The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

by David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, Rory Stewart (Foreword)

'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson, of America's role backing the anti-Soviet mujahideen. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' With no support for Afghanistan after that war, the vacuum was filled by the Taliban and bin Laden. The Ledger assesses the West's similarly failed approach to Afghanistan after 9/11-in military, diplomatic, political and developmental terms.

Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan they worked with the international mission both as advisers and within the Arg, and they have considerable experience of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations elsewhere in the world. Here these two experts show that there is plenty of blame to go around when explaining the failure to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11.

The signs of collapse were conveniently ignored, in favor of political narratives of progress and success. Yet for Afghans, the war and its geopolitical effects are not over because NATO is gone-Afghanistan remains globally connected through digital communications and networks. This vital book explains why and where failings in Afghanistan happened, warning against exceptionalist approaches to future peacebuilding missions around the globe.

Genres: Nonfiction, History, Military Fiction

368 pages, Paperback

First published January 15, 2022

Reviews

[Meghan Fraser · Rating 2 out of 5]

Incredibly insightful and in-depth reporting. However tough to read. Could use a good editor.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

A scathing overview of the disaster in Afghanistan. The authors unflinchingly expose the systematic failures of all parties in the war, from the initial invasion to the disastrous evacuation.

[Joel Trono-Doerksen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is a mixed bag. I really liked the criticism of the major missteps that the Coalition took from when they invaded to when they left. The authors enumerated many of the issues that I had read about in other books. The problem I had with it was that it was a book focused more on the practical than the moral. They talk about the many practical issues that the invasion force had but don't question the larger, moral question of the war itself and simply assume that it was right to invade Afghanistan. Very little was mentioned about civilian casualties (I think they maybe once) and there was no specific massacres mentioned like the Haksa Meyna airstrike, the Khataba raid or the Panjwai massacre, all of which certainly contributed to dissatisfaction and anger at the Afghan government and their Western backers. There is also no mention of the airstrikes and Special Forces massacres carried out by American trained Afghan troops, which further alienated the Afghan people. The citation of people with many skeletons in their closet, without mentioning the skeletons was also an irksome part of the book. Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani westernized hack, who could not even describe the American invasion as an "occupation. Amrullah Saleh is quoted extensively without mentioning he was the head of the National Directorate of Security, an organization heavily involved in torture, especially during his tenure between 2004 and 2010. Along with Kissinger and Robert Kagan, a war criminal and a neoconservative maniac, all these are quoted without any disclaimer or asterisk of any kind. Shockingly the book never mentions the Afghanistan Papers, which exposed the sham that the Afghan mission was.
The morals and ethics of the West are never in question and their crimes are passed off as "mistakes". One of their "solutions" was the "stay the course" and remain in Afghanistan like in Korea or Germany and that by announcing that they were leaving, they gave the Taliban motivation. The comparison of Afghanistan to Korea and Germany is laughable, as is this solution. Those two countries were involved or could have been involved with large conventional forces invading from outside the country. There was no active insurgency in either of those countries, while there was a very strong one in Afghanistan. The cost in lives and treasure would have been too much for a empire on its last legs. In addition, they state that the Taliban held back in the years leading up to the drawing down in 2014 but the number of dead Coalition soldiers tell a different story, the deadliest years being 2010 and 2011, when the Taliban were supposed to be hiding in Pakistan.
This book is worth the read but supplemented with other books. The American War in Afghanistan: A History by Carter Malkasian as well as The Afghanistan Papers by Craig Whitlock are great books to read along with this one. If you read it by itself you are given the false impression that the Americans had good intentions and that everything they did was a "mistake" and that the current capitalist, neoliberal order can do no wrong.

[Ad_Lindsay · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Ledger - Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan provides an in-depth account of the fall of Afghanistan and the re-takeover by the Taliban, following a war that spanned two decades. It is written by two people who were on the ground when the Taliban advanced and took back Kabul. They explain in-depth the dire situation that resulted in the fall of Afghanistan in less than a month and the quick withdrawal of the U.S and it’s allies. The authors cover exactly what went wrong and how nothing has changed in the 20 years that the war raged on for, while making valid comparisons to the failure of the U.S in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan decades earlier.

Two passages stood out to me most: Between 2001 and 2019, the number of international personnel (military and civilian) who served in Afghanistan exceeded two million people, an annual average of 134,000 personnel. They expended an estimated 628 million working days and five billion working hours over that period (page 189). The cost of the war was USD 2 trillion. Yet what went wrong was that no one stopped to listen to what the Afghans needed. It was another case of the west knows best. This was articulated in this quote on page 289 from Robert Kagan: “we live history forward, in the chaos of onrushing events, without a clear guide. But we judge history backwards, smugly armed with the knowledge of what did happen and uninterested in what might have happened”.

An excellent account of the failings of the war in Afghanistan.

[Nick Giokas · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The Ledger" offers a solid overview of the policy failures that led to the collapse of the Afghan government in the summer of 2021, providing a thorough explaination for how the rapid collapse over 9 days in August was not, as some have posited, proof of the inevitability of failure in Afghanistan.

To caveat, this 5 star review is predicated on several factors:
1) Familiarity with COIN doctrine/literature
2) Familiarity with the Afghan conflict
3) Familiarity with existing literature on state-building

Essentially, this book is, without a shadow of a doubt, worthy of 5 stars if you already possess a strong foundational knowledge on the underlying subject matter. If you do not possess this foundation, it is probably closer to 3 stars.

Many of the other reviews cite the need for an editor or difficulty parsing the analysis provided. This is because the book serves as a specific case-study, choosing to refresh the readers assumed knowledge rather than bringing readers fully "up to speed".

This is a fantastic editorial choice for those familiar with the subject matter as they are allowed to engage with the "meat and potatoes" of the book without having to slog over retreads of ideas they're familiar with.

However, for those less acquainted with the subject matter this editorial choice likely creates problems. The authors make very direct, pointed arguments that readers new to the subject area might misconstrue as conjecture and opinion rather than fact and analysis.

In essence, this book succeeds at acting like an advanced, specialized, class in a broader subject matter. For example, a class specifically on monetary policy, where the instructor assumes you have taken the prerequisite introductory economics courses. You can absolutely benefit a great deal from taking that monetary policy course without those prerequisites, but you'll end up coming away with a lot less than the instructor intended.

[Montaigne · Rating 3 out of 5]

I doubt theres a better book on the subject, as the authors were both involved in policy during the war and in evacuations in the aftermath, but unfortunately theres just an insane amount of filler and some pointless sniping at certain contemporary politicians that distracts from what should have been a little more dry historicity. Probably something yet to be written that can look back with a little more hindsight (this came out basically instantly after the withdrawal) will probably be superior

[Robert D · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent book and analysis of the disaster of Afghanistan. It truly makes the US look like they have no business undertaking such a project of nation building. The mistakes made by Bush and Rumsfeld set the stage for disaster, but no one ever apparently thought through how the process could actually bare fruit. After Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan and no apparent ability at learning lessons and our inability to govern ourselves at home I am very distraught to say the least!

[Inès Dalle · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is a really interesting book which gives a great insight on the conflict and on the reasons of the failure of the West’s intervention in Afghanistan. However, it is a bit difficult to read, especially with no good prior knowledge of the conflict (lots of names, dates, acronyms, data, etc. which makes it a bit heavy). Overall really liked it!

[Stefano · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book

The insight the authors give on the Afghan fiasco is terrific. I share most of the analysis and the conclusions. A must read for those who are interested in serious analysis

[Josie Seto · Rating 5 out of 5]

Super interesting! Loved his reflections on engaging with culture, and found comments on aid and the divided goals of the west thought provoking

[Matt Gilchrist · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brutal and clear