What really happens when the World Bank imposes its policies on a country? This is an insider's view of one aid-made crisis. Peter Griffiths was at the interface between government and the Bank.
In this ruthlessly honest, day by day account of a mission he undertook in Sierra Leone, he uses his diary to tell the story of how the World Bank, obsessed with the free market, imposed a secret agreement on the government, banning all government food imports or subsidies. The collapsing economy meant that the private sector would not import. Famine loomed. No ministry, no state marketing organization, no aid organization could reverse the agreement. It had to be a top-level government decision, whether Sierra Leone could afford to annoy minor World Bank officials.
This is a rare and important portrait of the aid world which insiders will recognize, but of which the general public seldom get a glimpse.
Although it is approachable, maybe you have to be an economics geek to really love this book… I sure did! Very detailed memoir of Griffiths's work in Sierra Leone over a few months in 1986, as he digs around to figure out the food situation, eventually realizes that a famine is coming, and then works to head it off. Griffiths gives the numbers to back up his narrative. It is also full of anecdotes, little stories of misadventure in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa—usually critical of the aid industry. Occasionally it can be hard to follow, and sometimes Griffiths gives reasons to doubt his credibility. (Needless to say, he's always right, even when he's contradicting himself from a few pages earlier.) But overall it is a fascinating story.
> "I cannot really see the logic behind this aid. The Sierra Leoneans have always known how to dig wells. The water table is near the surface, and they have plenty of people available to dig. This kind of aid pauperizes the people. It means that they will not dig their own well, on the off chance that some donor will come along and do it for them. Similarly, in other countries I have found villages refusing to build their own school or market on the grounds that other villages have been given them by aid projects."
> "Rice prices on the world market are particularly unstable. In most countries where rice is the staple food, the countries produce solely for their own needs, and only a little is grown for export, so in most years only 3 per cent of world production is sold on the world market. This means that if China, Bangladesh or Indonesia has a poor crop and they try to buy rice on the world market, the demand in that market doubles, trebles or quadruples."
I like how Griffiths looks around with an economist's eye, trying to figure the reasons for everything.
> "The only road signs I see look as though they have been vandalized. Someone has taken them down, knocked lots of holes in the metal, and then put the signs back again. Mohammed tells me that the Roads Department do it themselves. It means that nobody will steal the metal signs to fix holes in their roofs."
> "In Tanzania I was intrigued to see that wholesalers were buying potatoes at the same price per debbie as they were selling them. What they had done was beat out the sides of the debbie they used as a buying measure, so it held more than 4 gallons, and beat in the sides of the debbie they used when selling, so that it held less."
> "‘We are not interested in the number of broken grains. We are interested in the flavour and in how hard it is when we have cooked it. We all eat rice for two meals a day, every day, so it is important to us how good it is to eat. ‘The Thai rice and some of the Sierra Leone rice is grown in paddy fields. We call it “swamp rice”. It is not good to eat. In fact, if you serve it to a visitor, it is an insult.’"
This summary is quoted from Brad Andrew: "The World Bank proposed a complete deregulation of the rice market, eliminating all subsidies and government provision. This proposal was consistent with conventional economic theory. Deregulation would lead to higher prices, which in turn would encourage local production in the long run. In the short run, higher prices would stimulate food imports to meet demand. However, the World Bank ignored important local social conditions. The only locals with enough liquid capital and connections to import rice were ethnic Lebanese, who were almost universally despised by the indigenous population. The Lebanese refused to import rice because they could foresee that if the price of rice rose and they were one of the few groups selling it, they would be blamed for the higher prices; in the worst case scenario, they feared violent reprisals. Even if they weren't subject to violence, they feared that the government would impose price ceilings to mollify the population, making it impossible for them to recoup their investment. Without the importation of food, Sierra Leone would experience a severe shortage. Weeks and perhaps months might pass between the time the government recognized the severity of the problem and when they could import rice. During this period, Griffiths argued, a famine would take place. He urged the government to break the World Bank agreement and not deregulate the rice market…"
One of my favorite non fiction books and a must read for anyone interested in policy, international development, etc. I found this story really gripping and it felt sort of like a "bureaucratic thriller" while also setting very high stakes. The fact that's it's based on real world events makes it all the more engaging.