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Le Premier Jour du Monde: Mao Tsétoung et la Révolution Chinoise, 1949 1975
Fait suite au "Déluge du matin", du même auteur. Traduit de l'anglais par M.A. Revellat et R. Albeck ; revu et corrigé par l'auteur avec l'assistance de M Michelle Loi.
627 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 1976
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413 people want to read
About the author
Han Suyin
106 books103 followersHan Suyin (Pinyin: Hán Sùyīn) is the pen name of Elizabeth Comber, born Rosalie Elisabeth Kuanghu Chow (Pinyin: Zhōu Guānghú). She was a Chinese-born Eurasian author of several books on modern China, novels set in East Asia, and autobiographical works, as well as a physician. She wrote in English and French. She died in Lausanne, Switzerland in 2012.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 17, 2025
I suppose this book is now totally discredited, given all the exposure of Mao's abuses and errors in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. When it was written, the author sought to counter Western Cold War demonization of China, and to do so through a great story of heroic deeds and admirable accomplishments. Her tale was a beautifully written ode of praise, which won this talented writer a reputation as a sycophant for the Great Helmsman's tyranny. Even so, I enjoyed the book. It's bias in highlighting noble deeds ran directly counter to our bias for highlighting horrors, but actually both of those highlights expose things that really happened. To show the Chinese revolution as a triumph of evil is like telling the story of WWII exclusively in terms of devastation wrought and innocent people killed, with no account of the lives saved and horrific injustices overcome. We still need balance in how we view China, in our new age of demonizing this whole civilization.
May 21, 2024
This was definitely very informative and instrumental for gaining a good understanding of modern Chinese history, something which American education/mass media has a vested interest in teaching us absolutely nothing about. It was slower going than the first volume, as the subject matter in general was a bit dryer and harder to wrap my head around, but it still had some good insights and did a great deal to enrich my understanding about the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, two events in Chinese history which the American education system grossly misrepresents, causing a majority of Americans to have a completely ahistorical and absurd view of them, because we're not actually taught anything of real substance or historical factuality about them.
I particularly enjoyed the first half of this book, where Suyin Han presents the history of agricultural collectivization and land reform in the PRC (Peoples' Republic of China), as well as the Great Leap Forward. There are so many examples in both of these books where differing lines in the CCP leadership cause intra-party disputes, intense debate and policy changes within the party, and regional differences in how and when these different party lines are implemented (or not) based on the grassroots-level collectives, cooperatives, and provincial-level government structures. These well-documented historical facts go such a long way in countering the traditional American propagandistic view of Mao as some sort of egotistical, all-powerful tyrant who's bent on intentionally starving the masses for whom he just fought a bloody civil war/revolution because.... I dunno, scary socialist guy is bad I guess?
The idea of Mao we're taught in the U.S. doesn't actually make any sense when you give it even the remotest level of critical thought, but unfortunately we're also not taught how to analyze history from a materialist perspective, so many people simply accept this depiction of Mao as a murderous tyrant. I'm harping on this so much because this book covers the two events which are the most grossly distorted by American ideology, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolution. Someone who learns about the PRC from a solely bourgeois American standpoint would come away with an understanding that, somehow, these two periods are literally the only thing that ever happened in China between 1949 and Mao's death, and that they were both intentional atrocities committed by one single man at the top who wielded absolute power and for some reason used that power to slaughter tens of millions of his own people with no repercussions or attempts by them to overthrow his (hugely popular, mind you) government. Of course, no actual reasons or concrete analysis of historical material conditions are presented when we're taught this, and even outside of formal education, neoliberal American mass media also works to perpetuate this ridiculous idea. Reading this book was, for me, an overall lesson in how the ideology and media of my own bourgeois society interact with and distort the reality of historical events which it has a vested interest in portraying in as bad a light as possible. If Americans are taught that Mao and Stalin were just as evil, egomaniacal, and bloodthirsty as literally Hitler, then they internalize a false idea that socialism and fascism are pretty much the same, that the famines which happened in the PRC and the USSR were intentional, and that we're better off under capitalism.
When one actually learns about the power structures of the PRC post-revolution, how Chinese history was shaped not by one guy at the top but by many people within the CCP and by the masses at the grassroots level, one begins to see just how much they've been intentionally misled by bourgeois ideological conditioning. Let's take the Great Leap Forward as an example: in the U.S., we're usually taught that the GLF was an event where, for some reason, Mao intentionally produced and imposed a horrible famine on the Chinese people, which, again, is not in any way shape or form supported by the historical reality, and is just an irrational and childish characterization.
The GLF was an effort, after agricultural collectivization (which hugely increased China's agricultural productivity in comparison to the capitalism-imperialist oppression of the pre-revolutionary period), to further increase agricultural productivity so that an even greater surplus could be generated, which could then be used to acquire capital for industrial development and the diversifying of agricultural investment. The GLF, let's be clear, had some huge problems, and there was in fact a famine as a result; serious historians put the figure of deaths at somewhere between 10-12mil I think, which, as Mao and the CCP acknowledged, investigated, and sought to address, is an incredible tragedy. We're historical materialists, and we have a responsibility to analyze where and why the GLF went wrong, where it succeeded, and what we can learn from it. It's obvious with any amount of actual critical thought that it was not an intentionally imposed famine, and that the idea of the GLF was theoretically sound, well-justified, and could very well have been a great success. The actual reasons for the resultant famine can be boiled down more or less to a couple of reasons:
1. changes in weather/climate
2. bureaucratization within the party, resulting from its massive growth post-1949
The first reason is pretty straightforward. Weather conditions were ideal for agricultural production between 1949-1959, and then they weren't. 1959 saw too much rain, fluctuations in temperature, and overall insane weather patterns which, obviously, are gonna affect your harvest. We know now that El Niño was probably a big factor in this (Suyin Han doesn't mention this, but today's climate science has a much better understanding of how these things work; Dr. Ken Hammond is a great modern scholarly source to look into and gain a more current perspective), and we can see throughout the thousands of years of Chinese history that flooding, climatic fluctuations, and other environmental difficulties have resulted in many famines throughout the years. Interesting that the emperors at those times are not portrayed as intentionally starving millions of their people, isn't it? Hmmm, I wonder why that could be.
The second reason is a bit more complex but critical to understand, especially if one is to understand the subsequent Cultural Revolution. The CCP had about 1 million members in 1949, and in 1959, had grown to over 10 million members. With this massive expansion (which was necessary to actually build socialism and improve the living conditions for literally a quarter of the entire human population), there was a huge influx of people into the party who weren't necessarily wholly motivated by a genuine desire to build socialism, and instead could be referred to as "careerists"; people who see the CCP as a way to build their resume or gain material wealth/prestige.
Obviously the PRC is a planned economy, so the central government had set certain targets for agricultural production during the GLF. As production came in during 1959, most places actually did meet or exceed the set quotas. The problem began, though, when party cadres at the grassroots, collective level would say to themselves that, essentially, while the production figures they had to report up the ladder were pretty good, if they just added 1 or 2% to that number, it might reflect better on them personally. What's the harm in that, right? Then, it goes up to the next level, from town to county, and the county level cadre has the same thought, and slightly inflates their report as well. Then it goes on and on up the ladder, from collective to province to the central government itself, eventually causing huge distortions in the production figures that the national government was receiving. This makes itappear that there's more grain in the countryside than there actually is, so the amount of grain being taken out of the countryside and sold as surplus (for the growth of industrial development) is increased past what is sustainable, i.e. too much grain is being taken from the countryside and people no longer have enough food in their community to feed everyone. This is compounded because those artificially-inflated figures are then used by the national government to set production targets for the coming year as well, setting excessively high expectations. Then, in the following year, because of the aforementioned weather issue, the harvests are Not Good, but, in order to meet targets, many low-level party cadres report upward that they've met those targets even when they haven't, which again causes excessive procurement. This is why a famine occurs, and the party quickly realizes this.
Mao, as Suyin points out, was constantly touring the countryside and investigating, and realized that there was over-reporting, but did not initially know how bad things were getting. He was at all times connected to and worried about the working masses, and when it was realized that things were going horribly awry and why, he immediately sought to address it. He wrote letters to party cadres at the provincial, district, county, commune, brigade, and team levels, urging them to report realistic numbers; he issued a statement that "there must be a more scientific realistic standard according to local conditions" (p. 140), and in the many party meetings and debates held to address the issue, called for increased scrutiny and oversight of the party bureaucracy. At a meeting in Wuchang in November 1959, Mao opposed the setting of overly high quotas in opposition to the President of the PRC (contrary to popular misunderstanding, Mao was not the president of the country), Liu Shao-chi; Mao was overruled, however, and the quotas based on exaggerated reports were upheld for a while longer. This shows, again, that Mao was not some tyrannical totalitarian dictator with an iron fist; he was constantly overruled, and only through constant debate and investigation could he work to right the wrongs of the GLF. Suyin Han sums up the way by which Mao finally won out and began to address the suffering in the countryside, after a Central Committee meeting in Wuhan:
The Great Leap Forward did, however, despite its enormous administrative and organizational problems and lack of oversight of party bureaucracy, succeed in hugely increasing China's industrial sector and uplifting the peasant class from its previous misery under imperialist domination. Workers gained access to education in philosophy and science, lecturing in universities and publishing articles en masse. Enormous numbers of factories and workshops were set up; women began working as members of the cooperatives and gained full voting rights, no longer working as unpaid housewives for their husbands; huge numbers of mineral/oil deposits were discovered and continue to be mined today; hundreds of thousands of engineers and industrial workers were trained and set to work; dams, roads, and irrigation canals were built all over the country; agriculture began to be mechanized; etc. etc. etc. Overall, the GLF is an extremely nuanced mixed bag which should be understood as such and investigated with respect to the actual material conditions in China at the time. What it should NOT be understood as is some sort of intentional starving of the countryside by Mao; that idea clearly makes no sense. Suyin says:
This review is getting WAYYYY too long and I haven't even begun talking about the Cultural Revolution, so I'll try to sum it up in as little words as possible. Essentially, it sought to address the increasing levels of bureaucratization and elitism in the CCP, and fight against growing revisionism and collaboration with imperialists. The idea of cultural revolution is something that both Marx and Lenin talk about in their writings, and is theoretically sound; essentially, after revolution, old bourgeois ways of thinking do not simply disappear, and must be fought against. It's not enough to simply revolutionize the economic base of society, we must also revolutionize the ideological superstructure of society. The cultural revolution sought to do just that: free people from the old Confucian ways of thinking, bring the party back to the masses (from whom it had been drifting away amidst growing bureaucracy and elitism), and bring socialist construction not just to the economic sector, but to peoples' very ways of thinking. It sought to revive the idea that the PARTY should serve the MASSES, not the other way around. It sought to establish direct oversight of the CCP by the working masses.
Western media and education treat the Cultural Revolution as some sort of campaign of massacres and slaughters against intellectuals encouraged by Mao, so as to consolidate power and purge opposition. This again is a complete lie and leans into bullshit, bourgeois "great man" theories of history. Obviously, Mao could not do whatever he wanted with impunity, and the popular western understanding of the CR (as with the GLF) is a complete distortion of how human history and social life actually work. Mao at all times stressed education, self-examination, debate, and investigation rather than outright killing or purging, and we have absolutely zero indication that he ever sought to wholesale murder his opposition. Even during the revolution and land reform, the popular conception of Mao having "killed all the landlords" is entirely false; he, again, always stressed re-education and self criticism, and only the most violent and repressive landlords were killed.
I won't go super deep into it because I'm getting tired of typing, but suffice it to say that there were excesses and killings during the CR, especially in the Youth Movement, but this was a very small part of the CR which is disproportionately focused on by western media, and, again, was not called for or encouraged by Mao. The CR was, above all, a push by Mao for the masses to assert their control over the party which he himself was the chairman of. Mao's writings are full of self-criticism and introspection, and he sought to extend that to the party at large. It, like the GLF, was a long, nuanced, and extremely complex process, and I urge anyone who wants to learn about it to read this book. Another good resource, like I mentioned earlier, is Prof. Ken Hammond, who is a contemporary scholar on the PRC and its history, and is much better than me at explaining this kind of thing. I'm glad to finally be done with these books, and I look forward to actually reading Mao now with a proper understanding of the material conditions and historical facts within which he was writing and operating.
I particularly enjoyed the first half of this book, where Suyin Han presents the history of agricultural collectivization and land reform in the PRC (Peoples' Republic of China), as well as the Great Leap Forward. There are so many examples in both of these books where differing lines in the CCP leadership cause intra-party disputes, intense debate and policy changes within the party, and regional differences in how and when these different party lines are implemented (or not) based on the grassroots-level collectives, cooperatives, and provincial-level government structures. These well-documented historical facts go such a long way in countering the traditional American propagandistic view of Mao as some sort of egotistical, all-powerful tyrant who's bent on intentionally starving the masses for whom he just fought a bloody civil war/revolution because.... I dunno, scary socialist guy is bad I guess?
The idea of Mao we're taught in the U.S. doesn't actually make any sense when you give it even the remotest level of critical thought, but unfortunately we're also not taught how to analyze history from a materialist perspective, so many people simply accept this depiction of Mao as a murderous tyrant. I'm harping on this so much because this book covers the two events which are the most grossly distorted by American ideology, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolution. Someone who learns about the PRC from a solely bourgeois American standpoint would come away with an understanding that, somehow, these two periods are literally the only thing that ever happened in China between 1949 and Mao's death, and that they were both intentional atrocities committed by one single man at the top who wielded absolute power and for some reason used that power to slaughter tens of millions of his own people with no repercussions or attempts by them to overthrow his (hugely popular, mind you) government. Of course, no actual reasons or concrete analysis of historical material conditions are presented when we're taught this, and even outside of formal education, neoliberal American mass media also works to perpetuate this ridiculous idea. Reading this book was, for me, an overall lesson in how the ideology and media of my own bourgeois society interact with and distort the reality of historical events which it has a vested interest in portraying in as bad a light as possible. If Americans are taught that Mao and Stalin were just as evil, egomaniacal, and bloodthirsty as literally Hitler, then they internalize a false idea that socialism and fascism are pretty much the same, that the famines which happened in the PRC and the USSR were intentional, and that we're better off under capitalism.
When one actually learns about the power structures of the PRC post-revolution, how Chinese history was shaped not by one guy at the top but by many people within the CCP and by the masses at the grassroots level, one begins to see just how much they've been intentionally misled by bourgeois ideological conditioning. Let's take the Great Leap Forward as an example: in the U.S., we're usually taught that the GLF was an event where, for some reason, Mao intentionally produced and imposed a horrible famine on the Chinese people, which, again, is not in any way shape or form supported by the historical reality, and is just an irrational and childish characterization.
The GLF was an effort, after agricultural collectivization (which hugely increased China's agricultural productivity in comparison to the capitalism-imperialist oppression of the pre-revolutionary period), to further increase agricultural productivity so that an even greater surplus could be generated, which could then be used to acquire capital for industrial development and the diversifying of agricultural investment. The GLF, let's be clear, had some huge problems, and there was in fact a famine as a result; serious historians put the figure of deaths at somewhere between 10-12mil I think, which, as Mao and the CCP acknowledged, investigated, and sought to address, is an incredible tragedy. We're historical materialists, and we have a responsibility to analyze where and why the GLF went wrong, where it succeeded, and what we can learn from it. It's obvious with any amount of actual critical thought that it was not an intentionally imposed famine, and that the idea of the GLF was theoretically sound, well-justified, and could very well have been a great success. The actual reasons for the resultant famine can be boiled down more or less to a couple of reasons:
1. changes in weather/climate
2. bureaucratization within the party, resulting from its massive growth post-1949
The first reason is pretty straightforward. Weather conditions were ideal for agricultural production between 1949-1959, and then they weren't. 1959 saw too much rain, fluctuations in temperature, and overall insane weather patterns which, obviously, are gonna affect your harvest. We know now that El Niño was probably a big factor in this (Suyin Han doesn't mention this, but today's climate science has a much better understanding of how these things work; Dr. Ken Hammond is a great modern scholarly source to look into and gain a more current perspective), and we can see throughout the thousands of years of Chinese history that flooding, climatic fluctuations, and other environmental difficulties have resulted in many famines throughout the years. Interesting that the emperors at those times are not portrayed as intentionally starving millions of their people, isn't it? Hmmm, I wonder why that could be.
The second reason is a bit more complex but critical to understand, especially if one is to understand the subsequent Cultural Revolution. The CCP had about 1 million members in 1949, and in 1959, had grown to over 10 million members. With this massive expansion (which was necessary to actually build socialism and improve the living conditions for literally a quarter of the entire human population), there was a huge influx of people into the party who weren't necessarily wholly motivated by a genuine desire to build socialism, and instead could be referred to as "careerists"; people who see the CCP as a way to build their resume or gain material wealth/prestige.
Obviously the PRC is a planned economy, so the central government had set certain targets for agricultural production during the GLF. As production came in during 1959, most places actually did meet or exceed the set quotas. The problem began, though, when party cadres at the grassroots, collective level would say to themselves that, essentially, while the production figures they had to report up the ladder were pretty good, if they just added 1 or 2% to that number, it might reflect better on them personally. What's the harm in that, right? Then, it goes up to the next level, from town to county, and the county level cadre has the same thought, and slightly inflates their report as well. Then it goes on and on up the ladder, from collective to province to the central government itself, eventually causing huge distortions in the production figures that the national government was receiving. This makes itappear that there's more grain in the countryside than there actually is, so the amount of grain being taken out of the countryside and sold as surplus (for the growth of industrial development) is increased past what is sustainable, i.e. too much grain is being taken from the countryside and people no longer have enough food in their community to feed everyone. This is compounded because those artificially-inflated figures are then used by the national government to set production targets for the coming year as well, setting excessively high expectations. Then, in the following year, because of the aforementioned weather issue, the harvests are Not Good, but, in order to meet targets, many low-level party cadres report upward that they've met those targets even when they haven't, which again causes excessive procurement. This is why a famine occurs, and the party quickly realizes this.
Mao, as Suyin points out, was constantly touring the countryside and investigating, and realized that there was over-reporting, but did not initially know how bad things were getting. He was at all times connected to and worried about the working masses, and when it was realized that things were going horribly awry and why, he immediately sought to address it. He wrote letters to party cadres at the provincial, district, county, commune, brigade, and team levels, urging them to report realistic numbers; he issued a statement that "there must be a more scientific realistic standard according to local conditions" (p. 140), and in the many party meetings and debates held to address the issue, called for increased scrutiny and oversight of the party bureaucracy. At a meeting in Wuchang in November 1959, Mao opposed the setting of overly high quotas in opposition to the President of the PRC (contrary to popular misunderstanding, Mao was not the president of the country), Liu Shao-chi; Mao was overruled, however, and the quotas based on exaggerated reports were upheld for a while longer. This shows, again, that Mao was not some tyrannical totalitarian dictator with an iron fist; he was constantly overruled, and only through constant debate and investigation could he work to right the wrongs of the GLF. Suyin Han sums up the way by which Mao finally won out and began to address the suffering in the countryside, after a Central Committee meeting in Wuhan:
"The following weeks were filled with directives, all indicating Mao's urgent attention to methods, details, checkups. Wages, supplies, democracy, style of work were to be attentively managed; draft animals must be given sufficient food and rest, 'as otherwise they lose their reproductive powers.' Provincial committees were enjoined that peasants should not be made to work more than eight hours a day ... at the most twelve at the busiest season; there must be food and care; mess halls must give people enough to eat; the private plots which had been abolished in the Communist phase were returned, they were still a necessary supplement to peasants' income. Strict adherence to truth was enjoined."
The Great Leap Forward did, however, despite its enormous administrative and organizational problems and lack of oversight of party bureaucracy, succeed in hugely increasing China's industrial sector and uplifting the peasant class from its previous misery under imperialist domination. Workers gained access to education in philosophy and science, lecturing in universities and publishing articles en masse. Enormous numbers of factories and workshops were set up; women began working as members of the cooperatives and gained full voting rights, no longer working as unpaid housewives for their husbands; huge numbers of mineral/oil deposits were discovered and continue to be mined today; hundreds of thousands of engineers and industrial workers were trained and set to work; dams, roads, and irrigation canals were built all over the country; agriculture began to be mechanized; etc. etc. etc. Overall, the GLF is an extremely nuanced mixed bag which should be understood as such and investigated with respect to the actual material conditions in China at the time. What it should NOT be understood as is some sort of intentional starving of the countryside by Mao; that idea clearly makes no sense. Suyin says:
"Admiration goes to the Chinese working people, who gave all of themselves, in an unbelievable maelstrom of activity, to break the chains of stagnation, misery, and ignorance. Without the Leap, today's China would not be.
And Mao was at one with them. Even in the hard years to come, the people never lost their faith in Mao Tsetung. 'We trust him, because he trusts us.'" (p.142)
This review is getting WAYYYY too long and I haven't even begun talking about the Cultural Revolution, so I'll try to sum it up in as little words as possible. Essentially, it sought to address the increasing levels of bureaucratization and elitism in the CCP, and fight against growing revisionism and collaboration with imperialists. The idea of cultural revolution is something that both Marx and Lenin talk about in their writings, and is theoretically sound; essentially, after revolution, old bourgeois ways of thinking do not simply disappear, and must be fought against. It's not enough to simply revolutionize the economic base of society, we must also revolutionize the ideological superstructure of society. The cultural revolution sought to do just that: free people from the old Confucian ways of thinking, bring the party back to the masses (from whom it had been drifting away amidst growing bureaucracy and elitism), and bring socialist construction not just to the economic sector, but to peoples' very ways of thinking. It sought to revive the idea that the PARTY should serve the MASSES, not the other way around. It sought to establish direct oversight of the CCP by the working masses.
Western media and education treat the Cultural Revolution as some sort of campaign of massacres and slaughters against intellectuals encouraged by Mao, so as to consolidate power and purge opposition. This again is a complete lie and leans into bullshit, bourgeois "great man" theories of history. Obviously, Mao could not do whatever he wanted with impunity, and the popular western understanding of the CR (as with the GLF) is a complete distortion of how human history and social life actually work. Mao at all times stressed education, self-examination, debate, and investigation rather than outright killing or purging, and we have absolutely zero indication that he ever sought to wholesale murder his opposition. Even during the revolution and land reform, the popular conception of Mao having "killed all the landlords" is entirely false; he, again, always stressed re-education and self criticism, and only the most violent and repressive landlords were killed.
I won't go super deep into it because I'm getting tired of typing, but suffice it to say that there were excesses and killings during the CR, especially in the Youth Movement, but this was a very small part of the CR which is disproportionately focused on by western media, and, again, was not called for or encouraged by Mao. The CR was, above all, a push by Mao for the masses to assert their control over the party which he himself was the chairman of. Mao's writings are full of self-criticism and introspection, and he sought to extend that to the party at large. It, like the GLF, was a long, nuanced, and extremely complex process, and I urge anyone who wants to learn about it to read this book. Another good resource, like I mentioned earlier, is Prof. Ken Hammond, who is a contemporary scholar on the PRC and its history, and is much better than me at explaining this kind of thing. I'm glad to finally be done with these books, and I look forward to actually reading Mao now with a proper understanding of the material conditions and historical facts within which he was writing and operating.
June 22, 2019
5 stars for up until the Cultural Revolution; 4 stars for after. Analysis of the two-line struggle post-Lin Biao is lacking but, is of course due to the book being written in ‘75.
The way history unfolded after Mao’s death makes the last chapter particularly sad to read. Disappointed to find that Han Suyin eventually championed capitalist roaders.
The way history unfolded after Mao’s death makes the last chapter particularly sad to read. Disappointed to find that Han Suyin eventually championed capitalist roaders.
June 29, 2025
Again a fascinating and engaging read, particularly regarding intra-party politics and struggles as well as the successes and most notably the failures of the GLF and Cultural Revolution
March 30, 2020
Incredibly detailed and extensively cited, Suyin's work traces the development of China starting from directly after the People's Liberation War in '49 up until '75, when the book was written. While in my opinion the first half of the book, covering 1949-1961, is beyond reproach, it is in the second half where I took issue with more of what was written. I think the book has too strong of a tendency to shift the blame for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution onto Lin Biao- with that said, I do not want to disregard the critique of his anarchism, along with the anarchist tendencies within the party and the youth movements as I thought both were mostly valid. Furthermore, while the treatment of USSR-PRC relations was fascinating and informative, the book papers over the worst of the U.S.-PRC relations in a way I find nonconstructive (granted, this point of criticism is made 40+ after the fact). Overall, an insightful read, although not completely without reservations.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews