This volume brings together the vital contributions of distinguished past and contemporary philosophers to the important topic of personal identity. The first part sets forth the attempts by John Locke, Anthony Quinton, and H. P. Grice to analyze personal identity in terms of memory. The eleven other selections are largely critical of this approach and provide alternative perspectives.
Part II contains classic contributions by Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid, and Sydney S. Shoemaker, and a new paper by John Perry—"Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity"—in which he defends some of the central features of the Locke-Grice-Quinton approach.
Part III contains three sections from David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature : "Our idea of Identity," "Of Personal Identity," and an appendix which the editor has entitled "Second Thoughts."
In the fourth part of the volume, Bernard Williams discusses "The Self and the Future," and Derek Parfit contributes his view of "Personal Identity."
A recurring theme throughout the work is the possibility of "body transfer"—of a single person having, at different times, different bodies. In the final section of the volume ("Brian Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness"), Thomas Nagel examines the philosophical implications of recent scientific research on split-brain patients' he discusses the possibility, entertained by some researchers, that such cases involve two persons simultaneously inhabiting a single body.
In his long introduction to this unique anthology on a topic of prime interest to the philosophical community, Mr. Perry scrutinizes the differing approaches and vocabularies of the various authors. The editor also includes "Suggestions for Further Reading."
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
John R. Perry (born 1943) is Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. He has made significant contributions to areas of philosophy, including logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is known primarily for his work on situation semantics (together with Jon Barwise), reflexivity, indexicality, and self-knowledge.
despite my enthusiasm for the topic, i found this book almost unbearably dry and difficult. this is, in part, just a matter of its being metaphysics, which is always difficult and often dry. but i can't help but feel that it must be possible, given how compelling the topic is, to accurately survey the literature and still turn out a more compelling book. even if it just is the case that the seminal papers on personal identity are abstruse, the introduction might have made up for it by motivating the problems in an more engaging way, or in more accessible language. as it is, the most credible collection on this vital and fascinating topic feels neither vital nor fascinating.
This very nearly broke my brain. Bisected the hemispheres, transplanted it into a stranger’s body, divided that person in two, then fused the progeny back together again, repeating the process ten times over, leaving v little semblance, if any, of what I used to call “myself” intact.
Basically the analytic philosophy behind freaky friday (& poor things… and solaris… and every black mirror episode ever probably).
This book is a really good into to Personal Identity. It includes helpful selections from modern philosophers like John Locke and Thomas Reid, as well as contemporary writers, like Sydney Shoemaker and John Perry.
This very nearly broke my brain. Bisected the hemispheres, transplanted it into a stranger’s body, divided that person in two, then fused the progeny back together again, repeating the process ten times over, leaving v little semblance, if any, of what I used to call “myself” intact.
Basically the analytic philosophy behind freaky friday (& poor things… and solaris… and every black mirror episode ever probably).
only a man could make an anthology about the topic of personal identity that doesn't have a single essay by a woman in it and never even mentions the relationship between personal identity and other people (-> social identity)