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85 pages, Paperback
First published November 24, 2016
“the one who calculates probability relies on risk without actually taking a risk, that is to say, he leaves reality and at the same time transforms chance—l’hasard—into a principle allowing him to decide on reality. This means that probability is never punctually realized as such, nor does it concern a single real event, but... it allows us to intervene in reality, as considered from a special perspective, in order to govern it.”
“... if quantum mechanics relies on the convention that reality must be eclipsed by probability, then disappearance is the only way in which the real can peremptorily be affirmed as such and avoid the grasp of calculation. Majorana turned his very person into the exemplary cipher of the status of the real in the probabilistic universe of contemporary physics, and produced in this way an event that is at the same time absolutely real and absolutely improbable.”
It is evident that, as was suggested by Simone Weil, the paradoxes in question in quantum mechanics derive from the unconditional assumption of probabilistic conceptions, which are not matched by an adequate reflection on the very nature of the notion of probability. For both the supporters of the orthodox theory and their critics, the state of the system before and after observation is not a real but a probabilistic state; however, they seem to produce a representation of this state and argue as if probability were a very special kind of reality, which one can think in a paradoxical way (for example, as if a particle were at the same time in both state A and state B). But is it correct to represent the probable as if it were something that exists? In other words, what is at stake is a problem concerning the ontology of the probable — or the possible, since probability is nothing other than a possibility qualified in a certain way. . . (pp. 27–28).
. . . Chance is a non-cause, or an accidental cause, which we refer to when events that seem to have been produced because of a given final cause are instead produced accidentally and unexpectedly. . . . It goes without saying that Aristotle rules out that there can be a science of chance and what is accidental. . . . If we try to define probability in Aristotle's terms, we may say that it is a potency emancipated from its hierarchical subjection to the act. Insofar as it has secured an existence that is independent of its actual realization, such a possibility tends to replace reality and thus to become the object of a science of the accidental — unthinkable for Aristotle — that considers possibility as such, not as a means of knowing the real, but as a way of intervening in it in order to govern it. The analogy with Aristotelian dynamis is all the stronger here since the latter was indeed the specific dimension of human techniques and knowledge. In De Anima, Aristotle thus comes to define the intellect as "a being whose nature is potential being" and compares it to a writing tablet on which nothing has yet been actually written. What happened in modern statistics and quantum physics is that the writing tablet — pure possibility — replaced reality, and knowledge now knows only knowledge itself. . . (pp. 39–40).
Any experiment performed on an atomic system exerts a finite perterbation on it that cannot be eliminated or reduced for reasons of principle. The result of any measurement seems, therefore, to be concerned with the state the system is led to during the experiment rather than with the unknowable state of the system before being perturbed.This, from an essay where the physicist describes the parallel between the natural and social sciences. Of course, many social scientists will agree too, and have known this for a long time: the presence of an experiment(er) changs the outcome of an experiment. These bizarrely-called "social facts" are assertions of power in a domain ruled by probability.