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Pakistan's Wars: An Alternative History
This book studies the wars Pakistan has fought over the years with India as well as other non-state actors. Focusing on the first Kashmir war (1947–48), the wars of 1965 and 1971, and the 1999 Kargil war, it analyses the elite decision-making, which leads to these conflicts and tries to understand how Pakistan got involved in the first place. The author applies the ‘gambling model’ to provide insights into the dysfunctional world view, risk-taking behaviour, and other behavioural patterns of the decision makers, which precipitate these wars and highlight their effects on India–Pakistan relations for the future. The book also brings to the fore the experience of widows, children, common soldiers, displaced civilians, and villagers living near borders, in the form of interviews, to understand the subaltern perspective.
A nuanced and accessible military history of Pakistan, this book will be indispensable to scholars and researchers of military history, defence and strategic studies, international relations, political studies, war and conflict studies, and South Asian studies.
A nuanced and accessible military history of Pakistan, this book will be indispensable to scholars and researchers of military history, defence and strategic studies, international relations, political studies, war and conflict studies, and South Asian studies.
382 pages, Kindle Edition
Published June 9, 2022
About the author
Tariq Rahman
26 books27 followersTariq Rahman PhD is presently Dean, School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore. He is also HEC Distinguished National Professor and Professor Emeritus at the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr Rahman has been a guest professor in Denmark and Spain, and a Fulbright research scholar (1995-96) at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. He was also the first incumbent of the Pakistan Chair at U.C. Berkeley (2004-05). He has been a research fellow at the Oxford Centre of Islamic Studies and the South Asia Institute at the University of Heidelberg. He has been given several awards: the Presidential Pride of Performance (1994), HEC lifetime achievement award, the highly prestigious Humboldt Research Award (2012) from Germany, and the Sitara-i-Imtiaz in 2013. He was awarded a higher doctorate (D.Litt) by the University of Sheffield for all of his published research in 2014.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 14, 2025
I think this book is misunderstood. It is not a history of Pakistan’s wars, but rather a reflection on the desire that those wars may not have been fought at all—because all of them were “pointless” to the extent that those fighting them asked, “Why are we even fighting?” They were “ill-planned” to the degree that one of the key assumptions in all those wars was “India will not cross the international border.” They were “gambles,” and instead of serving the country’s most important interest—its survival—they endangered it every time.
This book reflects on the mindset of the planners and perpetrators of these wars, while also focusing especially on the experiences of soldiers, officers, and civilians. Having gone through the gruesome details in the chapters on 1948 and 1971, one develops a kind of aversion to war—especially wars of aggression.
A very strong point of the book is that Tariq has referenced extensively, giving references at the end of every chapter which reflects on the pain that he has taken to fulfil this humongous job. Moreover, he has tried to refer to a number of Political, psychological and social theories at different points in the book which makes the book interesting as well as gives it academic authenticity.
It is both interesting and disappointing to see commonalities in the planning of all the wars. All of the wars were planned by “cliques” comprising civilians and military personnel at different times. Each time, Pakistan overestimated its ability, underestimated the potential of its enemy, and neglected those who pointed out potential glitches in the strategy. Moreover, all the wars resulted from authoritarian thinking—including the government of MA Jinnah in 1948.
The writer aptly describes how each war shaped the mentality of decision-makers and the people on both sides—especially in Pakistan’s case. He identifies that after the 1948 war, civilians were never taken on board for any decisions regarding war. It was ingrained in the military mindset after this conflict that civilians could not handle such issues. This reminds me of the famous quote by Georges Clemenceau: “War is too important to be left to the generals.” But like many other matters, Generals tend to think that “WE” know better than anyone else. Even in 1948, though the Governor General and Prime Minister were part of the decision-making process, the parliament or cabinet was never consulted—just like in all other wars. While in the case of low intensity operations Civilian governments were given little to no information and they were in no position to hold those responsible accountable. Interestingly, in case of Kargil, it was the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif which came to the rescue of Musharaf where Musharraf’s adventure placed officers and soldiers in appalling conditions for a futile war.
The 1965 war, “the bastard child of foreign office and HQ 12 Corps”, made the nation more dogmatic in its thinking and moved it away from rationality, mystifying and giving a mythological color to war. Moreover, this war actually inculcated hatred for India and allowed the military establishment to shape its identity as the saviors and guardians of the country, with India portrayed as the key antagonist.
The key absurdity of the 1971 war—alongside a series of stupidities, atrocities, and errors—was the tagline: “The defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan.” Despite this thinking, perhaps the only strategic advantage Pakistan might have gained by opening the Western Front was lost because it was launched late and half-heartedly, resulting in an inglorious defeat and loss in the Battle of Longewal. As for the atrocities committed against the Bengalis by the Pakistan Army—and against Biharis by the Bengalis—they demand a separate piece of writing. These details are enough to make one realize the horrors of war and what human hatred is capable of achieving.
Of all the wars, the most damaging for “trust” between India and Pakistan was the Kargil War of 1999—most importantly due to its timing, in the wake of talks between Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee was broken to the extent that he told Sartaj Aziz in a gloomy voice, “Yeh aap ne kya kiya Sartaj Sahab.” Moreover, low-intensity warfare has the potential to take the region to an Armageddon—as was seen in the recent standoff between India and Pakistan.
The writer along with referring to the gruesome details of war and the atrocities also mentions the instances of altruism and kindness towards civilians as well as to the enemy soldiers of both sides. This chapter makes one realise the war is indeed a precarious and convoluted matter which exposes different shades of a human beings at different times. To some extent, it also revives one’s faith in humanity—showing that even those blinded by ideologies or misled by their leaders still find a way back to kindness.
In the End the Writer has understandably identified Kashmir as the main flash point between the two countries and has tried to give solutions. Here he seems to do wishful thinking but then solutions are always wishful and dreams until they are put to action. Rehman seems right to understand that for a truly enduring peace the international system needs to change and the cardinals of pride for the state need to rationalise as well.
It is a great book, and a must-read for anyone who wants to understand both the military and human sides of Pakistan’s wars.
This book reflects on the mindset of the planners and perpetrators of these wars, while also focusing especially on the experiences of soldiers, officers, and civilians. Having gone through the gruesome details in the chapters on 1948 and 1971, one develops a kind of aversion to war—especially wars of aggression.
A very strong point of the book is that Tariq has referenced extensively, giving references at the end of every chapter which reflects on the pain that he has taken to fulfil this humongous job. Moreover, he has tried to refer to a number of Political, psychological and social theories at different points in the book which makes the book interesting as well as gives it academic authenticity.
It is both interesting and disappointing to see commonalities in the planning of all the wars. All of the wars were planned by “cliques” comprising civilians and military personnel at different times. Each time, Pakistan overestimated its ability, underestimated the potential of its enemy, and neglected those who pointed out potential glitches in the strategy. Moreover, all the wars resulted from authoritarian thinking—including the government of MA Jinnah in 1948.
The writer aptly describes how each war shaped the mentality of decision-makers and the people on both sides—especially in Pakistan’s case. He identifies that after the 1948 war, civilians were never taken on board for any decisions regarding war. It was ingrained in the military mindset after this conflict that civilians could not handle such issues. This reminds me of the famous quote by Georges Clemenceau: “War is too important to be left to the generals.” But like many other matters, Generals tend to think that “WE” know better than anyone else. Even in 1948, though the Governor General and Prime Minister were part of the decision-making process, the parliament or cabinet was never consulted—just like in all other wars. While in the case of low intensity operations Civilian governments were given little to no information and they were in no position to hold those responsible accountable. Interestingly, in case of Kargil, it was the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif which came to the rescue of Musharaf where Musharraf’s adventure placed officers and soldiers in appalling conditions for a futile war.
The 1965 war, “the bastard child of foreign office and HQ 12 Corps”, made the nation more dogmatic in its thinking and moved it away from rationality, mystifying and giving a mythological color to war. Moreover, this war actually inculcated hatred for India and allowed the military establishment to shape its identity as the saviors and guardians of the country, with India portrayed as the key antagonist.
The key absurdity of the 1971 war—alongside a series of stupidities, atrocities, and errors—was the tagline: “The defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan.” Despite this thinking, perhaps the only strategic advantage Pakistan might have gained by opening the Western Front was lost because it was launched late and half-heartedly, resulting in an inglorious defeat and loss in the Battle of Longewal. As for the atrocities committed against the Bengalis by the Pakistan Army—and against Biharis by the Bengalis—they demand a separate piece of writing. These details are enough to make one realize the horrors of war and what human hatred is capable of achieving.
Of all the wars, the most damaging for “trust” between India and Pakistan was the Kargil War of 1999—most importantly due to its timing, in the wake of talks between Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee was broken to the extent that he told Sartaj Aziz in a gloomy voice, “Yeh aap ne kya kiya Sartaj Sahab.” Moreover, low-intensity warfare has the potential to take the region to an Armageddon—as was seen in the recent standoff between India and Pakistan.
The writer along with referring to the gruesome details of war and the atrocities also mentions the instances of altruism and kindness towards civilians as well as to the enemy soldiers of both sides. This chapter makes one realise the war is indeed a precarious and convoluted matter which exposes different shades of a human beings at different times. To some extent, it also revives one’s faith in humanity—showing that even those blinded by ideologies or misled by their leaders still find a way back to kindness.
In the End the Writer has understandably identified Kashmir as the main flash point between the two countries and has tried to give solutions. Here he seems to do wishful thinking but then solutions are always wishful and dreams until they are put to action. Rehman seems right to understand that for a truly enduring peace the international system needs to change and the cardinals of pride for the state need to rationalise as well.
It is a great book, and a must-read for anyone who wants to understand both the military and human sides of Pakistan’s wars.
June 27, 2026
Some books inform. Some books challenge. Occasionally, one comes along that does both with enough intellectual honesty to make the reader pause and reconsider what they thought they already knew. Tariq Rahman's "Pakistan's Wars: An Alternative History" belongs to that rarer category.
Rahman is not an outsider looking in. A former Pakistan Army officer who chose academia over a military career, he brings to this book something that neither pure scholars nor serving soldiers can easily claim i.e. the credibility of lived institutional experience combined with the freedom that comes from having stepped away from it. That combination gives the book its distinctive texture. It is critical without being cynical, searching without being sensationalist.
The book traces Pakistan's armed conflicts from the first Kashmir war of 1948 through the Kargil episode of 1999, with the War on Terror providing a sobering coda to the narrative. But Rahman is not interested in battles as such. His real subject is the human architecture of war; the decisions made at the top, the consequences borne at the bottom, and the vast, largely unexamined terrain in between.
On the question of leadership, Rahman is candid. He argues that Pakistan's military and political establishments have, at various moments, allowed personal ambition, institutional pride, and the intoxicating pull of national mythology to shape decisions that ought to have been guided by cooler strategic reasoning. He calls the senior military establishment the "General Cliques", a term that carries critique but also, one senses, a degree of sorrow from someone who once belonged to that world. His argument is not that the army is uniquely villainous but that the seductions of glory and honour; impulses as old as warfare itself, have not always been resisted as firmly as they should have been. It is a distinction worth holding onto. The tone is that of a concerned insider rather than a hostile critic.
Where the book truly distinguishes itself, however, is in the space it creates for those who rarely appear in military histories at all. Rahman gives sustained attention to what he calls the "subaltern class", the sepoys, the porters, the ordinary men and women whose lives were upended or ended by wars they had little hand in shaping. Most scholarship on South Asian conflicts moves briskly past these figures on its way to grander strategic arguments. Rahman slows down, and the book becomes more truthful for it.
The chapters on 1971 are the most deeply felt in the book. Rahman approaches the Bangladesh Liberation War with a moral seriousness that is evident on every page; the violence, the humanitarian catastrophe, the loss of innocence on multiple sides. He does not assign guilt selectively, and his willingness to document atrocities across the board reflects an intellectual integrity that is not always easy to maintain when writing about a wound this raw. One might wish, though, that he had extended similar attention to the experience of West Pakistani soldiers during that period; men who found themselves in an increasingly hostile land, far from home, caught between orders and conscience, their own disorientation and suffering a story that has never quite found its full telling.
A similar unevenness appears in the treatment of India. Rahman is willing to examine the ideological currents that have shaped Pakistani policy with considerable frankness. Yet when discussing India's position on Kashmir, particularly in the context of 1948, the Hindutva politics that have come to define so much of India's stance in the region go largely unexamined. It is a gap rather than a failing, but in a book that otherwise holds itself to high standards of even-handedness, it is worth noting.
These are, in the end, the kinds of reservations one has about a book that is genuinely trying to do something difficult and largely succeeds. "Pakistan's Wars: An Alternative History" does not offer the reader easy conclusions or the satisfaction of clear villains and unambiguous heroes. What it offers instead is something more durable; a humane, clear-eyed account of what war actually costs, measured not in territory gained or lost but in the lives it reshapes and the ones it quietly destroys. For anyone seeking to understand the deeper human and psychological dimensions of conflict in South Asia, this is a book that rewards the effort it asks of you.
Rahman is not an outsider looking in. A former Pakistan Army officer who chose academia over a military career, he brings to this book something that neither pure scholars nor serving soldiers can easily claim i.e. the credibility of lived institutional experience combined with the freedom that comes from having stepped away from it. That combination gives the book its distinctive texture. It is critical without being cynical, searching without being sensationalist.
