Though I had already read a fair bit of Irish history concerning the Treaty negotiations, this book particularly clarified how much Lloyd George was constrained in the negotiations, firstly by the diehard Unionists whose support in government he relied upon, and for whom any measure of Irish independence was anathema, and secondly by the independence movements gathering strength in India and Egypt: a republic at the heart of the British Empire, it was felt, could only encourage separatist movements elsewhere in the Empire and hasten its demise. The treatment of the negotiations is detailed and well referenced, and the author is careful to indicate where there are conflicting accounts of crucial stages in the negotiations. It is also a largely even handed treatment of a topic which is so often an occasion for polemic and propaganda in place of history. Some judgements in the final chapter might be questioned. His statement, for example, that De Valera was largely responsible for 'the dimensions if not the fact of the civil war' is at the least disingenuous. The civil war was started by a Free State army, created and armed by Britain, who insisted that the Free State government open hostilities against the republicans occupying the Four Courts, and continued to support the prosecution of the war (since the republican cause was an obvious threat to the Treaty they had so laboriously imposed) until the opposing side laid down their arms. The republicans led by De Valera were simply holding fast to the mandate given by the overwhelming success in the 1918 general election of Sinn Fein, who openly campaigned on the basis of the creation of an Irish republic separate from Britain. Like so much in this world created in the crucible of the post-WW1 years, the Irish conflicts covered in this book are still with us, as the current Fianna Fail gradually retreats from the republican principles which were its original raison d'être, and cedes ground to a reborn Sinn Fein.