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Things as They are: Nafs al-Amr and the Metaphysical Foundations of Objective Truth
In a philosophical idiom that attempts to be intelligible to the reader who is not traditionally trained,
this study outlines various dimensions of traditional Islamic 'correspondence' theories of truth. It
particularly argues that purely intelligible, 'abstract' concepts, universal natures and general principles
objectively apply to the world, against schools of thought that contend that they are subjectively
imposed. It is only by discerning the congruity or discordance of these fundamental instruments of
general metaphysics with forms of extramental reality, that we are able to avoid the implication that
their lack of sensible referents implies our knowledge of the world - which is contingent upon the
employment of these instruments - must be ultimately subjective. These intelligible entities, universal
natures and general principles can thus only be validated by situating them within an all-encompassing
theory of objective reality and truth, in the Islamic tradition nafs al-amr or 'things as they are'.
Transcending individual minds and sensible reality, such a theory must be sufficiently broad to account
for the ultimate ontological and henological status of such universal and abstract principles and forms.
This study demonstrates that a synthetical approach to the nature of objective reality and truth, drawing
on the Avicennan and kalām, and especially Platonic and Akbarian traditions is capable of effectively
responding to subjectivist, anti-metaphysical views on the nature of the world and our knowledge of it.
It purports to do this in a manner that strengthens the deepest foundations underlying traditional natural
theology, illustrating that the physical world of particulars is 'intelligible' (in the sense of 'objectively
knowable') exactly because it is a branch of an 'intelligible' (as the contrary of 'sensible'), non-physically instantiated
world.
this study outlines various dimensions of traditional Islamic 'correspondence' theories of truth. It
particularly argues that purely intelligible, 'abstract' concepts, universal natures and general principles
objectively apply to the world, against schools of thought that contend that they are subjectively
imposed. It is only by discerning the congruity or discordance of these fundamental instruments of
general metaphysics with forms of extramental reality, that we are able to avoid the implication that
their lack of sensible referents implies our knowledge of the world - which is contingent upon the
employment of these instruments - must be ultimately subjective. These intelligible entities, universal
natures and general principles can thus only be validated by situating them within an all-encompassing
theory of objective reality and truth, in the Islamic tradition nafs al-amr or 'things as they are'.
Transcending individual minds and sensible reality, such a theory must be sufficiently broad to account
for the ultimate ontological and henological status of such universal and abstract principles and forms.
This study demonstrates that a synthetical approach to the nature of objective reality and truth, drawing
on the Avicennan and kalām, and especially Platonic and Akbarian traditions is capable of effectively
responding to subjectivist, anti-metaphysical views on the nature of the world and our knowledge of it.
It purports to do this in a manner that strengthens the deepest foundations underlying traditional natural
theology, illustrating that the physical world of particulars is 'intelligible' (in the sense of 'objectively
knowable') exactly because it is a branch of an 'intelligible' (as the contrary of 'sensible'), non-physically instantiated
world.
248 pages, Kindle Edition
Published May 4, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 6, 2023
Great read, but should be read with Lahham's work on First Principles and Attas's Prolegomena for better understanding, and followed with the Arabic works/commentaries mentioned throughout the work.
November 19, 2024
Hasan Spiker’s Things as They Are represents one of the best modern (and English-written) expositions on the nature of the objective world. For most of us, the problem of the objective world seems to be an obscure one, but it is not. The problem of Being and Existence perpetually peers at us, waiting to emerge whenever we encounter the uncanny in life. Some of us experience such derealization episodes during the loss of loved ones, the so-called “midlife crisis,” or “existential crisis,” yet we are often poorly equipped to handle these catastrophes. This gives us more reason to fortify ourselves in preparation for such calamities, so we may face them truthfully and in accordance with reality, rather than masking them with layers upon layers of pathos.
The book’s general aim is twofold: first, to rebut erroneous schools of thought regarding their theories of the objective world; and second, though somewhat sparingly, to provide a positivistic account of the true theory of the objective world.
The main outline of the schools of thought expounded in the book generally involves two mechanisms of thought:
1. Immanentism vs. non-immanentism
2. Coherence vs. correspondence vs. correspondence-identity theories of truth.
It all begins with the eternal debate between Plato and Aristotle regarding their differing views on what constitutes the universal and indubitable in existents, guaranteeing their objectivity. Plato began with his conviction that sensual knowledge and its resulting conclusions are inherently insufficient to yield universal, necessary, objective facts. He proposed a group of suprasensible, subsistent entities from which existents gain existence by participating in them. This is akin to how a square shadow is necessarily derived from a square aperture. This forms the basis of all correspondence theory of truth; Plato conceived that the objectivity of the world depends on its correspondence to these eternal entities, which he named the Forms.
Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that there is no necessity to assume the existence of these utterly unknowable entities. Instead, he appealed to the sensible existents, which he believed to be adequate for producing true knowledge. He focused on the qualities inherent in these existents, which are universally observable by those with the same sensible apparatus. Both Plato and Aristotle subscribed to a version of correspondence theory: Plato believed truth is true because it corresponds to eternal, transcendental Forms, while Aristotle believed it corresponds to the inherent universal qualities of existents. This debate continues to this day.
Fast forward to the main antagonist of the book: Kant, with his coherence theory of truth. Kant was awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” by Hume’s devastating observation that nothing in external occurrences inherently provides indubitable universality. Hume reduced even causality to a “bundle of associations.” Thus, Kant sought universality not by dissecting the content of experience (which yields only appearances) but by examining the conditions that make experience possible in the first place—conditions he assumed to be indubitably true, as their absence would render experience impossible, which he deemed absurd.
Kant discovered that the mind provides the body of a priori truths through its external apparatus of sensibility and its internal apparatus of understanding. Both apparatuses process a specific substrate: sensible affectations. Raw sensations are bracketed by the understanding, which imbues them with universality by virtue of being products of the mind's conditions. According to Kant, truth is true because experience results from a coherent process between the mutually affirming poles of sensibility and understanding.
This conclusion, however, is devastating: what is known does not necessarily involve the objective extramental world, but only what appears to us and what we interpret. This leads to the awkward conclusion that Kant’s coherent truth, while epistemologically necessary, is ontologically contingent. Furthermore, Kant’s ideas themselves, being non-sensible propositions, invite scrutiny: where does their universality come from? Ultimately, Kant’s approach guarantees only the mind’s internal workings, exposing it to agnosticism or even solipsism regarding the extramental world. This predominance of the mind is why Kantian ideas are branded as “immanentist.”
On the other hand, a loose confederation of schools adheres to pure correspondence, following Aristotle’s footsteps. According to Spiker, this group includes the Peripatetics and some late kalam theologians. A shared view among these schools is that correspondence with existents occurs through the abstraction of qualities, with the corresponding object being the extramental particulars. Yet, as Husserl noted, there is no necessity that the mind’s representations of reality mirror the external world exactly. Moreover, abstract qualities, such as privation (e.g., blindness), raise questions: what, if anything, do they correspond to in extramental particulars? Additionally, the relational composition of things (e.g., the arrangement of wood particles forming a bed) poses further challenges to the correspondence model.
I came across a post by someone who identified himself as a student of Spiker. In a previous post, he declared that adherents of the school of immanentism must be considered infidels. However, in more recent posts, he began including prominent kalam scholars, such as al-Razi and al-Taftazani, under the label of "immanentist kalam theologians"! Reading the works of modern scholars whose ideas have not yet been tested by time is always a gamble. We cannot be certain whether what they preach aligns completely with the Islamic tradition or is influenced by their own cultural prejudices.
Perhaps I am an adherent of cultural individualism, but I strongly believe that while Islamic values are universal, they possess enough wisdom and flexibility to accommodate non-Arab cultural values, as long as these values do not conflict with the unity of Islam. The people of Nusantara exemplify this temperance and openness. Since time immemorial, this region has avoided the perpetual strife and animosities that have marred many other parts of the world. This inheritance of valuable cultural traits, synergized with the tenets of Islam, has produced a people unacquainted with the brutalism, fanaticism, and violent tendencies seen in some other Muslim communities. This worldview gave birth to the invaluable institution of the pondok/pesantren.
Bringing in “comparative religion preachers,” “celebrity preachers,” or students learning from distant cultures, due to insecurity about the modest appearance of pondok/pesantren scholars, would be ruinous for all of us. Even Prof. al-Attas valued the contribution of these local institutions, as evidenced by his commitment to translating the oldest manuscript of Aqaid al-Nasafi into Malay.
Speaking of Aqaid al-Nasafi, one of its most renowned commentaries was written by Imam al-Taftazani. Thus, his name and the works of other late kalam theologians are well-known to the people of Nusantara. Prof. al-Attas and the pondok/pesantren institutions unanimously see no contradiction or mutual exclusivity between proscriptive kalam and prescriptive Akbarian metaphysics. Rather, they consider the latter a natural extension and culmination of the former. Setting these two bodies of knowledge in opposition—and going so far as to declare some proponents of the former as excommunicated—is an alien practice, unknown to both Islam and its temperate adherents in Nusantara.
If such a division were valid, then why would Imam al-Ghazali write The Niche of Light, which serves as a bridge between these two bodies of knowledge? I am increasingly convinced that the binary, all-or-nothing mindset exhibited by the aforementioned person reflects his own culture of strife rather than the true nature of Islam. There is no need for us to match the tempo of any religious waves occurring outside our region. We must not become reverse Trojan horses—ashamed of the perceived “provincialism” of our esteemed pondok/pesantren scholars and, therefore, inviting an influx of foreign ideas while disregarding our own. What kind of perplexity and confusion is this?
Regarding the accusations of al-Taftazani being an immanentist thinker, I am far too ordinary to accuse such a great scholar of this. However, his statement that “Correspondence is a relation in order for which [to occur], the actualization, in the intellect, of the two relata is sufficient,” which appears to echo Kantian agnosticism, must be viewed in the proper context. Al-Taftazani was a champion of kalam against the heretical Sophists and Skeptics. His focus was on demonstrating the adequacy of relational experience, not on denying any objective reality beyond it. If he had denied objective reality, he would not have used the specific term nafs al-amr (things-in-themselves). It simply was not his role to provide an experiential or gnostic type of knowledge.
Moving briefly to the adherents of truth as being correspondent and identical to things subsistent beyond extramental particulars: Spiker discusses two general groups in this book:
1. Those who identify the things-in-themselves with the Active Intellect
2. Those who identify the things-in-themselves with the Divine Archetypes.
The former group includes followers of Avicenna and his great commentator, al-Tusi. The latter consists primarily of gnostics from the Akbarian school.
Al-Tusi provided a strong argument in favor of the Active Intellect:
1. We have no doubt that the apodictic judgments made by our intellects correspond to nafs al-amr, and we know that the judgments of the ignorant do not.
2. Correspondence can only occur between two entities that are distinct with respect to individuation but united in the shared factor enabling correspondence.
3. True and false propositions share equivalence in mental existence.
o Conclusion 1: True propositions, but not false ones, must correspond to a form of subsistence external to our minds—namely, nafs al-amr.
4. This extramentally subsistent entity is either self-subsistent or impressed upon something else.
5. Entities subsistent extramentally either possess physical position or do not.
o Premise 6: The former is impossible because judgments are not bound to particular times or directions, unlike entities with physical positions.
o Premise 7: Self-subsistence is also impossible, as it would necessitate the reality of Platonic Forms.
o Conclusion 2: Therefore, these judgments are impressed upon an entity with no physical position.
This salient argument was then thwarted by a student of al-Tusi, al-Hilli, who pointed out that false propositions would be as clear as true propositions when recalled. If this “illusion of true propositions” must be attributed to the activity of the Agent Intellect, it implies that the Intellect hosts both false and true propositions, rendering its position as the supposed guarantor of objectivity questionable.
Spiker then proceeded to provide a positive account in support of the Archetypes, which are the extramental, subsistent entities to which all qualities in every existent correspond. It is upon the fabric of Existence that these quiddities are instantiated into a particularized arrangement, contracting Existence simpliciter into the determined form of an individual. Essences, by themselves, stand only as a class of the most general—such as animality, solidity, etc.—and these cannot yield a particular individual on their own. They require both real composition and the particularization of their essence by the presence of a differentia, such as an animal with the differentia of “rational,” yielding the species of Man.
Yet, these quiddities cannot generate any particular existents, just as a mold cannot produce anything without some kind of substrate. It is Existence, effusing out from the Divine Creative Activity, that particularizes the species of Man with many other infinite differentiae to produce a single individual. The particularized arrangement of these instantiated quiddities is, by itself, inert; it requires the perpetual effusion of Creative Activity to will it in and out of Existence.
The book’s general aim is twofold: first, to rebut erroneous schools of thought regarding their theories of the objective world; and second, though somewhat sparingly, to provide a positivistic account of the true theory of the objective world.
The main outline of the schools of thought expounded in the book generally involves two mechanisms of thought:
1. Immanentism vs. non-immanentism
2. Coherence vs. correspondence vs. correspondence-identity theories of truth.
It all begins with the eternal debate between Plato and Aristotle regarding their differing views on what constitutes the universal and indubitable in existents, guaranteeing their objectivity. Plato began with his conviction that sensual knowledge and its resulting conclusions are inherently insufficient to yield universal, necessary, objective facts. He proposed a group of suprasensible, subsistent entities from which existents gain existence by participating in them. This is akin to how a square shadow is necessarily derived from a square aperture. This forms the basis of all correspondence theory of truth; Plato conceived that the objectivity of the world depends on its correspondence to these eternal entities, which he named the Forms.
Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that there is no necessity to assume the existence of these utterly unknowable entities. Instead, he appealed to the sensible existents, which he believed to be adequate for producing true knowledge. He focused on the qualities inherent in these existents, which are universally observable by those with the same sensible apparatus. Both Plato and Aristotle subscribed to a version of correspondence theory: Plato believed truth is true because it corresponds to eternal, transcendental Forms, while Aristotle believed it corresponds to the inherent universal qualities of existents. This debate continues to this day.
Fast forward to the main antagonist of the book: Kant, with his coherence theory of truth. Kant was awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” by Hume’s devastating observation that nothing in external occurrences inherently provides indubitable universality. Hume reduced even causality to a “bundle of associations.” Thus, Kant sought universality not by dissecting the content of experience (which yields only appearances) but by examining the conditions that make experience possible in the first place—conditions he assumed to be indubitably true, as their absence would render experience impossible, which he deemed absurd.
Kant discovered that the mind provides the body of a priori truths through its external apparatus of sensibility and its internal apparatus of understanding. Both apparatuses process a specific substrate: sensible affectations. Raw sensations are bracketed by the understanding, which imbues them with universality by virtue of being products of the mind's conditions. According to Kant, truth is true because experience results from a coherent process between the mutually affirming poles of sensibility and understanding.
This conclusion, however, is devastating: what is known does not necessarily involve the objective extramental world, but only what appears to us and what we interpret. This leads to the awkward conclusion that Kant’s coherent truth, while epistemologically necessary, is ontologically contingent. Furthermore, Kant’s ideas themselves, being non-sensible propositions, invite scrutiny: where does their universality come from? Ultimately, Kant’s approach guarantees only the mind’s internal workings, exposing it to agnosticism or even solipsism regarding the extramental world. This predominance of the mind is why Kantian ideas are branded as “immanentist.”
On the other hand, a loose confederation of schools adheres to pure correspondence, following Aristotle’s footsteps. According to Spiker, this group includes the Peripatetics and some late kalam theologians. A shared view among these schools is that correspondence with existents occurs through the abstraction of qualities, with the corresponding object being the extramental particulars. Yet, as Husserl noted, there is no necessity that the mind’s representations of reality mirror the external world exactly. Moreover, abstract qualities, such as privation (e.g., blindness), raise questions: what, if anything, do they correspond to in extramental particulars? Additionally, the relational composition of things (e.g., the arrangement of wood particles forming a bed) poses further challenges to the correspondence model.
I came across a post by someone who identified himself as a student of Spiker. In a previous post, he declared that adherents of the school of immanentism must be considered infidels. However, in more recent posts, he began including prominent kalam scholars, such as al-Razi and al-Taftazani, under the label of "immanentist kalam theologians"! Reading the works of modern scholars whose ideas have not yet been tested by time is always a gamble. We cannot be certain whether what they preach aligns completely with the Islamic tradition or is influenced by their own cultural prejudices.
Perhaps I am an adherent of cultural individualism, but I strongly believe that while Islamic values are universal, they possess enough wisdom and flexibility to accommodate non-Arab cultural values, as long as these values do not conflict with the unity of Islam. The people of Nusantara exemplify this temperance and openness. Since time immemorial, this region has avoided the perpetual strife and animosities that have marred many other parts of the world. This inheritance of valuable cultural traits, synergized with the tenets of Islam, has produced a people unacquainted with the brutalism, fanaticism, and violent tendencies seen in some other Muslim communities. This worldview gave birth to the invaluable institution of the pondok/pesantren.
Bringing in “comparative religion preachers,” “celebrity preachers,” or students learning from distant cultures, due to insecurity about the modest appearance of pondok/pesantren scholars, would be ruinous for all of us. Even Prof. al-Attas valued the contribution of these local institutions, as evidenced by his commitment to translating the oldest manuscript of Aqaid al-Nasafi into Malay.
Speaking of Aqaid al-Nasafi, one of its most renowned commentaries was written by Imam al-Taftazani. Thus, his name and the works of other late kalam theologians are well-known to the people of Nusantara. Prof. al-Attas and the pondok/pesantren institutions unanimously see no contradiction or mutual exclusivity between proscriptive kalam and prescriptive Akbarian metaphysics. Rather, they consider the latter a natural extension and culmination of the former. Setting these two bodies of knowledge in opposition—and going so far as to declare some proponents of the former as excommunicated—is an alien practice, unknown to both Islam and its temperate adherents in Nusantara.
If such a division were valid, then why would Imam al-Ghazali write The Niche of Light, which serves as a bridge between these two bodies of knowledge? I am increasingly convinced that the binary, all-or-nothing mindset exhibited by the aforementioned person reflects his own culture of strife rather than the true nature of Islam. There is no need for us to match the tempo of any religious waves occurring outside our region. We must not become reverse Trojan horses—ashamed of the perceived “provincialism” of our esteemed pondok/pesantren scholars and, therefore, inviting an influx of foreign ideas while disregarding our own. What kind of perplexity and confusion is this?
Regarding the accusations of al-Taftazani being an immanentist thinker, I am far too ordinary to accuse such a great scholar of this. However, his statement that “Correspondence is a relation in order for which [to occur], the actualization, in the intellect, of the two relata is sufficient,” which appears to echo Kantian agnosticism, must be viewed in the proper context. Al-Taftazani was a champion of kalam against the heretical Sophists and Skeptics. His focus was on demonstrating the adequacy of relational experience, not on denying any objective reality beyond it. If he had denied objective reality, he would not have used the specific term nafs al-amr (things-in-themselves). It simply was not his role to provide an experiential or gnostic type of knowledge.
Moving briefly to the adherents of truth as being correspondent and identical to things subsistent beyond extramental particulars: Spiker discusses two general groups in this book:
1. Those who identify the things-in-themselves with the Active Intellect
2. Those who identify the things-in-themselves with the Divine Archetypes.
The former group includes followers of Avicenna and his great commentator, al-Tusi. The latter consists primarily of gnostics from the Akbarian school.
Al-Tusi provided a strong argument in favor of the Active Intellect:
1. We have no doubt that the apodictic judgments made by our intellects correspond to nafs al-amr, and we know that the judgments of the ignorant do not.
2. Correspondence can only occur between two entities that are distinct with respect to individuation but united in the shared factor enabling correspondence.
3. True and false propositions share equivalence in mental existence.
o Conclusion 1: True propositions, but not false ones, must correspond to a form of subsistence external to our minds—namely, nafs al-amr.
4. This extramentally subsistent entity is either self-subsistent or impressed upon something else.
5. Entities subsistent extramentally either possess physical position or do not.
o Premise 6: The former is impossible because judgments are not bound to particular times or directions, unlike entities with physical positions.
o Premise 7: Self-subsistence is also impossible, as it would necessitate the reality of Platonic Forms.
o Conclusion 2: Therefore, these judgments are impressed upon an entity with no physical position.
This salient argument was then thwarted by a student of al-Tusi, al-Hilli, who pointed out that false propositions would be as clear as true propositions when recalled. If this “illusion of true propositions” must be attributed to the activity of the Agent Intellect, it implies that the Intellect hosts both false and true propositions, rendering its position as the supposed guarantor of objectivity questionable.
Spiker then proceeded to provide a positive account in support of the Archetypes, which are the extramental, subsistent entities to which all qualities in every existent correspond. It is upon the fabric of Existence that these quiddities are instantiated into a particularized arrangement, contracting Existence simpliciter into the determined form of an individual. Essences, by themselves, stand only as a class of the most general—such as animality, solidity, etc.—and these cannot yield a particular individual on their own. They require both real composition and the particularization of their essence by the presence of a differentia, such as an animal with the differentia of “rational,” yielding the species of Man.
Yet, these quiddities cannot generate any particular existents, just as a mold cannot produce anything without some kind of substrate. It is Existence, effusing out from the Divine Creative Activity, that particularizes the species of Man with many other infinite differentiae to produce a single individual. The particularized arrangement of these instantiated quiddities is, by itself, inert; it requires the perpetual effusion of Creative Activity to will it in and out of Existence.
March 12, 2026
One of the greatest works of contemporary Islamic philosophy. Shaykhuna Spiker adequately tackles the pitfalls of modern subjectivity by taking the reader through Islamic intellectual history, going over the views of the Kalam Theologians, the Falasifa, and the Sufis one after another all while adding important commentary and connections between manifold views and understandings from the tradition. This all culiminates in a synthesis wherein Shaykhuna offers a new approach, namely a henological interpretation of the Akbarian theory of Nafs al-Amr. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of Neoplatonism and Akbariyya, Shaykhuna makes the case for a 'Primacy of Unity' so to speak contra a 'Primacy of Being' (as seen in thinkers like Mulla Sadra, for instance), and the implications of this on his theory of Nafs al-Amr are notable (something worth reflecting on in more depth). I believe in a good few years time, Shaykhuna will be thought of alongside the late great Mawlana Syed Naquib Alatas (qaddas Allahu sirrahu) in his contributions to Islamic philosophy and the revival of a higher Islamic intellectual milleu. God knows best.
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