The book traces Pakistan's armed conflicts from the first Kashmir war of 1948 through the Kargil episode of 1999, with the War on Terror providing a sobering coda to the narrative. But Rahman is not interested in battles as such. His real subject is the human architecture of war; the decisions made at the top, the consequences borne at the bottom, and the vast, largely unexamined terrain in between.
On the question of leadership, Rahman is candid. He argues that Pakistan's military and political establishments have, at various moments, allowed personal ambition, institutional pride, and the intoxicating pull of national mythology to shape decisions that ought to have been guided by cooler strategic reasoning. He calls the senior military establishment the "General Cliques", a term that carries critique but also, one senses, a degree of sorrow from someone who once belonged to that world. His argument is not that the army is uniquely villainous but that the seductions of glory and honour; impulses as old as warfare itself, have not always been resisted as firmly as they should have been. It is a distinction worth holding onto. The tone is that of a concerned insider rather than a hostile critic.
Where the book truly distinguishes itself, however, is in the space it creates for those who rarely appear in military histories at all. Rahman gives sustained attention to what he calls the "subaltern class", the sepoys, the porters, the ordinary men and women whose lives were upended or ended by wars they had little hand in shaping. Most scholarship on South Asian conflicts moves briskly past these figures on its way to grander strategic arguments. Rahman slows down, and the book becomes more truthful for it.
The chapters on 1971 are the most deeply felt in the book. Rahman approaches the Bangladesh Liberation War with a moral seriousness that is evident on every page; the violence, the humanitarian catastrophe, the loss of innocence on multiple sides. He does not assign guilt selectively, and his willingness to document atrocities across the board reflects an intellectual integrity that is not always easy to maintain when writing about a wound this raw. One might wish, though, that he had extended similar attention to the experience of West Pakistani soldiers during that period; men who found themselves in an increasingly hostile land, far from home, caught between orders and conscience, their own disorientation and suffering a story that has never quite found its full telling.
A similar unevenness appears in the treatment of India. Rahman is willing to examine the ideological currents that have shaped Pakistani policy with considerable frankness. Yet when discussing India's position on Kashmir, particularly in the context of 1948, the Hindutva politics that have come to define so much of India's stance in the region go largely unexamined. It is a gap rather than a failing, but in a book that otherwise holds itself to high standards of even-handedness, it is worth noting.
These are, in the end, the kinds of reservations one has about a book that is genuinely trying to do something difficult and largely succeeds. "Pakistan's Wars: An Alternative History" does not offer the reader easy conclusions or the satisfaction of clear villains and unambiguous heroes. What it offers instead is something more durable; a humane, clear-eyed account of what war actually costs, measured not in territory gained or lost but in the lives it reshapes and the ones it quietly destroys. For anyone seeking to understand the deeper human and psychological dimensions of conflict in South Asia, this is a book that rewards the effort it asks of you.
July 11, 2023
Excellent excellent excellent study of the shitty and needless war 'gambles'. Must read for anyone interested in the history of Pakistan!
April 1, 2025
A brilliant and much-needed analysis of Pakistan’s military history examines all the major wars it has fought. The rationale behind these unnecessary decisions is steeped in racist beliefs and religious fundamentalism—unsurprising, given that the country was founded on the deeply problematic "Two-Nation Theory." A common trope in these conflicts is the assumption that Indians would be too "afraid" to counterattack, a miscalculation that has always backfired spectacularly.
Unsurprisingly, there has been little regard for the lives of both soldiers and civilians in pursuit of vaguely defined goals. The author does an excellent job of exploring the lives of affected families—whether soldiers or civilians on both sides of the border. Even decades after these conflicts, it’s clear that the families continue to pay a heavy price.
Given that the Pakistani military has a stranglehold on the nation's narrative-building and media, such reckless actions are unlikely to end anytime soon—and that’s dangerously destabilizing for the entire subcontinent.
Unsurprisingly, there has been little regard for the lives of both soldiers and civilians in pursuit of vaguely defined goals. The author does an excellent job of exploring the lives of affected families—whether soldiers or civilians on both sides of the border. Even decades after these conflicts, it’s clear that the families continue to pay a heavy price.
Given that the Pakistani military has a stranglehold on the nation's narrative-building and media, such reckless actions are unlikely to end anytime soon—and that’s dangerously destabilizing for the entire subcontinent.
March 24, 2025
Provides a wonderful objective stance and well written summaries on the wars that this nation has gone through, most probably the best source for information on these wars you can get, it focuses on the actual truth rather than being written with a nationalistic or any sort of biased focus in mind; fantastic for scholars, enthusiasts, and the average citizen alike.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews