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Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace
“ Why We Fight reflects Blattman’s expertise in economics, political science, and history… Blattman is a great storyteller, with important insights for us all.” —Richard H. Thaler, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and coauthor of Nudge
“Engaging and profound, this deeply searching book explains the true origins of warfare, and it illustrates the ways that, despite some contrary appearances, human beings are capable of great goodness.”—Nicholas A. Christakis author of The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society
Why did Russia attack Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan and launch WWIII? Why has the number of civil wars reached their highest level in decades? Why are so many cities in the Americas plagued with violence? And finally, what can any of us do about it?
It feels like we’re surrounded by violence. Each conflict seems unique and insoluble. With a reason for every war and a war for every reason, what hope is there for peace? Fortunately, it’s simpler than that. Why We Fight boils down decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions, giving us some counterintuitive answers to the question of war.
The first is that most of the time we don’t fight. Around the world, there are millions of hostile rivalries, yet only a fraction erupt into violence. Most enemies loathe one another in peace. The reason is war is too costly to fight. It’s the worst way to settle our differences.
In those rare instances when fighting ensues, that means we have to ask What kept rivals from the normal, grudging compromise? The answer is always the It’s because a society or its leaders ignored those costs of war, or were willing to pay them.
Why We Fight shows that there are just five ways this happens. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, Christopher Blattman shows that there are five reasons why violent conflict occasionally wins over compromise.
Through Blattman’s time studying Medellín, Chicago, Liberia, Northern Ireland, and more, we learn the common logics driving vainglorious monarchs, dictators, mobs, pilots, football hooligans, ancient peoples, and fanatics. Why We Fight shows that war isn’t a series of errors, accidents, and emotions gone awry. There are underlying strategic, ideological, and institutional forces that are too often overlooked.
So how to get to peace?
Blattman shows that societies are surprisingly good at interrupting and ending violence when they want to—even gangs do it. The best peacemakers tackle the five reasons, shifting incentives away from violence and getting rivals back to dealmaking. And they do so through tinkering, not transformation.
Realistic and optimistic, this is a book that lends new meaning to the adage “Give peace a chance.”
“Engaging and profound, this deeply searching book explains the true origins of warfare, and it illustrates the ways that, despite some contrary appearances, human beings are capable of great goodness.”—Nicholas A. Christakis author of The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society
Why did Russia attack Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan and launch WWIII? Why has the number of civil wars reached their highest level in decades? Why are so many cities in the Americas plagued with violence? And finally, what can any of us do about it?
It feels like we’re surrounded by violence. Each conflict seems unique and insoluble. With a reason for every war and a war for every reason, what hope is there for peace? Fortunately, it’s simpler than that. Why We Fight boils down decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions, giving us some counterintuitive answers to the question of war.
The first is that most of the time we don’t fight. Around the world, there are millions of hostile rivalries, yet only a fraction erupt into violence. Most enemies loathe one another in peace. The reason is war is too costly to fight. It’s the worst way to settle our differences.
In those rare instances when fighting ensues, that means we have to ask What kept rivals from the normal, grudging compromise? The answer is always the It’s because a society or its leaders ignored those costs of war, or were willing to pay them.
Why We Fight shows that there are just five ways this happens. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, Christopher Blattman shows that there are five reasons why violent conflict occasionally wins over compromise.
Through Blattman’s time studying Medellín, Chicago, Liberia, Northern Ireland, and more, we learn the common logics driving vainglorious monarchs, dictators, mobs, pilots, football hooligans, ancient peoples, and fanatics. Why We Fight shows that war isn’t a series of errors, accidents, and emotions gone awry. There are underlying strategic, ideological, and institutional forces that are too often overlooked.
So how to get to peace?
Blattman shows that societies are surprisingly good at interrupting and ending violence when they want to—even gangs do it. The best peacemakers tackle the five reasons, shifting incentives away from violence and getting rivals back to dealmaking. And they do so through tinkering, not transformation.
Realistic and optimistic, this is a book that lends new meaning to the adage “Give peace a chance.”
400 pages, Hardcover
Published April 19, 2022
222 people are currently reading
2718 people want to read
About the author
Christopher Blattman
4 books35 followersChristopher Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago, where he coleads the Development Economics Center and directs the Obama Foundation Scholars program. His work on violence, crime, and poverty has been widely covered by The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Forbes, Slate, Vox, and NPR.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 107 reviews
May 3, 2022
Preventing war and violence, if it’s not the top concern, has to rank among the most important problems facing humanity. As those in the throes of war will tell you, there is no greater freedom than the freedom from violence. Learning how to prevent it, then, or how to elect the leaders who can, should remain a top priority for everyone.
The stakes are high. We can’t afford to get the causes of war wrong because, if we do, the proposed solutions won’t work. And yet that is exactly what happens, time and time again. War, like any complex social phenomenon, resists a simple narrative, and yet if there is anything humans are consistently good at, it’s providing simple narratives. We blame wars on villains, oversimplified scenarios, or just invented conspiracies. But it’s never that simple.
Chris Blattman—an economist and political scientist who studies global conflict, crime, and poverty—resists this tendency towards oversimplification at every turn. Having studied prolonged violent conflicts between groups—whether it be gang violence, civil wars, or wars between nations—he knows how difficult war can be to explain, and to prevent.
Fortunately, for most people, most of the time, peace is the normal state of affairs. As Blattman explains, the costs of violent conflict almost always compel groups to compromise. Successful societies accomplish this all the time. You probably live in one, and you probably don’t spend too much time worrying about war breaking out.
But when war does break out, it is rarely for any single reason—it’s usually the result of complex factors all interacting to collectively decrease the perceived costs of war and increase the incentives to fight. In fact, Blattman identifies five such factors. To the degree that the five factors or causes of war are present, the risk of war increases. The flip side is that, to the degree we can manage the five causes of war, we can likewise mitigate the risks of conflict breaking out (this is obviously much easier said than done).
Normally, war is too costly for either side to pursue, and the incentive is to compromise peacefully, with the weaker side willingly taking less (but achieving more than they would win by fighting). The calculus changes, however, in certain scenarios.
According to Blattman, there are five reasons one side might initiate war, despite the costs: 1) unchecked leaders can benefit from war while being shielded from its costs, 2) ideologies can compel people to fight despite the costs (e.g., religious conflict), 3) uncertainty regarding the relative strength of an opponent can compel one side to test the waters or call a bluff, 4) commitment problems can compel an adversary to attack an enemy before the enemy grows stronger in the future, and 5) misperceptions can distort an adversary’s perceptions of the intentions of an enemy.
War results from a combination of these factors, and Blattman discusses several examples of how various conflicts throughout history can be explained in these terms. The end result is that the reader will be equipped with a much more sophisticated toolkit when assessing the causes of conflict, past and present.
The final part of the book considers the paths to peace, which, unsurprisingly, work to mitigate the five causes of war. Checks and balances on power, rules and enforcement, and democratic institutions and voting top the list, as these procedures collectively reduce the risk of a nation falling victim to an unchecked ruler. As the philosopher Karl Popper said, democracy is the ideal system not because it necessarily selects the best, strongest leaders, but that it provides a mechanism for removing the worst leaders, leaders who would sacrifice the well-being of the population at large for their own personal gain.
The other key to peace is interdependence. Societies that are dependent on each other economically and socially rarely go to war, as the costs would be too high. You don’t attack your enemy when your enemy provides economic benefits for you, just as you don’t demonize and attack the people you work or live with. It’s true that pluralism can create conflict as the result of different worldviews placed in competition with one another, but this rarely turns into violent civil war in integrated democracies.
On a final note, since we want our politicians to create stability and peace, this book not only outlines the causes of war and peace, but also outlines the manner in which we should elect politicians. Following the political philosophy of Karl Popper, Blattman recommends treating politics more like science by trying to improve society in incremental steps that can be tested, rather than by instituting grand sweeping plans that fulfill some utopian vision. We should be wary of any politician that proclaims that they alone can fix complex social problems, and, frankly, if we vote for them anyway, we probably deserve them.
The bottom line: Buy this book to have a deeper understanding of the causes of war and the paths to peace and stability, and to develop a more sophisticated toolkit for the evaluation of political candidates and policy decisions.
The stakes are high. We can’t afford to get the causes of war wrong because, if we do, the proposed solutions won’t work. And yet that is exactly what happens, time and time again. War, like any complex social phenomenon, resists a simple narrative, and yet if there is anything humans are consistently good at, it’s providing simple narratives. We blame wars on villains, oversimplified scenarios, or just invented conspiracies. But it’s never that simple.
Chris Blattman—an economist and political scientist who studies global conflict, crime, and poverty—resists this tendency towards oversimplification at every turn. Having studied prolonged violent conflicts between groups—whether it be gang violence, civil wars, or wars between nations—he knows how difficult war can be to explain, and to prevent.
Fortunately, for most people, most of the time, peace is the normal state of affairs. As Blattman explains, the costs of violent conflict almost always compel groups to compromise. Successful societies accomplish this all the time. You probably live in one, and you probably don’t spend too much time worrying about war breaking out.
But when war does break out, it is rarely for any single reason—it’s usually the result of complex factors all interacting to collectively decrease the perceived costs of war and increase the incentives to fight. In fact, Blattman identifies five such factors. To the degree that the five factors or causes of war are present, the risk of war increases. The flip side is that, to the degree we can manage the five causes of war, we can likewise mitigate the risks of conflict breaking out (this is obviously much easier said than done).
Normally, war is too costly for either side to pursue, and the incentive is to compromise peacefully, with the weaker side willingly taking less (but achieving more than they would win by fighting). The calculus changes, however, in certain scenarios.
According to Blattman, there are five reasons one side might initiate war, despite the costs: 1) unchecked leaders can benefit from war while being shielded from its costs, 2) ideologies can compel people to fight despite the costs (e.g., religious conflict), 3) uncertainty regarding the relative strength of an opponent can compel one side to test the waters or call a bluff, 4) commitment problems can compel an adversary to attack an enemy before the enemy grows stronger in the future, and 5) misperceptions can distort an adversary’s perceptions of the intentions of an enemy.
War results from a combination of these factors, and Blattman discusses several examples of how various conflicts throughout history can be explained in these terms. The end result is that the reader will be equipped with a much more sophisticated toolkit when assessing the causes of conflict, past and present.
The final part of the book considers the paths to peace, which, unsurprisingly, work to mitigate the five causes of war. Checks and balances on power, rules and enforcement, and democratic institutions and voting top the list, as these procedures collectively reduce the risk of a nation falling victim to an unchecked ruler. As the philosopher Karl Popper said, democracy is the ideal system not because it necessarily selects the best, strongest leaders, but that it provides a mechanism for removing the worst leaders, leaders who would sacrifice the well-being of the population at large for their own personal gain.
The other key to peace is interdependence. Societies that are dependent on each other economically and socially rarely go to war, as the costs would be too high. You don’t attack your enemy when your enemy provides economic benefits for you, just as you don’t demonize and attack the people you work or live with. It’s true that pluralism can create conflict as the result of different worldviews placed in competition with one another, but this rarely turns into violent civil war in integrated democracies.
On a final note, since we want our politicians to create stability and peace, this book not only outlines the causes of war and peace, but also outlines the manner in which we should elect politicians. Following the political philosophy of Karl Popper, Blattman recommends treating politics more like science by trying to improve society in incremental steps that can be tested, rather than by instituting grand sweeping plans that fulfill some utopian vision. We should be wary of any politician that proclaims that they alone can fix complex social problems, and, frankly, if we vote for them anyway, we probably deserve them.
The bottom line: Buy this book to have a deeper understanding of the causes of war and the paths to peace and stability, and to develop a more sophisticated toolkit for the evaluation of political candidates and policy decisions.
April 6, 2022
The review by Andrew1982 is mistaken.
Blattman does not 'defend' the War in Iraq, he tries to explain the motives of the various actors, with the same tone as for the other conflicts discussed in the book.
He does note that the US supported Hussein in the 80s, on page 129. It does not say that the invasion was primarily down to Hussein being a bad man, but rather a combination of bad intelligence (uncertainty), biases and personal motives for war (intangible incentives), underestimation of the difficulty (misperceptions), as well as difficulty on the parts of both parties to credibly commit to any agreement they struck.
Blattman does not 'defend' the War in Iraq, he tries to explain the motives of the various actors, with the same tone as for the other conflicts discussed in the book.
He does note that the US supported Hussein in the 80s, on page 129. It does not say that the invasion was primarily down to Hussein being a bad man, but rather a combination of bad intelligence (uncertainty), biases and personal motives for war (intangible incentives), underestimation of the difficulty (misperceptions), as well as difficulty on the parts of both parties to credibly commit to any agreement they struck.
April 28, 2022
Blattman's aim is to provide a general framework for analyzing the problem of war (whether between countries, political factions within a country, or gangs) with the intention of informing the design of policies, institutions, or other interventions. I think the primary audiences for the book are undergraduates or masters-level students, journalists, policymakers, practitioners, and general readers trying to inform themselves about why war happens and what we can do about it. Blattman is quite successful in executing this task. Graduate students and scholars would also benefit from the way that Blattman organizes a vast literature. I would wholeheartedly recommend this as *the* book for those either starting war studies or working in relevant fields.
Blattman's analytical framework synthesizes insights from political science and economics on strategic dynamics through which rivals fail in negotiating compromise and find themselves caught in staggeringly costly violent conflict. He organizes these insights into five themes: biases and misperceptions, uncertainty and incentives to misrepresent oneself, commitment problems, intangible incentives, and unchecked power. The foundation here is game theoretic, and so these themes will be very familiar to those who have read the work of Jervis, Fearon, Powell, Morelli and Jackson, among others. But Blattman also very skillfully integrates insights from psychology and sociology into this framework. Where I personally thought the book really excelled was in the second half, where it uses the strategic-analytical framework from the first half to explain why facile approaches to conflict management ("let's just put women in charge," "it's all about economic resources," "this country just needs a TRC",...) cannot possibly be sufficient to explain or mitigate the problem of war. Blattman also makes an impassioned pitch for conflict management and violence reduction practitioners to embrace a culture of evidence and incremental experimentation.
I am a scholar in this field, and I know Blattman to be one of the most well- and widely-read people in the field. He was trained as an economist, spent a decade teaching in political science departments, has a life partner who is a developmental psychologist, and is now positioned at an interdisciplinary policy school. The book reflects a deep engagement with what diverse fields have to offer. The analysis is rooted in game theory from economics and political science, but what I found especially impressive was the book's ability to organize vast literatures from other disciplines and to also integrate insights from the direct fieldwork and policy experiences of the author himself as well as other researchers and practitioners. I was already closely familiar with nearly all of the material that the book discussed, but I was nonetheless blown away with Blattman's ability to put it all together.
Blattman's analytical framework synthesizes insights from political science and economics on strategic dynamics through which rivals fail in negotiating compromise and find themselves caught in staggeringly costly violent conflict. He organizes these insights into five themes: biases and misperceptions, uncertainty and incentives to misrepresent oneself, commitment problems, intangible incentives, and unchecked power. The foundation here is game theoretic, and so these themes will be very familiar to those who have read the work of Jervis, Fearon, Powell, Morelli and Jackson, among others. But Blattman also very skillfully integrates insights from psychology and sociology into this framework. Where I personally thought the book really excelled was in the second half, where it uses the strategic-analytical framework from the first half to explain why facile approaches to conflict management ("let's just put women in charge," "it's all about economic resources," "this country just needs a TRC",...) cannot possibly be sufficient to explain or mitigate the problem of war. Blattman also makes an impassioned pitch for conflict management and violence reduction practitioners to embrace a culture of evidence and incremental experimentation.
I am a scholar in this field, and I know Blattman to be one of the most well- and widely-read people in the field. He was trained as an economist, spent a decade teaching in political science departments, has a life partner who is a developmental psychologist, and is now positioned at an interdisciplinary policy school. The book reflects a deep engagement with what diverse fields have to offer. The analysis is rooted in game theory from economics and political science, but what I found especially impressive was the book's ability to organize vast literatures from other disciplines and to also integrate insights from the direct fieldwork and policy experiences of the author himself as well as other researchers and practitioners. I was already closely familiar with nearly all of the material that the book discussed, but I was nonetheless blown away with Blattman's ability to put it all together.
July 29, 2022
Disappointing.
The central thesis about how people (normally leaders) box themselves into a narrow set of choices that leads to conflict seems sound and supported. I particularly liked the plane analogy here: that a pilot in clear open skies has more options when faced with an emergency vs when they are flying in a tight canyon.
But throughout the book the examples and arguments used are bad. Some are ahistorical. Some are lacking a lot of context. Some don't follow their own logic. And some are just rubbish. It's like a naive overly rational explainer on the world done by someone who read a couple of news articles on the examples used.
The Iraq stuff was insufferable. The justifying police violence was laughable. And the bit about Mounties delivering long-lasting violence reductions is an overly simplistic correlation (which doesn't equal causation, Christopher!!).
Another example: Mali was cited as a country where social inclusion was used to reduce violence between ethnic and religious groups. Two things stuck out for me with this example. First was that it was glossed over why this was done - a socialist coup instated several programs to help and integrate everyone. The second was that foreign actors have been interfering in Mali for 40 years now and as a result it has undergone numerous, sometimes violent, coups.
This is hardly a good example of reducing violence. It also shows that the context matters. It's all well and good to say that social bonds can stop violence, but you have to remember that there is a lot of money to be made from creating conflict and that aspect is being deliberately ignored.
The central thesis about how people (normally leaders) box themselves into a narrow set of choices that leads to conflict seems sound and supported. I particularly liked the plane analogy here: that a pilot in clear open skies has more options when faced with an emergency vs when they are flying in a tight canyon.
But throughout the book the examples and arguments used are bad. Some are ahistorical. Some are lacking a lot of context. Some don't follow their own logic. And some are just rubbish. It's like a naive overly rational explainer on the world done by someone who read a couple of news articles on the examples used.
The Iraq stuff was insufferable. The justifying police violence was laughable. And the bit about Mounties delivering long-lasting violence reductions is an overly simplistic correlation (which doesn't equal causation, Christopher!!).
Another example: Mali was cited as a country where social inclusion was used to reduce violence between ethnic and religious groups. Two things stuck out for me with this example. First was that it was glossed over why this was done - a socialist coup instated several programs to help and integrate everyone. The second was that foreign actors have been interfering in Mali for 40 years now and as a result it has undergone numerous, sometimes violent, coups.
This is hardly a good example of reducing violence. It also shows that the context matters. It's all well and good to say that social bonds can stop violence, but you have to remember that there is a lot of money to be made from creating conflict and that aspect is being deliberately ignored.
June 7, 2022
While the concepts in this book are interesting, the history is terrible and the basic scientific approach is ludicrous. The book is filled with cherry-picked anecdotes rather than a systematic analysis of data such as Correlates of War, all papered over with hand-waving references to "game theory" without any real use of it. The book is not a useful contribution to peace studies or IR, it is opinion masquerading as academics. And the historical examples are just annoying to anyone who knows anything about them in any depth.
April 5, 2022
ABSOLUTE TRASH! It's absolutely astonishing how much this man lives in his own filter bubble. He talks about all the bad wars that China, Russia, Nazi Germany fight/have fought, but continues by defending the war in Iraq because Saddam Hussein was a bad man. Which of course he was, but claiming that was the reason we invaded speaks to intellectual dishonesty and disqualifies the entire book. No talk of how the US wanted Saddam there in the first place, no talk of how Saddam could keep massacring his own people for years without any intervention from us. It was only when Saddam wanted to get rid of the petrodollar we invaded. Basically this book claims: US started wars good, wars started by others bad. Disgusting.
May 1, 2024
Könnte kaum weiter von ernstzunehmendem wissenschaftlichen Diskurs entfernt sein. Zudem wurden die meisten Beispiel so vereinfacht, dass sie auf seine Theorien passen müssten und trotzdem widersprechen sie sich immer wieder.
April 21, 2022
I have a confession to make:
I've been excited for Why We Fight to come out for years, and eagerly read it on the first day...
because I thought it was the book version of Chris Blattman's famous university course Order and Violence (https://chrisblattman.com/blog/2017/0...).
Turns out, Why We Fight is a totally separate other book 😳
Why We Fight is an interesting, important, well written, concise and rigorous book. Blattman provides a multifaceted framework for understanding why conflict arises that is grounded in reality and does not pretend to have all the answers. The only downside to Why We Fight if you're a nerd who's already up to do date with the field, you won't learn very much new.
I've been excited for Why We Fight to come out for years, and eagerly read it on the first day...
because I thought it was the book version of Chris Blattman's famous university course Order and Violence (https://chrisblattman.com/blog/2017/0...).
Turns out, Why We Fight is a totally separate other book 😳
Why We Fight is an interesting, important, well written, concise and rigorous book. Blattman provides a multifaceted framework for understanding why conflict arises that is grounded in reality and does not pretend to have all the answers. The only downside to Why We Fight if you're a nerd who's already up to do date with the field, you won't learn very much new.
August 2, 2022
Blattman's theories are not terribly insightful. Unfortunately, organizing the book around these theories meant that the conflicts' analyses were fragmentary or incomplete. The book would really have benefited from more details, and a more comprehensive—instead of cherry-picked—analysis of at least some conflicts, preferably from Blattman's own expertise.
> It turns out the planners in Lesotho—a mix of central government and foreign agencies—overlooked some important details. Not being able to sell cows was the whole point of buying them. Most Basotho men worked far away in South African mines. When they sent their money home, they didn’t want their wives to spend it, so they bought assets that were hard to liquidate. If you create a market for cows, you threaten their whole system of social control. The people with power (in this case, the migrant men) actively worked against the project. It failed spectacularly.
> It turns out the planners in Lesotho—a mix of central government and foreign agencies—overlooked some important details. Not being able to sell cows was the whole point of buying them. Most Basotho men worked far away in South African mines. When they sent their money home, they didn’t want their wives to spend it, so they bought assets that were hard to liquidate. If you create a market for cows, you threaten their whole system of social control. The people with power (in this case, the migrant men) actively worked against the project. It failed spectacularly.
October 4, 2024
Excellent. It is s Good Read. I could not have been more banal, i know
April 17, 2024
Several years ago, this book was recommended by locally renowned mediator Ron Kelly. I enjoyed his mediation class at UC Berkeley Extension and it took me a while to get this book from my TBR list but I'm super happy that I was able to get it as an audio book.
The author covers a LOT of material - he goes from gang warfare in the streets to football hooliganism to conflicts and wars between nations. He covers myths (ie "women are peace keepers"), biases, interests and more.
Ultimately, the methods for creating and ensuring peace include establishing consistent processes and keeping all conflict resolution within that framework or rubric. Create a system and work within it. It also requires identifying tangible benefits or outcomes -- so much of what drives conflict is often based on intangibles (like "honor") that it is critical to create some sort of mapping between the tangibles and intangibles.
Professor Neiburg wrote a better review of the book, covering Blattman's five groupings on the Washington Post called "An incremental way to peace despite Putin and the persistence of war" -- it's quite good and I encourage you to check it out.
The author covers a LOT of material - he goes from gang warfare in the streets to football hooliganism to conflicts and wars between nations. He covers myths (ie "women are peace keepers"), biases, interests and more.
Ultimately, the methods for creating and ensuring peace include establishing consistent processes and keeping all conflict resolution within that framework or rubric. Create a system and work within it. It also requires identifying tangible benefits or outcomes -- so much of what drives conflict is often based on intangibles (like "honor") that it is critical to create some sort of mapping between the tangibles and intangibles.
Professor Neiburg wrote a better review of the book, covering Blattman's five groupings on the Washington Post called "An incremental way to peace despite Putin and the persistence of war" -- it's quite good and I encourage you to check it out.
June 10, 2022
Provides an introductory framework on thinking about war and is well-written and engaging. Could have done better on being more holistic and less technical
December 26, 2024
WAR IS OVER
le di tres estrellas porque al menos está bien estructurado y te dice los puntos claves, y porque la mitad eran citas y bibliografía
le di tres estrellas porque al menos está bien estructurado y te dice los puntos claves, y porque la mitad eran citas y bibliografía
January 11, 2023
An engaging if diverse account of why wars begin and why some paths to peace have proven successful.
I wanted to like this book more than I did, and I'm still not entirely sure why. I agree with many of Blattman's analysis. Especially his first and most important point: Peace is actually the default within contesting groups, and we err by first and primarily looking at conflicts to understand security. Finally I think there's immense wisdom in his concluding point, advocating 'peacemeal' efforts, taking small steps towards piece, rather than large, centralized social change endeavours.
Perhaps the heart of the difference is philosophical. Blattman, an economist by training, explains war by creating mini models about how the world works, and through very basic assumptions (such as game theory) explains why groups are likely to cooperate or contest. There's a quasi aim at comprehensiveness in explanation, though it's not fully pursued. It's also notable that in the introduction when he explains the extensive research behind the book, the listed fields are 'economists, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and policymakers have learned' (p.16). Is it petty of me to wonder where the field of Strategy or History (especially military history) are? Even if names such as Schelling and Blainey do pop up (and even Clausewitz, albeit not in a substantive way).
At the same time, Blattman has spent many years living and working in NGO groups seeking development and stability in some pretty war-torn places. And he has a lot of compelling stories about how those places changed, some for the better. Likewise, when he turns to his stronger field, that of causes of peace, there is a broad and rich set of insights and analysis. From why some forms of sanctions and peacekeepers work, to why some of the proposed 'obvious' assumptions (such as more female leaders leading to peace, or the inevitability of wars over water) don't always pan out. So much of the book is thus quite free of models, and quite willing to live in a 'dappled world' (to borrow Nancy Cartwright's term) where we shouldn't expect elegant or consistent theoretical effects.
Perhaps I'm simply not the right audience for this book. It's a very richly researched and thoughtful book, but one aimed at a large public audience. And perhaps scholars who don't think about war nearly as much as they should (almost all the blurbs on the back are economists or physical scientists). As Blattman says, once you get interested in how do we prevent war, it's hard to care about anything else. It is still, the first order question. Especially in a world of thousands of nuclear weapons.
So we need more books like this, we need the question examined from those with a real diversity of backgrounds, and Blattman has both the academic and on-the-ground experience to provide rich insights, in an easy to read fashion.
Hopefully you'll get more out of it, but I remain slightly confused as to just what didn't quite sit right with me for this one.
I wanted to like this book more than I did, and I'm still not entirely sure why. I agree with many of Blattman's analysis. Especially his first and most important point: Peace is actually the default within contesting groups, and we err by first and primarily looking at conflicts to understand security. Finally I think there's immense wisdom in his concluding point, advocating 'peacemeal' efforts, taking small steps towards piece, rather than large, centralized social change endeavours.
Perhaps the heart of the difference is philosophical. Blattman, an economist by training, explains war by creating mini models about how the world works, and through very basic assumptions (such as game theory) explains why groups are likely to cooperate or contest. There's a quasi aim at comprehensiveness in explanation, though it's not fully pursued. It's also notable that in the introduction when he explains the extensive research behind the book, the listed fields are 'economists, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and policymakers have learned' (p.16). Is it petty of me to wonder where the field of Strategy or History (especially military history) are? Even if names such as Schelling and Blainey do pop up (and even Clausewitz, albeit not in a substantive way).
At the same time, Blattman has spent many years living and working in NGO groups seeking development and stability in some pretty war-torn places. And he has a lot of compelling stories about how those places changed, some for the better. Likewise, when he turns to his stronger field, that of causes of peace, there is a broad and rich set of insights and analysis. From why some forms of sanctions and peacekeepers work, to why some of the proposed 'obvious' assumptions (such as more female leaders leading to peace, or the inevitability of wars over water) don't always pan out. So much of the book is thus quite free of models, and quite willing to live in a 'dappled world' (to borrow Nancy Cartwright's term) where we shouldn't expect elegant or consistent theoretical effects.
Perhaps I'm simply not the right audience for this book. It's a very richly researched and thoughtful book, but one aimed at a large public audience. And perhaps scholars who don't think about war nearly as much as they should (almost all the blurbs on the back are economists or physical scientists). As Blattman says, once you get interested in how do we prevent war, it's hard to care about anything else. It is still, the first order question. Especially in a world of thousands of nuclear weapons.
So we need more books like this, we need the question examined from those with a real diversity of backgrounds, and Blattman has both the academic and on-the-ground experience to provide rich insights, in an easy to read fashion.
Hopefully you'll get more out of it, but I remain slightly confused as to just what didn't quite sit right with me for this one.
July 3, 2022
everyone should read this
Not just because it does what it prominenti in the title, but because it provides good frameworks for thinking about social change overall
Not just because it does what it prominenti in the title, but because it provides good frameworks for thinking about social change overall
January 21, 2025
Why We Fight by Christopher Blattman provides a clear and well-structured analysis of the causes of conflict and how they can be resolved. The book outlines five main reasons wars occur, including weak institutions, poor leadership, and mistrust, supported by examples from history and contemporary events.
The combination of research and case studies makes the concepts easy to understand, and the focus on practical solutions adds valuable insight into conflict prevention. It’s an informative read for anyone interested in international relations, economics, or peacebuilding.
The combination of research and case studies makes the concepts easy to understand, and the focus on practical solutions adds valuable insight into conflict prevention. It’s an informative read for anyone interested in international relations, economics, or peacebuilding.
May 26, 2022
Just read it.
April 7, 2022
A quick, thoughtful, epistemically humble guide to both game theory and the latest empirical social science on the roots of conflict. Highly recommended.
April 28, 2022
As a policy researcher, one of my favorite books has been Why We Fight. Prof Blattman argues that fighting is actually harder than keeping peace. He outlines five causes of war: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions. He then presents paths to peace: interdependence, checks and balances, rules and enforcement, interventions, and wayward paths like new leadership and ending poverty. He concludes with ten powerful 'peacemeal commandments' for the way forward.
Combining economics, political science, sociology, and history, Prof Blattman thoughtfully gives us wide-ranging insights not only for conflict and compromise, but also for various aspects of growth, such as state capacity, socio-economic inclusion, and fragility.
The book is also a master-class in engaging writing, a page-turner - I couldn't put it down! It is a must-read for anyone interested in international development.
Combining economics, political science, sociology, and history, Prof Blattman thoughtfully gives us wide-ranging insights not only for conflict and compromise, but also for various aspects of growth, such as state capacity, socio-economic inclusion, and fragility.
The book is also a master-class in engaging writing, a page-turner - I couldn't put it down! It is a must-read for anyone interested in international development.
May 3, 2022
As a long time reader of Blattman’s blog, I expected a clever economics book on violence told well. This is that and more. It’s a near treatise on fighting equal to a political economy classic - founding new ways of thinking on and how to deeply reconsider group conflict. A must-read remains an understatement.
May 31, 2022
Summary
It’s weird that war happens; armed conflict is really destructive, so we should be able to negotiate an alternative that’s better for everyone (the “bargaining space”).
There are five categories of reasons that shrink this “bargaining space” and make war more likely:
1) Unchecked interests. Sometimes people who decide whether to go to war don’t bare the full costs of war or stand to benefit personally because they’re not held accountable by the population). This is a principle-agent problem and shrinks the bargaining space. e.g. most Americans opposed a revolutionary war, but the founding fathers had trade interests that British colonial policy undermined.
2) Intangible incentives. Even if war is really bad for material wellbeing, political bodies might have other things they care about. Righteous outrage (e.g. El Salvador rebels angry at govt. repression), ideologies (e.g. lebensraum), quest for glory (e.g. Henry VIII war with France). These all give an incentive to fight to be weighed against the material disincentive, narrowing the bargaining space. It’s like how people defect in Ultimatum games.
3) Uncertainty. States might not know how strong each other are, so they might think the bargaining space is in different places. Uncertainty also gives an incentive to show or bluff strength to gain a reputation. e.g. Saddam Hussein bluffing developing WMDs.
4) Commitment problems. If one State is becoming more powerful, it might be able to extract more from a rival state in future. The rival state can attack before it becomes powerful to prevent this. There should be some mutually beneficial agreement without war. But the rising state can’t credibly commit to not extracting more later. e.g. Sparta attacking Athens, Germany attacking Russia in WW1.
5) Misperceptions. People tend to be overconfident (increasing chance that overestimate their position in bargaining space). People also tend to have negative views of enemies (reducing strategic empathy for how the bargaining space looks to others). These reasons seem to be more psychological than the others. I think Blattman’s point is that these personal biases are better explanations than e.g. anger (which he seems less convinced by), because they’re more likely to persist even in slow, deliberate decision-making.
Some ways to reduce war which fall into the same bargaining schema are:
1) Interdependence. Economic interdependence increases material costs of war. Socio-cultural interdependence makes us care about each other.
2) Checks and balances. Checks and balances ensure leaders are accountable to people who bare the costs of war. This isn’t *just* about democracy, but also decentralized power.
3) Rules and enforcement. States or international bodies can enforce peace. Cool quote I hadn’t heard before: “The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell” - Dag Hammarskjold.
4) Interventions. Bunch of interventions that Blattman thinks probably work (a bit). Punishment (e.g. sanctions). Enforcing (e.g. UN peacekeepers). Facilitating (e.g. UK-IRA negotiations). Socializing (e.g. CBT reduced crime by 50% in Liberia). Incentivizing (e.g. foreign aid).
Some things that seem less important to reduce conflict:
5) Putting women in charge. Women monarchs actually went to war more. Speculatively because women are more likely to be misperceived as weak.
6) Reducing poverty. Poverty is a good explanation for why some wars get more intense (soldiers get cheaper). But not a good reason for them to start in this framework. People would be fighting over less.
What did I like?
* I think it succeeded in its main aim: I didn’t know anything about conflict theory before reading this book and now think I have at least some framework / language for asking “why did this war happen?”. The book gives an overarching and useful game-theoretical frame of splitting a pie, and then fits everything into that.
* I liked the observation that war is weird and needs an explanation. Idk, kind of obvious but felt like an important insight I hadn’t really grasped before.
* Seems trustworthy and rigorous. Tries to ground in evidence where possible and say when there isn’t good evidence. Also mentioned reasons he thought were less compelling. Wide-ranging books like this can be grandiose but Blattman’s style is humble. I like that. It also focused on descriptive goals, and didn’t moralize much. I liked that too.
What did I not like?
* I think it was longer than it had to be. Most chapters had long anecdotes that were meant to add color but I often ended up skimming. I liked the stories from history more than the stories from Blattman’s academic work, which felt more forced and less relevant.
* Sometimes the book uses analogies about crime or relatively low-level conflict to make points about inter-state conflict (e.g. credibly demonstrating ruthlessness in gang warfare). Other times it tries to be explicit they’re very different things and you can’t make that leap (e.g. when discussing role of anger). I think it’s because he’s using the analogies to illustrate rather than argue. But I found it confusing.
It’s weird that war happens; armed conflict is really destructive, so we should be able to negotiate an alternative that’s better for everyone (the “bargaining space”).
There are five categories of reasons that shrink this “bargaining space” and make war more likely:
1) Unchecked interests. Sometimes people who decide whether to go to war don’t bare the full costs of war or stand to benefit personally because they’re not held accountable by the population). This is a principle-agent problem and shrinks the bargaining space. e.g. most Americans opposed a revolutionary war, but the founding fathers had trade interests that British colonial policy undermined.
2) Intangible incentives. Even if war is really bad for material wellbeing, political bodies might have other things they care about. Righteous outrage (e.g. El Salvador rebels angry at govt. repression), ideologies (e.g. lebensraum), quest for glory (e.g. Henry VIII war with France). These all give an incentive to fight to be weighed against the material disincentive, narrowing the bargaining space. It’s like how people defect in Ultimatum games.
3) Uncertainty. States might not know how strong each other are, so they might think the bargaining space is in different places. Uncertainty also gives an incentive to show or bluff strength to gain a reputation. e.g. Saddam Hussein bluffing developing WMDs.
4) Commitment problems. If one State is becoming more powerful, it might be able to extract more from a rival state in future. The rival state can attack before it becomes powerful to prevent this. There should be some mutually beneficial agreement without war. But the rising state can’t credibly commit to not extracting more later. e.g. Sparta attacking Athens, Germany attacking Russia in WW1.
5) Misperceptions. People tend to be overconfident (increasing chance that overestimate their position in bargaining space). People also tend to have negative views of enemies (reducing strategic empathy for how the bargaining space looks to others). These reasons seem to be more psychological than the others. I think Blattman’s point is that these personal biases are better explanations than e.g. anger (which he seems less convinced by), because they’re more likely to persist even in slow, deliberate decision-making.
Some ways to reduce war which fall into the same bargaining schema are:
1) Interdependence. Economic interdependence increases material costs of war. Socio-cultural interdependence makes us care about each other.
2) Checks and balances. Checks and balances ensure leaders are accountable to people who bare the costs of war. This isn’t *just* about democracy, but also decentralized power.
3) Rules and enforcement. States or international bodies can enforce peace. Cool quote I hadn’t heard before: “The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell” - Dag Hammarskjold.
4) Interventions. Bunch of interventions that Blattman thinks probably work (a bit). Punishment (e.g. sanctions). Enforcing (e.g. UN peacekeepers). Facilitating (e.g. UK-IRA negotiations). Socializing (e.g. CBT reduced crime by 50% in Liberia). Incentivizing (e.g. foreign aid).
Some things that seem less important to reduce conflict:
5) Putting women in charge. Women monarchs actually went to war more. Speculatively because women are more likely to be misperceived as weak.
6) Reducing poverty. Poverty is a good explanation for why some wars get more intense (soldiers get cheaper). But not a good reason for them to start in this framework. People would be fighting over less.
What did I like?
* I think it succeeded in its main aim: I didn’t know anything about conflict theory before reading this book and now think I have at least some framework / language for asking “why did this war happen?”. The book gives an overarching and useful game-theoretical frame of splitting a pie, and then fits everything into that.
* I liked the observation that war is weird and needs an explanation. Idk, kind of obvious but felt like an important insight I hadn’t really grasped before.
* Seems trustworthy and rigorous. Tries to ground in evidence where possible and say when there isn’t good evidence. Also mentioned reasons he thought were less compelling. Wide-ranging books like this can be grandiose but Blattman’s style is humble. I like that. It also focused on descriptive goals, and didn’t moralize much. I liked that too.
What did I not like?
* I think it was longer than it had to be. Most chapters had long anecdotes that were meant to add color but I often ended up skimming. I liked the stories from history more than the stories from Blattman’s academic work, which felt more forced and less relevant.
* Sometimes the book uses analogies about crime or relatively low-level conflict to make points about inter-state conflict (e.g. credibly demonstrating ruthlessness in gang warfare). Other times it tries to be explicit they’re very different things and you can’t make that leap (e.g. when discussing role of anger). I think it’s because he’s using the analogies to illustrate rather than argue. But I found it confusing.
October 30, 2022
This is an intro to game theory as it pertains to war, both among states and smaller actors. It is aimed at the layperson, which suited me very well. Blattman's main argument is that people generally choose a negotiated peace over war because war is so destructive. He lists five main reasons (he calls the the "Five Logics").
1. Unchecked interests - the person/people making the decision for war does not have to take other people's interests into account.
2. Intangible incentives - there is something that makes war attractive other than material gain. This could be glory, image political advantage inside a country or other things that are difficult to quantify.
3. Uncertainty - it is sometimes hard to understand your own strength relative to the strength of your opponent(s).
4. Commitment problems - this is when an agreement is possible but at least one side feels the other side won't honor the bargain and it will be impossible to enforce.
5. Misperceptions - this is similar to uncertainty as it involves not understanding the situation when making important decisions.
He also offers some ways to promote peace:
1. interdependence - groups that are interlinked political, economically and/or socially are less likely to fight as the costs would be higher.
2. Checks and balances - multiple sources of power within a society so no single player can take actions that drag the rest of society into war.
3. Rules and Enforcement - This would ideally be the state within a society and the international community for interstate wars - see Ukraine.
4. Interventions - these are ways to get people/institutions to look at other options than fighting, including incentivizing them towards peace and punishing violent behavior.
This was a very thoughtful and interesting book, but I definitely found the first half (causes of war) better than the second (ways to avoid fighting). It is written very informally. The author makes clear what is supportable with current evidence and what are his personal opinions. He writes almost as a lecture where he gives asides with his own thoughts.
1. Unchecked interests - the person/people making the decision for war does not have to take other people's interests into account.
2. Intangible incentives - there is something that makes war attractive other than material gain. This could be glory, image political advantage inside a country or other things that are difficult to quantify.
3. Uncertainty - it is sometimes hard to understand your own strength relative to the strength of your opponent(s).
4. Commitment problems - this is when an agreement is possible but at least one side feels the other side won't honor the bargain and it will be impossible to enforce.
5. Misperceptions - this is similar to uncertainty as it involves not understanding the situation when making important decisions.
He also offers some ways to promote peace:
1. interdependence - groups that are interlinked political, economically and/or socially are less likely to fight as the costs would be higher.
2. Checks and balances - multiple sources of power within a society so no single player can take actions that drag the rest of society into war.
3. Rules and Enforcement - This would ideally be the state within a society and the international community for interstate wars - see Ukraine.
4. Interventions - these are ways to get people/institutions to look at other options than fighting, including incentivizing them towards peace and punishing violent behavior.
This was a very thoughtful and interesting book, but I definitely found the first half (causes of war) better than the second (ways to avoid fighting). It is written very informally. The author makes clear what is supportable with current evidence and what are his personal opinions. He writes almost as a lecture where he gives asides with his own thoughts.
June 10, 2022
Presents a useful framework to think about past and present conflicts. A key takeaway is that conflicts are costly and it takes a combination of factors for a war to break out. Keeping those potential factors in mind helps one to stay away from simplistic one-factor explanations (e.g. "mad dictator").
Another takeaway (and an afterthought) is that, in terms of functionality: lawless state < honor system < functioning legal system. There is no functioning international legal system. Mainly thanks to Russia's aggression we now observe that the "honor" related to the non-use of nuclear weapons has dissipated, and we are descending into global lawlessness, a Hobbesian state of nature with nukes. Scary.
I heard in a couple podcast interviews with the author that the book is criticized for not containing any new ideas. In that sense it's more like a textbook, covering the essentials. Still, for me, a non-expert in international politics, very much was new, the theory as well as the case studies. Perhaps only the parts dealing with psychological factors, with learnings from behavioral psychology & behavioral economics, seemed a bit trite and repetitive. Could be because I have studied and read on that stuff quite a lot before.
Overall - could be worth your time if you are not an expert in the field and want to think in a more clear and comprehensive way about why and when big conflicts emerge.
Another takeaway (and an afterthought) is that, in terms of functionality: lawless state < honor system < functioning legal system. There is no functioning international legal system. Mainly thanks to Russia's aggression we now observe that the "honor" related to the non-use of nuclear weapons has dissipated, and we are descending into global lawlessness, a Hobbesian state of nature with nukes. Scary.
I heard in a couple podcast interviews with the author that the book is criticized for not containing any new ideas. In that sense it's more like a textbook, covering the essentials. Still, for me, a non-expert in international politics, very much was new, the theory as well as the case studies. Perhaps only the parts dealing with psychological factors, with learnings from behavioral psychology & behavioral economics, seemed a bit trite and repetitive. Could be because I have studied and read on that stuff quite a lot before.
Overall - could be worth your time if you are not an expert in the field and want to think in a more clear and comprehensive way about why and when big conflicts emerge.
September 13, 2023
Think about all the movies, books, articles, etc. you’ve seen about war—they are abundant. Now think of all the movies, books, articles, etc. you’ve seen about situations in which war might have happened, but didn’t—there aren’t many. This is true despite the fact that Peace is massively more common than War. For example, the United States is ~250 years old, and yet it’s only been involved in ~12 major wars.
This disconnect is at the core of this book: peace is the default; war only happens if something goes wrong. The majority of the book is dedicated to explaining how and why it sometimes does go wrong.
Overall, Blattman argues for 5 (and only 5) causes of war:
1) When the interests of leaders is misaligned with that of a nation/organization
2) When there are intangible incentives involved such as glory or religion
3) When there is uncertainty between both sides about the other’s capabilities
4) When there is a commitment problem—e.g. a lack of trust
5) And when there are misperceptions about the other side’s intentions.
None of these causes alone will trigger a war, but they all “narrow the bargaining” range, thereby increasing the chance of a war-causing blunder.
It’s a great read and challenges a lot of the misconceptions one might have about war and conflict. It is firmly rooted in game theoretical thinking (but it’s not technical), empirical literature, and interesting examples ranging from Chicago gang wars, to WWI, to London football riots.
This disconnect is at the core of this book: peace is the default; war only happens if something goes wrong. The majority of the book is dedicated to explaining how and why it sometimes does go wrong.
Overall, Blattman argues for 5 (and only 5) causes of war:
1) When the interests of leaders is misaligned with that of a nation/organization
2) When there are intangible incentives involved such as glory or religion
3) When there is uncertainty between both sides about the other’s capabilities
4) When there is a commitment problem—e.g. a lack of trust
5) And when there are misperceptions about the other side’s intentions.
None of these causes alone will trigger a war, but they all “narrow the bargaining” range, thereby increasing the chance of a war-causing blunder.
It’s a great read and challenges a lot of the misconceptions one might have about war and conflict. It is firmly rooted in game theoretical thinking (but it’s not technical), empirical literature, and interesting examples ranging from Chicago gang wars, to WWI, to London football riots.
July 30, 2024
Very common and ordinary thoughts can be sometimes very profound. A book title such as this one touches the basic fabric of community-living, but not many people would have nursed a thought on why quarrel is engendered in a society – like between individuals in a human group, between human groups in a larger conglomeration such as a nation, or between nations in the larger comity of international organizations such as the UN. This book presents a framework to understand the common forces that drive fights that are prolonged and violent between groups. Interpersonal violence is not included as also acrimonious competition between groups which is regarded as normal. Prolonged violence is a rarity and not normal. What is stressed in the book is that competition or quarrel or even a skirmish is common, sustained fights that exhaust resources are not so. The factors which lead a group to take the plunge by delivering the first planned blow that sets off conflict are carefully analysed. Another set of suggestions are given at the end that help to reduce conflict. Christopher Blattman is a professor of Global Conflict studies at the University of Chicago. As a young man, he met his future wife in a Kenyan internet café, where she set him on a path to working on conflict and international development. Through his academic work he has witnessed violence around the world and tried his hand in stemming them.
The book presents some hard facts which are not fairly obvious but would be found convincing if you apply your mind over it. The first principle is that instead of fighting it out on the streets, enemies prefer to loathe one another in peace. The established wisdom often suggest that issues like poverty, scarcity, natural resources, climate change, ethnic fragmentation, polarization and injustice lead to violence. Blattman thinks that though these may be terrible for a particular group, they don’t ignite fighting in a big way. Another counter-intuitive yet logical inference is that peace arises not from brotherly love and cooperation, but from the ever-present threat of violence (p.27). This is discovered in the context of urban gang wars, but a little consideration will show that it holds good for the relations between nations as well. The more destructive our weapons, the easier it is to find peace. When the prospects of war are more ruinous, the bargaining range widens and expands the dividend from peace. By corollary, it shows the arguments of non-violent gurus like Gandhi as just wishful thinking which are nothing but the pampered thoughts of one who had only to deal with a civilized antagonist. If you think that would be praising Britain too much, it may be changed as Gandhi chose to look the other way when his antagonist abandoned civilized ways on other people, but not him.
The book sounds like describing a hypothetical world where pure logic suggests what should take place rather than going behind what is taking place in the real world. The author introduces game theory models to describe real phenomena but which are too idealistic to serve much purpose. This requires rivals striving selfishly for their own interests in an anarchic system where there is no overruling authority to keep rivals from attacking each other. To be selfish is logical, and theory explains much of practice when self-interest in the physical sense is more prominent. Blattman’s theories hopelessly falter when they are applied to terrorism – Muslim suicide bombers blow themselves up for no selfish objective to be achieved in this world. What they aim for is greater things after death. No logic can describe this madness and that may be why the author carefully stays away from even mentioning terrorism in this book that studies reasons for fighting! Oversimplification or reductionism to an imagined principle is another drawback of the book. Street violence between Hindus and Muslims in India is simplified as politically orchestrated for purely political goals. He does not seem to be aware of the deep cleavages between the two communities and instead settle self-satisfyingly with a hypothesis that would do nothing more than please American academics. This book also examines ways to reduce conflict. Unconstrained and over-centralized rule is a basic cause of conflict everywhere. Proper checks and balances are the solutions. The more constrained societies are, the more peaceful they will be. Blattman presents the US constitution and its restrained presidency as the perfect examples for the world to emulate. It is also claimed that narrow dictatorships and military juntas are the most likely to launch wars. Note the qualifier ‘narrow dictatorship’! It’s a subtle ploy to acquit the Chinese regime where a highly distributed Communist party apparatus is said to be exercising enough checks and balances on the executive.
Blattman then makes a careful study of the origins of the tendency to violence in human societies. Humanity’s righteous vengeance is biologically and culturally evolved. This is a powerful social norm that is found in every human society. An instinct for fairness is a must for cooperation in large groups. Strange it may seem, there are powerful motivators to fight and die for others in the society. The author claims that status is what most people care about more than their lives. Nazi air force pilots fought and laid down their lives willingly for an elaborate system of war medals and status recognition. Intangible incentives like these are present in every society. Even though this was the ideal point to hint at, the author prefers to remain silent of Islamist suicide squads and their motivation to do so. Overconfidence is a crucial factor that pushes groups to violence. We are biased to search for evidence to confirm what we already believe. Electing overconfident leaders will narrow bargaining ranges and make peace more fragile. Groupthink, organizational forms and leadership styles are still prone to collective errors. Groups work especially well for problems that have a clear right or wrong answer. In a subjective matter or in uncertain environments, groups don’t take better decisions. Like-minded group members often get more extreme in their views through deliberation.
This book introduces several ideas to reduce conflict and violence between groups in human societies. Economic intertwining is a way to peace such that an attacker feels the financial pinch when a victim who is economically linked to him is assaulted. Social interactions and integrated civic life also help. Here, the author brings forward an Indian example to prove his point which is neither true nor logical. Hindu organizations carried out a Rath Yatra (chariot procession) from Somnath in Gujarat to Ayodhya in UP as part of the Ram temple movement. A string of violence was reported along the route. The author claims that Somnath – from where the procession began – was calm. The reason for this is hypothesized to be that the Hindu and Muslim communities are economically more intermingled there. This is a totally unsubstantiated conjecture. Both the communities are economically very closely linked everywhere in India. Communal tensions occur at some places in spite of that. Here the author is clearly regurgitating the fallacious finding of some local activist. Blattman also looks at the mechanism by which enlightenment ideals spread around the world. Sometime between 1689 and 1776, rights that had been viewed as the rights of a particular people were transferred into universal and natural human rights. The explosion of literary forms like the novel and paintings gave people a window into the minds of other people, cutting across distance and social boundaries. These extended the bounds of sympathy to include the interests of the Other and made fighting less acceptable than before.
The author has a lot of experience working in the world’s most notorious conflict zones and with gang leaders who are waiting for half a chance to be at their enemy’s throats. With this exposure behind him, Blattman proposes some factors that are essential to make and keep peace between contending parties. Peace is said to be the product of socialization. Power should be devolved into more hands. The number of stakeholders should be more to restrain a few intransigents. There is a hunch among scholars that women are more likely to keep peace as rulers. However, a survey of early modern Europe doesn’t buttress this idea where queens were found 40 per cent more likely to make wars than kings. Foreign aid agencies should distribute their resources in decentralized ways through the community, rather than channelling it through the government which would concentrate power in fewer hands. Foreign NGOs always have a poor opinion of third world regimes and would waste no chance to bypass their authority and grow taller in stature than the government in its citizens’ minds. Divisions on wealth and ethnicity are by nature not prone to violence. There are many poor and ethnically divided societies which are not going to dissolve into violence.
The book gives some plain talk on what matters in a standoff between rivals whose fighting capabilities are more or less balanced. Blattman asserts that weak nations do not set the policy agenda; bargaining power comes from the ability to threaten harm. Nations should project their strength in a measure exceeding their actual resources in order to demonstrate a credible deterrent. Even though not clearly spelt out as such, Gandhian nonviolence has no place in the changing balance of power between nations and is not even considered as an alternative system worthy of examination. The author has analysed specific scenarios using game theory models and associated pie charts that look rather too simplified. Religious terrorism is not handled in the book which is a serious disadvantage and this deficiency sticks out prominently in a narrative which is otherwise comprehensive in its analyses of the reasons of conflict. Another disadvantage is the sole anchoring of the narrative on sociology without any link to evolutionary biology that lies underneath. How a trait to fight strategically developed in biological evolution and whether they exist in other animal species would have provided informative context to the discussion.
The book is recommended.
The book presents some hard facts which are not fairly obvious but would be found convincing if you apply your mind over it. The first principle is that instead of fighting it out on the streets, enemies prefer to loathe one another in peace. The established wisdom often suggest that issues like poverty, scarcity, natural resources, climate change, ethnic fragmentation, polarization and injustice lead to violence. Blattman thinks that though these may be terrible for a particular group, they don’t ignite fighting in a big way. Another counter-intuitive yet logical inference is that peace arises not from brotherly love and cooperation, but from the ever-present threat of violence (p.27). This is discovered in the context of urban gang wars, but a little consideration will show that it holds good for the relations between nations as well. The more destructive our weapons, the easier it is to find peace. When the prospects of war are more ruinous, the bargaining range widens and expands the dividend from peace. By corollary, it shows the arguments of non-violent gurus like Gandhi as just wishful thinking which are nothing but the pampered thoughts of one who had only to deal with a civilized antagonist. If you think that would be praising Britain too much, it may be changed as Gandhi chose to look the other way when his antagonist abandoned civilized ways on other people, but not him.
The book sounds like describing a hypothetical world where pure logic suggests what should take place rather than going behind what is taking place in the real world. The author introduces game theory models to describe real phenomena but which are too idealistic to serve much purpose. This requires rivals striving selfishly for their own interests in an anarchic system where there is no overruling authority to keep rivals from attacking each other. To be selfish is logical, and theory explains much of practice when self-interest in the physical sense is more prominent. Blattman’s theories hopelessly falter when they are applied to terrorism – Muslim suicide bombers blow themselves up for no selfish objective to be achieved in this world. What they aim for is greater things after death. No logic can describe this madness and that may be why the author carefully stays away from even mentioning terrorism in this book that studies reasons for fighting! Oversimplification or reductionism to an imagined principle is another drawback of the book. Street violence between Hindus and Muslims in India is simplified as politically orchestrated for purely political goals. He does not seem to be aware of the deep cleavages between the two communities and instead settle self-satisfyingly with a hypothesis that would do nothing more than please American academics. This book also examines ways to reduce conflict. Unconstrained and over-centralized rule is a basic cause of conflict everywhere. Proper checks and balances are the solutions. The more constrained societies are, the more peaceful they will be. Blattman presents the US constitution and its restrained presidency as the perfect examples for the world to emulate. It is also claimed that narrow dictatorships and military juntas are the most likely to launch wars. Note the qualifier ‘narrow dictatorship’! It’s a subtle ploy to acquit the Chinese regime where a highly distributed Communist party apparatus is said to be exercising enough checks and balances on the executive.
Blattman then makes a careful study of the origins of the tendency to violence in human societies. Humanity’s righteous vengeance is biologically and culturally evolved. This is a powerful social norm that is found in every human society. An instinct for fairness is a must for cooperation in large groups. Strange it may seem, there are powerful motivators to fight and die for others in the society. The author claims that status is what most people care about more than their lives. Nazi air force pilots fought and laid down their lives willingly for an elaborate system of war medals and status recognition. Intangible incentives like these are present in every society. Even though this was the ideal point to hint at, the author prefers to remain silent of Islamist suicide squads and their motivation to do so. Overconfidence is a crucial factor that pushes groups to violence. We are biased to search for evidence to confirm what we already believe. Electing overconfident leaders will narrow bargaining ranges and make peace more fragile. Groupthink, organizational forms and leadership styles are still prone to collective errors. Groups work especially well for problems that have a clear right or wrong answer. In a subjective matter or in uncertain environments, groups don’t take better decisions. Like-minded group members often get more extreme in their views through deliberation.
This book introduces several ideas to reduce conflict and violence between groups in human societies. Economic intertwining is a way to peace such that an attacker feels the financial pinch when a victim who is economically linked to him is assaulted. Social interactions and integrated civic life also help. Here, the author brings forward an Indian example to prove his point which is neither true nor logical. Hindu organizations carried out a Rath Yatra (chariot procession) from Somnath in Gujarat to Ayodhya in UP as part of the Ram temple movement. A string of violence was reported along the route. The author claims that Somnath – from where the procession began – was calm. The reason for this is hypothesized to be that the Hindu and Muslim communities are economically more intermingled there. This is a totally unsubstantiated conjecture. Both the communities are economically very closely linked everywhere in India. Communal tensions occur at some places in spite of that. Here the author is clearly regurgitating the fallacious finding of some local activist. Blattman also looks at the mechanism by which enlightenment ideals spread around the world. Sometime between 1689 and 1776, rights that had been viewed as the rights of a particular people were transferred into universal and natural human rights. The explosion of literary forms like the novel and paintings gave people a window into the minds of other people, cutting across distance and social boundaries. These extended the bounds of sympathy to include the interests of the Other and made fighting less acceptable than before.
The author has a lot of experience working in the world’s most notorious conflict zones and with gang leaders who are waiting for half a chance to be at their enemy’s throats. With this exposure behind him, Blattman proposes some factors that are essential to make and keep peace between contending parties. Peace is said to be the product of socialization. Power should be devolved into more hands. The number of stakeholders should be more to restrain a few intransigents. There is a hunch among scholars that women are more likely to keep peace as rulers. However, a survey of early modern Europe doesn’t buttress this idea where queens were found 40 per cent more likely to make wars than kings. Foreign aid agencies should distribute their resources in decentralized ways through the community, rather than channelling it through the government which would concentrate power in fewer hands. Foreign NGOs always have a poor opinion of third world regimes and would waste no chance to bypass their authority and grow taller in stature than the government in its citizens’ minds. Divisions on wealth and ethnicity are by nature not prone to violence. There are many poor and ethnically divided societies which are not going to dissolve into violence.
The book gives some plain talk on what matters in a standoff between rivals whose fighting capabilities are more or less balanced. Blattman asserts that weak nations do not set the policy agenda; bargaining power comes from the ability to threaten harm. Nations should project their strength in a measure exceeding their actual resources in order to demonstrate a credible deterrent. Even though not clearly spelt out as such, Gandhian nonviolence has no place in the changing balance of power between nations and is not even considered as an alternative system worthy of examination. The author has analysed specific scenarios using game theory models and associated pie charts that look rather too simplified. Religious terrorism is not handled in the book which is a serious disadvantage and this deficiency sticks out prominently in a narrative which is otherwise comprehensive in its analyses of the reasons of conflict. Another disadvantage is the sole anchoring of the narrative on sociology without any link to evolutionary biology that lies underneath. How a trait to fight strategically developed in biological evolution and whether they exist in other animal species would have provided informative context to the discussion.
The book is recommended.
April 23, 2022
Excellent and general explanation of the causes of prolonged and organized conflicts. In plain language, relies on game theory, evidence and examples to make the case that conflicts are related to identifiable causes which are much more preventable than common sense, and much of the preceding literature, usually considers.
March 6, 2023
I thought it was good
June 6, 2023
Interesting ideas, useful content, unexpected parallels, but the book was somehow difficult to read. My own issue this time.
October 22, 2023
To my fellow social scientists out there, let's begin with this powerful reminder from Blattman:
"Indulge your passion for science, but let your science be human, and have a direct reference to action and society. Let your quest for understanding be accompanied by a desire to act." -- David Hume.
Listen, I am an economist and I’d be the first to admit that we are not good writers. We try. So, I get it. Also, I say this as a fellow game theorist, we like to oversimplify complexities for the sake of delivering (Pareto) “efficiency.” Then, unfortunately, we tend to miss (or assume away) key implicit elements of a system or problem.
That being said. Let’s dig in.
First things first, there are a few points in the book that warrant careful consideration. It's important to keep in mind that Blattman approaches these issues from the perspective of a game theorist, which might explain why certain aspects have been overlooked. This omission seems to serve the purpose of emphasizing uncertainty and the calculations of beliefs and probabilities in the context of potential conflicts.
Some red flags that would suggest a need for more nuance:
1. The Iraq war, where Blattman briefly touches upon the fact that, at a certain point, the U.S. government had initially supported Saddam Hussein's regime.
2. The discussion on police violence, which comes off as justifying and requires a more nuanced exploration.
3. The section concerning the (Canadian) Mounties and their role in achieving long-lasting violence reductions, which may, from a decolonial lens, seem oversimplifing the correlation between their actions and the desired outcomes.
It's important to approach these points critically and with an understanding of the author's perspective, as they contribute to the broader theme of uncertainty and decision-making in conflict scenarios.
***
In a time when discussing war, especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, it's essential to recognize the rare occurrence of armed conflicts, as Christopher Blattman does in his book, "Why We Fight."
Blattman highlights the multitude of incentives that typically discourage war, even among bitter adversaries. He argues that war is an infrequent event and that most potential conflicts are resolved peacefully. Indeed, war often seems to be a statistical anomaly, as it falls "in the error term," a concept aptly coined by political scientist Erik Gartzke.
Social scientists have struggled to predict war accurately because it frequently defies their established explanations. Most disputes that could escalate into violence are resolved through diplomatic means. However, recent events in the Israel-Palestine conflict serve as a stark reminder that one war can cause immense suffering, affecting countless lives. The fear of war is not irrational; rather, it is a natural response to the horrors that war can unleash. To the people living through these conflicts, the rarity of such events provides little solace.
Blattman's book seeks to elucidate why rival powers occasionally abandon peaceful negotiation and resort to war. While its title suggests an exploration of the causes of war, the book doesn't offer a comprehensive theory of war. Instead, it identifies five forces, drawn mainly from bargaining and social choice theory, which categorize the failures in negotiations between rivals: the inability to enforce or monitor agreements, uncertainty about intentions or resolve, unchecked or unlimited interests, misperceptions or miscommunications, and intangible motives for fighting, such as nationalism.
Blattman presents these forces individually in the book's first half, without offering a clear framework for how they interact or when their presence can predict war. He simply asserts that in a "fragile" society, "the five forces have eliminated most of the room for two enemies to find a compromise."
"Why We Fight" excels in introducing readers to the bargaining model of war, which explains conflicts as complex interactions involving negotiation. Blattman, a development economist and conflict studies professor at the University of Chicago, adeptly translates intricate concepts from game theory and social choice theory for a broader audience. He enriches the text with engaging anecdotes from his own experiences, including his work in post-conflict development.
However, by fixating on these abstract forces, Blattman largely disregards the primary actors in war: sovereign states, the international system, and the leaders responsible for life-and-death decisions. Ultimately, it is the incentives, norms, and culture of these actors that truly explain the origins of conflicts, including the Israel-Palestine dispute.
That is, nuances such as the following:
"When we really want to think about what this driver of violence is—and the pictures that have been coming out are sickening—we need to understand that colonial violence instills dehumanization both in the oppressor and in the oppressed." -- Tareq Baconi, the president of the board of the think tank Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network.
One significant issue with Blattman's book is his imprecise definition of war. While political scientists adhere to rigorous criteria, such as a minimum threshold for battle-related fatalities, Blattman defines war as "any kind of prolonged, violent struggle between groups."
This definition encompasses conflicts that may not result in casualties or be politically motivated, leading to confusion and oversimplification. It blurs the distinction between war and other forms of political violence. A more precise definition of war, involving violent armed contests within or between nations over governance, provides clarity and helps avoid unnecessary conflation. This narrower definition aligns with accepted criteria and facilitates more accurate analysis.
Blattman's taxonomy also struggles to explain why some fragile countries descend into war while others do not. To develop a genuine theory of war, he would need to delve into a specific fragile case and demonstrate how each factor in his taxonomy interacted to prevent successful negotiations, leading to violence. Unfortunately, he does not offer a coherent narrative of how wars begin or how they can be prevented.
Yet, one should always remember, a war-inducing organization, such as, say Hamas, can be all of the following: a terrorist group, pragmatic, pursuing it's own interests, as well a governing body. The same can be said about state governments, such as the Israeli government (or any other government), as they are also purveyors of destructive power (against militaries and civilians), and pursue their own interests, and govern. (Well, as much as I love America, see also the government of the USA).
In the second part of the book, Blattman explores the characteristics that make "stable and successful societies" more adept at achieving peaceful negotiations. In these relatively predictable settings, he finds firmer footing, using observational studies to identify effective stabilization and development techniques.
Blattman highlights the importance of interdependence, checks and balances, rule enforcement, and interventions like peacekeeping missions and sanctions, which counteract the forces that hinder successful bargaining. However, even this analysis falls short at times and overlooks historical context. His attempts to refute theories linking war to state-building lack relevance, as countries like South Korea have had their institutions deeply shaped by military interventions, occupations, and wartime experiences.
In conclusion, "Why We Fight" refrains from offering concrete solutions but provides ten "commandments" for individuals engaged in efforts to prevent conflicts or foster peaceful negotiations. While these principles may guide aid and development workers effectively, they are insufficient for addressing the complexities of conflicts like the Israel-Palestine dispute. Ultimately, understanding war and its prevention requires more attention to the motivations and cultures of states and leaders.
War is both an institution and a cultural phenomenon, and changing the culture of violence among states may be key to preventing future conflicts. For war to truly become an anachronism, it must be perceived as grotesque, immoral, and unnecessary, rather than merely rare and improbable.
***
TLDR:
In summary, Blattman challenges our common perception of violence by asserting that it is not a common occurrence; rather, it is a rarity. Despite the existence of numerous potential conflicts, most of them do not escalate into violence. This is because engaging in combat is a costly endeavor with unpredictable outcomes. In many cases, it is more advantageous for opposing parties to coexist, even if it means harboring mutual animosity rather than resorting to armed confrontation.
So, why, in light of its impracticality, do conflicts and violence still persist? According to Blattman, the answer lies in five distinct logics that undermine the incentives for peaceful compromise:
1. Unchecked interests: Leaders, like Vladimir Putin, who make decisions that send others to fight and die on their behalf.
2. Intangible incentives: Motivations such as faith or the pursuit of glory that transcend material interests.
3. Uncertainty: The presence of doubt, often accompanied by miscalculated bluffs that backfire.
4. Commitment problems: Dilemmas arising when one nation, destined to become more powerful than another, cannot commit to refraining from future aggression.
5. Misperceptions: The tendency for individuals or nations to overestimate their own capabilities, leading to overconfidence.
Blattman's perspective invites us to reevaluate our understanding of violence, emphasizing its infrequent occurrence and highlighting the intricate web of factors that can drive individuals and nations to engage in conflict.
At the end, he provides Ten Commandments centering "piecemeal tinkering":
1. Thou Shalt Judge the Easy from the Wicked
2. Thou Shalt Not Worship Grand Plans and Best Practices
3. Thou Shalt Not Forget All Policymaking is Political
4. Honor Thy Margins
5. Thou Shalt Find the Path by Exploring Many
6. Thou Shalt Embrace Failure
7. Thou Shalt Be Patient
8. Thou Shalt Set Sensible Goals
9. Thou Shalt Be Accountable
10. Find Your Margin.
"Too many people forget that social dilemmas are not all the same. They approach every issue like it's a mass vaccination campaign-- a straightforward criris with a known solution that just needs a little money and political will. Then they wonder why they failed. Your first commandment is to avoid this blunder, to develop a filter for distinguishing the rare and simple logistical problems from the ones that are wicked hard." -- Christopher Blattman.
"Indulge your passion for science, but let your science be human, and have a direct reference to action and society. Let your quest for understanding be accompanied by a desire to act." -- David Hume.
Listen, I am an economist and I’d be the first to admit that we are not good writers. We try. So, I get it. Also, I say this as a fellow game theorist, we like to oversimplify complexities for the sake of delivering (Pareto) “efficiency.” Then, unfortunately, we tend to miss (or assume away) key implicit elements of a system or problem.
That being said. Let’s dig in.
First things first, there are a few points in the book that warrant careful consideration. It's important to keep in mind that Blattman approaches these issues from the perspective of a game theorist, which might explain why certain aspects have been overlooked. This omission seems to serve the purpose of emphasizing uncertainty and the calculations of beliefs and probabilities in the context of potential conflicts.
Some red flags that would suggest a need for more nuance:
1. The Iraq war, where Blattman briefly touches upon the fact that, at a certain point, the U.S. government had initially supported Saddam Hussein's regime.
2. The discussion on police violence, which comes off as justifying and requires a more nuanced exploration.
3. The section concerning the (Canadian) Mounties and their role in achieving long-lasting violence reductions, which may, from a decolonial lens, seem oversimplifing the correlation between their actions and the desired outcomes.
It's important to approach these points critically and with an understanding of the author's perspective, as they contribute to the broader theme of uncertainty and decision-making in conflict scenarios.
***
In a time when discussing war, especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, it's essential to recognize the rare occurrence of armed conflicts, as Christopher Blattman does in his book, "Why We Fight."
Blattman highlights the multitude of incentives that typically discourage war, even among bitter adversaries. He argues that war is an infrequent event and that most potential conflicts are resolved peacefully. Indeed, war often seems to be a statistical anomaly, as it falls "in the error term," a concept aptly coined by political scientist Erik Gartzke.
Social scientists have struggled to predict war accurately because it frequently defies their established explanations. Most disputes that could escalate into violence are resolved through diplomatic means. However, recent events in the Israel-Palestine conflict serve as a stark reminder that one war can cause immense suffering, affecting countless lives. The fear of war is not irrational; rather, it is a natural response to the horrors that war can unleash. To the people living through these conflicts, the rarity of such events provides little solace.
Blattman's book seeks to elucidate why rival powers occasionally abandon peaceful negotiation and resort to war. While its title suggests an exploration of the causes of war, the book doesn't offer a comprehensive theory of war. Instead, it identifies five forces, drawn mainly from bargaining and social choice theory, which categorize the failures in negotiations between rivals: the inability to enforce or monitor agreements, uncertainty about intentions or resolve, unchecked or unlimited interests, misperceptions or miscommunications, and intangible motives for fighting, such as nationalism.
Blattman presents these forces individually in the book's first half, without offering a clear framework for how they interact or when their presence can predict war. He simply asserts that in a "fragile" society, "the five forces have eliminated most of the room for two enemies to find a compromise."
"Why We Fight" excels in introducing readers to the bargaining model of war, which explains conflicts as complex interactions involving negotiation. Blattman, a development economist and conflict studies professor at the University of Chicago, adeptly translates intricate concepts from game theory and social choice theory for a broader audience. He enriches the text with engaging anecdotes from his own experiences, including his work in post-conflict development.
However, by fixating on these abstract forces, Blattman largely disregards the primary actors in war: sovereign states, the international system, and the leaders responsible for life-and-death decisions. Ultimately, it is the incentives, norms, and culture of these actors that truly explain the origins of conflicts, including the Israel-Palestine dispute.
That is, nuances such as the following:
"When we really want to think about what this driver of violence is—and the pictures that have been coming out are sickening—we need to understand that colonial violence instills dehumanization both in the oppressor and in the oppressed." -- Tareq Baconi, the president of the board of the think tank Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network.
One significant issue with Blattman's book is his imprecise definition of war. While political scientists adhere to rigorous criteria, such as a minimum threshold for battle-related fatalities, Blattman defines war as "any kind of prolonged, violent struggle between groups."
This definition encompasses conflicts that may not result in casualties or be politically motivated, leading to confusion and oversimplification. It blurs the distinction between war and other forms of political violence. A more precise definition of war, involving violent armed contests within or between nations over governance, provides clarity and helps avoid unnecessary conflation. This narrower definition aligns with accepted criteria and facilitates more accurate analysis.
Blattman's taxonomy also struggles to explain why some fragile countries descend into war while others do not. To develop a genuine theory of war, he would need to delve into a specific fragile case and demonstrate how each factor in his taxonomy interacted to prevent successful negotiations, leading to violence. Unfortunately, he does not offer a coherent narrative of how wars begin or how they can be prevented.
Yet, one should always remember, a war-inducing organization, such as, say Hamas, can be all of the following: a terrorist group, pragmatic, pursuing it's own interests, as well a governing body. The same can be said about state governments, such as the Israeli government (or any other government), as they are also purveyors of destructive power (against militaries and civilians), and pursue their own interests, and govern. (Well, as much as I love America, see also the government of the USA).
In the second part of the book, Blattman explores the characteristics that make "stable and successful societies" more adept at achieving peaceful negotiations. In these relatively predictable settings, he finds firmer footing, using observational studies to identify effective stabilization and development techniques.
Blattman highlights the importance of interdependence, checks and balances, rule enforcement, and interventions like peacekeeping missions and sanctions, which counteract the forces that hinder successful bargaining. However, even this analysis falls short at times and overlooks historical context. His attempts to refute theories linking war to state-building lack relevance, as countries like South Korea have had their institutions deeply shaped by military interventions, occupations, and wartime experiences.
In conclusion, "Why We Fight" refrains from offering concrete solutions but provides ten "commandments" for individuals engaged in efforts to prevent conflicts or foster peaceful negotiations. While these principles may guide aid and development workers effectively, they are insufficient for addressing the complexities of conflicts like the Israel-Palestine dispute. Ultimately, understanding war and its prevention requires more attention to the motivations and cultures of states and leaders.
War is both an institution and a cultural phenomenon, and changing the culture of violence among states may be key to preventing future conflicts. For war to truly become an anachronism, it must be perceived as grotesque, immoral, and unnecessary, rather than merely rare and improbable.
***
TLDR:
In summary, Blattman challenges our common perception of violence by asserting that it is not a common occurrence; rather, it is a rarity. Despite the existence of numerous potential conflicts, most of them do not escalate into violence. This is because engaging in combat is a costly endeavor with unpredictable outcomes. In many cases, it is more advantageous for opposing parties to coexist, even if it means harboring mutual animosity rather than resorting to armed confrontation.
So, why, in light of its impracticality, do conflicts and violence still persist? According to Blattman, the answer lies in five distinct logics that undermine the incentives for peaceful compromise:
1. Unchecked interests: Leaders, like Vladimir Putin, who make decisions that send others to fight and die on their behalf.
2. Intangible incentives: Motivations such as faith or the pursuit of glory that transcend material interests.
3. Uncertainty: The presence of doubt, often accompanied by miscalculated bluffs that backfire.
4. Commitment problems: Dilemmas arising when one nation, destined to become more powerful than another, cannot commit to refraining from future aggression.
5. Misperceptions: The tendency for individuals or nations to overestimate their own capabilities, leading to overconfidence.
Blattman's perspective invites us to reevaluate our understanding of violence, emphasizing its infrequent occurrence and highlighting the intricate web of factors that can drive individuals and nations to engage in conflict.
At the end, he provides Ten Commandments centering "piecemeal tinkering":
1. Thou Shalt Judge the Easy from the Wicked
2. Thou Shalt Not Worship Grand Plans and Best Practices
3. Thou Shalt Not Forget All Policymaking is Political
4. Honor Thy Margins
5. Thou Shalt Find the Path by Exploring Many
6. Thou Shalt Embrace Failure
7. Thou Shalt Be Patient
8. Thou Shalt Set Sensible Goals
9. Thou Shalt Be Accountable
10. Find Your Margin.
"Too many people forget that social dilemmas are not all the same. They approach every issue like it's a mass vaccination campaign-- a straightforward criris with a known solution that just needs a little money and political will. Then they wonder why they failed. Your first commandment is to avoid this blunder, to develop a filter for distinguishing the rare and simple logistical problems from the ones that are wicked hard." -- Christopher Blattman.
October 25, 2022
I like a good chunk of Blattman's ideas, but the way they are laid out does not convey many, if any, of the final key takeaways. Moreover, half of the examples used ignore peacebuilding measures that drastically change the circumstances or conclusions being made. The only time it feels as if he talks about the idea of local actors, while he usually favors those top dogs like presidents, military leaders, and giant intercontinental wars, seems to be obscure. Overall, the very organization of the book made it hard to follow the ideas, even when I wanted to agree with them (I found myself struggling to keep up or even stay awake sometimes).
Most of my contention comes from his realist frame - and while I can understand where he is coming from, it seems to be exclusivist of a variety of factors. While he wants to portray all these reasons for going or not going to war as a calculated measure for obtaining and maintaining power, none of this accounts for irrational actors and it too readily dismisses opposing viewpoints, like environmental motivations for negotiation or even misrepresented psycho-social peacebuilding components.
But, despite these qualms and negative opinions (I find myself going into books like this as a pessimist looking to disagree), there are some great positives that make this book worth reading. For one, it introduces game and social theory in an understandable manner and in a new light. Unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment, and misperceptions all do negatively impact peace and the possibility for war. Second, the idea of using methods like interdependence and checks and balances tend to be backed by other peace and conflict researchers (but they don't really work if not supported). But again, the ways in which these are demonstrated are often using mismatched examples - trying to utilize a small conflict to make claims of international or national state violence or vice versa. Third, while many of the theories and general concepts are vague and basic, it is meant to be introductory and serves as an overview, which is really handy when trying to understand conflict and resolution.
Overall, I would like to give it a 2.75/5, but here we are with GoodReads, so a nice solid and worthy 3 Blattman gets from me.
Most of my contention comes from his realist frame - and while I can understand where he is coming from, it seems to be exclusivist of a variety of factors. While he wants to portray all these reasons for going or not going to war as a calculated measure for obtaining and maintaining power, none of this accounts for irrational actors and it too readily dismisses opposing viewpoints, like environmental motivations for negotiation or even misrepresented psycho-social peacebuilding components.
But, despite these qualms and negative opinions (I find myself going into books like this as a pessimist looking to disagree), there are some great positives that make this book worth reading. For one, it introduces game and social theory in an understandable manner and in a new light. Unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment, and misperceptions all do negatively impact peace and the possibility for war. Second, the idea of using methods like interdependence and checks and balances tend to be backed by other peace and conflict researchers (but they don't really work if not supported). But again, the ways in which these are demonstrated are often using mismatched examples - trying to utilize a small conflict to make claims of international or national state violence or vice versa. Third, while many of the theories and general concepts are vague and basic, it is meant to be introductory and serves as an overview, which is really handy when trying to understand conflict and resolution.
Overall, I would like to give it a 2.75/5, but here we are with GoodReads, so a nice solid and worthy 3 Blattman gets from me.
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