What do you think?
Rate this book
Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine
A timely and accessible history of how Putin and the conflicts he has chosen to involve Russia in has inexorably reshaped the country and her role on the world stage.
Putin's Wars is an accessible overview of the conflicts in which Russia has been involved since Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 2012. But it also looks more broadly at his recreation of Russian military power and its expansion to include a range of new capabilities, from mercenaries to operatives in a relentless information war against Western powers. This is a engrossing strategic overview of a rejuvenated Russian military and the successes, and failures, on the battlefield designed to keep Russia front and centre on the world stage. Thanks to Dr Galeotti's wide-ranging contacts throughout Russia, it is also peppered with anecdotes of military life, personal snapshots of conflicts, and an extraordinary collection of first-hand accounts from serving and retired Russian officers.
Russia continues to dominate the news cycle throughout the Western world. There is no better time to understand how and why Putin has involved his armed forces in a variety of conflicts for over a decade. There is no author better placed to demystify the capabilities of the Russian military and give a glimpse into what the future may hold.
Putin's Wars is a lively and engaging history of a reawakened Russian bear and how it currently operates both at home and abroad to ensure Russia is front and centre on the world stage.
Putin's Wars is an accessible overview of the conflicts in which Russia has been involved since Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 2012. But it also looks more broadly at his recreation of Russian military power and its expansion to include a range of new capabilities, from mercenaries to operatives in a relentless information war against Western powers. This is a engrossing strategic overview of a rejuvenated Russian military and the successes, and failures, on the battlefield designed to keep Russia front and centre on the world stage. Thanks to Dr Galeotti's wide-ranging contacts throughout Russia, it is also peppered with anecdotes of military life, personal snapshots of conflicts, and an extraordinary collection of first-hand accounts from serving and retired Russian officers.
Russia continues to dominate the news cycle throughout the Western world. There is no better time to understand how and why Putin has involved his armed forces in a variety of conflicts for over a decade. There is no author better placed to demystify the capabilities of the Russian military and give a glimpse into what the future may hold.
Putin's Wars is a lively and engaging history of a reawakened Russian bear and how it currently operates both at home and abroad to ensure Russia is front and centre on the world stage.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published November 8, 2022
130 people are currently reading
1336 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 74 reviews
January 19, 2024
Imperialistic hubris proves fatal
Imagine this: just as you've completed the manuscript for your latest book on Putin and his wars, Russia unexpectedly invades Ukraine. Mark Galeotti, the British Putin expert (or as the Germans would label him, a Putin versteher), found himself in this very predicament. Suddenly, his book became simultaneously relevant and hopelessly outdated. Swiftly, Galeotti added an extra chapter and fine-tuned earlier sections with a few strategic additions. When it comes to Putin, staying ahead in writing is a challenge.
As Galeotti candidly admits, even he failed to foresee the war. Yet, those who claimed they saw it coming, perhaps with hindsight, predicted a three-day conflict. This surprising duration indicates that the Russian army underperformed far beyond anyone's expectations. How did this happen? This is where this book exceeds.
While this book wasn't originally intended to serve as an explanation for the invasion of Ukraine, it inevitably takes on that role. I found it valuable to place the invasion within a broader military context and comprehend that this wasn't Russia's inaugural foray into warfare. Galeotti adeptly delves into the Chechen war, the Georgian conflict, and Russian involvement in Syria. He not only shows how and why these wars unfolded but also shows common threads such as inefficiency, brutality, and corruption within the Russian army, coupled with overconfidence and hubris at the political level.
Following the humiliation of the Russian army during the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin aspired to position Russia as a new superpower. A potent and modernized military was crucial to reclaim Russia's role in the evolving world order and construct a national myth of pride, glory, and success. Galeotti underscores that Putin's success as president stemmed from the second Chechen war. Putin revived Russia's pride, convinced that this formula, after successes in Georgia and reclaiming the Crimean peninsula, could be replicated in Ukraine.
It proved not to be: Putin and his generals' hubris disrupted the 'special military operation' plan, squandering the billions spent on modernizing the Russian army. It illustrates how Putin, aiming to emulate Tsar Alexander III can be more fittingly compared to Tsar Nicholas II, who saw World War I as a chance to rejuvenate his regime but instead precipitated its downfall.
Imagine this: just as you've completed the manuscript for your latest book on Putin and his wars, Russia unexpectedly invades Ukraine. Mark Galeotti, the British Putin expert (or as the Germans would label him, a Putin versteher), found himself in this very predicament. Suddenly, his book became simultaneously relevant and hopelessly outdated. Swiftly, Galeotti added an extra chapter and fine-tuned earlier sections with a few strategic additions. When it comes to Putin, staying ahead in writing is a challenge.
As Galeotti candidly admits, even he failed to foresee the war. Yet, those who claimed they saw it coming, perhaps with hindsight, predicted a three-day conflict. This surprising duration indicates that the Russian army underperformed far beyond anyone's expectations. How did this happen? This is where this book exceeds.
While this book wasn't originally intended to serve as an explanation for the invasion of Ukraine, it inevitably takes on that role. I found it valuable to place the invasion within a broader military context and comprehend that this wasn't Russia's inaugural foray into warfare. Galeotti adeptly delves into the Chechen war, the Georgian conflict, and Russian involvement in Syria. He not only shows how and why these wars unfolded but also shows common threads such as inefficiency, brutality, and corruption within the Russian army, coupled with overconfidence and hubris at the political level.
Following the humiliation of the Russian army during the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin aspired to position Russia as a new superpower. A potent and modernized military was crucial to reclaim Russia's role in the evolving world order and construct a national myth of pride, glory, and success. Galeotti underscores that Putin's success as president stemmed from the second Chechen war. Putin revived Russia's pride, convinced that this formula, after successes in Georgia and reclaiming the Crimean peninsula, could be replicated in Ukraine.
It proved not to be: Putin and his generals' hubris disrupted the 'special military operation' plan, squandering the billions spent on modernizing the Russian army. It illustrates how Putin, aiming to emulate Tsar Alexander III can be more fittingly compared to Tsar Nicholas II, who saw World War I as a chance to rejuvenate his regime but instead precipitated its downfall.
December 29, 2022
This is the best book I have read on Putin era Russian military reforms, organization, and capabilities. Although the title is “Putin’s Wars,” this book is not about Putin himself. Instead, Galeotti focuses almost exclusively on the Russian military, how it has evolved / reformed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and how it has performed in the conflicts of the immediate post Soviet decades, to include the most recent (and ongoing) aggression against Ukraine in 2022.
Unlike some other works in this area, Galeotti balances tactical and organizational minutiae with a broader examination of trends and strategic context. He is able to do so without sacrificing the detail necessary for the subject.
Among the big themes that emerge are:
(1) The uneven level of success of the Russian military reform efforts going back to the 1990s
(2) The largely mistaken Western estimations / interpretations of recently emergent Russian military “doctrines,” especially the vaunted notion of “hybrid warfare” usually attributed Chief of the Russian General Staff Gerasimov
(3) After an initial decade of good success, Putin has shown himself to be a poor strategist and increasingly isolated inside a policy bubble dominated NOT by his military commanders but by senior officials from the intelligence services
(4) How the failure to achieve success on the battlefield in Ukraine indicates larger systemic Russian weakness, not just with specific military reforms but also long term strategic realities (economic, social, demographic)
Overall, this was a fascinating and insightful read. As a long time student of Russian history and affairs, I found it superior to anything written by Lester Grau and other well- established Russian military observers. Highly recommended!
Unlike some other works in this area, Galeotti balances tactical and organizational minutiae with a broader examination of trends and strategic context. He is able to do so without sacrificing the detail necessary for the subject.
