i hope to come back and read the the objections and replies soon, for i enjoyed reading Meditations.
here are a few thoughts i wrote out about them.
Doubting Descartes
The method of doubt used in Meditations brings the text to such proximity to doubt that doubting the text’s veracity readily suggests itself as an approach for understanding the text. This would likely have vexed Descartes, who suggested that the methods employed in Meditations would eventually be considered by all who could closely attend to them to be absolutely rigorous demonstrations that would erase erroneous views on truth and God (6). But perhaps Descartes would understand the need to doubt his book, for, as he notes, “prudence dictates that we should never fully trust those who have deceived us even once” (18), and patient readers we all may be, yet there are none who have not been fooled at least once by a book containing articulate thoughts published by those who hoped to say something true. In doubting the veracity of Meditations, the most efficient approach would seem to be to question Descartes’ doubt, but before proceeding to this it may prove useful to first briefly examine what this doubt is.
Descartes describes his doubt as initially achieving an unrelenting darkness of difficulties (23) because he has stripped away the foundations of all his former beliefs (18). What his initial doubt then achieves is a systematic eradication of trust in the presupposed notions of body and feeling (18), which also means an eradication of the trust in the ideas that once defined existence. Stranded in darkness, Descartes next surmises that the only truth remaining is the truth of an exhaustive uncertainty (24), but his very thoughts help to remind him that he had not found sufficient ground to doubt his own existence (25), which allows him to do away with exhaustive uncertainty and know that “this proposition, ‘I am, I exist, whenever it is uttered by me [ . . . ] is necessarily true” (25). With this modicum of doubt assuaged, he then explains that this expresses a general rule, which can be understood as the sought for Archimedean Point (24), that everything very clearly and distinctly perceived is true (35). Although Descartes further refines his truth as the meditating continues in the book, his handling of doubt just described provides sufficient places for doubting the foundations of Meditations, which, following Descartes’ example, is the most expedient manner to apply the method of doubt and clarify our perspective on the book.
The quality of Descartes’ doubt must be doubted because his manner of eliminating all notions possibly touched by doubt provides the foundation to the Archimedean Point that allows Descartes’ ultimate grasp on truth and God. If it is true that Descartes destroys all his former beliefs (18) at the start of his meditating, then only new truths, built upon only what is clearly and distinctly perceived as true, shall be found as his thoughts progress in Meditations. That Descartes is unable to destroy all his former beliefs by attacking their very foundations (18) is most clearly seen in the near effortless correlation he makes between deception and imperfection. Positing that deception is a shortcoming and therefore not belonging to the perfection of God (52) is problematic because it is not something that has been clearly and distinctly perceived or established as true, but is instead an attempt to specify an attribute (in a negative manner) to the perfection of God and in which the ability of the finite thinker to specify an attribute to the perfect, incomprehensible, infinite God (46) is nowhere explained. Descartes seems to ground his ability to understand deception as an imperfection in God by attributing all perfections to God with the understanding that there must be as much in the cause as in the effect (49-50), and, since Descartes has an idea of a supremely perfect God and Descartes cannot account for all perfections, God exists as all perfections (51). The reason this does not actually allow Descartes the ability to have a clear and distinct perception of what might be a shortcoming (deception) in God is that to understand that God contains all perfections does not imply that one understands what all of those perfections are (46), nor what they might exclude, unless one is already conceiving the perfection of God as something more specific and exclusive.
What is revealed is that there seems to be an attempt by Descartes (it is unimportant to the present purpose whether it is intentional or not) to create a correlation between the ability to know that everything clearly perceived involves some perfection of God and the notion that the truest and clearest idea one can have is of God (46). The aim of this correlation is to set up an association between the conception of truth, as we are able to clearly and distinctly perceive it, with the perfection of God that suggests that the perfection of God is truth, which then allows for the claim that deception would be a shortcoming (52) because God is truth. What this ultimately implies and what Descartes is never fully able to doubt is that the perfection of God is goodness. It is true that Descartes more than once sincerely asks if God might be a deceiver (22-23, 26, 29) and therefore not goodness. He poses such a question before examining how God is the sum of all perfections (described above), “I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver” (36), but his answer to the question, to equate deception with imperfection is based upon the undoubted, preconceived notion of goodness in the perfection of God, which undoubtedly is a noble hope, but, in a meditation where everything has been doubted, it is has no more grounds for being true than the notion that deception is a perfection in God that simply remains incomprehensible to the finite thinker. I imagine that the objection that Descartes would offer here is that the former is clearly and distinctly perceived as true and the latter cannot be, but this objection (the Archimedean Point) is based on the foundation that was built securely by first doubting everything, which just has been shown was not in fact done. For Descartes, the way to complete doubt was halted by goodness, but is this true for everyone who might employ his methods? This question becomes of the highest importance when it is recalled, as mentioned in the introduction, that Descartes thought that his methods should eventually be considered by all who could closely attend to his methods to be absolutely rigorous demonstrations that would erase erroneous views on truth and God (6).
It seems highly probable that a person employing Descartes’ method would be able to obtain a complete doubt and be able to consider the idea of goodness as just one more uncertainty. For the complete doubter, the problem with the way goodness is handled in Descartes’ Meditations is that when the proof of God is given (in either the 3rd or 6th meditation) goodness is not expressed as an essential part of God, and Descartes’ aim seems to be to imply goodness with the use of the all encompassing form of perfection in God, but assuming goodness (no shortcomings like deception) to be in what is understood tentatively as an incomprehensible perfection (46) is not something the complete doubter would allow himself to do. The complete doubter, who is not secretly or accidentally still holding to goodness, would follow very much in Descartes’ manner in the beginning meditations with this crucial difference: when he pondered whether or not God was a deceiver he would not solely think of God as deceiving in an all or nothing manner. Descartes consistently conceives of deception in this manner (22-23, 26, 29) because goodness is still guiding his thoughts and goodness can only conceive of deception as wholly wrong—he finally openly acknowledges the latter of these near the end of Meditations when he states that it seems “contrary to the goodness of God that his nature should be deceptive” (84), which is the first direct mention of goodness. The complete doubter would not have the corrective quality of goodness within himself and could speculate that God was truthful enough to him so to as be able to allow him to establish his general rule, that everything that is clearly and distinctly perceived is true, similar to Descartes’, but the complete doubter could not safely be assured that God might not be lying to him in greater ways than this. Thus the general rule for the complete doubter could not be a true Archimedean Point that lifts the all encompassing darkness as it does for Descartes, but is instead a small candle in the vast darkness, lighting up clearly and distinctly objects only immediately in front of it. This end for the complete doubter can hardly be what Descartes intended by the erasure of erroneous views of truth and God.
The danger of Descartes’ method of doubt, then, is one that assumes goodness as undoubtable and ever present, even when unmentioned and unexplained. This may have been a safe assumption for Descartes, who somewhat jovially admits in the synopsis to the Sixth Meditation that he never truly but only speculatively doubted everything (16), but, for those who earnestly follow the method of doubt, it cannot be safely assumed that goodness shall halt the progress of darkness and doubt.