This is an interesting book. Nietzsche clearly perceives that morality is an external yardstick against which individual interests and acts are measured; he sees that the demand for a moral corrective implies an underlying conflict of interests, and that morality regulates or subordinates the execution of the wills of those it ensnares. Instead of pursuing our private interests with abandon and enforcing our will ruthlessly, taking our own interests as our standard, we are required by morality to pursue our interests hypocritically, always apologising, always paying lip-service to an external standard. We are supposed to compete for money, for example, but not too much money; we must not be greedy. We must, in a word, moderate ourselves.
But Nietzsche rejects this whole imposition. He would have us pursue our interests uncritically, without the bad conscience that dogs us today. In the clash of interests that characterises bourgeois society, Nietzsche would have us compete without restraint - he would have us admit to ourselves that we are embroiled in a conflict, and strive unapologetically to win that conflict. But nowhere does he question the necessity of the conflict itself, i.e. the necessity of the clash of interests over which morality asserts itself as a moderating influence. He wants us to compete, but without the hypocrisy of a bad conscience. In this sense Nietzsche is just as much a moralist as those he criticises - his morality, the credo he wants us all to follow, lies not in restraint but in its crude negation, in the total war of all against all, the brutal assertion of interest against interest. He replaces one morality - a hypocritical, affected morality which conceals the clash of wills that characterises bourgeois society - with another, an honest morality which nevertheless accepts this clash of wills as given and even revels in it.
He never makes the transition to the question: what is the necessity of this clash of wills, this clash of interests? Need things be this way? As such he cannot be considered a critic of morality, but rather a remarkably self-aware moralist.
The third essay in this book is by far the weakest, and the influence of Stirner is particularly striking here. Nietzsche considers as an imposition everything in which the will (i.e. his will) has not recognised itself, so that even the striving after scientific truth is said to be an 'ascetic ideal' enslaving mankind.
This leads him to some quite ridiculous conclusions. For example, he says that by striving after scientific truth, man has degraded himself from a 'demigod' to a 'mere animal', i.e. man has disproved God, and in doing so has sacrificed 'his belief that he was precious, unique and indispensable in the hierarchy of beings', whereas earlier he was 'almost God ('child of God', 'demigod')'. But, as Feuerbach has demonstrated, criticism of religion shows us that God did not make man, man made God. It shows us that the old theistic notion - according to which man is nothing, God is everything, man the dependent variable, God the independent variable, man the effect, God the cause - is completely backwards. Man is revealed as the real generative force, and God merely the transfigured, alienated form of man's own characteristics. Whatever man finds divine he alienates, gives independent form, in God. And when he recognises the truth of his relationship with God, i.e. that God is nothing but his own fantastical reflection, his view of himself is enriched. He now 'revolves around himself as his own Sun' rather than around his own product, God. In this sense, science - which has effected this criticism of God and religion - is precisely the negation of the 'ascetic ideal', i.e. of man's self-alienation, that Nietzsche seeks in vain throughout the third essay. His idealist, speculative method leads him to abstract from the various different concrete truths sought by various different concrete individuals for their own purposes; he sees only a single, abstract 'truth' towards which every scientific thinker and enquirer is subjugated. In exactly the same way, we might conclude from the fact that people around the world cultivate crops for various reasons that people are enslaved to 'the crop', the idea of the crop, and so impute to all of these different people - with their manifold individual purposes and desires, for which they require manifold different concrete crops - a single, abstract desire which has no existence in reality. The ridiculous and shallow nature of this method is obvious. Cf. Marx's remarks on 'utility' in The German Ideology:
"Hence the actual relations that are presupposed here are speech, love, definite manifestations of definite qualities of individuals. Now these relations are supposed not to have the meaning peculiar to them but to be the expression and manifestation of some third relation attributed to them, the relation of utility or utilisation."
Overall this is a very thought-provoking book, worth reading simply for its novelty and willingness to criticise prevailing dogma. It offers some valuable insights into the way morality operates - the hypocritical way in which it degrades us and camouflages the real clash of interests arising from the very basis of society.