Among the big themes that emerge are:
(1) The uneven level of success of the Russian military reform efforts going back to the 1990s
(2) The largely mistaken Western estimations / interpretations of recently emergent Russian military “doctrines,” especially the vaunted notion of “hybrid warfare” usually attributed Chief of the Russian General Staff Gerasimov
(3) After an initial decade of good success, Putin has shown himself to be a poor strategist and increasingly isolated inside a policy bubble dominated NOT by his military commanders but by senior officials from the intelligence services
(4) How the failure to achieve success on the battlefield in Ukraine indicates larger systemic Russian weakness, not just with specific military reforms but also long term strategic realities (economic, social, demographic)
Overall, this was a fascinating and insightful read. As a long time student of Russian history and affairs, I found it superior to anything written by Lester Grau and other well- established Russian military observers. Highly recommended!
March 5, 2023
At first glance at Putin’s Wars, you might think oh this is just another hit piece on Putin and, good, screw that guy. But dear reader, it’s so much more!
Author Mark Galeotti takes a deep dive into the Russian military in a way I have not seen before. This book was completed before the beginning of the Ukraine War but was slightly updated once it happened. Here’s what you need to know. This book explains everything about what we are seeing in the news. The rot of the Russian military system and why Putin is partly but not entirely to blame.
Galeotti is rightly seen as an expert on Russia and has written/talked extensively on it. This is a huge boon to the book because books like this can often get stuffy and bore the reader into submission. Galeotti keeps an eye on the wider picture and his choice of anecdotes are fascinating. A story about cell phones going off in the middle of battle is a particular standout. If you want to know how Ukraine happened, you must read this.
Author Mark Galeotti takes a deep dive into the Russian military in a way I have not seen before. This book was completed before the beginning of the Ukraine War but was slightly updated once it happened. Here’s what you need to know. This book explains everything about what we are seeing in the news. The rot of the Russian military system and why Putin is partly but not entirely to blame.
Galeotti is rightly seen as an expert on Russia and has written/talked extensively on it. This is a huge boon to the book because books like this can often get stuffy and bore the reader into submission. Galeotti keeps an eye on the wider picture and his choice of anecdotes are fascinating. A story about cell phones going off in the middle of battle is a particular standout. If you want to know how Ukraine happened, you must read this.
March 4, 2025
In what seems like an endless list of books about Putin’s Russia, this one stands out because it only focuses on its military. It was written before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, with subsequent updates until autumn 2023.
Galeotti has a clear structure. First, he looks at the state of the Russian military before Putin came to power. After the disintegration of the USSR, the remnants of its military inherited by Russia were in a very poor state. The military suffered from widespread corruption, lack of funds, outdated equipment, and very low morale. Attempts to reform were ineffective. This was showcased in the First Chechen War, where the Russian army performed very poorly, with a humiliating ceasefire in the end.
Putin was set to rebuild the strength of the military, to restore national pride, and, of course, to challenge Western dominance. He was, and still is, an insecure leader, nostalgic about the might of the USSR and what he sees as a humiliating disintegration of the Soviet power orchestrated by the West.
The two Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2000/2009) shaped the military’s approach to war. It learned from the first (essentially a defeat), to get better organized in the second one. It used a broader array of tactics, from airpower, indiscriminate bombing, to counterinsurgency and collaboration with local strongmen. Putin was happy. He saw that the military could be used to crush dissent and to project power abroad. These two wars led to modernization of the military and to a new strategy, but it wasn’t enough.
In the 2008 invasion of Georgia and intervention in the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, even though Russia essentially crushed the Georgian hopes for NATO and its military in direct conflict, the Russian military planners learned about the logistical weaknesses (including old equipment that never reached its destination). Another round of modernization followed. In addition, Russia started to develop a new way of conducting war: hybrid warfare or non-linear war, including cyber warfare, political warfare and proxies (Wagner and such). The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the 2015 Syria campaign were textbook examples of this new thinking.
In 2014 and 2022, Russia returned to big wars. With all its modernization and new equipment, with restructuring and new strategic planning, it failed. Putin got accustomed to its inner circle of yes men – few cherry-picked men from the security apparatus, and he became too bold and confident. Maybe the military was able to project power and to crush its adversary in smaller conflicts, but Ukraine showed that Russia miscalculated. Instead of a three-day march to Kyiv, it became a three-year (so far) war, in which Russian forces were matched in the field by a smaller military, of a smaller country, able to learn and adapt faster.
In the final part of the book, Galeotti looks at the future, at the importance of nuclear threats, on mercenaries, reliance on special forces, failures to properly adapt, internal instability. For the future, Putin may seek smaller, more manageable conflicts.
Galeotti is very detailed in his analysis. To be honest, some parts were pretty technical – which unit, where, what equipment, lists and lists – more suitable for military analysts than casual readers. Some biographies of different generals, ministers, chiefs of general staff, hierarchies, who answers to whom etc. – a very confusing web of hierarchies to be honest. Other parts were pretty interesting. He knows his stuff.
Every chapter starts with a personal anecdote.
Galeotti has a clear structure. First, he looks at the state of the Russian military before Putin came to power. After the disintegration of the USSR, the remnants of its military inherited by Russia were in a very poor state. The military suffered from widespread corruption, lack of funds, outdated equipment, and very low morale. Attempts to reform were ineffective. This was showcased in the First Chechen War, where the Russian army performed very poorly, with a humiliating ceasefire in the end.
Putin was set to rebuild the strength of the military, to restore national pride, and, of course, to challenge Western dominance. He was, and still is, an insecure leader, nostalgic about the might of the USSR and what he sees as a humiliating disintegration of the Soviet power orchestrated by the West.
The two Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2000/2009) shaped the military’s approach to war. It learned from the first (essentially a defeat), to get better organized in the second one. It used a broader array of tactics, from airpower, indiscriminate bombing, to counterinsurgency and collaboration with local strongmen. Putin was happy. He saw that the military could be used to crush dissent and to project power abroad. These two wars led to modernization of the military and to a new strategy, but it wasn’t enough.
In the 2008 invasion of Georgia and intervention in the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, even though Russia essentially crushed the Georgian hopes for NATO and its military in direct conflict, the Russian military planners learned about the logistical weaknesses (including old equipment that never reached its destination). Another round of modernization followed. In addition, Russia started to develop a new way of conducting war: hybrid warfare or non-linear war, including cyber warfare, political warfare and proxies (Wagner and such). The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the 2015 Syria campaign were textbook examples of this new thinking.
In 2014 and 2022, Russia returned to big wars. With all its modernization and new equipment, with restructuring and new strategic planning, it failed. Putin got accustomed to its inner circle of yes men – few cherry-picked men from the security apparatus, and he became too bold and confident. Maybe the military was able to project power and to crush its adversary in smaller conflicts, but Ukraine showed that Russia miscalculated. Instead of a three-day march to Kyiv, it became a three-year (so far) war, in which Russian forces were matched in the field by a smaller military, of a smaller country, able to learn and adapt faster.
In the final part of the book, Galeotti looks at the future, at the importance of nuclear threats, on mercenaries, reliance on special forces, failures to properly adapt, internal instability. For the future, Putin may seek smaller, more manageable conflicts.
Galeotti is very detailed in his analysis. To be honest, some parts were pretty technical – which unit, where, what equipment, lists and lists – more suitable for military analysts than casual readers. Some biographies of different generals, ministers, chiefs of general staff, hierarchies, who answers to whom etc. – a very confusing web of hierarchies to be honest. Other parts were pretty interesting. He knows his stuff.
Every chapter starts with a personal anecdote.
January 25, 2023
This is timely story and although Galeotti certainly has the intellectual chops to tell it, he is by and large incapable of writing it coherently. If his obsessive translation of Russian defense organizations into Russian won't cause your eyes to glaze over, his enduring fascination with 50+ word sentences will. This is written by a professional for the professionals, who will be more interested in the Russian military organization charts and weapons features than most readers will. Too bad the rest of the story wasn't told with the approachability of the opening and closing chapters.
April 8, 2023
An excellent book but the title should have been Putin's Wars and his army. Half of the book deals with the wars that Russia was involved with since the fall of the Soviet Union (First Chechen War, Second Chechen War, Georgian Invasion, Syrian Intervention and Ukraine Invasion) and the other half deals with the Russian army (the commanders, the organisation, the technology and the plans). The book is essential in understanding Russia's war machine and Galeotti is an expert in the field. Well worth the read.
May 6, 2023
I was afraid this would not bring much new. But not only it is a very good summary, even more importantly, the reasonably detailed look into organisational models and strategies of Russian armed forces is great and concise and in typical Galeotti fashion _reasonable_, quality not often seen in Russia related topics.
December 28, 2023
Tässä oli aika paljon listauksia siitä mitä tankkeja Venäjällä on ja kuinka paljon, odotin ehkä syvempää keskittymistä nykytapahtumien historialliseen kontekstiin, vaikka kyllä kirja sitäkin tarjosi varsinkin loppupäässään.
March 30, 2024
Not much to say here...it's an excellent overview of events I lived through. I only wish we knew at the time what we know now...it would have saved a lot of pain and torment in the present day. A well-written but depressing historical account.
November 10, 2023
El libro para alguien apasionado al tema militar y la historia de guerras y conflictos este libro será el indicado para conocer todo lo concerniente al aspecto militar de Moscú. El texto inicia mostrándonos como la guerra es parte importante de la Rusia de Vladimir Putin, con sus juegos y desfiles espectaculares en una Rusia que sin fronteras naturales ha sido susceptible de invacione, en la surge la idea de que la desunión por parte del pueblo ruso los hace débiles y por ello deben estar Unidos.
En la primera parte, es el ejército antes de Putin, en esta parte hay una descripción de la disolución de la Urss que fue relativamente pacífica si se le compara con Yugoslavia, tenemos a un Boris Yeltsin que usa la democracia según cuando le convenga y llegar a usar la fuerza como en la casa blanca cuando hay detractores, igual no había un plan claro de que hacer con Rusia.
En el ámbito del ejército tenemos uno muy débil que se usan incluso como sicarios, los soldados son expuestos a novatadas en la que muchos mueren, hay pocos suboficiales, el hambre y el no tener alojamiento propio era muy común dentro del propio ejército, que debía recurrír a otros trabajos, muchos de estos incluso ilegales, mucho se los problemas se agravaba con la llegada de los contingentes del extinto pacto de Varsovia y un ministro de defensa corrupto.
En la primera guerra chechena se vio la incompetencia del ejército ruso que no pudo contra la rebelión de esta región que defendía su tierra y conocía bien el terreno eran muy comun que se rodearán a las filas rusas, los tanques muchas veces resultaban averiados o sin el blindaje reactivo. Pese a tomar la capital los chechenos supieron usar las montañas y la noche para volver a conquistar grozni. La guerra en Chechenia desmoralizo al ejército ruso debido a su fracasó pese a esto, los mismos proyectaron su poder en transnistria, en Tayikistán, en Georgia y en Serbia como una forma de mostrar aún el poder ruso.
En la segunda parte entra Putin a escena aunque se mostró muy democrático al principio su objetivo era que el Estado volviera a tener el poder y la autoridad, además de criticar la expansión de la OTAN hacia el este, con los atentados terroristas chechenos y la invasión de estos al Daguestán inicio la segunda guerra chechena muy diferente a la primera, en esta los soldados rusos no caían en emboscadas eran más cautelosos en sus avances, los carros de combates iban acompañados de infantería, y se usó muy bien el dominio aéreo, pese a la destrucción de grozni occidente poco hizo de este hecho consumado.
Con las dos guerras chechenas los ministros de defensa aprendieron de sus errores y se pusieron manos a la obra para retomar el ejército ruso, el primero dio el aviso de la necesidad de cambios y actualización necesarias, el segundo ministro empezó a aplicarlas poco a poco, pero hubo un gran cambio que hizo que no hubiera tanta resistencia desde los altos mandos la guerra en Georgia.
Esta guerra se inició por los territorios separatistas de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, estos ya era diferente éticamente a los georgianos, en este país luego de la revolución de las rosas sube al poder alguien muy cercano a occidente que creía que tenía el apoyo de la OTAN, pese no haber una clara hora de ruta para su unión, los osetios provocaron a los georgianos con un bombardeo a pueblos georgianos, la respuesta no sé hizo esperar, pero estos cayeron en la trampa rusa que respondió, gracias a su superioridad numérica y área ya que los georgianos no contaban con mucha defensa antiaérea, los rusos se impusieron pese a la débiles comunicaciones entre estos en lo que llegó haber fuego amigo y vehículos dañados.
En la tercera parte llega el nuevo ministro de defensa Shoigú que llevo a cabo cambios importantes como el uso de medias o rodilleras por parte de las tripas rusas, se compró armamento a proveedores rusos, donde se vieron los nuevos cambios del ejército ruso fue en Crimea, donde el contexto ayudo a Rusia en la medida a que la población etnicamente era más cercana a Rusia se usaron las protestas pro Rusia y colabores a favor de Rusia, que introdujo tropas sin identificar allí, se movilizaron tropas en las fronteras ucranianas para desviar militares. Con el referfum se pasó Crimea a Rusia, donde no tuvo que disparar una sola bala.
En el donbas la situación era diferente las milicias locales estaban mal preparadas y las fuerzas Ucranianas estaba haciendo retroceder a los rebeldes frente a esto Rusia apoya a estos con equipo militar que por ejemplo derribó una avión de pasajeros neerlandés, los ucranianos muchas veces supieron resistir como en el caso del aeropuerto de donetsk, Rusia debió en muchas ocasiones eliminar a los líderes de la repúblicas independientes debido a su incompetencia y oportunismo remplazandolos mejor con líderes rusos, Ucrania de este conflicto reforzaría su identidad y centraría su esfuerzo en mejorar sus fuerzas armadas. Rusia en este conflicto llegó a usar mucho los drones y soldados extranjeros.
Otro conflicto donde intervino Rusia fue en Siria que luego de las protestas en 2011 el gobierno quedó débil ante los rebeldes, Rusia intervino ante miedo que pasara algo similar con lo que aconteció en Libia donde la OTAN depuso a Gaddafi, con el apoyó primero de la aviación y luego de artillería las fuerzas gubernamentales pudieron tomar varias ciudades, Rusia proyecto así su poder ante un EEUU que abandonaba la región, Rusia consiguió experiencia además se probar sus nuevas armas que sirvieron como una forma de publicidad ante clientes de oriente Medio, también hizo uso de mercenarios para así lavarse las manos de las operaciones, contigentes pequeños y que no solo basta con superioridad aérea fueron otras lecciones aprendidas como el uso de la diplomacia con Turquía r Israel.
La cuarta parte es a mi parecer la que menos me intereso, puede que no esté mal informada ni mal escrita, pero es más un trabajo militar sobre las fuerzas armadas rusas desde distintas ópticas Marina, áreas y terrestres, para alguien que quiere saber más acerca de este tema está parte será el indicado
En la quinta parte está el uso de inteligencia por parte de Rusia, Putin ve el mundo exterior a través de órganos de inteligencia rusa, se usa mucho la guerra híbrida en el exterior además de personas que eliminan a personas contrarias al régimen, también es común la guerra psicológica y el uso de mercenarios como Wagner para proyectar su poder en África, en donde también proyecta su poder en pequeña escala es en Kazajistán, otro aspecto a tener en cuenta es el uso de artillería y armas nucleares tácticas en caso de una guerra.
En otros lugares como Bielorusia Rusia a proyectado su poder en la ayuda al dictador luego de las protestas en 2020 este país se volvió un satélite de Moscú, en Ucrania lo que hizo fue volver más experimentado al ejército Ucraniano, en Moldavia usa la presión del gas y transnistria para presionar a su gobierno pro occidente, en el Cáucaso todavía hay terrorismo en menor medida y logro imponerse en Georgia, en Asia central es el proveedor de seguridad Rusia, en el conflicto de Azerbaiyán y Armenia se puso como un actor neutral pese a las ganancias del primero, finalmente con china Moscú se siente más avasallado por el gran poder económico de este, donde se verá el gran poder de la amistad entre ambos será en Taiwán.
El penúltimo capítulo es sobre la guerra en Ucrania que empezó con la acumulación de tropas alrededor de la frontera con Ucrania, que luego paso a unas exigencias irreales de Putin con la OTAN, este quería dejar un legado duradero además que el confinamiento solo ayudó a que Putin escuchará lo quería oír, pese a que la gente daba por derrotada a Ucrania estos pudieron resistir ya que llevaban años esperando esa invacion, Rusia no pudo imponerse al no derribar la aviación y defensa anti aérea ucranianas, que sumados a la corrupción y mala logística rusa no pudieron tomar Kiev y tuvieron que conformarse con un corredor hasta Crimea, aunque la guerra ha quedado como dice el autor en un punto muerto.
Un último capítulo tenemos el futuro de ejército ruso en el que debe enfrentar retos como la crisis demográfica que lleva a una disminución de sus reservistas que son cubiertas con mujeres, igual las novatadas siguen estando presentes al igual que el alcoholismo dentro de las tropas, las sensaciones económicas por parte de occidente y la actual guerra en Ucrania hace que se debiliten sus fuerzas armadas, el futuro ahora será pensarlo sin un Putin cada vez más viejo, la incógnita es quien será ese sucesor que tal vez sea más pragmático.
En conclusión un libro que aborda muy bien todo el aparato militar ruso, pero que muchas vec llega hacer pesado por el uso de gran terminología militar.
En la primera parte, es el ejército antes de Putin, en esta parte hay una descripción de la disolución de la Urss que fue relativamente pacífica si se le compara con Yugoslavia, tenemos a un Boris Yeltsin que usa la democracia según cuando le convenga y llegar a usar la fuerza como en la casa blanca cuando hay detractores, igual no había un plan claro de que hacer con Rusia.
En el ámbito del ejército tenemos uno muy débil que se usan incluso como sicarios, los soldados son expuestos a novatadas en la que muchos mueren, hay pocos suboficiales, el hambre y el no tener alojamiento propio era muy común dentro del propio ejército, que debía recurrír a otros trabajos, muchos de estos incluso ilegales, mucho se los problemas se agravaba con la llegada de los contingentes del extinto pacto de Varsovia y un ministro de defensa corrupto.
En la primera guerra chechena se vio la incompetencia del ejército ruso que no pudo contra la rebelión de esta región que defendía su tierra y conocía bien el terreno eran muy comun que se rodearán a las filas rusas, los tanques muchas veces resultaban averiados o sin el blindaje reactivo. Pese a tomar la capital los chechenos supieron usar las montañas y la noche para volver a conquistar grozni. La guerra en Chechenia desmoralizo al ejército ruso debido a su fracasó pese a esto, los mismos proyectaron su poder en transnistria, en Tayikistán, en Georgia y en Serbia como una forma de mostrar aún el poder ruso.
En la segunda parte entra Putin a escena aunque se mostró muy democrático al principio su objetivo era que el Estado volviera a tener el poder y la autoridad, además de criticar la expansión de la OTAN hacia el este, con los atentados terroristas chechenos y la invasión de estos al Daguestán inicio la segunda guerra chechena muy diferente a la primera, en esta los soldados rusos no caían en emboscadas eran más cautelosos en sus avances, los carros de combates iban acompañados de infantería, y se usó muy bien el dominio aéreo, pese a la destrucción de grozni occidente poco hizo de este hecho consumado.
Con las dos guerras chechenas los ministros de defensa aprendieron de sus errores y se pusieron manos a la obra para retomar el ejército ruso, el primero dio el aviso de la necesidad de cambios y actualización necesarias, el segundo ministro empezó a aplicarlas poco a poco, pero hubo un gran cambio que hizo que no hubiera tanta resistencia desde los altos mandos la guerra en Georgia.
Esta guerra se inició por los territorios separatistas de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, estos ya era diferente éticamente a los georgianos, en este país luego de la revolución de las rosas sube al poder alguien muy cercano a occidente que creía que tenía el apoyo de la OTAN, pese no haber una clara hora de ruta para su unión, los osetios provocaron a los georgianos con un bombardeo a pueblos georgianos, la respuesta no sé hizo esperar, pero estos cayeron en la trampa rusa que respondió, gracias a su superioridad numérica y área ya que los georgianos no contaban con mucha defensa antiaérea, los rusos se impusieron pese a la débiles comunicaciones entre estos en lo que llegó haber fuego amigo y vehículos dañados.
En la tercera parte llega el nuevo ministro de defensa Shoigú que llevo a cabo cambios importantes como el uso de medias o rodilleras por parte de las tripas rusas, se compró armamento a proveedores rusos, donde se vieron los nuevos cambios del ejército ruso fue en Crimea, donde el contexto ayudo a Rusia en la medida a que la población etnicamente era más cercana a Rusia se usaron las protestas pro Rusia y colabores a favor de Rusia, que introdujo tropas sin identificar allí, se movilizaron tropas en las fronteras ucranianas para desviar militares. Con el referfum se pasó Crimea a Rusia, donde no tuvo que disparar una sola bala.
En el donbas la situación era diferente las milicias locales estaban mal preparadas y las fuerzas Ucranianas estaba haciendo retroceder a los rebeldes frente a esto Rusia apoya a estos con equipo militar que por ejemplo derribó una avión de pasajeros neerlandés, los ucranianos muchas veces supieron resistir como en el caso del aeropuerto de donetsk, Rusia debió en muchas ocasiones eliminar a los líderes de la repúblicas independientes debido a su incompetencia y oportunismo remplazandolos mejor con líderes rusos, Ucrania de este conflicto reforzaría su identidad y centraría su esfuerzo en mejorar sus fuerzas armadas. Rusia en este conflicto llegó a usar mucho los drones y soldados extranjeros.
Otro conflicto donde intervino Rusia fue en Siria que luego de las protestas en 2011 el gobierno quedó débil ante los rebeldes, Rusia intervino ante miedo que pasara algo similar con lo que aconteció en Libia donde la OTAN depuso a Gaddafi, con el apoyó primero de la aviación y luego de artillería las fuerzas gubernamentales pudieron tomar varias ciudades, Rusia proyecto así su poder ante un EEUU que abandonaba la región, Rusia consiguió experiencia además se probar sus nuevas armas que sirvieron como una forma de publicidad ante clientes de oriente Medio, también hizo uso de mercenarios para así lavarse las manos de las operaciones, contigentes pequeños y que no solo basta con superioridad aérea fueron otras lecciones aprendidas como el uso de la diplomacia con Turquía r Israel.
La cuarta parte es a mi parecer la que menos me intereso, puede que no esté mal informada ni mal escrita, pero es más un trabajo militar sobre las fuerzas armadas rusas desde distintas ópticas Marina, áreas y terrestres, para alguien que quiere saber más acerca de este tema está parte será el indicado
En la quinta parte está el uso de inteligencia por parte de Rusia, Putin ve el mundo exterior a través de órganos de inteligencia rusa, se usa mucho la guerra híbrida en el exterior además de personas que eliminan a personas contrarias al régimen, también es común la guerra psicológica y el uso de mercenarios como Wagner para proyectar su poder en África, en donde también proyecta su poder en pequeña escala es en Kazajistán, otro aspecto a tener en cuenta es el uso de artillería y armas nucleares tácticas en caso de una guerra.
En otros lugares como Bielorusia Rusia a proyectado su poder en la ayuda al dictador luego de las protestas en 2020 este país se volvió un satélite de Moscú, en Ucrania lo que hizo fue volver más experimentado al ejército Ucraniano, en Moldavia usa la presión del gas y transnistria para presionar a su gobierno pro occidente, en el Cáucaso todavía hay terrorismo en menor medida y logro imponerse en Georgia, en Asia central es el proveedor de seguridad Rusia, en el conflicto de Azerbaiyán y Armenia se puso como un actor neutral pese a las ganancias del primero, finalmente con china Moscú se siente más avasallado por el gran poder económico de este, donde se verá el gran poder de la amistad entre ambos será en Taiwán.
El penúltimo capítulo es sobre la guerra en Ucrania que empezó con la acumulación de tropas alrededor de la frontera con Ucrania, que luego paso a unas exigencias irreales de Putin con la OTAN, este quería dejar un legado duradero además que el confinamiento solo ayudó a que Putin escuchará lo quería oír, pese a que la gente daba por derrotada a Ucrania estos pudieron resistir ya que llevaban años esperando esa invacion, Rusia no pudo imponerse al no derribar la aviación y defensa anti aérea ucranianas, que sumados a la corrupción y mala logística rusa no pudieron tomar Kiev y tuvieron que conformarse con un corredor hasta Crimea, aunque la guerra ha quedado como dice el autor en un punto muerto.
Un último capítulo tenemos el futuro de ejército ruso en el que debe enfrentar retos como la crisis demográfica que lleva a una disminución de sus reservistas que son cubiertas con mujeres, igual las novatadas siguen estando presentes al igual que el alcoholismo dentro de las tropas, las sensaciones económicas por parte de occidente y la actual guerra en Ucrania hace que se debiliten sus fuerzas armadas, el futuro ahora será pensarlo sin un Putin cada vez más viejo, la incógnita es quien será ese sucesor que tal vez sea más pragmático.
En conclusión un libro que aborda muy bien todo el aparato militar ruso, pero que muchas vec llega hacer pesado por el uso de gran terminología militar.
April 16, 2024
Great explanation of Putin’s Wars from Chechnya to Ukraine however I found it to be a little nauseating at times regarding unnecessary details on military hardware and units. I also feel that this book has lost a lot of relevance reflecting the Russian military as it stands today with the vast effects of the Ukrainian war has produced on the Russian military since this book’s publication.
November 18, 2022
An interesting overview of the wars which the late Soviet Union, and Russian Federation have been in. It's an odd intersection of military history and social analysis. Far more focused on military hardware than I'd anticipated, but interesting nonetheless.
July 3, 2025
In Depth
Kindle Edition
This is a detailed history of Putin, the Russian military and the key actions and actors along the way - at least since roughly the Cold War. The book is 31 chapters divided into 5 parts. it has a selected - not complete - bibliography, a list of general maps. If you have topo maps or detailed political/physical maps they will provide better geographic detail. The author lists a cast of characters with short summaries, a chronology/timeline, an introduction. several pages of plates/photos and the usual sundry other items for a total of 375 reading pages. The author is a Russian security affairs scholar and is presently a Senior Associate Fellow and Principal Director at RUSI - he has authored several books
This link will take you to more information Some material is for members only. https://www.rusi.org/people/galeotti
I encourage the reader to read the introduction It provides a succinct summary that nicely leads the reader to the main theme of this book. Putin, Putin's wars, the link analysis of key players and then in part 5, the final chapters that lead to the authors final overall conclusions in chapter 31. The narrative flows nicely and is readable history - however, with some small necessary redundancies as some players and events overlap the chronology.
The author is what you might call an "Old Russian Hand" with extensive experience and knowledge of Russian diplomacy, doctrine and history. For those that need a good and focused primer / backgrounder with context this is the book for you. My particular favorite chapters were the last five chapters in Part Five. The Financial Times named this a best book on politics in 2022
Kindle Edition
This is a detailed history of Putin, the Russian military and the key actions and actors along the way - at least since roughly the Cold War. The book is 31 chapters divided into 5 parts. it has a selected - not complete - bibliography, a list of general maps. If you have topo maps or detailed political/physical maps they will provide better geographic detail. The author lists a cast of characters with short summaries, a chronology/timeline, an introduction. several pages of plates/photos and the usual sundry other items for a total of 375 reading pages. The author is a Russian security affairs scholar and is presently a Senior Associate Fellow and Principal Director at RUSI - he has authored several books
This link will take you to more information Some material is for members only. https://www.rusi.org/people/galeotti
I encourage the reader to read the introduction It provides a succinct summary that nicely leads the reader to the main theme of this book. Putin, Putin's wars, the link analysis of key players and then in part 5, the final chapters that lead to the authors final overall conclusions in chapter 31. The narrative flows nicely and is readable history - however, with some small necessary redundancies as some players and events overlap the chronology.
The author is what you might call an "Old Russian Hand" with extensive experience and knowledge of Russian diplomacy, doctrine and history. For those that need a good and focused primer / backgrounder with context this is the book for you. My particular favorite chapters were the last five chapters in Part Five. The Financial Times named this a best book on politics in 2022
March 17, 2025
One of those books that (by luck) ends at the right time. Galeotti had to work in some extra material on the Ukrainian invasion but it is for the best that the conflict itself is barely covered. Putin built up his army in a certain way, which three years in no longer applies. Galeotti's book turns into a screenshot of the Russian Army pre-Ukraine War, one that does also acknowledge (if somewhat hurriedly in the extremely obvious late edits) its flaws. I also suspect that Galeotti is correct that Putin had a hand in a suboptimal invasion plan guided by maximal political goals rather than military reality.
Otherwise, a good coverage of Putin’s strong arming of Chechnya and his neighbours along with the reforms in the Russian Military (which I do believe weren’t totally fake). It is interesting the discussion of Battalion Tactical Groups and the difficulties in generating them from existing formations, particularly compared to how we do not appear to hear that term at all now. Again, the Black Sea Navy’s serious issues don’t fit into the scope, but the difficulties in building ships do, which seems to have been part of the problem.
So, still worth reading, despite the war.
Otherwise, a good coverage of Putin’s strong arming of Chechnya and his neighbours along with the reforms in the Russian Military (which I do believe weren’t totally fake). It is interesting the discussion of Battalion Tactical Groups and the difficulties in generating them from existing formations, particularly compared to how we do not appear to hear that term at all now. Again, the Black Sea Navy’s serious issues don’t fit into the scope, but the difficulties in building ships do, which seems to have been part of the problem.
So, still worth reading, despite the war.
March 30, 2023
An enlightening view on the Russian military from the end of the Cold War till present. It shows why the Russians fight the way they do, their strengths and weaknesses. The best information I've read on this topic it's well written and comprehensive.
My only complaint is that you can tell where the analysis had to be adjusted based on the current Ukraine war. But the author himself addresses this and to be fair his much rosier picture of the new Russian military was held by most experts.
-----------
"I wouldn't want a virgin telling me what to do on my wedding night"- Russian helicopter pilot on Putin and his control of the military.
"In 20 years time, Russia will either be an ally of the west or a vassal of China"- Retired Russian officer
----------------
Highly recommend.
My only complaint is that you can tell where the analysis had to be adjusted based on the current Ukraine war. But the author himself addresses this and to be fair his much rosier picture of the new Russian military was held by most experts.
-----------
"I wouldn't want a virgin telling me what to do on my wedding night"- Russian helicopter pilot on Putin and his control of the military.
"In 20 years time, Russia will either be an ally of the west or a vassal of China"- Retired Russian officer
----------------
Highly recommend.
March 9, 2025
This is a good book about Russia's military history, from the ruinous days after the break up of the Soviet Union to the invasion of Ukraine. It traces Putin's rise and his impact on Russia's military prowess and standing in the world. It's an in-depth look at the country's strengths and weaknesses, militarily speaking. Galeotti's geopolitical analysis can be quite thought-provoking, though the recent Trump-Zelinsky events make them seem just a bit dated. What is less interesting are his detailed descriptions of the structure of the armed forces and the weapons at their disposal - chapters I rushed through or skipped entirely.
Russia is always a compelling story. It may not be the power it was for much of the twentieth century, but its historical arc remains one of the more fascinating ones. Galeotti's book is informative and fast-paced and makes for a good read, especially the parts about the compulsions that drive Russia's actions on the world stage. A recommend for Russia-watchers and those interested in current geopolitics.
Russia is always a compelling story. It may not be the power it was for much of the twentieth century, but its historical arc remains one of the more fascinating ones. Galeotti's book is informative and fast-paced and makes for a good read, especially the parts about the compulsions that drive Russia's actions on the world stage. A recommend for Russia-watchers and those interested in current geopolitics.
April 21, 2023
A mi me gustan estos temas... intereses geopoliticos... terrorismo... actualidad... conflicto social... imperialismos modernos... esta escrito de forma facil y entendible y si tienes un ordenador o similar para apoyarte en el con fotos/wikipedia lo disfrutas mas.
Ahora bien, a menudo aborda demasiado profundamente las fuerzas armadas, tipos de armamento, siglas de brigadas, batallones... de Rusia y de los conflictos que en los ultimos 50 años ha tenido.
Me quedo con la reflexion de lo facil y asentado que esta el montar una guerra en un mundo supuestamente moderno y pacifico como creemos que es el actual.
Ahora bien, a menudo aborda demasiado profundamente las fuerzas armadas, tipos de armamento, siglas de brigadas, batallones... de Rusia y de los conflictos que en los ultimos 50 años ha tenido.
Me quedo con la reflexion de lo facil y asentado que esta el montar una guerra en un mundo supuestamente moderno y pacifico como creemos que es el actual.
April 19, 2023
Bien documentado, tremendamente ameno, explica estupendamente los entresijos de la maquinaria rusa de Defensa. Como pega, se echan de menos más mapas para entender el desarrollo de los conflictos.
May 18, 2023
An incredible account of Russia's military adventures. The road to Ukraine starts from Chechnya.
December 12, 2023
Didáctico.
November 2, 2022
Very knowledge and interesting discussion not only of the wars Putin has fought over his many years in power, but also discussion and history of Russian/Soviet military doctrine and reform.
April 9, 2023
Excellent read.
If you’re looking for information from the end of the Soviet union, two Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, this is a book you wanna read. Excellent analysis and breakdown of events that happened. Easy to understand I would recommend this book.
If you’re looking for information from the end of the Soviet union, two Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, this is a book you wanna read. Excellent analysis and breakdown of events that happened. Easy to understand I would recommend this book.
October 25, 2024
I read this book hoping to learn more about the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, but that section was pretty short. The author mostly focused on the Wild 90s, and the Donbas and Syrian wars. I tried not to hold that against the book though.
January 5, 2023
I'm a little split on this one. As an avid listener to Mark Galeotti's In Moscow's Shadow podcast, I was keen on finally reading some of his work. I found the book very interesting, timely and that broached a subject that in some years will be absolutely central to understanding the invasion in Ukraine. Nevertheless, I found myself at times skipping whole paragraphs and even chapters that delved deep into hardware, kit, location and names of Russian formations and brigades... Chapters and pages that could have been even more focused on internal Kremlin thinking, politics and Putin more specifically.
January 11, 2023
Wer ein besseres Verständnis des Verhältnisses des Westens mit Putins Russland haben möchte, ist mit diesem Buch gut aufgehoben. Galeotti hat akademische und praktische Erfahrung und seine Berichte von Gesprächen mit russischen Beamten und Soldaten machen geopolitische Entwicklungen unmittelbar greifbar. Er schildet im Detail russische Militärreformen der vergangenen 20 Jahre und wie Putin das Militär und die Kriege in Tsetschenien, Georgien, Syrien und der Krim geschickt nutzte, um seine eigene Macht und die Russlands massiv auszubauen. Am Ende geht Galeotti auch noch auf den Ukraine-Krieg 2022 ein. Wirklich lesenswert.
April 23, 2024
He's a guy who gets some details very right, but in term of goals, aims, geostrategy, russian motivations, he's just a mess.
Knowing where Galeotti is accurate and not accurate, helps 90% in making use of some of his works, and a lot of that might go with if you accept or don't accept the Realist school of political science and how they look at Russia and NATO.
Talking about the Russian military and 15% of Putin he's very accurate, but going beyond that, he's not very good.
Like he's good if you want to look into the age and capabilities of the tanks in the Ukraine conflict, but in predictions and motivations and stuff it's just an opinion piece with a few rolls of the dice.
I think he'll actually write a much better book 'after a conflict' but don't ask him to predict anything.
Interesting with the facts, way off half the time in his judgements. I like many of his books, but i can't buy any of his arguments beginning to end.
He's great for partial information, in my books
and a great resource, since some of his stuff isn't cookie cutter
but, sigh, SOME of it is.
blah
.........
From the Amazone
Disappointed, a turgid read
2/10
Apart from the last two chapters, this book is hard work and disappointing. I was hoping for some insights into Putin's thinking, the power structures that exist, and the mood in Russia. Those topics are not properly covered. Instead this book contains mostly lists of troop battalions and armament types. I had the feeling that the author is paid by word count.
Malcolm Hughes
.......
Nothing New
4/10
I found the book disappointing. The author identifies countless obscure actors and enjoys sharing their full Russian names along with the battalions, divisions, and armies they served under. He never really dug into Putin's soul, and why he fought the wars, more words were expended on this battalion did that, and another three did this. Rick Ambrose makes you feel like you're on the front line - Galeotti renders you wishing you were a casualty on that front line.
Grizzly Adams
.........
Major Mike
VERY well-done, authoritative and readable military history
10/10
This book had been almost ready to go to press when Putin invaded the Ukraine full-bore on 24 February 2022. Author Mark Galeotti stopped that process so he could follow the first months of this invasion (the book's original "Ukraine" coverage had been of the 2014-2021 Donbas fighting in eastern Ukraine, plus a discussion of the Russian takeover of the Crimea in spring 2014). The book, accordingly, was released in Fall 2022.
What has resulted is a truly excellent 384-page work that reflects the author's deep knowledge of both the military-political sphere and the nitty-gritty of military equipment, organization, and tactics.
(Born in the UK in 1965, Galeotti has apparently never served in the military, but one would think he's a retired major-general or so, from the authority and lucidity with which he describes how the Russian Army works.)
Galeotti gives a great history of both what shape the Russian military was in at the end of the Cold War (i.e., when the USSR broke up in December 1991), how the Nineties under Boris Yeltsin saw many plans but little action to improve the massive problems in that organization's operational efficiency, and how Vladimir Putin has spent the past 21 years pressing for more and better combat-worthiness, especially in the Army, to further his goal of pushing Russia's borders out to more "defensible" areas and "liberating" Russian-speaking populations.
As everyone can see from events in Ukraine of the past 13 months, those efforts were not remotely successful enough.
(Recall the best estimate by General Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, as told publicly to Congress a couple weeks before the war began, that Russia would likely take Kiev in three days, at a cost of 4,000 dead Russians and 15,000 dead Ukrainian soldiers...I certainly hope some heads rolled in the US Military Intelligence community after that massive "miss"!).
This book offers 37 color photos of Russian military equipment and operations, and especially appreciated is a list up-front so the reader can easily check what various equipment and/or organization abbreviations (APC, BMP, FSB, GRU, MLRS, RPG, VDV, VO, etc., etc.) stand for, and also an alphabetical "Cast of Characters" giving mini-biographies of all the key players in the Russian military or government who are mentioned in the text.
Bottom line: this is an outstanding work that will be very useful for both military-experienced and pure- civilian readers to get a grounding on the (non-military-veteran) paranoid tyrant who currently runs Russia, his motivations, and why things have (so far) played-out the way they have in Ukraine.
Major Mike
Knowing where Galeotti is accurate and not accurate, helps 90% in making use of some of his works, and a lot of that might go with if you accept or don't accept the Realist school of political science and how they look at Russia and NATO.
Talking about the Russian military and 15% of Putin he's very accurate, but going beyond that, he's not very good.
Like he's good if you want to look into the age and capabilities of the tanks in the Ukraine conflict, but in predictions and motivations and stuff it's just an opinion piece with a few rolls of the dice.
I think he'll actually write a much better book 'after a conflict' but don't ask him to predict anything.
Interesting with the facts, way off half the time in his judgements. I like many of his books, but i can't buy any of his arguments beginning to end.
He's great for partial information, in my books
and a great resource, since some of his stuff isn't cookie cutter
but, sigh, SOME of it is.
blah
.........
From the Amazone
Disappointed, a turgid read
2/10
Apart from the last two chapters, this book is hard work and disappointing. I was hoping for some insights into Putin's thinking, the power structures that exist, and the mood in Russia. Those topics are not properly covered. Instead this book contains mostly lists of troop battalions and armament types. I had the feeling that the author is paid by word count.
Malcolm Hughes
.......
Nothing New
4/10
I found the book disappointing. The author identifies countless obscure actors and enjoys sharing their full Russian names along with the battalions, divisions, and armies they served under. He never really dug into Putin's soul, and why he fought the wars, more words were expended on this battalion did that, and another three did this. Rick Ambrose makes you feel like you're on the front line - Galeotti renders you wishing you were a casualty on that front line.
Grizzly Adams
.........
Major Mike
VERY well-done, authoritative and readable military history
10/10
This book had been almost ready to go to press when Putin invaded the Ukraine full-bore on 24 February 2022. Author Mark Galeotti stopped that process so he could follow the first months of this invasion (the book's original "Ukraine" coverage had been of the 2014-2021 Donbas fighting in eastern Ukraine, plus a discussion of the Russian takeover of the Crimea in spring 2014). The book, accordingly, was released in Fall 2022.
What has resulted is a truly excellent 384-page work that reflects the author's deep knowledge of both the military-political sphere and the nitty-gritty of military equipment, organization, and tactics.
(Born in the UK in 1965, Galeotti has apparently never served in the military, but one would think he's a retired major-general or so, from the authority and lucidity with which he describes how the Russian Army works.)
Galeotti gives a great history of both what shape the Russian military was in at the end of the Cold War (i.e., when the USSR broke up in December 1991), how the Nineties under Boris Yeltsin saw many plans but little action to improve the massive problems in that organization's operational efficiency, and how Vladimir Putin has spent the past 21 years pressing for more and better combat-worthiness, especially in the Army, to further his goal of pushing Russia's borders out to more "defensible" areas and "liberating" Russian-speaking populations.
As everyone can see from events in Ukraine of the past 13 months, those efforts were not remotely successful enough.
(Recall the best estimate by General Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, as told publicly to Congress a couple weeks before the war began, that Russia would likely take Kiev in three days, at a cost of 4,000 dead Russians and 15,000 dead Ukrainian soldiers...I certainly hope some heads rolled in the US Military Intelligence community after that massive "miss"!).
This book offers 37 color photos of Russian military equipment and operations, and especially appreciated is a list up-front so the reader can easily check what various equipment and/or organization abbreviations (APC, BMP, FSB, GRU, MLRS, RPG, VDV, VO, etc., etc.) stand for, and also an alphabetical "Cast of Characters" giving mini-biographies of all the key players in the Russian military or government who are mentioned in the text.
Bottom line: this is an outstanding work that will be very useful for both military-experienced and pure- civilian readers to get a grounding on the (non-military-veteran) paranoid tyrant who currently runs Russia, his motivations, and why things have (so far) played-out the way they have in Ukraine.
Major Mike
May 28, 2025
This is an absolutely fascinating account of the wars that Russia undertook since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 until the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The author outlines the sequence of events that led to each conflict and its conclusion, taking a specific look at the Russian military, its state, and how it learned from each war and evolved in consequence. Galeotti takes a further look at the structure of the Russian army and its capabilities, demonstrating how it improved since the 1990s and how it was used by Putin to project power.
The Russian army was in poor shape in the 1990s and performed poorly in many of the conflicts it was involved in, even if it won eventually. Due to reforms and investment, it slowly improved until it reached a level that made it much more efficient. Yet, the invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that it still had ways to go. Galeotti provides us with his insight as to what the war in Ukraine might mean for Russia and for Putin, offering a somewhat hopeful future for the West. Unfortunately, his book was published in November 2022, and we are now in May 2025. Three years later, much has changed, but few people would have put Trump's disruptiveness in the equation.
Regardless, much of what Galeotti wrote still rings true in many regards. Russia is holding out but not on its own. Support from outside is critical, and the author explains clearly that Russia's relationship with China is clearly circumstantial. The two countries have competing interests in Asia, and Russia is in an uncomfortable position. In addition, Russia does not have the capacity to match what the West has to offer in terms of technologies, and that should make it weary of confronting it. There is clearly a sense that Putin overplayed his hand, and one would hope he will be more prudent in the future. It is, however, impossible to predict.
Therefore, this book is an excellent way to understand why Russia was involved in all those wars and how they shaped its military power. This was used by Putin to make himself heard by the West. In a way, there is a childish and tragic side to it: throughout the book we read that Russians do not want to be ignored, that they want to be considered, that they want to feel like a super power, that the West should listen to them, etc. So all these deaths, all this suffering, all this international instability seem to be for one thing and one thing only: Russian pride. This realization would leave more than one speechless...
The Russian army was in poor shape in the 1990s and performed poorly in many of the conflicts it was involved in, even if it won eventually. Due to reforms and investment, it slowly improved until it reached a level that made it much more efficient. Yet, the invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that it still had ways to go. Galeotti provides us with his insight as to what the war in Ukraine might mean for Russia and for Putin, offering a somewhat hopeful future for the West. Unfortunately, his book was published in November 2022, and we are now in May 2025. Three years later, much has changed, but few people would have put Trump's disruptiveness in the equation.
Regardless, much of what Galeotti wrote still rings true in many regards. Russia is holding out but not on its own. Support from outside is critical, and the author explains clearly that Russia's relationship with China is clearly circumstantial. The two countries have competing interests in Asia, and Russia is in an uncomfortable position. In addition, Russia does not have the capacity to match what the West has to offer in terms of technologies, and that should make it weary of confronting it. There is clearly a sense that Putin overplayed his hand, and one would hope he will be more prudent in the future. It is, however, impossible to predict.
Therefore, this book is an excellent way to understand why Russia was involved in all those wars and how they shaped its military power. This was used by Putin to make himself heard by the West. In a way, there is a childish and tragic side to it: throughout the book we read that Russians do not want to be ignored, that they want to be considered, that they want to feel like a super power, that the West should listen to them, etc. So all these deaths, all this suffering, all this international instability seem to be for one thing and one thing only: Russian pride. This realization would leave more than one speechless...
January 16, 2023
Mark Galeotti, political scientist and specialist in the modern Russian military, published this book in November 2022. It is an exhaustive, deep dive battalion by battalion study of current known Russian military structure, all the way from artillery capabilities (where Russia is dominant) to Spetsnaz (special forces) to nuclear stockpiles, and how it stacks up against the west and NATO.
Russia’s involvement in these wars is discussed:
o the disastrous intervention in Afghanistan,
o the split of Moldova and Transnistria,
o the First and Second Chechen Wars (military losses packaged as victories),
o the conflict in Georgia,
o the seizure of Crimea and Donbas,
o then Syria (used as a test site for ordnance and new tech),
o and finally the full invasion of Ukraine.
Most interesting parts:
1. The “Rumble for Ruble” chapter, explaining how the Russian economy works, and how a much weaker economy than most western European countries can have such a large military, if its cash flow is invested almost entirely in military-industrial complex.
2. Discussions with veteran Russian troops, noting how Putin himself, photo-ops aside, has almost no military training or in-the-field combat experience, and this is known and disparaged by those who have seen the realities of war. Memorable quip: “I wouldn’t want to be told what to do on my wedding night by a virgin.”
3. How the invasion of Ukraine was very rashly done. The troops were very poorly equipped, and with such weak supply lines, that there seems only one conclusion: Putin himself actually believed they would be met with flowers and open arms by the Ukrainian people. While western military observers had long thought of Putin as a careful pragmatist and very knowledgeable geopolitician, his bizarrely overreaching invasion indicates that the "Russian media bubble” which so many though was foisted on the people by government interests is actually a reflection of delusional thinking at the top levels.
The author predicts this will be Putin’s last war, though he could theoretically stay in power until 2036 (age 84 – unless he changes the constitution again) and paints a portrait of an increasingly paranoid leader whose machinations have created a nation so steeped in corruption and self-aggrandizing fallacies that it may only allow someone similar to himself to take power afterwards.
Russia’s involvement in these wars is discussed:
o the disastrous intervention in Afghanistan,
o the split of Moldova and Transnistria,
o the First and Second Chechen Wars (military losses packaged as victories),
o the conflict in Georgia,
o the seizure of Crimea and Donbas,
o then Syria (used as a test site for ordnance and new tech),
o and finally the full invasion of Ukraine.
Most interesting parts:
1. The “Rumble for Ruble” chapter, explaining how the Russian economy works, and how a much weaker economy than most western European countries can have such a large military, if its cash flow is invested almost entirely in military-industrial complex.
2. Discussions with veteran Russian troops, noting how Putin himself, photo-ops aside, has almost no military training or in-the-field combat experience, and this is known and disparaged by those who have seen the realities of war. Memorable quip: “I wouldn’t want to be told what to do on my wedding night by a virgin.”
3. How the invasion of Ukraine was very rashly done. The troops were very poorly equipped, and with such weak supply lines, that there seems only one conclusion: Putin himself actually believed they would be met with flowers and open arms by the Ukrainian people. While western military observers had long thought of Putin as a careful pragmatist and very knowledgeable geopolitician, his bizarrely overreaching invasion indicates that the "Russian media bubble” which so many though was foisted on the people by government interests is actually a reflection of delusional thinking at the top levels.
The author predicts this will be Putin’s last war, though he could theoretically stay in power until 2036 (age 84 – unless he changes the constitution again) and paints a portrait of an increasingly paranoid leader whose machinations have created a nation so steeped in corruption and self-aggrandizing fallacies that it may only allow someone similar to himself to take power afterwards.
January 13, 2023
What Putin's Wars lacks in fresh insight and depth it makes up for in providing a realistic, balanced view of Putin's Russia and military. Galeotti shows that Putin is neither a strategic chessmaster, not a bumbling idiot. Putin's military decisions have a sound logic and are broadly supported in Russia, albeit Russia that lacks many basic freedoms.
Left implicit in Putin's Wars is the consideration that if Putin and his deputies were much less corrupt and even slightly more competent militarily, they could have been more successful in Ukraine and in other military endeavors. Despite this, Putin has crafted an environment that generates domestic support and holds off international criticism and intervention. Perhaps the price of authoritarianism is the failure that Putin has experienced in Ukraine, and the looming economic and demographic disaster in Russia. However, we should be concerned that other authoritarians are looking at Russia an drawing lessons for their own conflicts, namely China. Also implicit is the potential for Putin and his regime to be around for many more years. North and South Korea are entering the eighth decade of the Korean War Armistice with the North Korean regime appearing as entrenched as ever. Hopefully the Russia Ukraine conflict and Putin's regime are not so long lasting.
Left implicit in Putin's Wars is the consideration that if Putin and his deputies were much less corrupt and even slightly more competent militarily, they could have been more successful in Ukraine and in other military endeavors. Despite this, Putin has crafted an environment that generates domestic support and holds off international criticism and intervention. Perhaps the price of authoritarianism is the failure that Putin has experienced in Ukraine, and the looming economic and demographic disaster in Russia. However, we should be concerned that other authoritarians are looking at Russia an drawing lessons for their own conflicts, namely China. Also implicit is the potential for Putin and his regime to be around for many more years. North and South Korea are entering the eighth decade of the Korean War Armistice with the North Korean regime appearing as entrenched as ever. Hopefully the Russia Ukraine conflict and Putin's regime are not so long lasting.
August 2, 2023
Buen libro, aunque merece unos comentarios.
1. El contenido: este es un libro sobre las guerras de Rusia desde los 90, las políticas de seguridad y defensa en ese país desde ese momento, el ejército y sus transformaciones y la implicación de Putin en todo ello.
2. La forma: Mark Galeotti escribe bien, pero su libro es ambiguo. En ocasiones es irónico y mordaz, lo cual facilita la lectura. Sus explicaciones e interpretaciones son muy interesantes, así como la narración de batallas u operaciones, de acciones bélicas. Sin embargo, el libro tiene fragmentos soporíferos. Cuando habla de qué divisiones hay en un sitio u otro, qué unidades participaron aquí o allí, qué tipo de naves tiene Rusia o qué misiles. Estas partes son enumeraciones de datos que aportan "cientifismo" y rigor a la obra, pero que para el lector casual aportan muy poco.
3. La dificultad: de acuerdo con todo lo anterior, diría que no es una obra sencilla, pero tampoco un arcano. Todo lector que se acerque a este libro aprenderá muchas cosas, aunque dependiendo de su nivel de conocimiento de la materia el nivel de instrucción será diferente.
Sea como fuere, el libro puede ser un 7,5-8 de cualquier manera, un libro fundamental para conocer el pasado reciente y la más rabiosa actualidad, e incluso el futuro próximo.
1. El contenido: este es un libro sobre las guerras de Rusia desde los 90, las políticas de seguridad y defensa en ese país desde ese momento, el ejército y sus transformaciones y la implicación de Putin en todo ello.
2. La forma: Mark Galeotti escribe bien, pero su libro es ambiguo. En ocasiones es irónico y mordaz, lo cual facilita la lectura. Sus explicaciones e interpretaciones son muy interesantes, así como la narración de batallas u operaciones, de acciones bélicas. Sin embargo, el libro tiene fragmentos soporíferos. Cuando habla de qué divisiones hay en un sitio u otro, qué unidades participaron aquí o allí, qué tipo de naves tiene Rusia o qué misiles. Estas partes son enumeraciones de datos que aportan "cientifismo" y rigor a la obra, pero que para el lector casual aportan muy poco.
3. La dificultad: de acuerdo con todo lo anterior, diría que no es una obra sencilla, pero tampoco un arcano. Todo lector que se acerque a este libro aprenderá muchas cosas, aunque dependiendo de su nivel de conocimiento de la materia el nivel de instrucción será diferente.
Sea como fuere, el libro puede ser un 7,5-8 de cualquier manera, un libro fundamental para conocer el pasado reciente y la más rabiosa actualidad, e incluso el futuro próximo.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 74 reviews