Myth of the Lost Cause: Why the South Fought the Civil War and Why the North Won

by Edward H. Bonekemper III

History isn't always written by the winners...

Twenty-first-century controversies over Confederate monuments attest to the enduring significance of our nineteenth-century Civil War. As Lincoln knew, the meaning of America itself depends on how we understand that fratricidal struggle.

As soon as the Army of Northern Virginia laid down its arms at Appomattox, a group of Confederate officers took up their pens to refight the war for the history books. They composed a new narrative—the Myth of the Lost Cause—seeking to ennoble the sacrifice and defeat of the South, which popular historians in the twentieth century would perpetuate. Unfortunately, that myth would distort the historical imagination of Americans, north and south, for 150 years.

In this balanced and compelling correction of the historical record, Edward Bonekemper helps us understand the Myth of the Lost Cause and its effect on the social and political controversies that are still important to all Americans.

Genres: History, Civil War, Nonfiction, American Civil War, American History, War, Politics

378 pages, Paperback

First published October 5, 2015

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The slavery question is not to be taken as an independent controversy in American politics. It was not a moral dispute. It was the mere incident of a sectional animosity, the causes of which lay far beyond the domain of morals. Slavery furnished a convenient line of battle between disputants; it was the most prominent ground of distinction between the two sections; it was, therefore, naturally seized upon as a subject of controversy, became the dominant theatre of hostilities, and was at last so conspicuous and violent, that occasion was mistaken for cause, and what was merely an incident came to be regarded as the main subject of controversy.”
- Edward A. Pollard, The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates (1866)

“The Lost Cause version of the war is a caricature, possible, among other reasons, because of the false treatment of slavery... This false treatment struck at the core of the truth of the war, unhinging cause and effect, depriving the United States of any high purpose, and removing African Americans from their true role as the issue of the war and participants in the war, and characterizing them as historically irrelevant. With slavery exorcised, it appeared that the North had conducted itself within the Union so as to provoke secession and then bloodily defeated the secessionists in war so as to compel them to stay in the Union against their will.”
- Alan Nolan, The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History


The Lost Cause is a sort of catchall term used to describe a school of Civil War historiography. The general purpose of the Lost Cause school is rather simple. It goes like this: Confederates good, Yankees bad. This might seem like a rather odd position to take, especially considering that the American Civil War was one of the very few wars in history in which freedom (which is always mentioned as a casus belli, but seldom is) was literally at stake. How did this come to pass? Well, the Lost Causers got a quick start, with the 1866 publication of Edward Pollard’s The Lost Cause.

Pollard set the stage for what followed, generations of writers repeating the same canards until they were accepted as truth: the Civil War started because of a dispute over “State’s rights”; General Lee was a military genius above reproach; General Grant was a bumbling drunk and a butcher; it was Stonewall Jackson, not Jesus Christ, who multiplied the loaves and fishes.

Two things have allowed this to happen. For one, the South had some very talented people working to advance the myth. Also, and perhaps more critically, the North never seemed to care all that much. By the time Reconstruction ended in 1877, Northerners were a mile past caring about the things they had accomplished at the cost of so many human lives and so much of the Federal treasury. White reconciliation, in the end, trumped all. This sad turn did not go entirely unnoticed, of course. In 1871, Frederick Douglass noted: “It is now a deeply rooted, devoutly cherished sentiment, inseparably identified with the ‘lost cause,’ which the half measures of the Government towards the traitors have helped to cultivate and strengthen.”

The Lost Cause version of history is the generally accepted version of history. Whether it’s Shelby Foote’s classic The Civil War: A Narrative, or Ken Burns’ widely watched documentary, The Civil War, the Lost Cause is firmly rooted in our contemporary understanding.

Civil War historian Edward Bonekemper has been pushing back against this tide. And he is not subtle about it. That’s what attracted me to The Myth of the Lost Cause. Part of the reason the Lost Cause mythology has endured so long is that many of its proponents are intellectual bullies. Dare to disagree, as Professor Thomas Connelly did in a 1969 article criticizing Lee, and you are bound to get an enormous amount of pushback. This doesn’t seem to bother Bonekemper at all. He is almost gleeful in his trashing of certain sacred (and mythological) cows. Even when I disagreed with him, I admired his chutzpah.

Bonekemper tackles seven “myths” that he feels most prevalent in Lost Cause mythmaking. Each of these myths get their own chapter (there is also an introductory and concluding chapter). Two chapters focus on slavery: the first asks whether it was a dying institution in 1861; the second examines whether slavery was the war’s primary cause.

The remaining chapters discuss: the South’s ability to have won the war (that is, whether they were hopelessly outnumbered, or did they just fritter away their advantages?); General Robert E. Lee’s status as “one of the greatest generals in history”; General James Longstreet’s role during the battle of Gettysburg (i.e., did he intentionally disobey Lee’s orders, out of pique?); General Ulysses Grant’s martial abilities (was he simply a resolute bludgeoner, or something more?); and whether or not the Union waged “total war” in conquering the South (in other words, did the North’s actions actually foreshadow WWII?).

As you can see, the chapters are a grab bag. You have big, overarching questions about slavery, Southern prospects for victory, and the Union’s overall tactics. Then you also have a super specific chapter on Longstreet at Gettysburg. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the overall quality of The Myth of the Lost Cause is a bit inconsistent.

The most important chapters are the ones devoted to slavery. Bonekemper breaks his discussion into two parts. First, he provides a general overview of the “health” of slavery as an institution, and shows that it remained strong in 1861, despite fervent Jeffersonian beliefs it would somehow die off on its own. Far from fading away, it was a massive source of wealth (slaves were worth somewhere in the neighborhood of $4 to $5 billion) and ripe for expansion (whether that was to the American West or Cuba or Central America). Bonekemper also discusses slavery’s specific role in causing the Civil War. This is obviously a big subject, but Bonekemper does an excellent job of hitting all the important points: the political platform of the newly-formed Republican Party; the fears that Lincoln would stop the expansion of slavery into the Territories; Southern anger that the Fugitive Slave Law was being violated; and the Crittenden Amendments, which attempted to halt secession by enshrining slavery protections into the Constitution.

The highlight of this section (and the high point of the book) is the way Bonekemper lets secessionists speak for themselves. Obviously, he’s going to quote the Confederate Constitution and the various secession declarations. But he goes further, to present the writings of secession commissioners, as they journeyed forth to propose a union of slave-holding states. Reading this provides a remarkable contemporary insight into secessionist thought processes, before they had a reason for obfuscation and equivocation.

The chapters on Lee and Grant are also good. The Lee chapter is devoted to puncturing Lee’s status as an unparalleled military genius. Among other things, Bonekemper criticizes Lee’s lack of an overall understanding of the war, his Virginia-first policy, and his decisions to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania (which gave up the South’s advantages of interior lines, familiar territory, and entrenchments). Lee’s losses are often explained away by blaming his subordinates. Bonekemper’s judgments, though, don’t concern Lee’s specific tactical decisions, but his larger strategic blunders. Bonekemper probably goes too far in damning Lee and short-selling his successes. On the other hand, it’s probably necessary to get anyone’s attention. Even if you don’t buy Bonekemper’s argument, he provides plenty of options for further reading. (And it should be noted that Bonekemper isn’t the lone voice in the wilderness here; many others, including military professionals, have made these observations. They just haven’t gotten much play).

In contrast to his dealings with Lee, Bonekemper is out to make a compelling case that Grant is the true genius of the war. He does this by focusing on the Vicksburg Campaign, which he goes through step-by-step (though without any maps). I liked this because it gives a lot of specifics, while his handling of Lee relied on a lot of generalities. Again, though, he goes too far in uplifting Grant, to the extent that he literally lists Grant’s qualities, as though he were a love-struck teenager.

(The thing that is too often ignored with Grant and Lee and every other Civil War general is simply how difficult it was to be successful. It’s like playing chess with both sides of the board covered. You can make your plans, but after that, you are relying on hundreds of subordinates and thousands of soldiers to carry them out, with very little oversight. We always hear about the Civil War being “modern”, but a telegraph is not a telephone, and a train is not a truck, and a hot air balloon is not a plane or drone. There was no good way to see all the battlefield; no efficient way to communicate immediately; no way of getting your multipronged attack to start on time. Luck, frankly, does not get its due).

