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The Emperor's Last Victory
In early July 1809 Napoleon crossed the Danube with 187,000 men to confront the Austrian Archduke Charles and an army of 145,000 men. The fighting that followed dwarfed in intensity and scale any previous Napoleonic battlefield, perhaps any in history: casualties on each side were over 30,000. The Austrians fought with great determination, but eventually the Emperor won a narrow victory. Wagram was decisive in that it compelled Austria to make peace. It also heralded a new, altogether greater order of warfare, anticipating the massed manpower and weight of fire deployed much later in the battles of the American Civil War and then at Verdun and on the Somme.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
272 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 2005
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About the author
Gunther E. Rothenberg
12 books5 followersGunther Erich Rothenberg was an internationally known military historian, best known for his publications on the Habsburg military and Napoleonic Wars.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
July 22, 2021
Gunther Rothenburg was considered one of the premier scholars of the Napoleonic era. Specializing in the history of the Hapsburg Monarchy during the period of Revolution and Napoleon, and with him having a clear love for the Austrians of the era, one would have assumed that his magnum opus would have been his book(s) on the epic story of the 1809 Franco-Austrian War.
While this isn't a bad book, the writing is crisp if rather workmanlike, well researched if very basic, it also isn't the culmination of a life's work that one would have expected. Then again, Mr. Rothenburg reposed before the book had gone to print, with the final edits made by his wife, so it's unseemly to fault him for the twilight effort of his life.
As I said, this isn't a bad book.
Beginning with a perfunctory look at both how the conflict started, Austrian planning, French sniffing of trouble in the air, and of a breakdown of both sides military systems, Rothenburg takes us right into the war before a hundred pages has gone by.
Taking equal time to give a bare bones narrative and analysis of both the French-Imperial and Hapsburg forces, he narrates both the main theater of the war, that which comprises Bavaria, Western Austria, Bohemia, and the rimlands of Hungary, while also discussing Hapsburg attempts at fomenting revolution in the Tyrol and Germany, as well as the subsidiary sectors of Northern Italy, and Poland.
Rothenburg is quite fair in his analyses of both sides' commanders, and his description of the combats themselves, while very brief, is clear and unambiguous. His analysis of why the planned insurrections didn't pan out as desired, nor had the carryover political effects that the Austrians hoped for, are also concisely well described.
The two great set pieces of this war: Aspern und Essling, and the titanic bloodbath of Schlacht bei Wagram, are also, concisely, well described, and unambiguously clear. His wrap up of the end of the war, the peace talks, and his conclusions, are all, likewise, brief and concise.
And therein lies my reasoning for only three stars.
This is, at least to me, besides 1812 and 1813, the single most interesting aspect of the entirety of the Napoleonic Wars.
Stinging and very eager for recompense, the Austrians, under the auspices of Archduke Karl (Charles) reform their Army along French lines.
Karl introduces the Corps system, reforms regimental structures, and reforms the recruitment and the mobilization levels of the Army, as well. New tactics, such as the Battalion Mass (merely a literally block of men on the battlefield, similar to a musket armed phalanx, ironically, the French-Imperial cavalry would, on more than one occasion, find this a frighteningly simple, yet effective tactical device) are introduced, and attempts at reforms are made amongst the artillery, cavalry, and ordnance as well. However, as Rothenburg points out, the Austrians fail to properly train their command hierarchy in the fluidity and operational dynamism that was the Corps system.
This meant that the Austrian Army never could take advantage of the full promise of the Corps system, though it did make their forces more survivable and recoverable upon defeat as the War would highlight.
Likewise, the Army never could get it's institutional mindset out of the 18th century, despite Karl's best efforts.
This would be a, as per usual, slow moving, ponderous Army, enamored far too much with lines of retreat, bases of supply, and filled to the brim with an overabundance of caution.
The French-Imperial forces, on the other hand, were the very definition of dynamism personified. With paternalistic styles of leadership (French top tier commanders routinely braved danger to inspire their men and lead by example, while Austrian higher leadership tended towards more of a technocratic form of "leadership", which often did nothing more than slow yet further, an already sluggish force), and a sheer natural aggression that the Austrians would lack for the remainder of their time as an Empire (look to 1866, and their effectiveness on the offensive in 1914 to see my point), the Imperial forces, both French, as well as those of the Poles and the Confederation of the Rhine states, simply outperformed their foes.
The Austrians gambled that a swift knockout blow to the main French forces in southern Bavaria would erode the status of the French in Europe, provoke a German pro-Austrian revolution, and convince the Confederation states to switch sides. They also rolled the dice that this would cause a cascading effect of forcing both Prussia and Russia to rejoin the war on Austria's side.
However, none of this came to be.
For one, the Confederation forces resisted stoutly the Austrians, as many of them rather liked the idea of German nationalism, which got a huge boost thanks to French ideals, and were somewhat weary of Imperial overlordship from Vienna. As a consequence, the Germans of the Rhine States fought tremendously well, especially the Bavarians and Saxons, for the French.
Needless to say, this didn't bode well for the planned pro Hapsburg revolution in Germany.
While there was a revolt in northern Germany, it was pro-Prussian, not Austrian, and ended fairly rapidly. While in the Tyrol, there was a highly effective revolt which did, for some time, clear the area of French and German forces, it was unsupported by a main Austrian Army which was simply too slow to take advantage of their early success, and the insurrection was crushed.
The Poles fought far more stubbornly than the Austrians intended them to, saving Warsaw, while the Russians, and Czar Alexander, were far too interested in their own interests to be overly concerned with those of Vienna (though, in the process the Czar played it a tad too safe, and caused suspicion betwixt him and Napoleon). And in Northern Italy, despite an initial victory against the French, the French rallied, won the next battle, and then drove the Austrians out and into Dalmatia, and across into Hungary.
Rothenburg describes all of this well enough, but only in bare bones fashion, and with little sense of drama or import. One would think that him being a combat veteran, a bit of the soul of the warrior would have been infused into his work. This is all just a very, matter of fact, type narrative.
His discussion on the Bavarian sector, and the French counteroffensive, is the same.
Here, the main force under Karl's personal command, wins some minor border engagements, and genuinely discomfits the French forces, temporarily under Marshal Berthier who proved why, sometimes, Staff officers shouldn't ever be field commanders, before Napoleon and reinforcements can arrive.
As previously mentioned, the German forces, especially the Bavarians and the Saxons, perform admirably, and buy considerable time for the French, now under the Emperor's sure hand, to concentrate, and then launch a counter strike.
As per usual, the French move with such a resolute speed and aggression, that the Austrians are entirely unbalanced, and after very heavy fighting, and heavy losses on both sides, shoved out of Bavaria, and into Austria and Bohemia. Vienna falls, and then Karl blocks Napoleon's attempt at a quick crossing of the Danube at the Battle of Aspern und Essling.
Here Karl wins the first, definitive, victory against Napoleon (though one can argue that the Russians beat him to it at Eylau a couple of years prior). However, as per Austrian usual, they fail to take advantage of their success, and allow Napoleon time (a terrible, unforgivable sin in the eyes of the god of war, whose avatar the Austrians faced) to reorganize and prepare a much more thorough crossing operation.
In July, Napoleon crosses, pushes the Austrian outposts back toward the massive Markgraf plateau, near the town of Wagram, and there, for two terrible days, the two largest armies in European history up to that time slug each other's faces bloody and battered.
Rothenburg makes an astute observation that this battle is more akin to the firepower and attrition centric battles of the War Between the States in America or the Great War than it is the Napoleonic era. Maneuver fails to accomplish much because the Austrian Corps system, while never fully utilized, at least ensures that their forces are, now, more survivable, and the quality of the two armies is more symmetrical, meaning neither has too much of an overall qualitative edge over the other to be a major force multiplier.
Well, except Napoleon, that is.
As such, while Napoleon wins the battle, it's a bare bones victory, not an Austerlitz level triumph, and he even takes heavier losses in doing so.
Even so, the Austrians are essentially finished, and they sue for peace after a final major engagement at Znaim on the edge of Hungary.
This is such an incredible, back and forth, genuinely exciting, fascinating, monumental tale, worthy of its own heroic epic, that it's a tad disappointing that this book was just a rather dull read.
It seems harsh to rate a work less than a four from a scholar the level of Herr Rothenburg, however this was simply a very bare bones, introductory level work on one of the most important conflicts of the early modern age.
I will still recommend it, however. The several volumes by John Gill, or the two by James Arnold might not be to the taste of those just wanting a basic introduction to the conflict. And in that, this one perfectly fits the bill.
While this isn't a bad book, the writing is crisp if rather workmanlike, well researched if very basic, it also isn't the culmination of a life's work that one would have expected. Then again, Mr. Rothenburg reposed before the book had gone to print, with the final edits made by his wife, so it's unseemly to fault him for the twilight effort of his life.
As I said, this isn't a bad book.
Beginning with a perfunctory look at both how the conflict started, Austrian planning, French sniffing of trouble in the air, and of a breakdown of both sides military systems, Rothenburg takes us right into the war before a hundred pages has gone by.
Taking equal time to give a bare bones narrative and analysis of both the French-Imperial and Hapsburg forces, he narrates both the main theater of the war, that which comprises Bavaria, Western Austria, Bohemia, and the rimlands of Hungary, while also discussing Hapsburg attempts at fomenting revolution in the Tyrol and Germany, as well as the subsidiary sectors of Northern Italy, and Poland.
