unification
Dharmakirti’s types of reason that link properties: 1. karya-hetu that links cause and effect 2. Svabhava-hetu, the essence of a thing, identity 3. Anupalabdhi hetu non-observation, reason by counter-factual
Nyaya theory - the mind performs the function of inner apperception, anuvyavasaya, so it becomes aware of the perception that the sense organ is picking up. Awareness is a second order phenomenon. Dignaga counters this with svapaksha view (self-illumination), reflexive awareness which is built into the perception itself. As a phenomenalist, he says we don’t perceive outer objects, but internal representations of them, and awareness of this representation is part of the perception.
Difference between rasa and emotion: the poet feels an emotion (bhava), then represented by actors through good dramatical technique (bhavayan), which arouses rasa.
June 16, 2020
While they are views from a Western perspective, it was an enjoyable read. A good, well researched introduction to the varied philosophies of India.
June 26, 2022
After reading the fifth entry of this series I was conflicted about the rating.
One the one hand it's a well-written, accessible and valuable member of the series. I think it continues to strike the right balance between accessibility and philosophical technicality.
As such I think that's worth 4-stars.
On the other hand, I found getting through this book a real slog.
Perhaps this was because there were so many unusual names of people and the numerous groups of thinkers; although, it's worth noting that it's similar in that sense to the 'Arabic philosophy' book in the series which I didn't find nearly as tiresome.
Another source of discontent was likely the fact that a fairly large amount of the material concerns (or has at its origin) peculiarities of Sanskrit.
The second issue was that I found some of the assessments to be beyond charitable.
I had started to write-up the examples but found that they did not inspire motivation to do so, which says something about the content. Instead I'll list a few page numbers as examples: 270, 272, 331.
Again, I was disappointed that the paper used for the printing wasn't the same as the first 3 books in the series and felt to have less perceived-value.
One the one hand it's a well-written, accessible and valuable member of the series. I think it continues to strike the right balance between accessibility and philosophical technicality.
As such I think that's worth 4-stars.
On the other hand, I found getting through this book a real slog.
Perhaps this was because there were so many unusual names of people and the numerous groups of thinkers; although, it's worth noting that it's similar in that sense to the 'Arabic philosophy' book in the series which I didn't find nearly as tiresome.
Another source of discontent was likely the fact that a fairly large amount of the material concerns (or has at its origin) peculiarities of Sanskrit.
The second issue was that I found some of the assessments to be beyond charitable.
I had started to write-up the examples but found that they did not inspire motivation to do so, which says something about the content. Instead I'll list a few page numbers as examples: 270, 272, 331.
Again, I was disappointed that the paper used for the printing wasn't the same as the first 3 books in the series and felt to have less perceived-value.
November 13, 2021
very detailed, worth a quick read
An interesting summary of a thousand years or so of successive series of individuals and schools and movements arguing at each other over ontology, epistemology, logic, semantics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethics. Rich traditions. Too much to ever learn in any real detail. And occurring In the overall context of competing brahmanic/Vedic, Buddhist, and Jain ‘religious’ traditions. Where as I understand it the emphasis at least initially was on certain real/enlightened experiences which supposedly go beyond the incessant prattle of thoughts and words. But what would I know. I guess the monks had to have something to squabble about. And with which to distinguish themselves from each other. From a distance the distinctions seem thin bordering on vacuous. But At least they didn’t go to war with each other over who had the best imaginary friend. God. Whatever. Or at least I don’t think they did.
An interesting summary of a thousand years or so of successive series of individuals and schools and movements arguing at each other over ontology, epistemology, logic, semantics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethics. Rich traditions. Too much to ever learn in any real detail. And occurring In the overall context of competing brahmanic/Vedic, Buddhist, and Jain ‘religious’ traditions. Where as I understand it the emphasis at least initially was on certain real/enlightened experiences which supposedly go beyond the incessant prattle of thoughts and words. But what would I know. I guess the monks had to have something to squabble about. And with which to distinguish themselves from each other. From a distance the distinctions seem thin bordering on vacuous. But At least they didn’t go to war with each other over who had the best imaginary friend. God. Whatever. Or at least I don’t think they did.
October 14, 2020
ما هو النشاط الفلسفي المركزي؟ حسنًا ، ربما يكون النشاط الفلسفي الأكثر شيوعًا هو كتابة مقال لصف الفلسفة في وقت متأخر من الليل . ثم هناك نشر كتب ومقالات حول هذا الموضوع ، والتي يميل الأكاديميون المحترفون إلى القيام بها . لكن الممارسة الأساسية للفلسفة لا تحتاج إلى تضمين الكتابة على الإطلاق. إنه حوار : تبادل هادئ وصريح للأفكار والحجج والأمثلة والأمثلة المضادة. أن تكون فيلسوفًا ، أي أن تكون مستعدًا بل ومتلهفًا لاختبار وجهة نظرك ضد وجهات النظر المتنافسة ، وإخضاع نظرياتك للدحض وتلبية هذا التفنيد بدفاع مدروس جيدًا ، أو بالفعل بتغيير رأيك. في الأدب الفلسفي القديم ، بالطبع أفلاطون هو الذي يقفز إلى الذهن باعتباره أكبر داعية للحوار الفلسفي.
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Peter S. Adamson
Classical Indian Philosophy
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
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Peter S. Adamson
Classical Indian Philosophy
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
Read
May 16, 2025The quality of this book varies wildly from chapter to chapter. Some sections are beautiful, well-researched, and thoughtful in their explanations. They read easy and I finish the chapters excited by the concepts explained. Other chapters lean so heavily on unnecessary metaphors they render the core concepts absurd. These chapters condescend as though the philosophical concepts are so foreign, we need a go-between to translate the exotic beliefs of the Eastern world. If they deleted the chapters employing Muppet analogies and giraffe metaphors, this would be much much better.
November 15, 2023
A difficult book to read because it encompasses a wide range of theories and philosophers. Despite the magnitude of the undertaking the authors do a great job at explaining these ideas in easily understandable terms with appropriate humour. Would recommend to anyone considering diving into Indian philosophy.
September 21, 2024
Adamson's volume on Classical Indian Philosophy (in which he is capably assisted by Jonardon Ganeri) makes a strong case for the value of this series, particularly in bringing readable assessments of non-Western traditions to a general readership, which - as noted on p.xi - wasn't the original intent of the series.
This book, then, offers a comprehensive overview of philosophy in the region of India until roughly 600 CE. There are intriguing assessments of the Upanishads, the Buddha (as philosopher), Gautama's logic, art and aesthetics. It's a stronger book than earlier ones in the series, like the earlier volume on Islamic philosophy, where the narrative was made extremely jarring by the persistent insertion of jokes and puns. This book isn't completely without the jokes, but they have certainly been sidelined in favour of a more serious tone.
A prominent theme throughout the analyses is the central role of epistemology in classical Indian thought. Early Buddhists like Nagasena, for example, argued things are no more than the sum of their parts - using the example of a chariot to demonstrate how knowledge and words derive from convention, rather than any universal "chariot" that exists in its own right (p.53). With echoes of Plato's Cratylus, this could be read as an early forerunner to nominalism or conceptualism.
Arguably the strongest sections are those on Gautama's Nyaya-Sutra (not to be confused with the Buddha), and the assessment of Dignaga's logic toward the end of the book. Gautama makes a similar argument to Nagasena, this time applied to cows. Adamson observes how his definition of cows 'does not reveal the essence or nature of cows, but just gives us a reliable way of picking out cows from all other things' (p.175). As later commentators observed, in Adamson's words, universals are 'by their very nature located in particulars, but I cannot see or hear them directly. I have to do so by perceiving the particulars in which they occur' (p.177). Take, for example, the chariot or the cow. There is no essential "chariot" or "cow" that provide a reference for those existing in our world, the concepts only exist in our imaginations in order to organise reality. Gautama also identified a set of logical fallacies (hetvabhasa) (p.185) roughly contemporaneously to Aristotle.
Dignaga distinguishes between two sources of knowledge: perception and inference (p.289), which Adamson links to "experience" and "reasoning", then by extension to particulars and universals (p.289). While early Buddhists, and the later Carvaka, 'tended to view perception as a kind of direct sensory acquaintance with sensible data, like colors, sounds, and smells' (p.176), other philosophers in the tradition have observed how perception may not always be reliable. Dignana, by turn, 'does not think we immediately perceive objects in the world around us, but at best grasp them indirectly by means of what he calls "knowable interior forms", representations that are internal to the perceiver' (p.304). Again, we have the subjectivity, constructed, collectively cognitive nature of knowledge. Universals exist only in the mind (p.290). This might also be read as a sort of indirect realism - the world has an objective quality, but our perception of it is linked to an internal representation in our mind. As Adamson observes, 'he seems to leave it open whether there is some thing outside in the world to which that representation corresponds' (p.304). Confusingly, however, Dignaga does believe perception gives us direct knowledge and 'can never be in error' (p.290). This is perhaps too strong an assertion, but it fits with his idea that our objective understanding is mediated by our subjective cognition.
The book is a strong assessment of these trends and the lengthy analysis of specific figures is welcome. One thing Adamson shys away from (deliberately, as he notes early on in the book) is drawing too many comparisons to the Western philosophical tradition. Though it's admirable he wants the Indian tradition to stand in its own right, it would have been useful and interesting to see these connections more explicitly highlighted in the texts. The works on logic, language, and epistemology have significant parallels with both ancient and early modern Western philosophy, and these linkages might have served to more greatly enhance our appreciation of what the classical Indian tradition has to offer, developing seemingly independently of the former. In fact, Adamson devotes some discussion towards the end on the extent to which scholars theorise on the exchange between the Indian and Western thought traditions.
In all, a very useful resource that incentivises readers to dive deeper.
This book, then, offers a comprehensive overview of philosophy in the region of India until roughly 600 CE. There are intriguing assessments of the Upanishads, the Buddha (as philosopher), Gautama's logic, art and aesthetics. It's a stronger book than earlier ones in the series, like the earlier volume on Islamic philosophy, where the narrative was made extremely jarring by the persistent insertion of jokes and puns. This book isn't completely without the jokes, but they have certainly been sidelined in favour of a more serious tone.
A prominent theme throughout the analyses is the central role of epistemology in classical Indian thought. Early Buddhists like Nagasena, for example, argued things are no more than the sum of their parts - using the example of a chariot to demonstrate how knowledge and words derive from convention, rather than any universal "chariot" that exists in its own right (p.53). With echoes of Plato's Cratylus, this could be read as an early forerunner to nominalism or conceptualism.
Arguably the strongest sections are those on Gautama's Nyaya-Sutra (not to be confused with the Buddha), and the assessment of Dignaga's logic toward the end of the book. Gautama makes a similar argument to Nagasena, this time applied to cows. Adamson observes how his definition of cows 'does not reveal the essence or nature of cows, but just gives us a reliable way of picking out cows from all other things' (p.175). As later commentators observed, in Adamson's words, universals are 'by their very nature located in particulars, but I cannot see or hear them directly. I have to do so by perceiving the particulars in which they occur' (p.177). Take, for example, the chariot or the cow. There is no essential "chariot" or "cow" that provide a reference for those existing in our world, the concepts only exist in our imaginations in order to organise reality. Gautama also identified a set of logical fallacies (hetvabhasa) (p.185) roughly contemporaneously to Aristotle.
Dignaga distinguishes between two sources of knowledge: perception and inference (p.289), which Adamson links to "experience" and "reasoning", then by extension to particulars and universals (p.289). While early Buddhists, and the later Carvaka, 'tended to view perception as a kind of direct sensory acquaintance with sensible data, like colors, sounds, and smells' (p.176), other philosophers in the tradition have observed how perception may not always be reliable. Dignana, by turn, 'does not think we immediately perceive objects in the world around us, but at best grasp them indirectly by means of what he calls "knowable interior forms", representations that are internal to the perceiver' (p.304). Again, we have the subjectivity, constructed, collectively cognitive nature of knowledge. Universals exist only in the mind (p.290). This might also be read as a sort of indirect realism - the world has an objective quality, but our perception of it is linked to an internal representation in our mind. As Adamson observes, 'he seems to leave it open whether there is some thing outside in the world to which that representation corresponds' (p.304). Confusingly, however, Dignaga does believe perception gives us direct knowledge and 'can never be in error' (p.290). This is perhaps too strong an assertion, but it fits with his idea that our objective understanding is mediated by our subjective cognition.
The book is a strong assessment of these trends and the lengthy analysis of specific figures is welcome. One thing Adamson shys away from (deliberately, as he notes early on in the book) is drawing too many comparisons to the Western philosophical tradition. Though it's admirable he wants the Indian tradition to stand in its own right, it would have been useful and interesting to see these connections more explicitly highlighted in the texts. The works on logic, language, and epistemology have significant parallels with both ancient and early modern Western philosophy, and these linkages might have served to more greatly enhance our appreciation of what the classical Indian tradition has to offer, developing seemingly independently of the former. In fact, Adamson devotes some discussion towards the end on the extent to which scholars theorise on the exchange between the Indian and Western thought traditions.
In all, a very useful resource that incentivises readers to dive deeper.
July 2, 2024
A comprehensive guide to over a millennium of Indian philosophy. Extensive cross-references lends authenticity. At the same time, it is lucid and simple enough for a non-specialist to read and understand. A worthy successor to the podcast of the same name.
September 26, 2025
pretty great overview of the various philosophical traditions of the subcontinent which does beg the question: if ancient India was so great, how come all the great sages talked about liberation from suffering?
October 23, 2022
i hv read all his works except work on neo platonisme
January 5, 2024
And of course, you can listen to the audio version online which includes interviews as well.
October 28, 2024
A bit beyond me
January 2, 2026
i want this
July 3, 2023
A very good overview of the intellectual currents of classical India, but spoiled a bit by the first author's complete lack of talent for making something humourous. He is clearly not aware of this, as he is anything but restrained, with his unending procession of lame puns whose only, but serious, effect is to cause one to wince, and of various other attempts at jokes which entirely fail to land. The combined effect of this is to make the reader recoil before the heights to which delusion of this kind can reach, while otherwise feeling locked into the book because of its actually excellent treatment of the vast content surveyed.
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