Bonekemper’s remaining chapters didn't really work as well for me. They were either too short or too generalized or – in the case of the Longstreet chapter – too lacking in context to be effective. For instance, the chapter on the Union’s alleged “total war” feels completely tacked on. It’s only seven pages long. I happen to agree with Bonekemper’s contention, but he doesn’t prove it. You’ll have to go elsewhere for that evidence. (I’d suggest reading Marszalek’s biography on Sherman; the man talked a good “total war” game, but it was mostly talk).

This is a flawed and imperfect book. At its best, it makes some keen arguments, stresses some important points, and directs the curious reader to a number of other sources to consider, both primary and secondary. At its worst, it is incomplete, half-debated, and conclusory. Nevertheless, it has value, both for Civil War buffs and for those looking to become Civil War buffs. The Confederacy has long had a stable of able defenders, spinning a legend that has endured for a century and a half. It is nice to have a passionate advocate willing and able to call out the Lost Cause for what it is: an elaborate excuse to rationalize a war fought to keep people in chains.

[Theo Logos · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Myth of the Lost Cause is a point by point refutation of what Bonekemper calls, “the most successful propaganda campaign in American history.” If you are at all familiar with this Cultural myth, you’re not likely to find anything new here. What the author does for us, though, is to organize the information into a concise and convincing volume.

He begins with a brief overview of The Lost Cause Myth. He explains why the South needed it, why the North tolerated it, who created it, and how it eventually became accepted as historical by most everybody. He then lists the individual components that make up the Myth. Finally, he gives each point, from the War wasn’t about Slavery, to Grant was a bull-headed butcher, it’s own chapter where he thoroughly debunks it with primary sources, historians, and logic. At the end, he gives a brief summation of what he has already covered.

This isn’t a flashy presentation. It’s simply broken down in such a methodical, orderly manner that the information becomes that much more valuable to you, even if you already knew it.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

In the conclusion to The Myth of the Lost Cause, Edward H. Bonekemper III writes that "The Myth of the Lost Cause may have been the most successful propaganda campaign in American history," a sentiment with which I have to agree. Even today, discussions of the events leading up to and occurring during the American Civil War are liable to devolve into a contest between hard facts and cherished myths. The favourite myths of proponents of the Lost Cause include:

· Chattel slavery was a largely benevolent institution that benefited both master and slave.
· Slavery was not a primary cause of the civil war
· Thousands of blacks fought in the Confederate ranks against Northern aggression
· The South was caught in an unwinnable war
· Robert E. Lee was a great general with Christ-like virtues
· James Longstreet was responsible for the failure of Lee's Gettysburg campaign
· Ulysses S. Grant was a drunk and a butcher who only won by blunt-force application of superior resources
· The Union Army waged "total war" on a defenceless southern citizenry

All of these claims are disprovable by citation of historical evidence and primary sources. They are often flatly contradicted by the written reports and testimony of the Confederates themselves. Of course, neo-Confederates and white supremacists couldn't possibly care less about the reality, their cherished Lost Cause interpretation of the Civil War being propaganda that they wilfully practice. These myths and outright lies are, however, so prevalent in literature and public discussion of the Civil War that they are liable to hoodwink people who are genuinely interested in learning about the war and its myriad details. The Myth of the Lost Cause is an invaluable resource for such people.

A point-by-point takedown of pro-Confederate, anti-Union mythology, Bonekemper's book does a fine job of contrasting fairy tales with fact, passionately dismantling Lost Cause falsehoods in a clear, robust manner. Its chapters on the centrality of slavery to the southern secession movement and how commitment to the 'peculiar institution' became the stubborn Confederacy's proverbial albatross -- dooming both its hopes of recognition by European powers and its ability to compete against strong Union forces -- leave no room for doubt. At his best, Bonekemper compares the records of Confederate general Robert E. Lee with his Union counterpart Ulysses S. Grant and rightly concludes that Grant, as well as being Lee's better, was "one of the greatest generals in American history."

The Myth of the Lost Cause isn't quite perfect. In adopting its point-by-point structure the book doesn't always make for smooth reading. And in his defence of General Ulysses Grant, Bonekemper has a tendency to minimise the very real errors that Grant committed on the ultimate path to victory by framing them in the context of his larger triumphs. In this way the lopsided Battle of Cold Harbor, which Grant bitterly regretted, is presented as but one component of the strategically successful Overland Campaign. These are minor issues, of course, and they don't change the fact that Bonekemper's work is an essential read in the subset of Civil War books dealing with historical memory. It's not quite on the level of Searching for Black Confederates: The Civil War’s Most Persistent Myth or The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society , but it's near enough.

[Beauregard Bottomley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Through their words, their deeds and their actions the author shows the South fought the war for slavery. Most people already know that, but seldom does one see it presented as well as in this book.

Racist totalitarians always have these four foundational items: 1) a mythical past to long for, 2) a sacred leader who tells them only they can solve their problems, 3) cast doubt on reality based providers of facts and 4) an ‘other’ to hate, disenfranchise and most of all to fear. (Hannah Arendt’s book ‘Totalitarianism’ is a necessary but not sufficient book for our times).

The ‘fake based reality’ that the South created after the War are the myths which are laid out in this book and the biggest myth of all was the South convinced themselves that the war was about ‘state rights’ not slavery and to perpetrate that delusion the South redefined their world with fictional foundations all debunked within this book.

The South after they lost the war slowly created a separate reality that had all four of these racist totalitarian foundations. The South recreated their past by redefining their reality as an antebellum paradise as exemplified in ‘Gone With The Wind’, and slavery wasn’t really slavery to them and they convinced themselves that slaves were just happy servants who had never had it better than they did when they were slaves and overall everyone knew their place, just as ‘Miss Scarlett’ would have you believe as written by Margaret Mitchell.

Their sacred leader was Robert E. Lee. They elevated him to the greatest war General ever, and as mentioned in this book, children would ask ‘mom, was Robert E. Lee in the Old Testament or the New Testament’? It doesn’t matter that Lee was no longer in command, what mattered is that everyone had to believe that he was the greatest war General ever and to them he wasn’t responsible for losing the war, but he was stabbed in the back by Longstreet at Gettysburg, and it was that ‘butcher’ Grant and that ‘total war’ creep Sherman who broke the rules of gentlemanly warfare that we should blame, and that the North was destined to win anyways, and the South had to do the honorable thing and fight for ‘state rights’ because racist totalitarians believe that their ideals never can fail they can only be failed by the treachery of those who are not within their cult and they must always believe themselves to be the victim in order to feed their hate of the ‘other’.

The last item which all racist totalitarians have in common is finding an ‘other’ to hate. For the defeated South, the ‘other’ will be the Africans and their descendents. Jim Crow lived for at least 150 years. Only recently have the racist ‘Stars and Bars’ and Confederate monuments started to come down. No matter how bad an individual in the ruling class life was, they would by default believe themselves superior to every member of the ‘inferior’ class and if anything good happens to the ‘inferior’ class member that means something bad happened to them further feeding their hate of the other and their own sense of ‘victim-hood’.

Always, with racist totalitarians there must be a cognitive dissonance, a paradox. This book gave three of which stood out. The ‘state rights’ cause didn’t matter to them when a Northern state didn’t want to enforce the fugitive slave act and would invoke their own state rights, ‘state rights for me but not for thee’. The lie that General Longstreet lost Gettysburg thus causing Lee to not have won the war will conflict with the myth that the South never had a chance of winning the war. The third paradox is that the South in order to justify slavery needed to think of Africans as inferior to the ‘white race’ therefore they never could have had a society that would treat the African and their descendants equally as they claimed they wanted to do, because in the end the Civil War was fought to enslave another ‘race’ of people who were believed inferior and was not fought for gentlemanly kindness towards the African slaves. They would agree with Aristotle when he said ‘just look at those slaves they can’t read or write and have no motivation to work and they are meant to be slaves not free like us’.

The parallelism with the racist totalitarians perpetrators after the Civil War and Trump and his followers seem obvious. Trump longs for the ‘good ole days’ and his slogan is ‘Make America Great Again’ for a reason. He claims he’s special by routinely claiming such things as ‘the market will crash if I’m not your leader’ or ‘only I know how to unite the country’. As with all totalitarians who value power for the sake of power he must undermine reality and will say things such as ‘CNN is fake news and the failing New York Times can’t be trusted and I never said those things that Lester Holt claims I said since the tape has been doctored’. The last but necessary criterion for a totalitarian is to find an ‘other’ to hate and for Trump hate of the ‘other’ is second nature to him, I really don’t know if he hates Mexican more than Muslims or how anyone but him or his crazy followers could think there is a worldwide Jewish Conspiracy lead by “George Soros who paid protesters to become a mob against Bret Kavanaugh”.

Overall, this book gives a good overview of the myths that the South embraced after the North defeated them and refutes those myths. It’s regrettable that 160 plus years after the war has ended some people still believe in those lies, and it’s even worse that Trump still perpetrates the same kinds of fallacious foundational schema necessary for racist totalitarians to triumph.

[Keith · Rating 3 out of 5]

as a native of Virginia, I was certainly steeped in the myths discussed in depth by Bonekemper. Growing up in Central Virginia and attending college in Richmond - the myth was all around us.

his exhaustive case should prove once and for all, the South should treat the Civil Wa much as Germany treats WWII.

the few critiques I'd level are that maps would have been more helpful than charts and that he was a bit repetitive.

[Regina · Rating 5 out of 5]

** Review of Audio Format **

The Civil War was about Slavery. Period.

Oh, and Ulysses S. Grant was a way better general than Robert E. Lee. And Longstreet wasn’t the reason the south lost the war. It was Lee’s fault, pure and simple. This is what Edward Bonekemper sets out to prove in writing this book. And he does a good job.

Bonekemper first talks about what slavery was like in all its horror. People as property and thought of in terms of money and what use could be gotten from them. People not allowed to marry, learn, or ever work for themselves. Families were torn apart and sold separately. Slaves were beaten mercilessly to keep them in line. Slave owners were in a constant state of fear over potential slave uprisings. To quell this potential conflict, slave owners tried to keep their slaves in a constant state of ignorance and fear. The myth of a happy slave was just that, a myth. One of the reasons the Confederacy was so reluctant to use slaves in battle was because most slaves would run or turn on their owners at the first chance. The south could not risk slaves being armed.

Bonekemper also takes on the myth that slavery was dying a slow death and would have gone away on its own, given time. He dismantles all of the arguments of this myth and tells of a revisionist history that was allowed to take root after the Civil War in order for and attempt at reconciliation to take place. Then he details all of the states’ arguments for seceding after Lincoln was elected President. Each state only had one reason: slavery. Slavery was also the reason the south could not be recognized by European governments. The peculiar institution was more important than winning the war. A seminal moment for me was a discussion prior to Lincoln’s election when the southern states tried to get a 13th amendment passed to protect and prolong slavery in the United States. This struck me as particularly ironic as, of course, the 13th amendment that was ultimately passed freed the slaves.

After the myths of why the states seceded are dismantled, Bonekemper takes an in depth look at Robert E. Lee and talks about why he was elevated to a hero of mythical proportions. Bonekemper also completely deconstructs major battles and shows that Lee’s leadership style itself was mostly at fault for many losses. He talks about how Lee fought an offensive war when all he needed to do was fight a defensive war and how he gave vague orders and never followed them up when the on field battle situation changed. Lee also used aggressive tactics which wasted men’s lives and would not leave his native Virginia to help the other Confederate generals no matter how much they needed his back up.

Bonekemper goes into Grant’s style and how he was a brilliant tactician and made use of whatever he had on hand to get the job done. Grant’s outmaneuvering of the southern forces in many battles is detailed and the myth of Grant as the stupid, drunken general given command as a last resort was also ripped to shreds.

This listen includes a thorough discussion of the sustained propaganda campaign against Longstreet to prop up the myth of Lee. Letters are detailed and battles are again desconstructed which prove there was a campaign to elevate Lee and that it was decided that Longstreet would be the sacrificial lamb to blame for the lost war.

This book was really a very interesting listen. So much of what Bonekemper details makes sense. So many things click into place when he is going through his arguments. I can’t recommend this book enough to get a different perspective for any Civil War buff.

CJ McAllister does a nice job narrating this material. Some of the discussion of the slave treatment is hard to listen to so I can only imagine that it was difficult to narrate and he did a good job both with this material and with the numerous battles that were discussed.

I received this audiobook for free through Audiobook Boom! In exchange for an honest review.

[Steve · Rating 5 out of 5]

A couple of years ago, in the context of a conversation on race, a southern friend said to me "You know, Steve, the civil war was not fought over the issue of slavery."

I was familiar with this argument, but was surprised to hear a friend of mine advance it to me. I took the bait. "Really? What was it fought about?"

"State's rights." he said confidently, in a tone that implied that this definitively ended the conversation.

"Huh. The right to do what, exactly?" I asked him.

The question, which seemed to me to be an obvious follow up to his statement, appeared to catch him unprepared.

This notion of "states rights" is an old one, of course, beginning almost immediately after the south lost the war, as a way of dignifying their cause, and making that cause appear noble and principled. In truth, it was neither. Evidence from historical documents from the time leading up to the civil war makes it obvious that the south was interested primarily in defending slavery, which was, of course, the foundation of the southern economy, and an institution that many southerners believed was sanctioned by the almighty, himself.

One has only to look at the various states' declarations of secession for evidence of this fact. The confederate states saw the very real threat to their way of life in the growing abolitionist movement in the north, and they were especially angry at the northern states' resistance to returning runaway slaves to their proper masters. Southern legislators had successfully written into the constitution the obligation for returning slaves to their owners, and they were outraged that northern states exercised their state's rights by resisting this obligation.

It's a whole, complicated issue, a fascinating one, one well worth exploring in detail. This book does just that.

[Glen Stripling · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is said that the winners of wars get to write the history. That was not exactly the case with the history of our nation's Civil War. Though before the war, Confederate politicans made it clear the Southern states seceded from the Union over the issue of slavery. But after the war Confederate veterans picked up their pens and tried to portray the war as a gallant struggle over states' rights and Southern heritage. This is the history I grew up with. As a white Southerner, I considered it my duty to remember the great men who took a heroic stand for the South's Lost Cause.

This is why the book THE MYTH OF THE LOST CAUSE - WHY THE SOUTH FOUGHT THE CIVIL WAR AND WHY THE NORTH WON by Edward H. Bonekemper III is important. Mr. Bomekemper, book review editor of CIVIL WAR NEWS, covers several common modern claims modern Southerners like to claim about the Civil War and shows they are not true. Perhaps the two most common beliefs was that slavery was a dying institution by 1861 and that the South was really fighting for States' rights. A lot of people believe this because after the war Confederate leaders like Jefferson Davis and (CSA Vice President) Alexander Stephens tried to claim this, though before the war they made it clear that secession was indeed because of the slavery issue.

Bonekemper shows that by the 1860's slavery and the cotton economy was a billion dollar industry, with plenty of fertile land still available.

It was actually the NORTHERN states that insisted on states' rights when the states of the South were angry the Northern states did not wish to cooperate with the fugitive slave law and return runaway slaves.

As I read the book it occured to me that preserving myths could hurt Southerners in some ways. One common belief is that Robert E. Lee was one of the greatest generals in history. (And to some extent, I still belief this). Bonekemper claims this is a myth because Lee made serious blunders at Gettysburg and that James Longstreet was unfairly blamed for the loss of that key battle. If I was a descendant of Longstreet, I would be angry if my ancestor was treated that way.

One thing I found curious about Bonekemper's book, is that he does not mention that Abraham Lincoln offered the Southern states a deal where they could keep their slaves provided they agree to a high tariff to protect northern manufacturers. The South refused. I have long wondered whether this was just greed or an obsessive fear that Lincoln would end slavery altogether, (perhaps due to his reluctance to expand slavery to the US territories). So I was a bit disappointed that Bonekemper did not cover this.

But he nevertheless does a splendid job in knocking down the myths one by one and I am convinced that all Southerners should read this book because we are much better off learning our true history instead of continually teaching an embellished heritage.

[Jeff Campbell · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am from South Carolina. I wish that I could make everyone in the state read this great book. The Confererate flag debate shows just how misinformed many, if not most, Southerners are about what the old South was really like

[C.T. Phipps · Rating 5 out of 5]

In these troubled times, I think the truth sets us free. I grew up with the myth of "Northern barbarians" [Nope], "General Lee donated Arlington to become a military cemetery as a gesture of healing" [flat out a lie], "Slaves were too valuable to abuse" [nonsense], and other stories designed to undermine the Union while propping up the Confederacy. I was a child of the Eighties and even then people tried to sell me the idea that the Civil War was about state's rights and that the South was full of larger-than-life heroes defending their homes rather than white supremacists depending their brutal exploitation of innocent people.

Indeed, one doesn't have to go far these days to find proof that the Lost Cause myth was always nothing more than a pack of lies. My great aunt always insisted that General Lee loved Virginia too much to raise his hand against it, so that's why he led the Rebellion's [capital R] forces. If you stop to note that this didn't prevent him from taking up arms against WEST VIRGINIA (the non-traitors), a very different picture is painted of Robert E. Lee. Edward H. Bonekemper III (and that is a name, sir) gives a lengthy but entertaining deconstruction of virtually every lie, darn lie, and darn dirty lie that the Confederate apologists told in order to paint themselves as something other than perpetrators of one of the worst evils of human history.

The book is written in a conversational and entertaining style that makes history fun, even as it deals with dark and depressing subject matter. The Lost Cause was a war on the truth and for over a century, I'd argue it was won by the Daughters of the Confederacy [who I never thought of as a sinister organization until this book].

What's impressive is really how MANY lies the Confederacy's apologists told about everyone and everything. "State's rights" doesn't hold up under the least scrutiny because the Declaration of Secession of almost every state cites slavery directly and sometimes the preservation of white supremacy. Union generals were treated as morons and monsters when they were geniuses against an intractable enemy.

Truth, it turns out, has a Union bias.

I highly recommend it.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hi everyone, it’s been almost 4 months since I last read a book; I’ve recently taken time off to find myself in the local goth music scene, so I’ve spent time going to concerts, and also I’ve been interested in politics a great deal. Here is my review for this amazing book.

Next month is going to be April; for most, it’s going to be an ordinary April, but for those of us who are history buffs, this is the 160th anniversary since General Robert E Lee of the confederate army of northern Virginia surrendered to United States lieutenant general Ulysses S Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. We’re still very much living with the consequences of this cataclysmic event known as the American Civil War, socially, politically, and culturally as a people. It’s important that we as human beings seek truth and higher understanding of the world, so it’s important for the historian to present the truth.

For many years, the narrative of the American Civil War was one that was not truth but rather mythology, this mythology is now referred to as the lost cause. Even to this day, there are many who believe in this Lost Cause myth, and I hate to say it, but some of its tenets I believed until very recently. Edward Bonekemper’s book discusses the lost cause, what it was, what are the tenets of it, and explains what the truth is. Each chapter focuses on a specific tenet, and then Bonekemper refutes the said tenet with facts he’s found and presents.

Basically, the Lost Cause believed:
1. Slavery was a dying institution by 1861, and the war was unnecessary. The truth is that it was thriving, and southerners had plans to continue and grow the institution. Bonekemper enlightened me a great deal on this.
2. The southern states seceded not because of slavery but because of states rights. The truth is that all of the southern states in question seceded because of slavery, they didn’t secede because of states rights, but rather, as Bonekemper hammers at, the fact that they didn’t receive enough federal rights to protect slavery and/or retrieve their lost “property” from the states in the north. The south feared the election of Lincoln, because he wasn’t prepared to let them expand their slave empire into new territories. The whole premise of states rights for me is now a farce; the confederate politicians used it post war instead of saying slavery
3. The south couldn’t have won the war; the north was too strong and the south was overwhelmed by numbers. The truth of the matter is that the south could’ve won the war if it had fought defensively. Bonekemper explains that the south had the advantage of fighting a defensive war; all it had to do was not be conquered, whereas the north had to conquer the south. All the south had to do was fight defensively, not invade the north, and use its terrain and vast area of territory to its advantage against the north. Sure, the north had higher numbers of men and was an industrial nation, but if the south had competently fought defensive battles against the Union armies, and shifted troops from various commands to vital points, the north would’ve eventually grown war weary and possibly by 1864, Lincoln might not’ve been reelected and the south may have won the war.
4. Robert E Lee was the greatest general of all time. Basically, there’s this mythos around Lee, that basically makes him into being some heroic, Christlike figure. I have to admit, for a long time I’ve held Lee is a high regard, and yet after reading this book, I don’t think I can say that anymore. The truth is that Lee was a poor general. Lee lacked the understanding of advances in modern weaponry, which gave the advantage to defense. Lee held onto the Napoleonic idea of a grand army fighting a decisive battle or campaign against another army, and one decisive battle would lead to victory in the war. Not just this, but Lee was very haphazard in regards to how he used Frontal assaults against his opponents at places like Seven Days, Malvern Hill, Antietam (counter-attacks), Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the wilderness, and Fort Stedman. Lee was poor in terms of giving commands, and coordination of his troops, we see this at Gettysburg and at the Seven Days Battles. Lee did not use his staff effectively, they were more like clerks. Lee was a myopic, one theatre general, who didn’t see the bigger picture of the war. This point about Lee, I’ve always believed; he was Virginia-centric, several times he was offered command in the west, several times he was asked to reinforce other armies in Tennessee, Georgia and Mississippi, but each time he refused and therefore led to the defeat of the Confederacy. The most important point is that Lee as a command was a disaster for the confederacy. His way of waging war was inconsistent with the points I made in point number 3. He didn’t use his army defensively, and he instead waged an aggressive war, which caused him to incur heavy casualties on his army. Those casualties were experienced, and brave men, who could’ve been used efficiently.
5. Longstreet is to blame for the loss of Gettysburg, which lost causers believe is the battle that determined the loss of the war. The truth is that Longstreet was a scapegoat for the lost cause myth makers, because he was not a Virginian, and he was against Lee’s decision to invade the north again, and fight an aggressive battle that day. Longstreet didn’t delay, Longstreet followed his orders. The real blame could be laid at the feet of Jubal Early, Richard Ewell, JEB Stuart, and Robert E Lee, all of whom made umpteenth mistakes here, but certainly not Longstreet. While Gettysburg was an important battle, the real turning point was in Vicksburg and out in Tullahoma.
6. The lost cause claims that Ulysses S Grant was a “butcher”, who only won by brute force and was not as skilled at all. This is a very fictitious argument. Grant did not incur more casualties than Lee did. Bonekemper shows that based on numbers calculated, Grant was efficient with his troops whereas Lee incurred heavy casualties that were irreplaceable. Grant as a general was truly the best of the war, right next to George Thomas in my opinion. Grants greatest campaign at Vicksburg saw him use a winning formula in a Napoleonic vein: deception, Maximum use of numbers, maneuver, defeat in detail against a numerically superior force, and relentless adhesion to his foes. The five major battles of his Vicksburg campaign leading up to the siege are all examples of a general who is skilled in the art of warfare. Grant used his staff efficiently, Grant was a master of terrain, he could visualize very well, and he was not afraid or uncertain. Grant stood on high stead with Lincoln, and realized the need to keep him in his good graces. Grant realized that logistically, he had to forage off the land, and did so effectively. Grant wasn’t afraid of the fog of war; he of course would want to know the numbers he was facing against, but he never let it stop him from doing the job. (What I love about Grant is this dogged relentless determination, his adhesion, and his confidence, it inspires me in my life as a human being.) When it comes to the Overland campaign, Grant used his army effectively; he knew he had to remain adhesively to Lee’s army, he had to continually engage him and maneuver him, which he did all the way to Petersburg and eventually to Appomattox in 1865. One other trait is that Grant wasn’t just a one theatre general; Grant saw the need to attack the Confederacy at multiple points at multiple times. For example, while Grant was in Virginia, Sherman was fighting Johnston in Georgia, Benjamin Butler was fighting Beauregard at Bermuda Hundred, Phil Sheridan was facing Jubal Early in the Shendoah Valley, and the Union navy was taking Mobile and the army was attacking fort fisher. With all of these points being attacked simultaneously, the south was paralyzed and couldn’t help itself. Grants strategy guaranteed Lincoln his re-election in 1864 and guaranteed the south’s defeat in 1865.
7. The last point made by the lost cause myth is that the North made total war against the south and committed war against the civilian population. The truth is that the north did not do any of these things. In the beginning of the war, the Lincoln administration had a very moderate approach to everything, so there was no foraging, no war crimes, and abolition of slavery wasn’t even in practice yet, but in 1862, after Shiloh, after the peninsula, second Manassas, and Antietam campaigns, Lincoln and others realized this war was going to need to be a war fought hard. This meant that slavery would have to end, free blacks would be recruited in the army and fight against the confederacy; the northern armies would have to forage liberally in the south, and most importantly, the north had to defeat southern armies and force their surrender. It wasn’t about taking Richmond, or really Vicksburg, but destroying every southern army in the field and making the war so difficult that southerners would not want to fight it anymore. Grant and Sherman knew this and they executed the idea with the utmost determination, But when they did, there was no condoning of war crimes, no support for rapine or violence against civilians. In fact, the only times such war crimes were happening was out in Kansas, Missouri and Arkansas, where confederate guerillas like Bloody Bill Anderson, and William Quantrills raiders were burning towns, and killing innocents. Oh, and you can’t forget Nathan Bedford Forrest and his deliberate murder of an entire garrison of black troops at Fort Pillow in 1864. To sum up, no southern city experienced a Dresden, or a Hiroshima, and no northern army was as vicious as the Wehrmacht or Genghis Khan, but the confederates had no problem in many instances committing vile acts. On a side note, from my own perspective and research, it wasn’t all one sided in Kansas-Missouri, as Union raiders did retaliate.
Thinking about this book, thinking about my summarization of it all, and giving some final thought to it all, I think it is a masterpiece. I love it when Historians come forth and challenge an old narrative and ask questions, and present efficient and effective arguments and evidence for their views. For me, this is an eye opener and a reckoning for myself. As someone whose ancestors were on both sides of the war, I’ve had a mixed feeling about it all; I’ve always tried to give the confederate side a little sympathy, specifically the soldiers and generals, because from all the books I’ve read before this , they seemed to not fight for slavery but rather for their homes, their families, and worried they would lose these things. I think now that my confederate ancestors were good soldiers, brave, but they were conned into fighting for a racist and Slave holding government that deserves no respect from me anymore. I think it’s time the confederate monuments go, and I think it’s time we start looking at the war for what it was, a war to save the Union and end slavery. Slavery is a sin which will haunt this nation forever, but we must seek to love one another, work together and stop all of this fighting. We may not heal the wound, but we can salve it.

[Ray Harris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Facts with Explaination

I enjoyed the careful item by item rebuttal of the long standing myths that portray the Southern secession as noble and the Northern response as a brutal response that destroyed the last vestige of nobility.
I gave the book a 4 star because it isn’t always great prose and sometimes repetitive. But it is a necessary read for anyone valuing a composite view of the Civil War.

[Lucas Lowry · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a great takedown of exactly what it described: The specific and deliberate effort to distort history and build a myth following the Civil War.

I'd call this more of a political history book than military history, and that's a good thing. The author makes a point of how sanitized and tactics driven most Civil War history has become, mainly in an effort to spare readers having to consider why all those tactics were being used in the first place. The middle of the book is spent on a lot of this type of Civil War history, and that gets pretty dry. It's all done in service of the two biggest points: That Lee was not the god-like figure he's since been made out to be, and that Grant wasn't simply a drunk and a butcher.

The amount of these myths and echos I still see reported today, in new writing, far from traditional Civil War history and even by authors making no attempt to apologize for the South, is shocking. This book makes them jump out even more, and makes for extremely relevant reading in 2020.

[Jim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Longer review coming. Bonekemper is becoming the go to historian for counters to Southern inspired myths about the Civil War, from its cause, to how figures integral to its prosecution have been remembered. Here he takes on the whole notion of the Lost Cause, effectively debunking 100 years of conventional wisdom, successfully inserted into mainstream histories of the war through a concerted effort by Southern apologists to whitewash its real cause. There are some flaws with this book...he repeats much of what he presented in his previous books, and spends an inordinate amount of time on some topics out of proportion to the rest of the book. Overall a very good presentation however.

[Keith · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides a much needed dose of common sense! Edward H. Bonekemper III calls the myth of the lost cause—that the Confederate States of America (CSA) and its war were virtuous endeavors—one of the great retcons of human history. Using extensive historical research, he thoroughly debunks lies commonly told about the Civil War (1861-1865). Yes, the South seceded primarily to protect slavery. Here's an example:

“The strongest evidence of seceders’ motivations is the language they used in their own secession documents. Their reasons included the election of Abraham Lincoln, who opposed extension of slavery into territories; the runaway slave issue; the threat to slavery’s existence – the largest component of Southern wealth; the perceived end of white supremacy and the resultant political and social equality of blacks and whites. Not only did their own secession resolutions reveal slavery and white supremacy as their causation, but the seven states who seceded before Lincoln’s inauguration immediately began an outreach campaign to other slave states. Their correspondence and speeches relied only on slavery-related issues to encourage other slave states to adopt secession.”

No, slavery was not about to die out on its own—it was enormously profitable for the oligarchs that ruled the Southern states. No, the North did not “fight with one arm tied behind its back”—the CSA could have achieved its goal of seceding from the United States of America, especially if it had stuck with Jefferson Davis’s preferred strategy of waging a defensive war. Yes, Robert E. Lee is an overrated general—his aggressive tactics (untenable given limited men and resources) and myopic focus on his home state of Virginia helped hasten the defeat of the CSA. And no, Ulysses S. Grant was not merely an ignorant butcher who used sheer force of numbers to win the war—Grant was one of America’s greatest generals. His aggressive tactics were essential to winning the war. My one complaint about The Myth of the Lost Cause is that Bonekemper’s analysis of Grant’s military strategy, tactics, and achievements is too long-winded and gets dull. Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Civil War and its place in the American psyche. It is a strong argument for facts and logic over emotional reasoning in our view of history.


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[Image: Book Cover]

Citation:
Bonekemper, E.H. (2016). The myth of the lost cause: Why the South fought the Civil War and why the North won (Audiobook; C.J. McAllister, Narr.). Regnery Publishing. https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Myth-o... (Original work published 2015)


Title: The Myth of the Lost Cause: Why the South Fought the Civil War and Why the North Won
Author(s): Edward H. Bonekemper III
Year: 2015
Genre: Nonfiction - History
Page count: 352 pages
Date(s) read: 11/7/25 - 11/10/25
Book 237 in 2025
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[Peter Bradley]

The Myth of the Lost Cause by Edward Bonekemper

Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...

Back in the 1980s, I read John Keegan’s “The Masks of Command.” I was stunned to read Keegan describe U.S. Grant as the only military genius to come out of the American Civil War. That casual statement – backed up by the observation that Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign was studied in War Colleges – flipped my view of Grant from an unimaginative plodder, a “butcher,” to that of a military strategist.

How did I form the belief I held? I had never read anything on Grant’s campaigns. Was it just that there were references and offhand comments about Grant that added up to poison my opinion?

Or was it the Lost Cause Tradition that poisoned my mind?

This book is an eye-opening dissection of the Lost Cause Tradition that has seemed to hold sway over the American mind since the Civil War.

The Lost Cause Tradition (“LCT”) basically presents, or invents, a noble South where the Civil War was fought purely over issues of States Rights without regard to the fact that the State right in question was slavery against overwhelming odds, led by the genius of Robert E. Lee against the single-minded barbarity of U.S. Grant. In the LCT, the South would have won but for the error of General Longstreet at Gettysburg and the unfair material advantage of the North.

The author, Edward Bonekemper, does an effective job of dismantling the presuppositions on which the LCT is based. For example, Bonekemper destroys the claim that the South did not secede over the issue of slavery by marshaling the statements and arguments of Confederate leaders and emissaries, who made it very clear that their concern was over the abolition of slavery. He also shows that the states with the largest proportion of slaves in the population seceded first with the states less dependent on slavery seceding later or not at all. Finally, the argument that Southern slaves were happy with their condition is belied by the masses of slaves that fled toward Union forces.

Bonekemper also presents a strong argument that Lee was a general who made substantial mistakes, lacked the skills necessary to win the war, particularly against Grant, and misunderstood the strategic objectives that the South should have been pursuing. The South did not have to defeat the North, it only had to avoid being beaten. Lee’s invasions of the South and his focus on the Virginia theater at the expense of other regions expended limited Southern manpower and lost vast Southern regions.

Bonekemper also exonerates General Longstreet of the loss at Gettysburg. The myth that Longstreet was ordered to attack at dawn was never given. Longstreet had the better argument that the South should fight a defensive war and preserve its limited manpower.

Grant’s military genius is also presented in a way that remains eye-opening:

“As Grant approached Vicksburg, he could look back on the past eighteen successful days with satisfaction. He had entered enemy territory against a superior force and with no secure supply-line, fought and won five battles, severely damaged the Mississippi capital, driven away Johnston’s relief force, driven Pemberton’s army back into Vicksburg, inflicted over seven thousand casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) on the enemy, separated Loring’s seven thousand troops from the main enemy army, and reduced Pemberton’s army by fourteen thousand troops. Grant’s own casualties were between 3,500 and 4,500.”

In addition, Grant inflicted more damage and suffered fewer losses than his opponents, including Lee:

“Lee’s strategic and tactical aggression while commanding a single army in a single theater cost him 209,000 casualties (see the table of Lee’s casualties below)—a loss the South could not afford. Almost incomprehensibly, Lee’s single army suffered fifty-five thousand more casualties than the five armies commanded (victoriously) by Grant in three theaters. Lee’s willingness to incur such devastating casualties might be explained, in part, by his religious faith. Richard Rollins speculates, “Perhaps, most importantly, Lee believed the results would be best for all concerned, and if a man died he would be in a better place. It was this faith that allowed him to pray that ‘our merciful Father in Heaven may protect & direct us,’ and then to add, ‘In that case I fear no odds & no numbers.”62 In any case, if a single statistic explains the outcome of the war, it is those 209,000 casualties. On the other side of the ledger, Lee did impose 240,000 casualties on his foes, for an advantage of thirty-one thousand.63 But the South could not afford or compensate for Lee’s overly aggressive and offensive style of fighting. Grant, on the other hand, was able to capture Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg (along with their defending armies); save a trapped Union army at Chattanooga and drive the Confederate Army of Tennessee into Georgia; and come east to defeat Lee and finish the war in less than a year—all while incurring a reasonable 154,000 casualties (see the table of Grant’s casualties below). By inflicting 191,000 casualties on his opponents, Grant achieved a favorable margin of thirty-seven thousand. Considering the breadth and depth of Grant’s successes in a necessarily offensive mode, even a negative balance of casualties would have been militarily acceptable.”

People like underdogs and the South was the underdog. However, Bonekemper demonstrates that the South was fighting for an ignoble goal which it could have won but for the appearance of a truly admirable military commander. This is a engaging book made all the more engaging by its solid argument against the converntional wisdom.

[Gerry · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dixie got well and truly stomped during the Civil War, its slaves liberated, its cities occupied, its officials imprisoned or driven out of the country. To help them deal with this world turned upside down, Southerners gradually created what several current authors term “The Myth of the Lost Cause,” a spin which cast the Southern cause in the best possible light. Southerners and many a Yank have grown up with this since. Drawing on writings by Alan Nolan (Lee Considered), Gary Gallagher (The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History [ed.]), William C. Davis (The Cause Lost), Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson (Attack and Die), and others, Dr. Bonekemper presents seven tenets of the Lost Cause and refutes them. Here they are with this reader’s take on them.

1) “Slavery was a benevolent institution for all involved but was dying by 1861. There was therefore no need to abolish slavery suddenly, especially by war.” Bonekemper shows the peculiar institution was profitable, expanding, and of benefit to whites only. What Lincoln said holds true: “…we never hear of the man who wishes to take the good of (slavery), by being a slave himself.” Spot on.

2) “States rights, not slavery, was the cause….” Bonekemper compares what was said and done before secession with what happened after, and deflates that argument.

3) “The Confederacy had no chance of winning the Civil War….” In 1864, Lincoln conceded his chances for reelection were slim. Besides that, Bonekemper lists several advantages the South had, but failed to use. Dixie did come close to winning, but then came the news from Atlanta.

4) “Robert E. Lee…was one of the greatest generals in history.” Bonekemper says no; Lee’s fixation on Virginia and his aggressive tactics helped cause the Confederacy’s loss. Here this (admittedly amateur) critic disagrees. By assuming a strictly defensive posture, one surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Lee couldn’t afford to do so when McClellan was approaching Richmond with a siege train in 1862, or when Burnside was about to, and Hooker did, cross the Rappahannock. True, Lee did make some regrettable attacks (ask General Pickett), but the Army of Northern Virginia kept Richmond (the capital) out of Federal hands for four years. Lee opposed sending troops from his army to the western theater, but it was his Commander in Chief who could have overruled him, and didn’t. I’m not sure of his losses being a cause; I didn’t read of the specifics. Bonekemper did include several charts, one of which totaled up Lee’s losses in the Overland Campaign as being twice the size of his army! I guess folks were being shot twice.

5) “James Longstreet caused Lee to lose the Battle of Gettysburg and thus the Civil War.” Bonekemper deflects this with the facts. He blames Lee for it, and yes, Lee was the commander. Even Douglas S. Freeman, begrudgingly, supports this.

6) “Ulysses S.Grant was an incompetent “butcher” who won the war only by brute force and superior numbers.” Here Bonekemper gives us the entire history of Grant’s campaigns to show they were more than just “charge.” Numbers help, but as the career of Burnside, Hooker, Darius III, and Vercingetorix show, you have to use them properly.

7) “The Union won the war by waging unprecedented and precedent-setting ‘total war.’” This was the first this reviewer has ever hear the accusation. Bonekemper says there’s a difference between “hard” and “total” war.

Twenty-two page bibliography, sixty-two pages of footnotes (at the back), and written with simple, but not juvenile, language. An easy read, if not one hundred percent convincing of all points.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

I think I have read more about the Civil War than any other event in history and this is one more book to add to the long list. Bonekemper's focus is on the myth of "the Lost Cause" that we've come to believe about the Civil War- and which is reflected best I think in the book and film "Gone With the Wind" ( and in an earlier movie-"The Birth of A Nation"). Bonekemper points out that the myth was created by General Jubal Early and others following the Civil War and continued into the 20th Century by historians such as Douglas Southall Freeman and Shelby Foote. A basis of the myth is that slavery was a benevolent institution that was actually good for the African-Americans and this certainly came across in the movie GWTW. I would like to think this myth is well on the way to dying out. But the idea that the South fought for states's rights and not slavery is a more persistent myth. To me this is very easily refuted by simply reading what the people of the time wrote. Bonekemper quotes from state secession conventions, resolutions, and declarations.We can easily see that all the talk and writing in support of secession was for the preservation of slavery and the fear that the Republican Party was going to abolish slavery. It was after the war that defenders of the South said it was about "states' rights" not slavery. For me the most interesting point of the book is Bonekemper's assertion that General Robert E. Lee was no military genius and that it was General Grant who was the greatest general of the war. I always felt that Lee was a great general-despite the disaster that was Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg. Bonekemper points out that Lee was overly aggressive in his strategy and tactics throughout the war. He squandered the very limited manpower that the Confederacy had. Overall, Lee suffered 209,000 casualties. Although Lee imposed 240,000 casualties on the Union, the Union could afford the losses and the Confederacy couldn't. Lee lost 20.2% of his soldiers in battle while inflicting only 15.4% losses on his opponents. Again, the Union's losses could be made good, but not Lee's losses. If you look at General US Grant, the general who has been called a "butcher" and extremely wasteful of his men, he incurred 18.1% casualties while imposing 31 % on his foes. Lee was the wrong man for the job. It turned out that Grant was the better general in the war. He could best make use of the North's resources to fight the war to a successful conclusion. Bonekemper does well pointing out that Grant's campaign to take Vicksburg was a true masterpiece of the war. Grant was able to inflict more than 40,000 casualties on the enemy while incredibly losing only 9,400--and all while on the offensive when the defenders should have had a tactical advantage. To quote Bonekemper-"Unlike most Union generals, Grant knew what had to be done-take advantage of the North's numerical superiority and invade and conquer the Confederacy-and he did it." For all his flaws, Lee could still have won if he had faced no better generals than Gens. McClellan or Burnside or other Union generals who were not decisive and totally unable to press forward to achieving victory.

[Erik · Rating 5 out of 5]

An eye-opening book, well documented and easy to read. Much of what you think you know about the Civil War is probably wrong. Lee wasn't a better general than Grant. Ulysses S. Grant wasn't a butcher who won by sheer brute force. The South wasn't doomed to lose the war to the superior numbers and equipment of the North. There were no "Black Confederates." And no, the South didn't start the Civil War because of states rights. They started the war to defend and expand slavery. That's the main reason they deserved to lose. But there were plenty of others.

Edward Bonekemper has no sympathy for the Lost Cause propagandists like rebel General Jubal Early or "Lost Cause" author Edward Pollard who spread these myths starting soon after Appomattox and continuing right up to the present day. So he busts each one of their myths remorselessly, while replacing the myths with a more accurate version of the Civil War and its meaning for American history.

Grant was a great general, perhaps the best in American history, and the North deserved to win not merely because it fought a better battlefield war but because its cause was better.

These days, as Confederate statues come down across the country, we might cheer to see the end of the Lost Cause. But we shouldn't stop by tearing down the traitors and enslavers who fought for what Grant termed one of the worst causes in history. Instead, we should put up new statues of Grant and real Civil War heroes whose memory deserves to be honored, and the truth of whose stories deserves to be better known by all Americans.

Bonekemper's book is an excellent start.

[Jwest87 · Rating 2 out of 5]

Disappointing. I think I had different expectations when I started this. I was expecting MORE about the creation of the Lost Cause, who was responsible for it and their background. While this book dives into it at times, I felt it was underwhelming. My two biggest pet peeves:
-The book goes to great lengths to describe in detail, The Gettysburg Campaign and The Vicksburg Campaign. I feel like anyone who is reading this book already knows these campaigns fairly well. Because of that, these sections of the book feel more like filler.
-My biggest interest right now is James Longstreet after the Civil War (if anyone has any reading suggestions on him, let me know). When introducing the chapter on Longstreet, they briefly mention one of the reasons for scapegoating him was because he was a Republican. I thought later in the chapter, the author would go into further detail about this, but seems to be all they mention about it.

I will say, I REALLY enjoy getting to understand Stephen Douglas more.

[Jon Harris · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book is worse than Gallagher's on the same topic.

[Dana Wilson · Rating 1 out of 5]

Terrible book, couldn’t finish and returned it.

[Alex Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Edward Bonekemper's The Myth of the Lost Cause is a compact and persuasive little book that demolishes the various myths underpinning neo-Confederate Lost Cause mythology, chief among them that the South seceded from the Union to preserve "states' rights", not slavery, and that Robert E. Lee was the greatest general of the war, only succumbing to Ulysses S. Grant through the brute force of Northern men and arms; if Lee failed, as he did at Gettysburg, the blame lies with his subordinates, not with Lee personally. There are other facets of Lost Causeism - did the Union wage punitive "total war" on the South as legend has it? No, says Bonekemper - but the dual myths of "states' rights" as the motivating factor for secession and the legend of Robert E. Lee, the personification of Southern honor and martial valor, are at the heart of Lost Cause mythology and Bonekemper spends a majority of the book successfully debunking these two fables.

In disproving the notion that the South was driven to secession by a philosophical commitment to states' rights and not slavery, Bonekemper goes straight to the horse's mouth and compiles a lengthy list of contemporary statements and documents from leading Confederates who made it clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the preservation of slavery was the overwhelming reason, arguably the sole reason, why they felt compelled to dissolve the Union. The secession proclamations from the first five seceding states (which were also the five states with the most slaves per capita, as Bonekemper notes) gave slavery pride of price in declaring to the world why they were seceding from the United States; Mississippi's secession ordinance bluntly stated that, "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world." Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens declared two months before Fort Sumter that the Confederacy's foundation, "rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth.” And this entire outburst of slavery-induced secessionitis came in the wake of the election of an explicitly anti-slavery candidate to the presidency, Abraham Lincoln, after a campaign almost exclusively dominated by the single issue of slavery. The evidence, in sum, is clear that the mantra of "states' rights" was merely a means to an end; the end being the protection of slavery, as openly admitted by the leaders of the would-be breakaway state.

After laying bear Southern motives, Bonekemper follows up with two chapters that successfully cut the sainted Robert E. Lee down to size. The Robert E. Lee in this book was an overrated general with a flimsy grasp of strategy who squandered the South's natural advantages of defense with aggressive, costly campaigns that depleted Southern manpower and paved the road to Southern defeat. Wedded to antiquated Napoleonic notions of decisive victory, Lee launched two failed invasions of the North, and in the second of those campaigns, at Gettysburg in 1863, fatefully ordered a frontal assault on the Union center that ended in catastrophe. Strategically and tactically aggressive, Lee's style of warfare was fundamentally ill-suited for the manpower-starved South, which only needed to wear down the North in attrition warfare to achieve its ultimate objective of independence. In Bonekemper's inimitable phrasing, Lee only needed a tie, gambled for a win, and recorded a loss. Bonekemper makes a convincing case that Grant, and not Lee, was the war's outstanding general (Grant won decisive victories in the two main theaters of war and suffered fewer casualties than Lee despite commanding far greater forces), although the criticism of Lee's military nous seems overdone, all things considered. Indeed, he is so keen on destroying the notion of Lee the military genius that he misses an opportunity here of debunking the notion of Lee the reluctant warrior who tisked-tisked at slavery and secession (part-and-parcel of the Lee legend); Lee was actually more of a Southern ideologue than conventional wisdom has it, as even sympathetic biographers like Michael Korda have documented.

I'd still have no problems recommending this book to anyone who wants a quick and easy-to-read demolition of the distorted history that even today colors our understanding of the war. If you've read this book, you'll at least realize that the next time you come across a Robert E. Lee statue, you'll view him not as a saintly, honorable figure but a flawed general who betrayed his country in the name of slavery.

[Bill Christman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Myths are stronger and more lasting than the truth can ever be. Myths are tidy stories, heroes with a great cause. The American Civil War is steeped in many myths derived from southerners who had to justify the destruction of the south; they had to justify the reason for the war they started; they also had to spin the war into a noble cause and hide away the real reason they fought. To these people Edward H. Bonekemper III must be satan. Bonekemper has made it his life's work to rewrite the story of the Civil War into something that resembles the truth and to kill the myths. This is his most encompassing book attacking the Lost Cause school of Civil War history, yet it is short and highly readable.

Robert E. Lee being the winningest general in the south would become clouded in marble as Lost Causers would try to ennoble the war. I don't think Lee was that good of a general. Bonekemper agrees. Lee has been given a reputation far outsizing his accomplishments. The great generals in US history understood how to achieve the final objectives of what they and the country wanted. Washington, Eisenhower, and U.S. Grant understood what they needed to do and therefore set about with a strategy to achieve it. At times for all of them there was failure but it never interfered with their persistence heading towards their goals. Lee on the other hand did not seemed concerned for his 'country', only his state. He would suck up the resources of the confederacy, waste his soldiers lives on frontal assaults (where Grant's few frontal assaults were followed by maneuver, yet he gained the reputation as a butcher), and in the end Lee would not come down off his figurative high horse and give the Union generals credit for how they handled their forces. His brief comments created the entire Lost Cause movement that continues to shadow the United States to this day. As a point of this Grant's conquest of the south resulted in gaining more acreage under control than Dwight D. Eisenhower did in Europe in World War II yet his reputation would be of a drunk butcher who used overwhelming force and got lucky. If Grant got 'lucky', why is it that the army commanders before him did not completely harness the full power of the north until Grant? Usage of all the resources at your disposal is a sign of at least very good generalship.

Bonekemper is good at using statistics to prove Grant was the better general. He also focuses on the cause which he says, surprise here, was slavery. By sticking to what the southerners said at the beginning of the confederacy he establishes that slavery and white supremacy was the cause of the war. States rights' was actually a problem for the south as they complained the federal government was not enforcing its own fugitive slave laws and forcing the northern states to return the runaways. From the compromise constitutional amendments protecting slavery (which are still eligible to become amendments unlike the Equal Rights Amendment), to the constitution of the confederacy, to the desertion and chances of being a casualty within the confederate army Bonekemper shows over and over again that slavery was the reason and the motivation for the treason.

This book here is a nice brief look at the lost causers beliefs and each of their arguments. Each gets attacked by Edward Bonekemper, with the deadliest aim. This book will not be the last word because as long as people believe myth over fact, the struggle for the truth will go on.

[Thomas · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a valuable resource for refuting the pack of lies that is the Lost Cause Myth, a thing that has been passed off to generations of vulnerable school children as history.

There’s a lot to unpack in this one so I’ll be brief.

Slavery was an evil institution that destroyed the lives of generations of slaves and their descendants.

The American Civil War was absolutely about slavery and very little else.

The soldiers that fought for the Confederacy in that war might have had heroic intentions but that does not change the fact that they were pawns of evil.

Robert E Lee was not the greatest general in the history of the world. He wasn’t even the greatest general in the Civil War. That honour belongs to Ulysses S Grant.

The Myth of the Lost Cause is one of the most successful and pernicious propaganda campaigns in the history of the United States. It continues to do massive harm to all who believe in it as well as the entire world. It, along with racism and white supremacy, is near the top of the list of ideas that need to die.

[Bill · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent well researched book that dismantles the longstanding civil war myths of the “Lost Cause” by southern/Confederate apologists. Two of the most critical elements were the fact the cause of the war was not states rights but slavery, and the dismantling of the myth and worship of Robert E Lee. The author provides a compelling narrative ascribing Ulysses S. Grant as the greatest general of the civil war.

10/10 for anyone interested in, aware of, or bothered by the continuation of these myths in current American history, culture, and politics.

[Christine B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book does a great job introducing (and then debunking) the 'myth of the lost cause'. I suspect that chapters of this will end up in some of my classes.

[Hunter · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not particularly deep, so nothing new from it, but it is at least a nice, concise primer to recommend to people.

[NephriteON · Rating 4 out of 5]

The following review was originally published in the online newspaper The Orkney News in 2019. Link here. https://theorkneynews.scot/2019/12/29...

The Myth Of The Lost Cause: Why The South Fought The Civil War And Why The North Won by Edward H. Bonekemper III

Hello again to you all! Now that we are slowly recovering from our overindulgences during Christmas and the holiday period it is time for me to review one final audiobook before the end of the year. Originally I was planning on reviewing something somewhat more cheerful but I found myself drawn to the topic and gave this book a chance. I’m glad I did!

For those of you unaware, the idea of the ‘Lost Cause’ is the concept that no matter what the South did during The American Civil War they were guaranteed to lose and their rebellion was in fact doomed from the beginning. Tied into this is the idea that The American Civil War was fought over states rights and that southern slavery had very little to do with the causes of the war. The other main conjecture of the ‘Lost Cause’ idea is that General Robert E. Lee was some form of military genius and he only lost the Battle of Gettysburg due to the incompetency of others (namely James Longstreet) and the butchery of Ulysses S. Grant.

As you can guess by the title of the audiobook this book is written by Mr Bonekemper - a noted American historian - to counteract the mythmaking of southern revisionists. The book is a very interesting read for those curious about the American Civil War as it dissects the multiple elements that create the myth using original sources from the period. Another good thing about this book is the language is quite simple and easy to understand with very minimal jargon unlike some history books I’ve listened to over the years. I assume this is because the book was written with intent to counter the arguments made by others and convey its message so therefore had to be understandable by the general public. In my personal opinion he makes his arguments quite convincingly while still making the book enjoyable. Notably the author also specifically name drops a few examples of those individuals who - even if they don’t explicitly support the ‘Lost Cause’ - indirectly continue its themes or messages - such as respected figures like Mary Beard and John Keegan. I definitely recommend this book even if you aren’t particularly enamoured with history. You never know what part of history from all over the world could spark your interest. Be it the local history of Orkney during the world wars or specifically the Italian Chapel or more globally such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 or as in this case The American Civil War.

Now for the part I’m not looking forward to. You may have noticed that up to this point I have made very minimal references to the audiobook version of this book? That is for a very good reason. Despite the book itself being rather engrossing and interesting in my personal opinion, the audiobook release is very much a disappointment. The book is narrated by C.J.McAllister who unfortunately takes a well done book on an interesting subject and makes it dull as dishwater! His voice is some form of American (I can’t tell the specific regional accent) and he does quite a decent job when reading the sections Mr Bonekemper quotes from period sources. However the rest of the time it sounds like listening to a robot with an American accent. I finished the audiobook because it is (relatively) short and I personally found the subject and actual book to be quite interesting. I’m not sure however that others would say the same if their only exposure was through the audio version.

Another important criticism - specifically of the audiobook - is that on at least two or three different occasions the narrator can be heard pausing and taking a breath before repeating the last few words of his previous sentence and continuing on. It is very rare in a professionally produced, edited and released audiobook for things like this to slip through the cracks and be left on the final release version to be heard by listeners. This disappoints me greatly on a personal level as I really enjoyed the book otherwise but my recommendation to my readers is to buy and read either a physical version of the book, a digital ebook version or - if one exists - an audio version with a different narrator depending on your preferences.

In conclusion the book itself is a very worthwhile read for those of you who are so inclined (even if it’s not the most seasonally appropriate listening or reading.) However despite highly recommending the book I do think it’s more enjoyable in physical or digital format.

I hope my readers have a Happy Hogmanay and hopefully I can ring in the new year with a first review that’s somewhat more light listening. Who knows...I might be joining a friend soon.

Sayonara! And Auld Lang Syne!

Nephrite

[Peter Harrington · Rating 1 out of 5]

As a Civil War Buff, I must say that I was very disappointed with this read. Why you may wonder? Because it contained too many "opinions" that the Author identifies as "Facts" that he attempts to defend with, often contradictory, claims.

I stopped reading the book several times but only continued to finish it because it was given to me as a gift. I made some notes during the early parts of my readings that helps explain what I mean by contradictory opinions by this Author. By the end of the book, you will see he (the Author) is on some type of “vengeance” against the Confederacy and even more specifically General Robert E. Lee. I have to wonder if perhaps Lee killed his Grandfather or something? He ends the last half of the book trying to argue that General Grant was not an Alcoholic and was actually the best General in the world; what that has to do with the Lost Cause is still beyond me?

Here are a few points I made note of while I read, again I stopped writing down points of contradiction because there was way too many to keep documenting.

Thus far the author has provided no evidence to show his arguments, in fact what few attempts the author has provided are actually contradictory. For example, early in the book the author makes the claim that slavery was in increasing and his proof was to detail the increase in cost to purchase a slave. By the author’s estimates the cost tripled in over 50 years (1805-1860). I know that in the business world of selling items that the cost of an item generally increases as its availability becomes harder to obtain, thus the increase shows that the sale of slaves was decreasing not increasing. Another terrible habit the author has is to write a statement as a fact with no evidence other than that you the reader should take his opinion as a fact and not the many other historians that claim otherwise.

Page 46, Author claims the Crittenden Compromise, that would have protected some southern slave rights but also restricted Congress in Washington DC to have slaves, showed that the war was started because of slavery. In the end it was the northern Republicans that turn down this proposed compromise, keep in mind those that turn it down were those in Congress in Washington DC, what is considered the north. This actually shows the opposite, it shows that the north also wanted to have slaves when it came down to it.

Pg 128 is a great example of data manipulation; in fact it is so bad that some of the battles between Lee and Grant are not even in the overall total battle chart. Almost stopped reading at this point.

Pg 138 contradicts the previous section; the previous section by the author portrayed Lee as a General that did not lead his troops while in battle, but yet the author says just the opposite in the very next session in that Lee didn’t trust his staff so much that he led his troops into the heart of battle and had to be sent back by his worried troops. It is clear the Author is simply writing what he wants so to twist the truth into what he is trying to sell. The Author also tried to claim that Lee was not a good leader; I suspect the Author failed to learn that Lee was not only a Great leader but graduated second of his class from the United States Military Academy at West Point!

Bottom line…As someone who has studied the Civil War for the last 2 decades, I do not recommend this book.