زبان و آگاهی

by Gerald M. Edelman, رضا نیلی‌پور (Translator)

انتشار کتاب زبان و آگاهی یکی از جدیدترین کتاب‌های جرالد اِدلمن به زبان فارسی و طرح نظریه بیولوژیکی او درباره آگاهی، به عنوان واقعه‌‌ای قلمداد می‌شود که نمی‌توان درباره آن بی‌تفاوت بود. این یک کتاب جدی علمی ولی به زبان ساده است که مطالعهٔ آن باید به طور جدی و با دقت انجام گیرد.

اِدلمن مکانیسم ایجاد آگاهی در انسان را بر مبنای ایجاد «مدارهای نورونی» توضیح می‌دهد و سپس وارد بحث مبسوطی در رابطهٔ علّی این مدارها با آگاهی می‌شود. وی در مراحل مختلف به نقش تأثیرگذار زبان در ایجاد و تکامل آگاهی اشاره می‌کند. به طوری که می‌توان گفت به نظر او-وبسیاری از صاحبنظران دیگر-بدون زبان «آگاهی برتر» در انسان بوجود نمی‌آید. این بحث پیشنهاد جدیدی است برای برون رفت از سؤال قدیمی مبنی بر اینکه آیا آگاهی خود یک «پی پدیدار» است یا یک «پی پدیده»؟

به نظر می‌رسد «نظریه نورونی» اِدلمن یکی از جدی‌ترین و پیچیده‌ترین نظریات در مورد آگاهی است. نمی‌توان آن را نشناخت و نمی‌توان بدون دقت به عمق آن دست یافت. آن را باید مانند هر متن دشوار بیش از یک بار خواند. هنگامی که رموز آن گشوده می‌شود به اهمیتی پی می‌بریم که بدون تردید روی تفکرات آیندۀ ما مؤثر خواهد بود.

Genres: Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Nonfiction, Brain, Biology

229 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004

About the author

Gerald Maurice Edelman (born July 1, 1929) is an American biologist who shared the 1972 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for work with Rodney Robert Porter on the immune system.[1] Edelman's Nobel Prize-winning research concerned discovery of the structure of antibody molecules.[2] In interviews, he has said that the way the components of the immune system evolve over the life of the individual is analogous to the way the components of the brain evolve in a lifetime. There is a continuity in this way between his work on the immune system, for which he won the Nobel Prize, and his later work in neuroscience and in philosophy of mind.

Reviews

[Alborz Baghipour · Rating 4 out of 5]

یک کتاب خوب در مورد موضوع آگاهی از دانشمند برنده ی جایزه ی نوبل جرالد اِدلمن
کتابی جدی و علمی ولی به زبان ساده که مطالعه ی آن باید به طور جدی و با دقت انجام گیرد... نظریه ی "انتخاب گروهی نورونی" اِدلمن یکی از جدی ترین و پیچیده ترین نظریات در مورد آگاهی است، نمی توان آن را نشناخت و نمی توان بدون دقت به عمق آن دست یافت. آن را باید مانند هر متن دشوار بیش از یک بار خواند. هنگامی که رموز آن گشوده می شود به اهمیتی پی می بریم که بدون تردید روی تفکرات آینده ی ما موثر خواهد بود

[Jon Stout · Rating 3 out of 5]

Gerald Edelman, a Nobel prize-winning neuroscientist, offers a neurological theory of consciousness, which interests me because consciousness is central to many philosophical positions and disputes. Edelman is philosophically well-informed, especially praising the work of William James, so that he often addresses the obvious philosophical concerns. For example, he takes care to avoid “category errors,” such as the tendency to treat objects of consciousness as though they were “things” in the same sense as material objects.

Early in his book, Edelman makes the point that a theory of consciousness should not be expected to duplicate consciousness (e.g. to generate my unique experience of red), but only to explain it. Just as a meteorologist can explain a hurricane, but cannot produce one, “a brain-based theory of consciousness should give a causal explanation of its properties but, having done so, it should not be expected to generate qualia ‘by description.’”

Unfortunately, much of the groundwork for the theory involves a detailed description of brain processes, much of which is lost on me because he names and identifies many parts of the brain, most of which are difficult for me to keep distinct in my own mind. He then describes brain processes in terms of neural impulses which travel from this part of the brain to that, so that I have a picture of a lot of traffic, but not much clarity. I do get a grasp of some of the general principles.

Edelman makes a strong point that the brain does not function like a computer. Instead of algorithms and Turing Machine type operations, the brain functions using neural networks, and exhibits “degeneracy,” a technical term meaning massive redundancy, or that the same result can be reached by many different paths. I am somewhat surprised by this, since I have read Paul Churchland, a neurophilosopher, who describes “parallel distributed processing,” a theoretical description of neural networks which can be implemented on a computer. I think this may be a terminological dispute, since artificial intelligence is based on parallel distributed processing, which learns by trial-and-error, based on massive feedback loops. This resembles brain processing as Edelman describes it.

Edelman says that consciousness is an epiphenomenon, based on the continual cycling of neural impulses in the brain. Neural input may come from sense organs such as the optic nerves and is then cycled through a part of the cerebral cortex which categorizes it in terms of conceptual experience, and then is recycled so as to refine and to clarify the original impression. Along the way, the neural impulses may go through “value systems” (areas of the brain, not ethics) which prioritize neural impulses in various ways, such as to promote survival, or to focus, or to accomplish some other purpose. This recycling of neural impulses, called “reentrant” and related to a feedback loop, resembles churning, such as water in a washing machine, or in ocean tides, and serves to generate a constantly changing model of the sensory world, as well as of one’s own body and needs.

The “image” generated by the constant cycling of neural impulses, is consciousness. Or to put it another way, consciousness is the way the world (including our own bodies) seems to us, after the brain has done its categorizing, prioritizing, updating, emotional coloration, and other refinements.

So, according to Edelman, consciousness is generated by neural processes, but unlike neural processing, cannot cause anything to happen. Only neural processes have causal efficacy. Edelman quotes beautiful metaphors from William James to illustrate, “So the melody floats from the harp-string, but neither checks nor quickens its vibration; so the shadow runs alongside the pedestrian, but in no way influences his steps.”

I’m impressed by Edelman’s argument, but I have a problem with the idea that consciousness itself, as distinct from neural processes, cannot cause anything to happen. Just for starters, if I call up the movie theater, and find out the time of the next screening, my conscious knowledge of that time is part of the causal chain that leads me to go to the theater. I suppose the counterargument is that my neural processes are handling all of that, and my consciousness is only keeping me updated.

But I think this limits the term “consciousness” to only the most superficial aspects of my awareness. If I know (in the usual sense of the word) that “force equals mass times acceleration,” it is not just words that I know. I know the meanings of the terms, and how to apply those terms in specific situations. Even though I may not articulate all of that, I know that I know, and that is part of my consciousness of knowing the equation from physics. To say that my knowledge of how to apply the equation is handled by neural processes, while I am only conscious of words, is to take the term “consciousness” in too restricted a sense. My consciousness includes awareness of meanings and powers that I don’t necessarily recite to myself.

Be all of that as it may, I am impressed enough by Edelman’s theory to pursue the issue by further reading. While I have no doubt that Edelman is a great neuroscientist, I have seen science writing done better by other people. Paul Churchland, in The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, to my mind does a far more impressive job of describing parallel distributed processing (neural networks), though he approaches it from a theoretical viewpoint, rather than from the viewpoint of empirical research. Either way, it is a fascinating topic.

[samm · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Brain -- is wider than the Sky --
For -- put them side by side --
The one the other will contain
With ease -- and You -- beside --

The Brain is deeper than the sea --
For -- hold them -- Blue to Blue --
The one the other will absorb --
As Sponges -- Buckets -- do --

The Brain is just the weight of God --
For -- Heft them -- Pound for Pound --
And they will differ -- if they do --
As Syllable from Sound --

-Emily Dickinson

This book is amazing. Edelman is amazing. It' not exactly light reading, and while he does do alot of explaining. One may get lost with out a solid knowledge base in the subject to begin with.

[Chris Naylor · Rating 1 out of 5]

*Sigh*

You'd think that, by now, I would know better. Why did I buy a book about consciousness by an eminent scientist and expect it to shed light on the question of how brain processing relates to subjective conscious experience? Scientists are the last people to shed light on this question, because they (or at least most of them) don't even understand the question.

Why not? Because it's not a scientific question at all but a philosophical one, and I have yet to find a scientist who knows anything about philosophy.

I should warn you that the rest of this review will be written from the point of view of a peeved philosophy graduate who detests the way in which scientists all too often misconstrue and misrepresent a philosophical problem as if it were a scientific one. Edelman's book is a depressing example of this.

A very clear signal of the problems we are in for appears as early as page 3, where Edelman refers to a quale, and tells us that it is a subjective conscious state. However, 'quale' is a technical philosophical term with a precise meaning: it doesn't mean a conscious state, it means the subjective content of a conscious state. So, for example, if you're looking at something square and green, one of your qualia is a green square; not, as Edelman wants you to believe, the state of being conscious of a green square.

Not content with misusing 'quale' in one way on page 3, Edelman decides to misuse it in an entirely different way later on, where he tells us that qualia (or experiences of qualia) are the same as distinctions. Yet you can prove to yourself that, for example, experiencing colour is not the same as drawing distinctions between colours, simply by lying on your back and looking up at a cloudless blue sky: you experience an expanse of blue (that is your quale), but since that is the only colour you are experiencing, you are not drawing a distinction between that colour and any other. So although it is true that distinguishing between colours is a part of the business of colour perception, it is not the whole of it, and the bit that has been missed is the subjective experiencing of the colour itself. 

It is this subjective experiencing that is at the heart of the philosophical problem of consciousness. The philosophical question, essentially, is this: when we have understood everything that the brain does when we see colours, have we then understood what the subjective experiencing of colour is and how it is created? If so, then there is nothing more to say about colour perception than is given in an exhaustive account of the brain processing associated with colour perception; if not, then there is something more. The first view is reductionist, the second non-reductionist; and despite Edelman's breezy assurance that reductionism is the only acceptable position, the issue continues to be hotly debated by real philosophers, who actually know what words like 'quale' mean, and use them correctly.

The arguments we get from Edelman in support of reductionism are facile. For example, he dismisses the idea of a disembodied consciousness on the grounds that there is no scientific evidence for it. Now I am certainly not here to sell you the notion of a free-floating disembodied consciousness: I have no idea whether such a thing is possible or not. But does one really have to point out that, in the past, there was no scientific evidence for such things as black holes, subatomic particles and many other phenomena, and that this, far from providing evidence that such things did not exist, merely showed that science was not in a position to detect them? Absence of evidence, as we all know (or should know) is not evidence of absence.

Throughout this book, Edelman constantly confuses the neural base of consciousness with consciousness itself (a very common failing among scientists). When he does manage to separate them, he opts for the weak position of epiphenomenalism, while implausibly claiming not to do so. He argues that consciousness cannot be causal, because physics decrees that the physical world must be a closed causal system. This is out-of-date physics, because in a probabilistic quantum universe there is actually no such thing as a closed system. It would also mean, if it were true, that Darwinian evolution was wrong, because if consciousness of e.g. pain is not causal, then there is no evolutionary reason why we should have evolved the ability to feel pain.

So, to sum up: if you're looking for a book that gives a simplified account of brain processing as it relates to conscious experience, by all means read this book. But if you want something that treats what philosophers nowadays call 'the hard problem of consciousness' in a sensible fashion, avoid it like the plague.

[John Turlockton · Rating 3 out of 5]

So, I did a single module of neuropsychology in college and have read a few books about the brain since, to give you an idea of my background.

To me, about half of it was comprehensible. He starts off admirably explaining the 'theory of brain' that he is basing this explanation of consciousness on. This part is difficult, but I was just about able to understand it, and it was frankly, fascinating, I had never read an overall theory of the brain before and it was great.

As the book progresses though, he loses all pretence of writing the book for a general or non-expert audience. After the theory of brain, he goes into the basic theory of consciousness he is expounding, this part is faintly understandable, though much of it was lost on me. He then goes into specific topics like explaining qualia (the sense of feeling something) and intentionality (the intention to do something) and these parts were way past me and I believe 80-90% of people out there, which makes you wonder, as I have done so often with these types of books, why he bothered explaining things at the start if the book wasn't written for a general audience. It wasn't an issue of talking about specific brain regions that an expert wouldn't know, it was his use of language, something that was entirely avoidable if he just wrote it better or had a better editor.

For example there was a sentence "The reticular nucleus, it is suspected, acts to switch or “gate” the activities of the specific thalamic nuclei, yielding different patterns of expression of such sensory modalities as sight, hearing, and touch" which could have been written " The reticular nucleus is believed to be a switch or 'gate' to different ways to see, hear or sense the world." and would've been shorter and a lot clearer.

The last two chapters become very readable again and are a quite interesting summary of the book, but leave out a lot of detail I can only presume was gone into in more detail in previous chapters. He also leaves out things like experimental backing for the theory, which he says is done in different books, listed in the bibliography, which is also very well laid out. The glossary is poorly explained as well as it always being cumbersome to have to go to the end of the book to read the out of context explanation of a term that could've been just explained in-text.

As it was, what I did understand was fascinating but there was far too little of those bits.

[Anna]

Necítím se úplně oprávněná toto hodnotit hvězdičkami. Jsem totiž jen hloupý aspirující pseudovědec a nikoli filosofující neurovědec ponořený do neurálních substrátů vědomí.

Začínalo to vážně slibně. Jak se ale objevily grafíky, tabulky a mozky s šipečkami, odborné výrazy začaly houstnout na téměř nesrozumitelnou frekvenci a nepomohl ani slovníček na konci. Z textu si toho mnoho nepamatuji, a jestli mi něco dal, tak především mentální rozcvičku před začátkem semestru a záminku k machrování před kamarády.

Líbí se mi, že se autor snaží vysvětlit něco tak subjektivního a netělesného jako vědomí na biologických principech, a ukázat, že se jedná o falešnou dichotomii. Mám z toho ale podobný pocit, jako když jsem se pokoušela pochopit teorii relativity nebo statistiku. Docházejí mi důsledky a projevy, ale pořád mám pocit, že mi to někde uprostřed nedává smysl. Že je to natolik abstraktní abstraktno, že to svým mozkem prostě nepoberu.

A možná taky má pravdu někdo, jehož komentář ke knize jsem zahlédla. Že autor zkouší vysvětlit vědecky filosofický problém, který vlastně vůbec nepochopil.

Beru to jako výzvu. O vědomí chci mít lepší povědomí.

[Farhad Azadjou · Rating 4 out of 5]

ترجمه كردن كتاب هاي حوزه علوم اعصاب خيلي كار سختي هست و ترجمه روان و قابل فهم اين نوع كتاب ها كار هر كسي نيست. مترجم اين كتاب هم به نظرم اصلا نتونست از پس ترجمه كتاب بر بياد. يك واژه نامه انتهاي كتاب هست كه پيشنهاد ميكنم حتما قبل از شروع اون رو نگاه بندازيد و بعد هرجا با ترجمه هاي عجيب و غريب مواجه شديد حتما به اون واژه نامه رجوع كنيد و توضيحات رو بخونيد، خيلي كمك ميكنه. ترجمه بد كتاب باعث ميشه خوندن كتاب فرسايشي بشه و براي فهميدن مطلب انرژي زيادي ازتون گرفته بشه. حتي اگر كاملا با فيلد علوم اعصاب شناختي آشنا باشيد.
از ترجمه كه بگذريم آقاي ادلمن تو اين كتاب سعي در توضيح يك نظريه جدي و بنيادي براي توصيف مكانيستي شكل گيري آگاهي داره. مثل هر كتاب ديگه اي در رابطه با آگاهي خيلي از جاها با حدسيات و گمان هاي ادلمن مواجه هستيم بدون اينكه اثباتي براي حرف باشه. بعضي از قسمت هاي كتاب هم توصيف مكانيستي بي نقصي رو براي بعضي از عملكردهاي مغز ميخونيم.
با همه اين تفاسير فكر ميكنم جز كتاب هاي بسيار جدي در حوزه آگاهي باشه و خوندنش براي كسايي كه در اين حوزه مطالعه و پژوهش ميكنن واجب هست.
البته من هم با نظر بقيه دوستان موافق هستم كه اين كتاب رو بايد چندين بار خوند تا جان مطلب دستگير شما بشه

[Kayson Fakhar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thinkable

[Arif Zaman · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is written by one of the most prominent scientists of this field, therefore, making it an authentic and credible depiction of the topic Consciousness.

However, This was my first read book about consciousness, and I had a hard time finishing this book (not because it wasn't a great book!) but I had barely any knowledge as prerequisites other than the quest to understand consciousness and wondering. Moreover, I was in a rush to return the book to the borrower.

The only thing I remember from this book is the exquisite poem by Emily Dickinson in its preface-

The Brain—is wider than the Sky—

The Brain—is wider than the Sky—
For—put them side by side—
The one the other will contain
With ease—and You—beside—

The Brain is deeper than the sea—
For—hold them—Blue to Blue—
The one the other will absorb—
As Sponges—Buckets—do—

The Brain is just the weight of God—
For—Heft them—Pound for Pound—
And they will differ—if they do—
As Syllable from Sound—

And, after reading the poem you can get a sense how well suited this poem is for the book.

So, I really loved this book and wish to re-read it, even though I haven't understood anything in my first read.

So, I recommend this book to anyone wondering about these issues- as I do.

[Behruz Babaeinejad · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتاب خیلی خوب و هوشمندانه به این مساله میپردازه، این که فرآیند آگاهی چیه، چطوری به وجود میاد و چه پروسه ای در مغز صورت میگیره تا یک جاندار صاحب این امتیاز بشه. حتی به صورت کاملا مختصر نظریه ای داده میشه در این باره که در مسیر تکامل از چه زمانی به بعد جانداران صاحب آگاهی شدن تنها ایرادی که میتونم به کتاب بگیرم زبان بی نهایت تخصصی در بخش های مختلف کتابه، انگار که نویسنده فراموش میکنه که مخاطب کتابش نه یک متخصص مغز و اعصاب که یک خواننده معمولیه. با این حال شاید باید به نویسنده حق بدیم، چون چیزی که باهاش سر و کار داریم، مغزه! پیچیده ترین سازمان کشف شده در کل نظام هستی.
با این حال حتی خوندن بخشهای خیلی تخصصی هم به صورت غیر مستقیم اطلاعات خیلی زیادی رو در اختیار ما قرار میده و اگرچه نمیتونه به میلیونها سوالی که در ذهنمون هست جواب بده دست کم میلیونها سوال جدید رو در ذهنمون ایجاد کنه. تازه میفهمین که چه شگفت انگیز و پر رمز و رازه که دو آدم با هم حرف میزنن!

[Jack Youngkin · Rating 5 out of 5]

For me this book rates up there with other classics in science like Chance and Necessity by Jacque Monod.

[Ferruccio Fiordispini · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interessante, scritto da un grande neuroscienziato.
Purtroppo, non facile da leggere, denso e da iniziati, poco divulgativo.
Supplisce uno strepitoso glossario finale.

[Ana Luísa Joaquim Martins · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Consciência do ponto de vista das Neurociências, muito interessante!

[Scott · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm arbitrarily giving this three stars. A lot of it was over my head (pun half-heartedly intended).

[Alan Rodriguez Tiburcio · Rating 4 out of 5]

The most exciting science book I’ve read in a while. Oliver Sacks was justified in being enthralled by Edelman’s TNGS.

[Nick Oliver · Rating 4 out of 5]

…i just have more questions

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not so much a review as a synopsis.
Edelman's work on both researching and describing neuroanatomy has significantly changed the way we see how the brain works. It is not too difficult to follow and should be enough to rock subjects like psychology to the core as they seem happy to proceed on the delusion that there is some kind of metaphysical (i.e. non-physical) mind that bears no resemblance to the brain. With people such as Edelman and Maturana and Varela on the case, metaphysical approaches to the mind should soon be a thing of the past (wishful thinking!!)


Re-entry within the dynamic core of the brain allows for primary consciousness: mediation of value-category memory (originating in bodily experiences, and thru re-entry can be re-enacted with or without motor function at any time) and perceptual categorisation (the here and now of sorting perception into different objects).
Higher-Order consciousness = re-entrant circuits mediating between primary consciousness and semantic capability. Symbolic nature of semantic dissociation between symbol and meaning combined with the flexibility of manipulating these symbols thru syntax releases the consciousness from the “remembered present” and thru these re-entrant circuits enables remembered past, imagined past and future, and planned future.

“although the conscious process involves representation, the neural substrate of consciousness is non-representational” (104)

“mental images arise in a primary-consciousness scene largely by the same neural processes by which direct perceptual images arise. One relies on memory, the other on signals from without.” (105)
[it is thru re-entry that these processes are so similar]

This view rejects the notion of computation and the idea that there is a “language of thought.” Meaning is not identical to mental representation. Instead it arises as a result of the play between value systems, varying environmental cues, learning, and non-representational memory. (105)
[also Thibault Jnl of Prag.]

“…much of cognitive psychology is ill-founded. There are no functional states that can be uniquely equated with defined or coded computational states in individual brains and no process that can be equated with the execution of algorithms. Instead, there is an enormously rich set of selectional repertoires of neuronal groups whose degenerate responses can, by selection, accommodate the open-ended richness of environmental input, individual history and individual variation. Intentionality and will, in this view, both depend on local contexts in the environment, the body and the brain, but they can selectively arise only through such interactions and not as precisely defined computations.” (111)
[embodied and grounded!!]

Constructivist brain:
“Filling in of the blind spot, the phenomena of apparent motion, and gestalt phenomena can all be explained in terms of temporal synchrony in re-entrant circuits. The same is true of time, of succession and of duration. The re-entrant brain combines concepts and percepts with memory and new input to make a coherent picture at all costs.” (124)
e.g. saccades: eye movements are erratic, with the eye ‘jumping’ to a new point of focus, often as a result of peripheral vision, and then resting. Our experience of vision, however, is one of a smooth transition from one scene to the next.


”Given the continual sensorimotor signals arising from the body, subjectivity is a baseline event that is never extinguished in the normal life of conscious individuals. But there is no need for an inner observer or a “central I” – in James’s words, “the thoughts themselves are the thinker”.” (134)

Higher order consciousness may be considered as a trade-off of absolute precision for rich imaginative possibilities. (135)

The pervasive presence of degeneracy in biological systems is particularly noticeable in neural systems, and it exists to a high degree in the rentrant selective circuits of the conscious brain. In certain circumstances, natural languages gain as much strength from ambiguity as they do under other circumstances through the power of logical definition. Association and metaphor are powerful accompaniments of (135) conscious experience even at early stages, and they flower withy linguistic experience. (136)


…the study of consciousness must recognize the first-person, or subjective, point of view. (140)


Consciousness is a property of neural processes and cannot itself act causally in the world. (141)

Whether in the dreams of REM sleep, or in imagery, or even in perceptual categorization, a variety of sensory, motor, and higher-order conceptual processes are constantly in play… in visual imagery, the same reentrant circuits used in direct perception are reengaged but without the more precise constraints of signals from without. In REM sleep, the brain truly speaks to itself in a special conscious state – one constrained neither by outside sensory input nor by the tasks of motor output. (144)

[Ouroboros]

be patient - u've gotta get thru about 80 pages before the book starts getting anywhere near interesting

the [biological:] theory must show how the neural bases for consciousness could have arisen during evolution & how consciousness develops in certain animals.

causal status of consciousness:
- epiphenomenon w/o material consequences
- efficacious: causes things to happen

--> neural bases of consciousness [but not consciousness per se:] can cause things to happen

how a neural mechanism entails a subjective conscious state: quale

William James <>

consciousness is utterly dependent on the brain <=> consciousness is embodied

how properties of conscious experience can emerge from properties of brain

consciousness is a process, not a thing

Jamesian properties of consciousness:
private/subjective (occurs only in the individual)
continuous [albeit continually changing:]
intentionality [about things/events:]
does not exhaust all aspects [...:] to which it refers
---
unitary/integrated scenes differentiated from moment to moment

"the remembered present"
all past experience is engaged in forming my integrated awareness of this single moment

primary consciousness: lacking in semantic/linguistic capabilities
socially defined self
sense of past/future
higher-order consciousness:
recreate past episodes
form future intentions
semantic ability: assignment of meaning to a symbol
linguistic ability: system of symbols & grammar

quale: particular experience of some property

qualia: higher-order discriminations that constitute consciousness experienced as parts of unitary/integrated conscious scene

conscious events: complex [set:] of qualia

qualia: ability of conscious individuals to make high-order discriminations

scientific description of consciousness:

give a causal account of relationship btw these domains so properties in one domain may be understood in terms of events in the other

brain-based theory of consciousness should give a causal explanation of its properties but should not be expected to generate qualia "by description."

[Saša Mataić · Rating 4 out of 5]

A pretty technical and dense book, Wider Than the Sky aims to provide a consistent scientific theory on the emergence of consciousness from the neural base, without delving into speculation (such as quantum consciousness) resolving to dualism (mind/body), but focusing on embodiment - the fact that brain develops in a different way for every person, and neurons are highly adaptable, making representations of concepts non-permanent in the patterns of neural firing.

The theory outlined makes a distinction between primary consciousness and higher-order consciousness (being conscious of being conscious). Primary consciousness seems to have evolved in the transition from reptiles to birds and reptiles to mammals. Having primary consciousness means having concepts, basic understanding of cause and effect and learning from experience. In the development of primates (specifically, with evolution of Broca and Wernicke's areas) and simultaneously with the development of language, conceptualizations about time, space and the self enabled higher-order consciousness to emerge, making it possible to be conscious of being conscious.

The book discusses massive re-entry of neural cells, a looping interplay of connections between different parts of the brain, to explain the neural base for consciousness. Even though it simplifies the organization of the brain structures enough for their interplay to be understood to a layman, I found it difficult to follow, due to many anatomical terms, in addition to sheer complexity of the brain. The author provides a good explanation between the interplay of thalamus, hippocampus, cortex and other, more functional areas.

Not a casual read, and very dense in parts, it's hard to follow without previous understanding of brain anatomy and some level of familiarity with more philosophical approaches to explanations of consciousness.

[Nima Nariman · Rating 3 out of 5]

کتابی جدی برای خواننده‌ای جدی که مایل است درباره مساله "آگاهی" به شکلی جدی‌تر و عمیق‌تر بداند. این کتاب را جرالد ادلمن٬عصب‌شناس مشهور نوشته که بخاطر تلاش‌های تحسین‌برانگیزش در راه شناخت بنیان‌های زیستی-تکاملی آگاهی سالها قبل برنده جایزه نوبل پزشکی شد و چند سال پیش هم از دنیا رفت. استاد بسیار گران‌قدرم دکتر رضا نیلی‌پور عزیز این کتاب را به روان‌ترین شکل ممکن ترجمه کرده است٬با این وجود همانطور که در مقدمه گیرای این کتاب که دکتر خسرو پارسا (جراح مغز و اعصاب) نگاشته می‌خوانید برای یک خواننده کاملا معمولی و بدون هیچ اطلاع و مطالعه قبلی شاید کتابی سخت و خسته‌کننده باشد اما برای کسی با حداقل اطلاعات و مطالعه در این باره بغایت جذاب خواهد بود. ادلمن از اصطلاحات تخصصی و بعضا و عجیب و ناآشنا و غریب برای خواننده فارسی استفاده کرده که این خود کار برگردان و تفهیم مطالب را کمی دشوارتر هم کرده٬اما جای نگرانی نیست چون وقتی مترجم یکی از اساتید بی‌بدیل روان‌شناسی‌زبان و زبان‌شناسی ایران باشد (و چقدر مفتخرم که در سالهایی دور شاگرد ایشان بودم) کار به دست کاردان سپرده شده و نتیجه‌ای مطلوب حاصل. توصیه می‌کنم مقدمه این کتاب را بخوانید و در صورتی که همچنان علاقه‌مند و کنجکاو بودید فصل اول را که در باب به سرانجام رسانیدن کار نیمه‌تمام چارلز داروین بوده را مطالعه کنید و پس از آن یا تا آخر خواهید خواند یا اینکه به سراغ کتابی دیگر خواهید رفت. نکته آخر اینکه اگر تصمیم گرفتید تا آخر بخوانید این نکته را در نظر داشته باشید که شما در حال مطالعه عمیق‌ترین مطالب ممکن درباره پیچیده‌ترین و اسرارآمیزترین و ناشناخته‌ترین پدیده تمام کائنات یعنی آگاهی هستید؛ پدیده‌ای که قرنها پرسش بی‌پاسخ متفکران بوده و رمزگشایی آن و پی بردن به چند و چونش هم‌اکنون هدف غایی علوم‌اعصاب و به عبارتی تمام علوم زیستی مرتبط٬بنابراین شاید در پایان کتاب لازم بدانید آن را دوباره و از نو بخوانید! خلاصه اینکه بدانید و آگاه باشید که این اتفاق برای یک خواننده عادی کاملا طبیعی و قابل‌ پیش‌بینی است

[Sharon · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is very interesting, but very difficult. Edelman starts by describing the neural anatomy that sensory perceptions and then processed information travels through in order for our brains to process information, then describes how this process of ordering info is primary consciousness. Combined with value systems with instinctual responses to stimuli, the development of communication & then language, our brains evolved to also process abstract thoughts. How our brains process language was not really discussed, and could have bridged the gap between advanced sensory perception and value filters and Socrates. So, this is only the beginning of my reading, not the end. However, Edelman notes how our memories, and concepts about those memories form our identities. A good start, but be prepared for alot of hard vocabulary.

[Mark Valentine · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great. I read, skipped, and jumped to the final chapter only to realize that I had misapplied a symbol in Edelman's formula for higher-order consciousness and now realize that I need to re-read the book. By the time I arrived at the final chapter, it all made sense--I now had the right meaning attached to the right symbol--and I was exhausted. I wish that Edelman had elected to place his final chapter as the introduction. I don't know if it would helped my addle-brained reading though.

I really like his expression for the present, the remembered present. I also like his emphasis on giving dignity to the variance and individuality of brains; he states that all that not noise. What I select to be the focal point of my attention shapes my destiny seductively while logic keeps a tidy house.

Oh, my sanity! Choose thy mistress well.

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thanks to this book, I have a way of talking about what consciousness is from a physiological perspective. They author uses the term "reentry" to describe how distinct areas of the brain are massively cross-wired with repeated feedback loops that are enriched each time one area "enters" another, is processed and merged with the distinct information unique to that area then sent back to the original area with its new layer of information only to "re-enter" again to make possible an even richer and more subtly refracted neurological impression. The scale of what the brian is doing is incomprehensible, but the book creates a visual and conceptual model that I've been able to hold on to, even if I couldn't retain much of the detailed information. A thrilling read.

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

A lot of books on consciousness say half as much in twice the space. Gerald M. Edelman's short book is crammed with biological description and interpretation that is guaranteed to challenge and, eventually, reward the reader.

The occasional entanglements with Latin and scientific jargon are clarified by Edelman's careful interpretive remarks. In a few paragraphs he gives a clearer account of how the mind produces (or entails, as he would put it) conscious feeling than I have yet to find elsewhere.

If you want a book about the mind that makes you work and that you will benefit from re-reading, you can do little better than Edelman's impressive contribution to the field.

[Renee Valdez · Rating 3 out of 5]

Though written for the layman, this book is a bit difficult. I'd suggest reading Francis Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul" before you start this book. I think Crick sets a good foundation, tackling consciousness with a focus on the brain's visual system. He's just a more accessible author and makes Edelman's book a little easier to understand.
Overall, the book was interesting and I'm glad I read it. I just wish I had read "Astonishing Hypothesis" first.

[Clare · Rating 2 out of 5]

Very interesting descriptions of the brain and neural anatomy. Challenging and rather heavy going to begin with but the occasional chapter offered delightful views of consciousness and it does eventually reward the reader. The sheer length of description was at times, intrusive, but when you persevere you find the end result all the more charming.

[Katty · Rating 2 out of 5]

Eh, not bad. Just not that accessible. Consciousness is already a tricky subject, even for the experts, and Edelman doesn't seem to shine any new light on it or make it easier to comprehend. Either I'm not smart enough to get it or Edelman isn't good at conveying the subject (or, most likely, a bit of both).

[Bevan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the second time I am reading this book, and it hasn't gotten any easier. Nevertheless, I can learn from it. Dr. Edelman is a Nobel laureate and a neuroscientist, and this book is meant for the layperson.

[Blair · Rating 2 out of 5]

Eek, this book fell short for me. Too much jargon, diagrams, technicalities, etc. With a background in biomedical engineering, I thought for sure I would have no problem getting through this book and leave with some interesting insights into Consciousness, but it fell flat for me.

[Ethan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dense and academic prose, but it's worth chugging along for Edelman's remarkable theory of how the brain works.