It has become axiomatic in Washington to contend that U.S. foreign policy must adapt to an era of renewed "great-power competition." The United States went on a quarter-century strategic detour after the Cold War, the argument goes, basking in triumphalism in the 1990s and getting bogged down in the Middle East in the 2000s. Now it finds itself on the defensive, with China and Russia increasingly challenging its influence across the globe and undercutting the order it has led since the end of World War II. How should it respond to these two formidable authoritarian powers?
In this timely intervention, Ali Wyne offers the first detailed critique of "great-power competition," warning that a foreign policy anchored in that now-ubiquitous construct could place the United States in a perpetually defensive, reactive mode. He exhorts Washington to find a middle ground between complacence and consternation, selectively contesting Beijing and Moscow but not allowing their decisions to determine its own course. Analyzing a resurgent China, a disruptive Russia, and a deepening Sino-Russian entente in depth, Wyne explains how the United States can seize the "great-power opportunity" at hand: to manage all three phenomena confidently while renewing itself at home and abroad.
Ali Wyne makes an important contribution to the discussion of U.S. policy in the current era where the term "great power competition" has become a widely accepted description of the dynamic the U.S. will confront in the years ahead. It is a timely critique of the broad agreement on the term, but a lack of clarity on what in fact the impact of it means. He explains that descriptively, great power competition captures how the U.S. faces a geopolitical environment marked by competing with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation at a time where both have proven able and willing to challenge U.S. and the rules-based international order of the post-Cold War decades. However, he argues this falls short in providing a prescription to carry out this competition with Beijing and Moscow. He acknowledges the tremendous challenge a resurgent Beijing presents that is long-term in nature and a condition to be managed. This work was a useful one to engage with in the run-up and aftermath of the 2022 mid-term election with the challenge to develop a consensus that can endure American domestic political divides along with those steps taken by both Beijing and Moscow. In the end, the U.S. must lay out a vision for its allies and partners on the future that it seeks, not just its opposition to authoritarian rivals.
Released right before the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, it’s not exactly prescient but still has good insights. Definitely the represents the liberal (foreign policy, not political definition) end of the spectrum.
3 big ideas I appreciated: - Strongly argues that coherent domestic policy leads to better foreign policy credibility. - Points out that while America engenders many emotions the international response to its COVID policy was new and unsettling: Pity. - Argues national strategy should be more than what the US is against…like it or not the PRC has long term idea of where it’s heading decades from now.
Ali Wyne reframes the environment describing interactions between great powers. Most frameworks, current and historical, oversimplify these relationships in ways that then drive action. Her description and framework is additive to the discussion and it is refreshingly current.
When I last visited Washington D.C in 2019, there seemed a sense of relief in the Foreign Policy community. As bad as Trump was, the US finally had a clear sense of what it was doing. The aimless 1990s and 2000s had given way to Great Power Competition with China. This was a game they knew well and had won big in last time. Yet after having a coffee with just about everyone I could during my stay (over a few months) I came away somewhat pessimistic. Agreement seemed a mile wide, but an inch thick. China was a problem, but what kind of problem and how it should be responded to were divisive topics.
In the years since, Trump has proven worse than anticipated, China a tougher opponent to handle, and the foreign policy community is once more divided. The traditional suggestions of either 'Strength' (The right wing argument) and 'firm engagement' (the left wing argument) have not panned out. And increasingly scholars wonder if the Cold War playbook makes any sense. Decoupling is not viable, and the competition seems to be harder to navigate and clarify than presumed.
Enter Ali Wyne with a sharp analysis of the challenges. Wyne rightly notes that while competition is descriptive of the world we're in, it isn't necessarily prescriptive. Everyone is using the term in different ways, and the idea itself doesn't automatically lead to particular choices and approaches. Hence the fraying of the sense of union and common purpose hoped for. Wyne also notes a number of significant problems with the US approach to competition thus far. It is often reactive, the Cold War analogy is a poor one given the significant changes (removed ideological edge, China's much bigger than the USSR ever was, the world order is very different etc). The risk, as Wyne offers quoting Kathleen Hicks (citing an episode of The Office), is akin to trusting a GPS even when it suggests driving into a lake. It's worked every time before, why would it be wrong now?
Yet having set up the big play, Wyne ends up taking the check-down. Rather than argue for getting rid of Great Power Competition as the defining framework, he argues for a US approach that is smarter, more self-directed and defined by its 'quiet confidence'. The main proposals in the concluding chapter turn on making the US a more efficient, thoughtful competitor. As policy recommendations, they are all compelling. I hope the Biden Administration has someone reading it closely and getting in touch.
But I couldn't help feel like an opportunity had been missed for putting down a book length marker on why Great Power Competition is the wrong framework. Or at least, could only ever be half (the description, not the prescription). That's not to suggest this book should have offered a full alternate approach. But there seems a disparity between the incisive critique and at least where I the reader thought the book was going, and where it ultimately ends up. Then again, with the title of the book offering 'great power opportunity' and to 'meet the challenges of strategic competition', the framing within competition is at least apparent for a sharper reader than I.
The other question that arose in reading it, was why there wasn't any mention of Andrew Marshall's Competitive Strategy approaches (or the Pentagon's programs of the same name from the 1980s). Wyne at one point references the need to make Net Assessments, but doesn't follow through. That framework is of course only one on offer, but it does at least provide the kind of prescription that Wyne argues current thinking about competition seems to lack. Of course no book can cover everything, and Wyne has engaged broadly on the literature, so perhaps it was too left-of-centre to fit the main arguments made herein.
These modest concern aside, this is a very well researched and thoughtful account of where the US stands today in 2022 and the nature of the struggle it is in. The chapters on China and Russia are strong, and the argument for seeing them as very distinct entities requiring very different areas of emphasis is compelling. For a one-volume account of the broad themes of how we got here and ways that we can do this better, this is a valuable account from which I've both learned a fair bit, and found a lot of great sources.
I don't read as many of these 'state of the world' books as I used to, and it's nice to get the chance to go through one that is very well done. It won't change the core framework, but for those wishing to get a better handle on US policy challenges and choices, and to know there is a better way, this is a thoughtful and substantive account.
Ali Wyne's America's Great Power Opportunity: How Strategic Competition Can Revitalize U.S. Foreign Policy reads like a literature review of most major points that are a part of the US Defense Policy discussions. This reads a bit like someone vying for a job in the NSC, DoD, or State Department staff, as this text demonstrates a mastery and competence over the fundamental issues facing the U.S., and puts forward eight principles to shape future policy goals and orientation. As such, it also tells a less informed reader many of the things they should keep in mind when thinking about competition with China and Russia. There's a lot to like here, and I feel like I should throw in a dozen sticky notes so that I can have something to look to if I want a reference. Wyne has a lot of quotes, referencing a who's who of many of the leading thinkers in the realm of international security. Its not exactly new for anyone following these issues closely, but for the next couple of years it is a good, short, and readable foray into the world of U.S. foreign policy in increasingly dangerous times.
Highly recommended for anyone attempting to navigate great power politics in the current state of the world. Wyne does a great job delving into what "great power competition" can mean, and how often this phrase is used with no real thought about what the phrase actually means. I also really enjoyed his policy prescriptions at the end - not only does he diagnose some interesting issues with the current American foreign policy approach, he also offers some fascinating ideas that I believe policymakers in the U.S. would be wise to heed.
Good snap shot of the current state of play in great power competition. The author highlights America's opportunity to continue to lead the world by not only focusing on Russia and China as great power competitors, but to look across the globe to our allies and potential partners. This breaks the Cold War paradigm and opens up America's aperture to realize positive growth not dependent on an aggressive competitor. Interesting.