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Armies of the Second World War
Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939–1942
Defeat and Division launches a definitive new account of France in the Second World War. In this first volume, Douglas Porch dissects France's 1940 collapse, the dynamics of occupation, and the rise of Charles de Gaulle's Free France crusade, culminating in the November 1942 Allied invasion of French North Africa. He captures the full sweep of France's wartime experience in Europe, Africa, and beyond, from soldiers and POWs to civilians-in-arms, colonial subjects, and foreign refugees. He recounts France's struggles to reconstruct military power within the context of a global conflict, with its armed forces shattered into warring factions and the country under Axis occupation. Disagreements over the causes of the 1940 debacle and the subsequent requirement for the armistice mirrored long-standing fractures in politics, society, and in the French military itself, as efforts to reconstitute French military power crumbled into Vichy collaboration, De Gaulle's exile resistance, Alsace-Moselle occupation struggles, and a scuffle for imperial supremacy.
440 pages, Hardcover
First published July 31, 2022
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148 people want to read
About the author
Douglas Porch
15 books20 followersDouglas Porch is an American historian, academic and a Professor and former Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs for the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee in 1967 and a Ph. D. from Cambridge University in 1972. He has been a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, a guest lecturer at the Marine Corps University, a post-doctoral research fellow at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris and the Mark W. Clark Professor of History at The Citadel.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 23, 2024
This is an enormous brick of a book, and even if you are an eager consumer of WW2 history, your heart might quail a little. But fear not – it is something of a page turner. Yes, it assumes you have basic French, and there are acronyms a-plenty sprinkled on every page, but the style is lucid and frequently arresting. Porch is particularly good at picking out anecdotes which illustrate a broader theme – for example – as a trainload of recruits pulls away from the station, one of them sees that his mother is the only one waving a tricolour flag – causing one of his fellow recruits to remark – entirely accurately – “Look! You can tell she’s not French”. Later, fifteen Croix de Guerres are awarded to the members of a company “who only shot at rabbits.”
The defeatism and negativity of the French in 1940, and the uselessness of almost all their senior officers, is well expressed. This is not a revisionist history. Of course there was courage as well, but not enough, either to counteract poor preparation and terrible plans, or to overcome the ill discipline and inertia of the majority. De Gaulle, though not lacking in either courage or determination, had multiple failings both on and off the battlefield, and these are explored in detail.
Porch is excellent as to how the French were so disappointing, but less convincing when trying to establish why. I do not believe him when he says “the desire to continue the war was limited to the anti-fascist left.” He seems to me to exhibit his own political prejudices when he links defeatism to the right and the urge to fight to the left. For most Frenchmen at the time the exact opposite seemed to be the case: it was Communist cadres who engaged in wholescale sabotage in military factories – something which Porch glosses over. The left had a long tradition of anti-militarism, and of course Stalin and Hitler were allies in 1940, so Communists were anti war on the Comintern’s orders. There is not enough consideration given to this, in my view. I also think sometimes Porch is too dismissive of the British contribution – whilst not as Anglophobic as Joseph Kennedy, he nevertheless seems to me so share some of his prejudices.
But nevertheless there is a huge amount here to discover and enjoy. I particularly enjoyed reading about General Catroux, the magnificently cultured and sybaritic Free French General and diplomat, whose wife – appropriately known as “Madam Cat” – is jaw dropping in her amusing awfulness. She is far from being the only colourful and significant Frenchwoman described in these pages – see also the hatred between the rival mistresses of Daladier and Reynaud. It all came out (mostly) all right in the end, though for that we will need to read the second volume. In the meantime, I am (somewhat unfairly) reminded of Adrian Molesworth on de Gaulle: “He fled to England with his companion Viv le France, where they spent the rest of the war bravely pinning medals on each other with no thought of their personal safety.” But perhaps such flippancy is out of place, when so many Frenchmen fought bravely and made the ultimate sacrifice – let down by a rotten and decadent political culture and a short sighted and ineffective General Staff.
The defeatism and negativity of the French in 1940, and the uselessness of almost all their senior officers, is well expressed. This is not a revisionist history. Of course there was courage as well, but not enough, either to counteract poor preparation and terrible plans, or to overcome the ill discipline and inertia of the majority. De Gaulle, though not lacking in either courage or determination, had multiple failings both on and off the battlefield, and these are explored in detail.
Porch is excellent as to how the French were so disappointing, but less convincing when trying to establish why. I do not believe him when he says “the desire to continue the war was limited to the anti-fascist left.” He seems to me to exhibit his own political prejudices when he links defeatism to the right and the urge to fight to the left. For most Frenchmen at the time the exact opposite seemed to be the case: it was Communist cadres who engaged in wholescale sabotage in military factories – something which Porch glosses over. The left had a long tradition of anti-militarism, and of course Stalin and Hitler were allies in 1940, so Communists were anti war on the Comintern’s orders. There is not enough consideration given to this, in my view. I also think sometimes Porch is too dismissive of the British contribution – whilst not as Anglophobic as Joseph Kennedy, he nevertheless seems to me so share some of his prejudices.
But nevertheless there is a huge amount here to discover and enjoy. I particularly enjoyed reading about General Catroux, the magnificently cultured and sybaritic Free French General and diplomat, whose wife – appropriately known as “Madam Cat” – is jaw dropping in her amusing awfulness. She is far from being the only colourful and significant Frenchwoman described in these pages – see also the hatred between the rival mistresses of Daladier and Reynaud. It all came out (mostly) all right in the end, though for that we will need to read the second volume. In the meantime, I am (somewhat unfairly) reminded of Adrian Molesworth on de Gaulle: “He fled to England with his companion Viv le France, where they spent the rest of the war bravely pinning medals on each other with no thought of their personal safety.” But perhaps such flippancy is out of place, when so many Frenchmen fought bravely and made the ultimate sacrifice – let down by a rotten and decadent political culture and a short sighted and ineffective General Staff.
July 9, 2025
This is a qualified 5 star review as I did not stay up past my bedtime to read this.
I've been reading books on World War II since I was a teenager and compared to the average reader, have a pretty solid understanding of the war. But where my understanding is a bit weak would be the French Army pre-war to 1942 (Torch) - and this is where this magisterial book by Douglas Porch proved to be so informative and comprehensive.
Rather than being a simple narrative tale of how the French rearmed and prepared for conflict, the Phony War, the stunning collapse at Sedan, armistice, and then Vichy, Porch takes a more analytical approach. Yes, the book flows chronologically but, especially in the 1940 Battle of France section, the outcome is presupposed for the reader and Porch takes us more into why the collapse occurred. Similarly, rather than a month-by-month story of Vichy France and the rise of De Gaulle, he focuses on specific topics - such as French POWs and the remnants of the French North African army / navy.
When I picked up the book, and glanced inside, I thought, oh no, this is going to be a slog. 500+ pages, dense paragraphs, and limited maps and illustrations. I expected to be reading some academic's life work, capable of appreciation only by other academics.
But this was not the case at all. Porch has a way with clever turns of phrase that lightly sprinkle the text. Here's an example comparing Reynaud, French premier who replaced Daladier in March 1940:
And if Porch is not using his own gift of language, he liberally uses quotes from the participants. Here's Churchill's liaison to the French Government describing Reynaud's mistress:
The book makes clear that once the French declared war on Germany, they were doomed should the Germans attack. Everything was wrong about the French military - no all arms coordination or training, Great War communications systems, armored units with tiny fuel tanks and no easy way to refuel, Great War artillery, large numbers of troops but essentially untrained in anything useful, distrust of the Brits, lots of distrust of the politicians, terrible dispositions, and much, much more.
The French basically believed that it was going to a static, long war where Allied might and blockade would do Germany in. Or that Hitler would be overthrown. Oops.
Porch takes great care to discuss both the "decadence" theory of why France collapsed versus the "revisionists" theory that France did better than commonly viewed.
Once the Armistice is declared, the book retained its interest with multiple chapters. I especially enjoyed (and learned a lot) about the French POWs. Turns out that 1.5 million or so happily surrendered and marched off to POW camps, fully expecting the war to be over in weeks with a peace settlement with Britain. There were only a few POWs who took it upon themselves to escape the poorly guarded processions through France. But, surprise! No peace settlement was signed, including between Vichy and Germany, so the vast bulk of POWs found themselves languishing in POW camps and mostly turned out to do labor in Germany for the duration of the war.
And here is where I also learned things -- Vichy commanded loyalty of the population as they portrayed themselves as the protectors of the POWs and every step the Vichyites took to collaborate with the German war effort was couched in terms of how it would facilitate the release of the POWs. Needless to say, the power dynamic was all with the Germans. Vichy firmly believed (or deluded themselves) that Germany would win the war, so, in for a centime, in for a franc - as collaboration increased step-by-step.
You can't help but compare Vichy France and the cult-like figure of adoration, Marshal Petain, to autocratic and wannabe autocratic polities. I did not realize how much the French military, in general, detested the Third Republic and a democratic form of government. They especially worried about trade unions and communists and a revolt of the masses a la St. Petersburg 1917. Even De Gaulle didn't initially embrace a return to democracy, seeing in himself a French messiah.
The story moves on to the tiny Free French army and its scramble for legitimacy. Through a handful of battles, notably Bir Hakeim in spring 1942 (a story told through the lens of Koenig's female driver/lover), the Free French gained respect from the British, though this was frittered away by lack of troops, training, and equipment.
Lastly, the story moves to French North Africa; the "jewel" in the French Empire and one where its proconsuls dreamt would lead the rebirth of France (but not on the side of the Allies nor Axis, but France as a world power). Of course, none of this happened. The Germans restricted the army size, air force planes, and other accoutrements of war. Air missions were curtailed for lack of fuel and fear the pilots would defect to Gibraltar. Anti-Jewish Vichy policies combined with condescension towards the 15x numerous Arab population all amidst a bewildering byzantine chain of command oriented around loyalty to Petain left French North Africa a relatively easy picking for Operation Torch. Allied hopes that the French would join up to fight the Axis were unfulfilled, the French preferring to dither, prevaricate, preserve their satrapies, and otherwise be obstreperous left Allied leaders rending the air in exasperation.
There are a ton of acronyms in the book (AFN, AOE, PPF, FFI, FFL, ...) so much so that there is a 6 page preface enumerating them. And I can't leave this review without mentioning one of Porch's favorite words - fissiparous - used to describe the factions and groups in every part of the book - the North African populations, the Resistance, the government, and so on. Look it up - I know I'll try and use it myself.
Summary: I would love to discuss this book with a French citizen who understands their history as modern France is not Vichy and I wonder how modern French citizen thinks of Vichy, the Third Republic, French POWS, the sell-out of the citizens of Alsace Lorraine to Germany, forced labor, Petain, and France's humiliation in May-June 1940. This would extend to the French-Algerian war (something I also know very little about but whose seeds were planted in World War II).
Despite the heft and the discursions into political infighting at all levels (Vichy, Vichy North Africa, Third Republic, DeGaullists), I looked forward to reading this book every day.
This book sparked so much interest that my next book is France on Trial: The Case of Marshal Pétain
Also worth reading to people interested in this topic
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 - something I read 30+ years ago
When France Fell: The Vichy Crisis and the Fate of the Anglo-American Alliance - read my review, 4 stars
I've been reading books on World War II since I was a teenager and compared to the average reader, have a pretty solid understanding of the war. But where my understanding is a bit weak would be the French Army pre-war to 1942 (Torch) - and this is where this magisterial book by Douglas Porch proved to be so informative and comprehensive.
Rather than being a simple narrative tale of how the French rearmed and prepared for conflict, the Phony War, the stunning collapse at Sedan, armistice, and then Vichy, Porch takes a more analytical approach. Yes, the book flows chronologically but, especially in the 1940 Battle of France section, the outcome is presupposed for the reader and Porch takes us more into why the collapse occurred. Similarly, rather than a month-by-month story of Vichy France and the rise of De Gaulle, he focuses on specific topics - such as French POWs and the remnants of the French North African army / navy.
When I picked up the book, and glanced inside, I thought, oh no, this is going to be a slog. 500+ pages, dense paragraphs, and limited maps and illustrations. I expected to be reading some academic's life work, capable of appreciation only by other academics.
But this was not the case at all. Porch has a way with clever turns of phrase that lightly sprinkle the text. Here's an example comparing Reynaud, French premier who replaced Daladier in March 1940:
While Reynaud was often contrasted with his chief rival Daladier, in essential respects Reynaud was simply Daladier with a dictionary.
And if Porch is not using his own gift of language, he liberally uses quotes from the participants. Here's Churchill's liaison to the French Government describing Reynaud's mistress:
She was certainly not pretty and quite certainly untidy, and her voice even in an undertone made one think of a corncrake muffled under an eiderdown
The book makes clear that once the French declared war on Germany, they were doomed should the Germans attack. Everything was wrong about the French military - no all arms coordination or training, Great War communications systems, armored units with tiny fuel tanks and no easy way to refuel, Great War artillery, large numbers of troops but essentially untrained in anything useful, distrust of the Brits, lots of distrust of the politicians, terrible dispositions, and much, much more.
The French basically believed that it was going to a static, long war where Allied might and blockade would do Germany in. Or that Hitler would be overthrown. Oops.
Porch takes great care to discuss both the "decadence" theory of why France collapsed versus the "revisionists" theory that France did better than commonly viewed.
Once the Armistice is declared, the book retained its interest with multiple chapters. I especially enjoyed (and learned a lot) about the French POWs. Turns out that 1.5 million or so happily surrendered and marched off to POW camps, fully expecting the war to be over in weeks with a peace settlement with Britain. There were only a few POWs who took it upon themselves to escape the poorly guarded processions through France. But, surprise! No peace settlement was signed, including between Vichy and Germany, so the vast bulk of POWs found themselves languishing in POW camps and mostly turned out to do labor in Germany for the duration of the war.
And here is where I also learned things -- Vichy commanded loyalty of the population as they portrayed themselves as the protectors of the POWs and every step the Vichyites took to collaborate with the German war effort was couched in terms of how it would facilitate the release of the POWs. Needless to say, the power dynamic was all with the Germans. Vichy firmly believed (or deluded themselves) that Germany would win the war, so, in for a centime, in for a franc - as collaboration increased step-by-step.
You can't help but compare Vichy France and the cult-like figure of adoration, Marshal Petain, to autocratic and wannabe autocratic polities. I did not realize how much the French military, in general, detested the Third Republic and a democratic form of government. They especially worried about trade unions and communists and a revolt of the masses a la St. Petersburg 1917. Even De Gaulle didn't initially embrace a return to democracy, seeing in himself a French messiah.
The story moves on to the tiny Free French army and its scramble for legitimacy. Through a handful of battles, notably Bir Hakeim in spring 1942 (a story told through the lens of Koenig's female driver/lover), the Free French gained respect from the British, though this was frittered away by lack of troops, training, and equipment.
Lastly, the story moves to French North Africa; the "jewel" in the French Empire and one where its proconsuls dreamt would lead the rebirth of France (but not on the side of the Allies nor Axis, but France as a world power). Of course, none of this happened. The Germans restricted the army size, air force planes, and other accoutrements of war. Air missions were curtailed for lack of fuel and fear the pilots would defect to Gibraltar. Anti-Jewish Vichy policies combined with condescension towards the 15x numerous Arab population all amidst a bewildering byzantine chain of command oriented around loyalty to Petain left French North Africa a relatively easy picking for Operation Torch. Allied hopes that the French would join up to fight the Axis were unfulfilled, the French preferring to dither, prevaricate, preserve their satrapies, and otherwise be obstreperous left Allied leaders rending the air in exasperation.
There are a ton of acronyms in the book (AFN, AOE, PPF, FFI, FFL, ...) so much so that there is a 6 page preface enumerating them. And I can't leave this review without mentioning one of Porch's favorite words - fissiparous - used to describe the factions and groups in every part of the book - the North African populations, the Resistance, the government, and so on. Look it up - I know I'll try and use it myself.
Summary: I would love to discuss this book with a French citizen who understands their history as modern France is not Vichy and I wonder how modern French citizen thinks of Vichy, the Third Republic, French POWS, the sell-out of the citizens of Alsace Lorraine to Germany, forced labor, Petain, and France's humiliation in May-June 1940. This would extend to the French-Algerian war (something I also know very little about but whose seeds were planted in World War II).
Despite the heft and the discursions into political infighting at all levels (Vichy, Vichy North Africa, Third Republic, DeGaullists), I looked forward to reading this book every day.
This book sparked so much interest that my next book is France on Trial: The Case of Marshal Pétain
Also worth reading to people interested in this topic
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 - something I read 30+ years ago
When France Fell: The Vichy Crisis and the Fate of the Anglo-American Alliance - read my review, 4 stars
March 18, 2025
It took me over a month but I really did enjoy the book. It is enormous, yes, but Porch has a pleasant and readable style. If you are interested in the French militaries in World War II up to Operation Torch, this is for you. It might not be great for the casual reader, however.
April 29, 2023
Very good and interesting discussion of the defeat of France ending with Torch. Well worth reading, and if another volume appears on the second half of the war, I'll get that.
December 3, 2024
Excellent work but very dense and took some commitment to work through it. Worth the exercise as he does a lot to outline the structural failures in the pre-war and early-war regimes and military in France.
April 28, 2025
Very interesting. I'm fairly knowledgeable about WW2 and I still learned a lot
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews