It has long been a trope of Civil War history that Gettysburg was an accidental battlefield. General Lee, the old story goes, marched blindly into Pennsylvania while his chief cavalryman Jeb Stuart rode and raided incommunicado. Meanwhile, General Meade, in command only a few days, gave uncertain chase to an enemy whose exact positions he did not know. And so these ignorant armies clashed by first light at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. In the spirit of his iconoclastic Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg, Troy D. Harman argues for a new once Lee invaded Pennsylvania and the Union army pursued, a battle at Gettysburg was entirely predictable, perhaps inevitable. Most Civil War battles took place along major roads, railroads, and waterways; the armies needed to move men and equipment, and they needed water for men, horses, and artillery. And yet this perspective hasn’t been fully explored when it comes to Gettysburg. Look at an 1863 map, says look at the area framed in the north by the Susquehanna River and in the south by the Potomac, in the east by the Northern Central Railroad and in the west by the Cumberland Valley Railroad. This is where the armies played a high-stakes game of chess in late June 1863. Their movements were guided by strategies of caution and constrained by roads, railroads, mountains and mountain passes, rivers and creeks, all of which led the armies to Gettysburg. It’s true that Lee was disadvantaged by Stuart’s roaming and Meade by his newness to command, which led both to default to the old strategic and logistical bedrocks they learned at West Point—and these instincts helped reinforce the magnetic pull toward Gettysburg. Moreover, once the battle started, Harman argues, the blue and gray fought tactically for the two creeks—Marsh and Rock, essential for watering men and horses and sponging artillery—that mark the battlefield in the east and the west as well as for the roadways that led to Gettysburg from all points of the compass. This is a perspective often overlooked in many accounts of the battle, which focus on the high ground—the Round Tops, Cemetery Hill—as key tactical objectives. Gettysburg Ranger and historian Troy Harman draws on a lifetime of researching the Civil War and more than thirty years of studying the terrain of Gettysburg and south-central Pennsylvania and northern Maryland to reframe the story of the Battle of Gettysburg. In the process he shows there’s still much to say about one of history’s most written-about battles. This is revisionism of the best kind.
A fresh perspective on an often-overlooked aspect of the Gettysburg campaign, this volume fills a gap in Civil War literature. The author argues that Gettysburg wasn't a chance occurrence; the battle happened there because of the area's road, rail, and water connections. While I found the book to be highly readable, this book isn't for everyone; the novice Civil War student might not appreciate this volume as much as the devoted buff. But overall, I think this book adds significantly to current historical scholarship.
Like many I had always believed that the battle of Gettysburg happened around the town of Gettysburg because the Union troops needed shoes and the Confederate General Lee presumed it was a good a place as any other to attack.
But the author shows beyond a doubt that both armies never spent more than a day’s march from a river, railroad and road network. Both armies depended on those three for water, supplies and escape.
I enjoy Troy Harman’s revisionist takes on Gettysburg. Few can be said to have more knowledge than Harman on this particular subject. Here he dives into a much needed re-examination of the importance of roads, rail, and water in the Gettysburg campaign. In almost every major work on the battle with the campaign, little—if any—attention is paid to these important elements. Harman argues that Gettysburg was not some mere meeting engagement between two armies, stumbling around in the dark, but rather the logical result of Lee’s raid into Pennsylvania and the union pursuit.
He spends a great deal of time concentrating on the Union right flank and the importance of Rock Creek and Gettysburg’s railway connection to the North Central Railroad. This is certainly a valuable piece of scholarship to serious students of the Battle of Gettysburg and Civil War logistics, but like Harman’s previous work I’m not sure that this was worthy of a full length book treatment. This was probably an essay that was expanded a bit too much. The book gets a little bit repetitive at times, and Harman’s writing style, while effective at hammering home the points he’s trying to make, can be a bit of a slog.
An interesting take on the Battle of Gettysburg that I don't think quite hits the mark on it's arguments. The author argues that roads, railways and waterways played a much larger role in the Battle of Gettysburg than the conventional narrative of the battle gives credit to.
I can certainly see the argument for roads, as Gettysburg was a crossroads. The arguments don't necessarily work for me when it comes to water and rail. It was an interesting take on the battle, but not one that will supplant the common narrative.
I had Dr. Troy Harman as a professor at Penn State. He is a great professor and has an engaging class. I enjoyed taking his class. I had to get his book.
This is a great book on the Battle of Gettysburg and why the battle took place where it did. The book argues against the idea that the Battle of Gettysburg was an accidental battlefield. Dr. Harman gives an insightful and detailed description of the tactically fought Battle of Gettysburg.
Tactically, Gettysburg makes sense for a battle. There are creeks for the men, equipment, and animals to get water. There are roads that come from major cities and all directions. There are modern communication lines. There is also access to railroads. I appreciated the maps of Gettysburg that show all the creeks, roads, and railroads. I really appreciated the demonstrations in the book of the advantages of the roads, railroads, and waterways in a battle. It was quite fascinating the advantages of the railroad. They could make a delivery of an ammunition train, 200 miles from Washington, DC to Harrisburg, PA in about 12 hours. (pg 69)
Dr. Harman did a good job at explaining why the generals made the decisions they did. The armies were never more than a days march from water. This makes sense, especially during the summer. The roads, railroads, and water were necessary for direction and sustenance. No general made a decision during the battle that didn't have to do with a road, railroad, creek, or hill.
It was also fascinating hearing more about the use of hydrogen balloons for surveillance. (pg 71) I would highly recommend this in-debth book to anyone interested in the Civil War and the Battle of Gettysburg.
A great book, providing a different perspective on the U.S. Army’s action in the Gettysburg Campaign. The author, history professor Troy D. Harman, combines a deep understanding of contemporary military thinking and a detailed geographic appreciation for the Gettysburg region to present a different narrative of the Civil War battle. The book starts with a literature review, concentrating on the continuing evolution of the broad narrative of the battle. Harman then presents a very enjoyable chapter on Jomini and his importance to the Civil War’s military leadership. This is followed by a series of examples from the days leading up to the battle through to the Second Day’s fighting where Harman argues for a more offensively minded interpretation of the Union’s actions. Laying his basis on the water courses and roads around Gettysburg, Harman shows that Meade and the other Union leaders were engaged in a fight to turn Lee’s left flank to secure the railway, rather than just waiting on the high ground for the Confederate attack. It is a compelling argument and provides a very different perspective on the battle’s course. I especially appreciated Harman’s interpretation of contemporary accounts through an understanding of military staff dynamics - there is a constant churn of what-if planning. A great book for understanding the role of geography in shaping the flow of military actions. Also a good reference for understanding Civil War staff through a Jomini-centric viewpoint.
Interesting premise offering a very detailed analysis of how battlefield tactics and maneuvering revolved around railroad, improved roads and water access to and around Gettysburg.
This book is not for the casual reader as I hoped for it delves into the nitty-gritty movements of individual units; detailed analysis of military orders; environmental and topography characteristics and considerations of battlefield commanders and other minutiae that unless one is intimately familiar with the battlefield it is a real slog of a read. Actually even if one is generally familiar with the battlefield it drags. As another critic wrote, I agree that this could’ve been an essay or a publication for a scholarly journal. I think it’s a bit much for the general Civil War buff or Gettysburg enthusiast.
Four stars for argument and analysis, but two stars for general enjoyment of reading.
This book is not for the beginning student of the battle. Unless one is already familiar with the geography of the area and has some knowledge of the commonly accepted version of the battle plan, it may be difficult to follow. That said, the author’s take on the importance to Meade of the right flank throughout the battle provides a different approach from which to consider Meade’s actions. All in all, I am glad I read it.
Harman is always worth reading. In this book he does an excellent job of connecting logistics, staff work, and cavalry and skirmish actions from all along the operational front in to the narrower tactical battle of Gettysburg.
The writing can sometimes be repetitive. Harman also falls for the academic's opiate of writing long sections about what other academics have written. These sections add very little to an otherwise concise and thoughtful history.
A new look at a battle that has been identified as the turning point in the Civil War by scholars everywhere. An easy read that will provide the reader with many new items to think about in regard to the battle. Worth the time investment to read.
To understand this book it is best if you have a good working understanding of the battle and battlefield. It brings a fresh perspective if you do. The maps could have been better.