Rothenburg is quite fair in his analyses of both sides' commanders, and his description of the combats themselves, while very brief, is clear and unambiguous. His analysis of why the planned insurrections didn't pan out as desired, nor had the carryover political effects that the Austrians hoped for, are also concisely well described.
The two great set pieces of this war: Aspern und Essling, and the titanic bloodbath of Schlacht bei Wagram, are also, concisely, well described, and unambiguously clear. His wrap up of the end of the war, the peace talks, and his conclusions, are all, likewise, brief and concise.
And therein lies my reasoning for only three stars.
This is, at least to me, besides 1812 and 1813, the single most interesting aspect of the entirety of the Napoleonic Wars.
Stinging and very eager for recompense, the Austrians, under the auspices of Archduke Karl (Charles) reform their Army along French lines.
Karl introduces the Corps system, reforms regimental structures, and reforms the recruitment and the mobilization levels of the Army, as well. New tactics, such as the Battalion Mass (merely a literally block of men on the battlefield, similar to a musket armed phalanx, ironically, the French-Imperial cavalry would, on more than one occasion, find this a frighteningly simple, yet effective tactical device) are introduced, and attempts at reforms are made amongst the artillery, cavalry, and ordnance as well. However, as Rothenburg points out, the Austrians fail to properly train their command hierarchy in the fluidity and operational dynamism that was the Corps system.
This meant that the Austrian Army never could take advantage of the full promise of the Corps system, though it did make their forces more survivable and recoverable upon defeat as the War would highlight.
Likewise, the Army never could get it's institutional mindset out of the 18th century, despite Karl's best efforts.
This would be a, as per usual, slow moving, ponderous Army, enamored far too much with lines of retreat, bases of supply, and filled to the brim with an overabundance of caution.
The French-Imperial forces, on the other hand, were the very definition of dynamism personified. With paternalistic styles of leadership (French top tier commanders routinely braved danger to inspire their men and lead by example, while Austrian higher leadership tended towards more of a technocratic form of "leadership", which often did nothing more than slow yet further, an already sluggish force), and a sheer natural aggression that the Austrians would lack for the remainder of their time as an Empire (look to 1866, and their effectiveness on the offensive in 1914 to see my point), the Imperial forces, both French, as well as those of the Poles and the Confederation of the Rhine states, simply outperformed their foes.
The Austrians gambled that a swift knockout blow to the main French forces in southern Bavaria would erode the status of the French in Europe, provoke a German pro-Austrian revolution, and convince the Confederation states to switch sides. They also rolled the dice that this would cause a cascading effect of forcing both Prussia and Russia to rejoin the war on Austria's side.
However, none of this came to be.
For one, the Confederation forces resisted stoutly the Austrians, as many of them rather liked the idea of German nationalism, which got a huge boost thanks to French ideals, and were somewhat weary of Imperial overlordship from Vienna. As a consequence, the Germans of the Rhine States fought tremendously well, especially the Bavarians and Saxons, for the French.
Needless to say, this didn't bode well for the planned pro Hapsburg revolution in Germany.
While there was a revolt in northern Germany, it was pro-Prussian, not Austrian, and ended fairly rapidly. While in the Tyrol, there was a highly effective revolt which did, for some time, clear the area of French and German forces, it was unsupported by a main Austrian Army which was simply too slow to take advantage of their early success, and the insurrection was crushed.
The Poles fought far more stubbornly than the Austrians intended them to, saving Warsaw, while the Russians, and Czar Alexander, were far too interested in their own interests to be overly concerned with those of Vienna (though, in the process the Czar played it a tad too safe, and caused suspicion betwixt him and Napoleon). And in Northern Italy, despite an initial victory against the French, the French rallied, won the next battle, and then drove the Austrians out and into Dalmatia, and across into Hungary.
Rothenburg describes all of this well enough, but only in bare bones fashion, and with little sense of drama or import. One would think that him being a combat veteran, a bit of the soul of the warrior would have been infused into his work. This is all just a very, matter of fact, type narrative.
His discussion on the Bavarian sector, and the French counteroffensive, is the same.
Here, the main force under Karl's personal command, wins some minor border engagements, and genuinely discomfits the French forces, temporarily under Marshal Berthier who proved why, sometimes, Staff officers shouldn't ever be field commanders, before Napoleon and reinforcements can arrive.
As previously mentioned, the German forces, especially the Bavarians and the Saxons, perform admirably, and buy considerable time for the French, now under the Emperor's sure hand, to concentrate, and then launch a counter strike.
As per usual, the French move with such a resolute speed and aggression, that the Austrians are entirely unbalanced, and after very heavy fighting, and heavy losses on both sides, shoved out of Bavaria, and into Austria and Bohemia. Vienna falls, and then Karl blocks Napoleon's attempt at a quick crossing of the Danube at the Battle of Aspern und Essling.
Here Karl wins the first, definitive, victory against Napoleon (though one can argue that the Russians beat him to it at Eylau a couple of years prior). However, as per Austrian usual, they fail to take advantage of their success, and allow Napoleon time (a terrible, unforgivable sin in the eyes of the god of war, whose avatar the Austrians faced) to reorganize and prepare a much more thorough crossing operation.
In July, Napoleon crosses, pushes the Austrian outposts back toward the massive Markgraf plateau, near the town of Wagram, and there, for two terrible days, the two largest armies in European history up to that time slug each other's faces bloody and battered.
Rothenburg makes an astute observation that this battle is more akin to the firepower and attrition centric battles of the War Between the States in America or the Great War than it is the Napoleonic era. Maneuver fails to accomplish much because the Austrian Corps system, while never fully utilized, at least ensures that their forces are, now, more survivable, and the quality of the two armies is more symmetrical, meaning neither has too much of an overall qualitative edge over the other to be a major force multiplier.
Well, except Napoleon, that is.
As such, while Napoleon wins the battle, it's a bare bones victory, not an Austerlitz level triumph, and he even takes heavier losses in doing so.
Even so, the Austrians are essentially finished, and they sue for peace after a final major engagement at Znaim on the edge of Hungary.
This is such an incredible, back and forth, genuinely exciting, fascinating, monumental tale, worthy of its own heroic epic, that it's a tad disappointing that this book was just a rather dull read.
It seems harsh to rate a work less than a four from a scholar the level of Herr Rothenburg, however this was simply a very bare bones, introductory level work on one of the most important conflicts of the early modern age.
I will still recommend it, however. The several volumes by John Gill, or the two by James Arnold might not be to the taste of those just wanting a basic introduction to the conflict. And in that, this one perfectly fits the bill.
December 25, 2009
This is a serviceable version of Napoleon's last major victory--at Wagram, as he defeated the Austrian Army under Archduke Charles. The battle was a monster of its kind, with a huge number of soldiers involved. 300,000 troops fought over a 2 day period; there were about 72,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing, prisoners), with each side suffering about equally. As the book concludes: "The year after Wagram, Napoleon still looked unbeatable, but Wagram was to be his last decisive victory, the last to break the enemy's will to resist."
The book itself traces the Wagram campaign from its early origins. It describes how Napoleon created an army by shuffling a variety of units, some scattered hither and yon. It also describes the Austrian forces, under the leadership of Archduke Charles.
The maneuvering before the battles itself is described. Indeed, the lead up to Wagram was most propitious for the Austrian forces. In a battle at Aspern-Essling, Charles managed to bloody the French and experience a tactical victory. Unhappily for the Austrians, however, they did very little (such as fortification) after their modest victory. On the other hand, Napoleon redoubled his labors, brought some additional forces onto the field, and developed a typically ambitious plan of action.
At the last instant, Charles decided that he must also show some initiative. Thus, both armies planned to attack the other at about the same time. However, the French generals were better, Napoleon hit his stride during the battle at Wagram, and the end result was a fairly convincing French victory. It was not Austerlitz, but it was a substantial win.
Some useful features of the book: there are some decent maps at the beginning (while they could be better, they are serviceable); there is a nice section with short biographies of the major figures; the "order of battle" provides detailed information on the structure and leadership of the armies. The writing is not elegant, but it is serviceable. For a brief description of Napoleon's last big victory, this will serve.
A final brief comment. The author died before this book was published, always a sad event.
The book itself traces the Wagram campaign from its early origins. It describes how Napoleon created an army by shuffling a variety of units, some scattered hither and yon. It also describes the Austrian forces, under the leadership of Archduke Charles.
The maneuvering before the battles itself is described. Indeed, the lead up to Wagram was most propitious for the Austrian forces. In a battle at Aspern-Essling, Charles managed to bloody the French and experience a tactical victory. Unhappily for the Austrians, however, they did very little (such as fortification) after their modest victory. On the other hand, Napoleon redoubled his labors, brought some additional forces onto the field, and developed a typically ambitious plan of action.
At the last instant, Charles decided that he must also show some initiative. Thus, both armies planned to attack the other at about the same time. However, the French generals were better, Napoleon hit his stride during the battle at Wagram, and the end result was a fairly convincing French victory. It was not Austerlitz, but it was a substantial win.
Some useful features of the book: there are some decent maps at the beginning (while they could be better, they are serviceable); there is a nice section with short biographies of the major figures; the "order of battle" provides detailed information on the structure and leadership of the armies. The writing is not elegant, but it is serviceable. For a brief description of Napoleon's last big victory, this will serve.
A final brief comment. The author died before this book was published, always a sad event.
May 5, 2024
Great history of Danube campaign. Wasn't too confusing keeping up with all the different regiments and divisions and ultimately I enjoyed. it could have used a bit more firsthand accounts of the battle though
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews