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الولاءات المتضاربة: القومية والسياسة الجماهيرية في سورية مع أفول شمس الإمبراطورية
صدر عن سلسلة "ترجمان" في المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات كتاب لجيمس ل. غيلفين بعنوان الولاءات المتضاربة: القومية والسياسة الجماهيرية في سورية مع أفول شمس الإمبراطوريةDivided Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire، ترجمه إلى العربية عمرو الملّاح (يقع الكتاب في 464 صفحة).
يقدم المؤلف في هذا الكتاب منظورًا جديدًا ومختلفًا لموضوع القومية في البلدان العربية، ويشرح دور المجموعات غير النخبوية في السياسة القومية في الشطر الأول من القرن العشرين. ويعتمد مصادر غير مستخدمة سابقًا، فيوثق ظهور شكل جديد من التنظيم السياسي - اللجنة الشعبية - التي انتشرت في مدن سوريا الكبرى وقراها في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الأولى.
ويقوّم، بما يتعدى السرد، حقبة من تاريخ القومية في الشرق الأوسط العربي. فيقدم، في فحصه المنشورات والكتابات على الجدران والخطب والشائعات والافتتاحيات، رؤى جديدة بشأن البناء الرمزي للمجتمعات الوطنية. ويساهم تحليله الاحتفالات - الوطنية، والتظاهرات، والمسرح - في فهمنا لظهور السياسة الجماهيرية، وفي فهم القومية في المنطقة وخارجها. وينقسم الكتاب ثلاثة أقسام:
أولًا: بنية المنظمة السياسية في سورية الفيصلية
يتألف القسم الأول الكتاب من الفصلين الأول والثاني، وقد عاين فيهما المؤلف "تأجيج الشعور الوطني" وتشكيل اللجان، وقد ركز النقاش بشأن القومية على الشروط الأساسية المسبقة اللازمة لانبثاقها. وذلك، على الرغم من أن ضرورة انتشار البنى والعلاقات المرتبطة بـ "الحداثة الكلاسيكية" لا تكفل ظهور النزعة القومية بين السكان. فالنزعات القومية تتطلب قيام حركات قومية، أو المخاطرة بضرب ما هو واضح؛ إذ يستحيل تحقيق القومية من دون قوميين. ولم يكن المسار التطوري الذي اتخذته اللحظة القومية النخبوية في الشرق الأوسط العربي بالفريد من نوعه في المنطقة. وتماثل هذه المرحلة تلك الحقبة التي أنجز فيها الأدباء والباحثون المرتبطون بحركة "النهضة" والحركة "السلفية"، اللتين شهدتهما أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، أعمالهم معزولين عن أغلبية السكان، وغافلين في معظم الأحيان عن الآثار السياسية التي قد تترتب على دراساتهم.
وهكذا، ملأت اللجان الشعبية الفراغ الذي لم يكن في وسع الحكومة العربية ولا المنظمات القومية المرتبطة بها، مثل جمعية العربية الفتاة والنادي العربي، أن تملأه بنيويًا أو عقائديًا. ويمثل بروز اللجان شاهدًا على فعالية السيرورات التي حولت الإمبراطورية العثمانية إبان القرن التاسع عشر. فقد جعلت هذه السيرورات الكثير من السوريين قادرين على "تصور" الجماعة القومية؛ فراحوا يتطلعون إلى اللجان الشعبية من أجل تحقيقها. ولكن "تصور" الجماعة القومية ينطوي على آثار بالنسبة إلى هيكلة علاقات السلطة، وقد وفرت اللجان الشعبية بديلًا من الهياكل التقليدية للسلطة التي ثبت أنها غير ملائمة للظروف التي واجهها العديد من سكان سورية في مطالع القرن العشرين.
وفي هذا السياق، يرى المؤلف أن اللجان الشعبية غالبًا ما أفادت من الشبكات المحلية للرعاة والأتباع، وقوضت أيضًا تلك الشبكات عبر التنظيم خارج النطاق المحلي، وترشيد اتجاهات السلطة السياسية، وتجاهلها من أجل توفير الخدمات لأنصارها. أما المهمات التي كانت مناطة بالأعيان المحليين، فقد أضحت الآن مسؤوليات موزعة عبر مجال سياسي، جرى تحديده على نحو أسع نطاقًا، وأصبح الأتباع أعضاء في "الأمة"، وبات تقديم الخدمات مرتبطًا ارتباطًا وثيقًا لا ينفصم بأيديولوجيا تسير على هدي الرموز الشعبية والمفاهيم الشائعة عن الإنصاف.
إذًا، يناقش القسم الأول كيفية تغير طبيعة التنظيم السياسي في سورية، قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى وإبانها وبعدها. وغداة هذه التغييرات، غالبًا ما حلت المنظمات السياسية المعقدة والشاملة محل أنماط التنظيم التقليدية والضيقة أو همشتها أو أعادت صياغة سياقها، ميسرة بذلك التعبئة البرنامجية لأعداد كبيرة من المكونات. ولم تتسبب هذه المنظمات في توسيع نطاق المشاركة السياسية فحسب، بل أنهت احتكار الفئات المهيمنة سابقًا من النخب للسلطة، وأعادت تعريف الصلات التي تربط اللانخبة بزعمائهم وسيّستها. ونتيجة لذلك، لم تعد السياسة الجماهيرية ممكنة في سورية إبان الفترة التي أعقبت الحرب العالمية الأولى مباشرة فحسب، وإنما باتت أمرًا محتومًا.
ولما كانت المنظمات الشعبية الجديدة شاملة وعقائدية، ودمجت أتباعها عبر مجموعة متنوعة من روابط الولاء المألوفة والأصيلة، فقد عملت على تبين وتكثيف وتحقيق وصقل المعاني الممكنة التي في مقدورنا استخلاصها من مجموعة متماسكة من الرموز التي غالبًا ما كانت مميزة. ومن ثمّ لم يكن أولئك المرتبطون بالجماعات الشعبية من "الغوغاء" غير محددي المعالم، إنما كانوا أعضاء في جماعة خطابية جرى تشكيلها بصورة سرية - على الرغم من اختلافهم الشديد عن الجماعة الخطابية المكونة من أعضاء الحكومة العربية ومؤيديها - ممن ينبغي اعتبارهم أيضًا جزءًا من التيار القومي.
ثانيًا: الجماعات الخطابية القومية
امتد القسم الثاني على الفصلين الثالث والرابع. وكان مجال بحث المؤلف فيهما منصبًا على دراسة المكون الرمزي للمجالات الخطابية القومية المتنافسة، وكذلك قواها الإدماجية والتوجيهية. فقد ضم المجال القومي، في سورية ما بعد الحقبة العثمانية، جماعة متباينة من الناشطين، والمنظمات، والناخبين الذين عبروا عن نزعاتهم القومية عبر الخطابات التي كانت متباينة على نحو مماثل. فعملت هاتان السيرورتان التوأمان على نحو متفاوت، وأثرتا في مناطق وشرائح اجتماعية مختلفة بصورة غير متزامنة وغير متساوية. ونتيجة لذلك، ففي حين عكست كل الخطابات القومية السيرورات العالمية التي تعمل في الشرق الأوسط، فإن نطاق عملها وأسلوبه كانا متباينين. إضافة إلى ذلك، لما كانت الإمبراطورية العثمانية وحكومة الأمير فيصل العربية كلتاهما تعانيان الضعف، ونظرًا إلى اتساع مدى التحول الاقتصادي والسياسي، فلا يمكن خطابًا قوميًّا مهيمنًا بمفرده أن يكون مقنعًا ولا أن يجبر الآخرين على التسليم له...
يقدم المؤلف في هذا الكتاب منظورًا جديدًا ومختلفًا لموضوع القومية في البلدان العربية، ويشرح دور المجموعات غير النخبوية في السياسة القومية في الشطر الأول من القرن العشرين. ويعتمد مصادر غير مستخدمة سابقًا، فيوثق ظهور شكل جديد من التنظيم السياسي - اللجنة الشعبية - التي انتشرت في مدن سوريا الكبرى وقراها في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الأولى.
ويقوّم، بما يتعدى السرد، حقبة من تاريخ القومية في الشرق الأوسط العربي. فيقدم، في فحصه المنشورات والكتابات على الجدران والخطب والشائعات والافتتاحيات، رؤى جديدة بشأن البناء الرمزي للمجتمعات الوطنية. ويساهم تحليله الاحتفالات - الوطنية، والتظاهرات، والمسرح - في فهمنا لظهور السياسة الجماهيرية، وفي فهم القومية في المنطقة وخارجها. وينقسم الكتاب ثلاثة أقسام:
أولًا: بنية المنظمة السياسية في سورية الفيصلية
يتألف القسم الأول الكتاب من الفصلين الأول والثاني، وقد عاين فيهما المؤلف "تأجيج الشعور الوطني" وتشكيل اللجان، وقد ركز النقاش بشأن القومية على الشروط الأساسية المسبقة اللازمة لانبثاقها. وذلك، على الرغم من أن ضرورة انتشار البنى والعلاقات المرتبطة بـ "الحداثة الكلاسيكية" لا تكفل ظهور النزعة القومية بين السكان. فالنزعات القومية تتطلب قيام حركات قومية، أو المخاطرة بضرب ما هو واضح؛ إذ يستحيل تحقيق القومية من دون قوميين. ولم يكن المسار التطوري الذي اتخذته اللحظة القومية النخبوية في الشرق الأوسط العربي بالفريد من نوعه في المنطقة. وتماثل هذه المرحلة تلك الحقبة التي أنجز فيها الأدباء والباحثون المرتبطون بحركة "النهضة" والحركة "السلفية"، اللتين شهدتهما أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، أعمالهم معزولين عن أغلبية السكان، وغافلين في معظم الأحيان عن الآثار السياسية التي قد تترتب على دراساتهم.
وهكذا، ملأت اللجان الشعبية الفراغ الذي لم يكن في وسع الحكومة العربية ولا المنظمات القومية المرتبطة بها، مثل جمعية العربية الفتاة والنادي العربي، أن تملأه بنيويًا أو عقائديًا. ويمثل بروز اللجان شاهدًا على فعالية السيرورات التي حولت الإمبراطورية العثمانية إبان القرن التاسع عشر. فقد جعلت هذه السيرورات الكثير من السوريين قادرين على "تصور" الجماعة القومية؛ فراحوا يتطلعون إلى اللجان الشعبية من أجل تحقيقها. ولكن "تصور" الجماعة القومية ينطوي على آثار بالنسبة إلى هيكلة علاقات السلطة، وقد وفرت اللجان الشعبية بديلًا من الهياكل التقليدية للسلطة التي ثبت أنها غير ملائمة للظروف التي واجهها العديد من سكان سورية في مطالع القرن العشرين.
وفي هذا السياق، يرى المؤلف أن اللجان الشعبية غالبًا ما أفادت من الشبكات المحلية للرعاة والأتباع، وقوضت أيضًا تلك الشبكات عبر التنظيم خارج النطاق المحلي، وترشيد اتجاهات السلطة السياسية، وتجاهلها من أجل توفير الخدمات لأنصارها. أما المهمات التي كانت مناطة بالأعيان المحليين، فقد أضحت الآن مسؤوليات موزعة عبر مجال سياسي، جرى تحديده على نحو أسع نطاقًا، وأصبح الأتباع أعضاء في "الأمة"، وبات تقديم الخدمات مرتبطًا ارتباطًا وثيقًا لا ينفصم بأيديولوجيا تسير على هدي الرموز الشعبية والمفاهيم الشائعة عن الإنصاف.
إذًا، يناقش القسم الأول كيفية تغير طبيعة التنظيم السياسي في سورية، قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى وإبانها وبعدها. وغداة هذه التغييرات، غالبًا ما حلت المنظمات السياسية المعقدة والشاملة محل أنماط التنظيم التقليدية والضيقة أو همشتها أو أعادت صياغة سياقها، ميسرة بذلك التعبئة البرنامجية لأعداد كبيرة من المكونات. ولم تتسبب هذه المنظمات في توسيع نطاق المشاركة السياسية فحسب، بل أنهت احتكار الفئات المهيمنة سابقًا من النخب للسلطة، وأعادت تعريف الصلات التي تربط اللانخبة بزعمائهم وسيّستها. ونتيجة لذلك، لم تعد السياسة الجماهيرية ممكنة في سورية إبان الفترة التي أعقبت الحرب العالمية الأولى مباشرة فحسب، وإنما باتت أمرًا محتومًا.
ولما كانت المنظمات الشعبية الجديدة شاملة وعقائدية، ودمجت أتباعها عبر مجموعة متنوعة من روابط الولاء المألوفة والأصيلة، فقد عملت على تبين وتكثيف وتحقيق وصقل المعاني الممكنة التي في مقدورنا استخلاصها من مجموعة متماسكة من الرموز التي غالبًا ما كانت مميزة. ومن ثمّ لم يكن أولئك المرتبطون بالجماعات الشعبية من "الغوغاء" غير محددي المعالم، إنما كانوا أعضاء في جماعة خطابية جرى تشكيلها بصورة سرية - على الرغم من اختلافهم الشديد عن الجماعة الخطابية المكونة من أعضاء الحكومة العربية ومؤيديها - ممن ينبغي اعتبارهم أيضًا جزءًا من التيار القومي.
ثانيًا: الجماعات الخطابية القومية
امتد القسم الثاني على الفصلين الثالث والرابع. وكان مجال بحث المؤلف فيهما منصبًا على دراسة المكون الرمزي للمجالات الخطابية القومية المتنافسة، وكذلك قواها الإدماجية والتوجيهية. فقد ضم المجال القومي، في سورية ما بعد الحقبة العثمانية، جماعة متباينة من الناشطين، والمنظمات، والناخبين الذين عبروا عن نزعاتهم القومية عبر الخطابات التي كانت متباينة على نحو مماثل. فعملت هاتان السيرورتان التوأمان على نحو متفاوت، وأثرتا في مناطق وشرائح اجتماعية مختلفة بصورة غير متزامنة وغير متساوية. ونتيجة لذلك، ففي حين عكست كل الخطابات القومية السيرورات العالمية التي تعمل في الشرق الأوسط، فإن نطاق عملها وأسلوبه كانا متباينين. إضافة إلى ذلك، لما كانت الإمبراطورية العثمانية وحكومة الأمير فيصل العربية كلتاهما تعانيان الضعف، ونظرًا إلى اتساع مدى التحول الاقتصادي والسياسي، فلا يمكن خطابًا قوميًّا مهيمنًا بمفرده أن يكون مقنعًا ولا أن يجبر الآخرين على التسليم له...
- GenresHistoryMiddle East
464 pages
First published December 17, 1998
1 person is currently reading
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About the author
James L. Gelvin
14 books32 followersJames L. Gelvin is an American scholar of Middle Eastern history. He has been a faculty member in the department of history at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) since 1995 and has written extensively on the history of the modern Middle East, with particular emphasis on nationalism and the social and cultural history of the modern Middle East.
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November 13, 2014
James Gelvin provides a very informative, poststructuralist analysis of (an) Arab nationalism in the early twentieth century, focusing on Syria during the Sharifian period of rule under Amir Faysal. I say, "an" Arab nationalism, for Gelvin's primary design in this monograph is to underscore the divergent streams of Arab nationalisms that existed at the close of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of European colonial rule in the Near East, nationalisms predicated on different worldviews, and reflective of different class-based and sectarian-based interests. Gelvin treats George Antonius's totalizing thesis of an "Arab Awakening" with barely-concealed scorn, for Gelvin feels it canalizes disparate forms of Arab nationalism into one undifferentiated mass, moving along a teleological trajectory, forming one sweeping metanarrative. The rise of "mass politics" (a key word in this text) in Sharifian Syria serves as the focus of Gelvin's text, not as a synecdoche for the history of nationalism in the rest of the modern Arab world, but simply a case study in the evolution of one brand of Arab nationalism manifesting its own unique particulars.
Gelvin bookends his analysis in the two year period of Sharifian rule in Syria between the withdrawal of the Ottoman regime from Damascus before the advance of General Allenby's Anglo-Arab army in 1918 and the French Mandatory army's lunge from the Lebanese coast to seize of all of the eastern zones of Syria in 1920. What his argument amounts to is a juxtaposition of the "Arab government" of Amir Faysal and its bourgeois enablers among the Arab intelligentsia and literati (such as members of the Arab Club and al-Fatat) and the more proletarian "national committees" composed of a greater cross-section of the Syrian population. It has been conventional wisdom - working from George Antonius' thesis - to credit bourgeois societies of belletrists, such as the Arab Club, of fostering "Arab nationalism" (understood abstractly to be one, undifferentiated thing). After all, these men were the direct intellectual progeny of the "Nahda", having absorbed Arab revivalism through their elite educations and exposure to European concepts. Not surprisingly, the men who formed the ranks of groups such as the Arab Club and al-Fatat generally came from middle class backgrounds, and often occupied positions in the Ottoman imperial structure. In the wake of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, these figures busied themselves calling for "complete independence" of the Arab "nation", grossly defined as the entirety of the Arab world from the Euphrates to the Nile, from Aleppo to Aden. Such groups as these allied themselves with the Sharifian government, seen to legitimately possess leadership of the Arab World on account of its association with the Arab Revolt, as the surefire catalyst to realizing this overarching nationalist goal. Literati societies like al-Fatat also busied themselves communicating their ideals to the king's common subjects. However, it was always an axiom among members of such political societies that their membership stood above the common people in authority and purpose.
However, the Syrian masses did not accept the hierarchical pretensions of the literati with obsequious deference. On the contrary, as Gelvin points out, historical evolution had brought Syrians beyond the point of political passivity or indifference. By 1918, an era of Ottoman civil reforms, and the expansion of the market economy in the Empire, had brought Syrians out of parochial obscurity into the orbit of the 'modern' world. Not only had market forces made Syrians more aware of their place in the global economy, and thus, their particular global economic interests, but Ottoman domestic reforms and the opening of heretofore closed doors to Ottoman subjects' greater civic engagement had given Syrians a taste of participation in the political system and made them cognizant of how its structure and agenda personally affected their lives, including the state's foreign policy and relations. It was the era of MASS POLITICS. It is important to note that different sectors of Syrian society were exposed to and influenced by these prodigious developments at varying levels of intensity and effect.
When the Arab Army of Sharif Husayn entered Damascus and 'liberated' Syria from the Ottomans, the bourgeois societies like the Arab Club and al-Fatat proffered their services to the novice Sharifian government of Amir Faysal to assist the upstart king in ordering and running society. The more quotidian elements of Syrian society banded together to form "national committees," capped by the Higher National Committee, a grassroots fellowship of enfranchised Syrian citizens who organized around common interests such as security and welfare distribution - services that the Arab government of Amir Faysal was not capable of providing, and to which the elitist elements of the Arab Club and al-Fatat would not attend. The 'national committees' practiced a rudimentary form of democracy, electing their leadership cadres by popular vote. Thus, the inclusiveness of the 'national committees' set them apart from the more exclusive Arab Club and al-Fatat variants of the Arab intellectual class.
Beyond differences in polity, an intellectual rift also rent Syrian society between the Sharifian Gov./Arab 'intellectual' cadre and the ranks of the popular committees. This chasm was opened by the question of what constituted "Syria" and whether Syria was synonymous with the wider Arabic-speaking world. Originally, the Sharifians, following the lead of "Nahda" intellectuals, envisioned the post-war "independent" Arab state as encompassing virtually all of the Middle East. The members of the Arab Club and al-Fatat were beholden to this idea of 'Greater Syria', the sine qua non of Nahda intellectuals' nationalist reveries. However, Gelvin demonstrates that this was primarily the limited preserve of the Syrian intelligentsia class; the bulk of the general Syrian populace held to a conception of themselves as constituting a more localized national community defined by particular historical and cultural peculiarities that delineated them from the rest of the Arab world, idiosyncrasies which Gelvin claims were present beginning in the Middle Ages, providing a rough circumscription of "Syrian" national entity. Thus, there was a fundamental disconnect between what the "mutanawwirun" allies of the Shaifian government desired for "Syria" and what the average Syrian, represented by the 'national committees' envisioned. Thus, the Sharifians' failure to secure a greater Arab state at the Paris Peace Conference struck a blow to their own party faithful more than it did the 'national committees'. Conversely, the eventual Sharifian concession to allow League of Nations mandates to govern sections of the Syrian homeland was interpreted by the 'national committees' as a betrayal of Syrian jurisdictional and territorial integrity - in short, impingement of Syrian national sovereignty. For the national committees this was an outrage. By contrast, the "mutanawwirun" took a more sanguine look at Mandate interference, at least if it was temporary. After all, the "mutanawwirun" were infatuated with European abstractions like "modernity," "progress" and "civilization" and their cultivation in the Arab world and interpreted an certain degree of European tutelage as conducive to that end. Added to this were those Christian Arab intellectuals who saw European suzerainty as a welcome counterweight to unchecked Islamic and Hijazi dominance of the Syrian state. That the 'national committees' turned to Islamic symbols and discourse in circumscribing their communitarian boundaries - eschewing the talk of secularism and ecumenism advocated by the Sharifian and mutanawwirun parties - speaks volumes to the fact that Syrians in the committees identified with a more traditional, local worldview, not the "modernist" one transplanted from Europe to the Middle East by the Arab Nahda literati.
Of course, the ultimate French seizure of the whole of the Syrian state and the abdication of Faysal from the 'throne' of Syria meant that neither the Sharifians or the national committees got what they wanted. Thenceforth, there would be a quarter century of French colonial rule. Nevertheless, Gelvin sees Syria's two-year odyssey of independence under the Sharifians as setting an important precedent. The jockeying for position and influence in Syrian society that played out between the mutanawwirun and the national committees ushered in an era of mass political engagement by the Syrian people. There was not one "Arab nationalism" or established codified corpus of "Arab nationalist" beliefs that some Arabs were attune to and working towards while others were left on the sidelines of history. Rather, disparate competing nationalisms were hammered out, articulated and advanced by different competing interest groups, at different levels on intensity, in the face of historical exigencies and local- and time-specific circumstances. Succeeding movements would learn from their progenitors. This process, Gelvin avers, is still being played out in the Middle Eastern theatre of today.
Gelvin bookends his analysis in the two year period of Sharifian rule in Syria between the withdrawal of the Ottoman regime from Damascus before the advance of General Allenby's Anglo-Arab army in 1918 and the French Mandatory army's lunge from the Lebanese coast to seize of all of the eastern zones of Syria in 1920. What his argument amounts to is a juxtaposition of the "Arab government" of Amir Faysal and its bourgeois enablers among the Arab intelligentsia and literati (such as members of the Arab Club and al-Fatat) and the more proletarian "national committees" composed of a greater cross-section of the Syrian population. It has been conventional wisdom - working from George Antonius' thesis - to credit bourgeois societies of belletrists, such as the Arab Club, of fostering "Arab nationalism" (understood abstractly to be one, undifferentiated thing). After all, these men were the direct intellectual progeny of the "Nahda", having absorbed Arab revivalism through their elite educations and exposure to European concepts. Not surprisingly, the men who formed the ranks of groups such as the Arab Club and al-Fatat generally came from middle class backgrounds, and often occupied positions in the Ottoman imperial structure. In the wake of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, these figures busied themselves calling for "complete independence" of the Arab "nation", grossly defined as the entirety of the Arab world from the Euphrates to the Nile, from Aleppo to Aden. Such groups as these allied themselves with the Sharifian government, seen to legitimately possess leadership of the Arab World on account of its association with the Arab Revolt, as the surefire catalyst to realizing this overarching nationalist goal. Literati societies like al-Fatat also busied themselves communicating their ideals to the king's common subjects. However, it was always an axiom among members of such political societies that their membership stood above the common people in authority and purpose.
However, the Syrian masses did not accept the hierarchical pretensions of the literati with obsequious deference. On the contrary, as Gelvin points out, historical evolution had brought Syrians beyond the point of political passivity or indifference. By 1918, an era of Ottoman civil reforms, and the expansion of the market economy in the Empire, had brought Syrians out of parochial obscurity into the orbit of the 'modern' world. Not only had market forces made Syrians more aware of their place in the global economy, and thus, their particular global economic interests, but Ottoman domestic reforms and the opening of heretofore closed doors to Ottoman subjects' greater civic engagement had given Syrians a taste of participation in the political system and made them cognizant of how its structure and agenda personally affected their lives, including the state's foreign policy and relations. It was the era of MASS POLITICS. It is important to note that different sectors of Syrian society were exposed to and influenced by these prodigious developments at varying levels of intensity and effect.
When the Arab Army of Sharif Husayn entered Damascus and 'liberated' Syria from the Ottomans, the bourgeois societies like the Arab Club and al-Fatat proffered their services to the novice Sharifian government of Amir Faysal to assist the upstart king in ordering and running society. The more quotidian elements of Syrian society banded together to form "national committees," capped by the Higher National Committee, a grassroots fellowship of enfranchised Syrian citizens who organized around common interests such as security and welfare distribution - services that the Arab government of Amir Faysal was not capable of providing, and to which the elitist elements of the Arab Club and al-Fatat would not attend. The 'national committees' practiced a rudimentary form of democracy, electing their leadership cadres by popular vote. Thus, the inclusiveness of the 'national committees' set them apart from the more exclusive Arab Club and al-Fatat variants of the Arab intellectual class.
Beyond differences in polity, an intellectual rift also rent Syrian society between the Sharifian Gov./Arab 'intellectual' cadre and the ranks of the popular committees. This chasm was opened by the question of what constituted "Syria" and whether Syria was synonymous with the wider Arabic-speaking world. Originally, the Sharifians, following the lead of "Nahda" intellectuals, envisioned the post-war "independent" Arab state as encompassing virtually all of the Middle East. The members of the Arab Club and al-Fatat were beholden to this idea of 'Greater Syria', the sine qua non of Nahda intellectuals' nationalist reveries. However, Gelvin demonstrates that this was primarily the limited preserve of the Syrian intelligentsia class; the bulk of the general Syrian populace held to a conception of themselves as constituting a more localized national community defined by particular historical and cultural peculiarities that delineated them from the rest of the Arab world, idiosyncrasies which Gelvin claims were present beginning in the Middle Ages, providing a rough circumscription of "Syrian" national entity. Thus, there was a fundamental disconnect between what the "mutanawwirun" allies of the Shaifian government desired for "Syria" and what the average Syrian, represented by the 'national committees' envisioned. Thus, the Sharifians' failure to secure a greater Arab state at the Paris Peace Conference struck a blow to their own party faithful more than it did the 'national committees'. Conversely, the eventual Sharifian concession to allow League of Nations mandates to govern sections of the Syrian homeland was interpreted by the 'national committees' as a betrayal of Syrian jurisdictional and territorial integrity - in short, impingement of Syrian national sovereignty. For the national committees this was an outrage. By contrast, the "mutanawwirun" took a more sanguine look at Mandate interference, at least if it was temporary. After all, the "mutanawwirun" were infatuated with European abstractions like "modernity," "progress" and "civilization" and their cultivation in the Arab world and interpreted an certain degree of European tutelage as conducive to that end. Added to this were those Christian Arab intellectuals who saw European suzerainty as a welcome counterweight to unchecked Islamic and Hijazi dominance of the Syrian state. That the 'national committees' turned to Islamic symbols and discourse in circumscribing their communitarian boundaries - eschewing the talk of secularism and ecumenism advocated by the Sharifian and mutanawwirun parties - speaks volumes to the fact that Syrians in the committees identified with a more traditional, local worldview, not the "modernist" one transplanted from Europe to the Middle East by the Arab Nahda literati.
Of course, the ultimate French seizure of the whole of the Syrian state and the abdication of Faysal from the 'throne' of Syria meant that neither the Sharifians or the national committees got what they wanted. Thenceforth, there would be a quarter century of French colonial rule. Nevertheless, Gelvin sees Syria's two-year odyssey of independence under the Sharifians as setting an important precedent. The jockeying for position and influence in Syrian society that played out between the mutanawwirun and the national committees ushered in an era of mass political engagement by the Syrian people. There was not one "Arab nationalism" or established codified corpus of "Arab nationalist" beliefs that some Arabs were attune to and working towards while others were left on the sidelines of history. Rather, disparate competing nationalisms were hammered out, articulated and advanced by different competing interest groups, at different levels on intensity, in the face of historical exigencies and local- and time-specific circumstances. Succeeding movements would learn from their progenitors. This process, Gelvin avers, is still being played out in the Middle Eastern theatre of today.
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October 12, 2020Read it for a course ages and ages ago, zero memory of the content.
December 9, 2013
The overarching theme of James Gelvin’s Divided Loyalties is that historians of Arab nationalism have mischaracterized the movement as a monolithic, uniform entity promulgated by small sectors of local elites. The author argues instead that that there were many different strains of Arab nationalism, and that the more effective ones were based on popular sentiments rather than the ideological idealism of intellectuals. Writing from a poststructuralist theoretical background, Gelvin’s case study is Syria under the two years of King Faisal’s rule (1918-1920). The author contrasts the composition and efficacy of the Arab government and its elite clubs during this period against that of the “popular committees” of merchants, ulama, and similar segments of the population. His research question stems out of a popular revolt near the end of Faisal’s rule that has been hitherto ignored by scholars as an aberration, but which Gelvin argues is paradigmatic of the actual Arab nationalist sentiment of the era.
After tracking the rise and development of the elite clubs and the popular committees in Faisal’s Syria, Gelvin shows how the Arab government’s manipulation of the former led to a mobilized population that grew dissatisfied with the state’s continuing inability to resolve the issues that plagued their new nation. The British withdrawal from Syria was a key moment: not only was it representative of the government’s failure to serve the best interests of its people, but it made it impossible for the state to reconcile the popular factions with federal and elite aims. Delving into the theoretical, the author then shows how this period was defined by “rival ‘communities of discourse’” that appropriated slogans and key symbols in different ways in order to advance their objectives. While the elites defined Syria as a place of youth and progress that only the intellectuals could manage, the popular committees focused on the historical and organic nature of the country, with an emphasis on its traditional and civil societal elements that could be best served by merchants and the ulama. He then examines these “communities” through their use of “collective ceremonies” and concludes that the popular committees were more successful and more representative of the way in which the public at large engaged with Arab nationalism.
Gelvin’s conclusion is an excellent summary of his argument and main points, easily among the most clear and concise in academic literature. His writing style in the former half is somewhat dry and difficult to follow, particularly with the litany of names and information that are presented, but the second half is more engaging and his case study illuminates his argument in a way that is easy to digest. The theoretical portions can seem overwhelming at times, but these sections are brief and are deployed on a level that facilitates understanding rather than contributing to needless complexity. Gelvin wields his theory effectively, and thus one can comprehend his argument even without a full grasp of the theoretical concepts or any background in poststructuralism. Overall Divided Loyalties has the feel of a book that completes an analysis, like uncovering a lost piece that finishes a puzzle, and presents a fresh vision of Arab nationalism in the post-World War I era. For anyone interested in engaging with the popular dimension of Arab nationalism that has been so long ignored, Gelvin’s work is an accessible place to begin.
After tracking the rise and development of the elite clubs and the popular committees in Faisal’s Syria, Gelvin shows how the Arab government’s manipulation of the former led to a mobilized population that grew dissatisfied with the state’s continuing inability to resolve the issues that plagued their new nation. The British withdrawal from Syria was a key moment: not only was it representative of the government’s failure to serve the best interests of its people, but it made it impossible for the state to reconcile the popular factions with federal and elite aims. Delving into the theoretical, the author then shows how this period was defined by “rival ‘communities of discourse’” that appropriated slogans and key symbols in different ways in order to advance their objectives. While the elites defined Syria as a place of youth and progress that only the intellectuals could manage, the popular committees focused on the historical and organic nature of the country, with an emphasis on its traditional and civil societal elements that could be best served by merchants and the ulama. He then examines these “communities” through their use of “collective ceremonies” and concludes that the popular committees were more successful and more representative of the way in which the public at large engaged with Arab nationalism.
Gelvin’s conclusion is an excellent summary of his argument and main points, easily among the most clear and concise in academic literature. His writing style in the former half is somewhat dry and difficult to follow, particularly with the litany of names and information that are presented, but the second half is more engaging and his case study illuminates his argument in a way that is easy to digest. The theoretical portions can seem overwhelming at times, but these sections are brief and are deployed on a level that facilitates understanding rather than contributing to needless complexity. Gelvin wields his theory effectively, and thus one can comprehend his argument even without a full grasp of the theoretical concepts or any background in poststructuralism. Overall Divided Loyalties has the feel of a book that completes an analysis, like uncovering a lost piece that finishes a puzzle, and presents a fresh vision of Arab nationalism in the post-World War I era. For anyone interested in engaging with the popular dimension of Arab nationalism that has been so long ignored, Gelvin’s work is an accessible place to begin.
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