To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942

Stalingrad Trilogy #1

by David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House

The confrontation between German and Soviet forces at Stalingrad was a titanic clash of armies on an unprecedented scale--a campaign that was both a turning point in the Second World War and a lasting symbol of that war's power and devastation. Yet despite the attention lavished on this epic battle by historians, much about it has been greatly misunderstood or hidden from view--as David Glantz, the world's foremost authority on the Red Army in World War II, now shows.

This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides--including the Red Army General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Soviet 62nd Army--to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House, an authority on twentieth-century warfare, adds further insight and context.

Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts--one to secure the city on his flank, one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin, in response, demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw, leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that, although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks, ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad.

This fresh, eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes--on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed--will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, Russian History, War

678 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2009

About the author

David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.

He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.

After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.

In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.

A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.

Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.

Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.

He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei

Reviews

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Glantz never ceases to impress me with his writings, and I have to say I am such a big fan. My favorite area of historical study is the Eastern front of World War Two, and so naturally I have always wanted to learn as much as I can about it. I used to watch the History Channel over and over when I was growing up, hearing the same old narratives, and very little detail. A few years ago, (before COVID-19) I discovered a youtuber by the name of "TIKHistory", who makes intricate content about the Eastern Front. I was fascinated with how he used so many sources, quoted so many different works, and from watching him, I developed this desire to read books on the Eastern Front. I wrote him a comment on one of his videos, asking for recommendations, and one of the authors he recommended was David Glantz. Ever since that time, I have become immersed in reading as many books as I can on the Eastern front, and really on various other conflicts from military history.

This book gets a 5-star rating from me because it was truly a great piece of historical research. I have to admit, that there was one time I felt like I was having a hard time understanding the detail, but I kept going and it got to the point where I couldn't stop turning page after page. When it comes to works like this, I try to soak up whatever knowledge I can from the author, but I also realize that I can come back to this book again and read it.

Glantz explains the situation that led up to Stalingrad, such as the preliminary operations undertaken around Voronezh, the Kerch Peninsula (Operation Bustard hunt), the siege of Sevastopol, Operations Wilhelm, Fredricus, and second battle of Kharkov. One main idea Glantz reiterates is how Hitler expected army group south to do too much with too little, not enough time, not enough supplies, and too many goals in sight (Caucasus oilfields, Stalingrad, and Voronezh). While reading this, I felt like I was reading the build up to a disaster, because Glantz explains how the Sixth army was running low on men, and supplies while fighting to Stalingrad. Reading about casualties from one battle after another, makes me think and believe that 1942 was the year the professional Wehrmacht was destroyed. Glantz mentions how so many Wehrmacht NCO's were killed in combat, and I begin to see the truth in the fact that the Wehrmacht was being worn down in an attritional war.

I love Anthony Beevor, James Holland, and Max Hastings, but their works do not compare to David Glantz and Prit Buttar. Reading Glantz is for the serious afficionados who want to know in's and out's, and every detail about the Eastern front. I cannot wait to read this whole series through, and I am stoked for the level of detail that the next Three books bring!

[John · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'm glad I read this, and I'll continue on to the next book in the trilogy (probably after a bit of a break), but there was definitely room for improvement.

The dry recitation of facts is the kind of thing I expect from military history at the operational level. That's a big part of these kinds of histories. Detailing exactly which units did what and when they did it. The missing part here is why they did it. There is some analysis of overall events at the end of each chapter, but not nearly enough to make sense of it all without further study of other sources.

Then there are the maps. The maps are simply awful. Did no one proof the maps? Most are all but unreadable, and none of them are very useful in helping to visualize things because of the poor quality of their reproduction. The maps alone dropped this from liking the book to just being OK.

Edit: I'm tempted to raise this a star after reading this volume for a second time, but I think all my points still stand, especially the terrible maps, which still end up keeping me from raising this to three stars.

[Walter Mendoza · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well, the book is a very detailed work about the eastern front, Glantz show us a great book about the tactical and estrategical movement of armies. First the author discuse about the state the armies, after about the preliminaries the operation Blau, and covers the summer offensive, etc.

About the author, Glantz is a great writer. The book is a very detailed work about the eastern front, with a extensive research notes. Maybe for some people are the problem, the information overload. If you looking that, is your book.

He presents an excellent view of the battles leading up to Stalingrad, with a review the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, later Glantz presents the Operation Blau, the capture of Sevastopol, the advance to the Don River. I think this book have a problem: the maps, they're so tiny, but is the only error in this study.

Finally a word of advice. This book are for well schollars of the Eastern Front, but undoubtedly I recommend it. Then let's start "Armageddon in Stalingrad".

[Cliff Hare · Rating 5 out of 5]

Objective and superbly researched - this work will become the definitive text on the most decisive battle of the 20th century.

[Averell · Rating 5 out of 5]

The sheer amount of information makes this series the ultimate reference for Stalingrad in English language

[Jeff Dawson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The detail in this book is overwhelming! It is not a sit down and read cover to cover. The amount of information David is throwing at readers would take months to properly digest, absorb and disseminate. That is the greatness and weakness of the book.

Weakness
I was not a fan of the constant listing of all the units that were attached to each Army, Corps, Division,etc. If a reader would like to know each units participation in each battle and Battle order would suffice. And then when it came to the Russian commanders, is there a reason each one’s full name had to be used each time? I think not.
The maps were very seldom helpful in detailing the battle plans. Many shoed the proposed strategy and then failed to show if the plan succeeded or failed. I believe Glantz should have take the time to draw up his own maps and used them. The ones is the book only added confusion to the “fog of battle.” I did not run across this with Ziemke’s works.
I was not a fan of the author’s conclusions at the end of each chapter or the final chapter of the book. When an author has to say other historians got it wrong, I want to know who they are referring to? For those of us who have extensively read about the Eastern Front, we know that Germany did not have the resources to wage a massive three axis front-North, Central and Southern. We also know that the Russians had a massive man pool to pull from where the Germans did not. We also know the farther Germany plunged into Eastern Europe their supply lines and logistics would be hampered trying to sustain all of its forces.
As detailed as this book is, I found one glaring omission. Why didn’t Glantz cover the logistics and transportation network of the Russians. We know how they were able to build new divisions and armies but there is not mention on how these troops, supplies and weapons were transported to the front. Why? Why is this covered? There is not a good road network, the air force was unreliable, thus rail traffic would have to the main source of transportation.
One last note. Why is there no mention of “The Lucy Organization?” Sorge warned Stalin about “Barbarossa” and “Blau.” I think it would have deserved a note or two that Hitler was preparing to break his agreements and invade Russia.

Strength
The amount of research required is impressive. No other book I’ve read goes into the detail this one does when it comes to the individual Generals who commanded units in this epic struggle.
It was interesting to get the running commentary in the OKW, OKH and The Stavka as each side kept jockeying for position and how they were analyzing and deciphering how the front troops were performing. It’s always interesting to see how each side has a different take on the actions and how they affect future operations.
One item to note is because of the detail of the work, the readers gets a good feel on when The Stavka and Stalin started to learn to fight. As their forces were evicted from the Great Don Bend, their defense became stubborn, more resolute and co-ordinated. Even the counterattacks around Serafimovich, even though they didn’t achieve the smashing success’ envisioned, they became a thorn in the German flanks and showed that they were far from throwing in the towel.
We see the same action in the Caucasus region. The Russians are being hard pressed and despite their losses at Rostov, Millerova and Novorossitsk. Even with these victories the Russian were gaining time and space. The father the Germans pushed, the tighter and closer the Russians came to there logistical supply base and the area they had to defend. Add in there inexhaustible manpower force and you have a recipe of disaster for the enemy.
I recommend this book to any World War Two historian for its’ wealth of information on the units that fought and how they were handled. If you’re looking for a more tactical work on the subject, check out Earl Ziemke’s , “Moscow to Stalingrad.”
Haven’t decided if I’m going to pick up the other two volumes. I’ll decide after I read his take on the Battle of Kursk.

Four Stars

[Michael Hayes · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent beginning to Glantz & House's (five book) Stalingrad trilogy. Some may find the prose a bit dry, but it did not detract from this volume. The often-confusing maps, on the other hand, are a different story; because of that, I would rate this 4.5 stars if Goodreads allowed it.

[John Gordon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Operation Blau - the German offensive on the Eastern Front in 1942 is the focus of this book. Being extremely detailed this work breaks down the campaign to a level I have never experienced before.
The author had access to recently available sources both Soviet and German, and he consequently provides a more factual, and realistic account than previous efforts.
I found the book fascinating, the Wehrmacht was able to achieve so much that Hitler felt they could do anything - his overall divergent offensive plan was risky in the extreme. Supply issues and a lack of infantry were felt over and over again. The Russians meanwhile gradually improved their combat and organisational prowess.
It was such a struggle even to get the 6th Army to Stalingrad and that is where this work ends (Volume 1 of a trilogy).
It looks like I will need to purchase the next instalment in this magnificent opus.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the best analyses and narratives of the Stalingrad campaign, that does a lot to dispel some of the myths around the biggest single battle in human history. Well written, but dry for those who are not into military history. If you are, this book is highly recommended.

[Grant Renshaw · Rating 5 out of 5]

Definitive!

[Maverick Mo · Rating 4 out of 5]

【2025Book06】“To the Gates of Stalingrad” (Chinese ver.), the first volume of the “Stalingrad Trilogy” by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House. This book focuses on military operations centered around “Case Blue” from April to September 1942 -- how Germany's Army Group B advanced 500 kilometers eastward, broke through the great bend of the Don River, and reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. Some of the most striking takeaways for me after reading the book include:
1. The Red Army was extremely fragile in the early stages of the war. In the first year of the Soviet-German conflict, the Soviets suffered 4 million losses (killed, missing, or captured). Entire Soviet armies often collapsed and disappeared seemingly overnight after coming into contact with enemies.
2. And yet, despite its weaknesses, the Soviet Union’s vast territory and population meant it was unconquerable. When the German army was stretched thin and drained of resources, the Red Army was able to raise new units faster than the frontline units were being destroyed. No matter how many bloody battles the Germans won, they would always run into fresh Soviet forces. During the breakthrough at the Don Bend, the Red Army never outright defeated the Germans, but constant delaying actions and counterattacks severely wore down the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army. By the time they reached Stalingrad, they were already exhausted, and winter was approaching — foreshadowing the catastrophic outcome to come.
3. The Germans repeated the same mistake they made in 1941: dividing their efforts across multiple strategic targets. Hitler demanded that Army Group B capture Stalingrad while also ordering Army Group A to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus. As a result, both groups hindered each other, with neither receiving adequate resources or manpower.
4. Many of the battle sites in “Case Blue” still appear in today’s headlines: Donetsk, Donbas, Kharkiv, Kursk, Rostov… except now, those once-defenders of the homeland have become criminal invaders. It’s just ridiculous.
I originally started this book back in February, but its detailed operational history made it a poor fit for the stressful period of thesis defense and job hunting — so I put it down for over two months in the middle.

【2025年的第6本书】David M. Glantz和Jonathan M. House“斯大林格勒三部曲”的第一部——《兵临城下》。这本书主要介绍了在1942年4-9月以“蓝色方案”为核心的军事行动中，德军B集团军群是如何东进500公里，打穿顿河大弯曲部，兵临斯大林格勒城下的。看完之后印象深刻的地方包括：
（1）苏军真的不经打。在苏德战争的第一年，苏军死亡、失踪、被俘共400万。经常可以读到苏军在集团军这个层面一触即溃，灰飞烟灭的叙述。
（2）尽管如此，对于资源捉襟见肘的德军而言，苏联庞大的领土和人口依然注定了它无法被征服。苏军组建新部队的速度比前线部队崩溃的速度更快，德军在经历了无数的血战之后永远会遇见新的苏军。在突破顿河大弯曲部的过程中，苏军从来没有战胜过德军。但是苏军不停的迟滞与反突击严重地磨损了德军的第六集团军和第四装甲集团军，使得最终兵临斯大林格勒城下的德军根本不是一股满状态的力量，时间也离冬天太近，这为这场波澜壮阔血流成河的战役的结局埋下了伏笔。
（3）德军犯下了和1941年一样的错误——同时攻击多个战略目标。希特勒一方面要求B集团军群占领斯大林格勒，同时要求A集团军群夺取高加索油田，结果两个集团军群互相掣肘，都得不到足够的资源和兵力。
（4）“蓝色方案”的很多作战地点今天依然出现在新闻里：顿涅茨克、顿巴斯、哈尔科夫、库尔斯克、罗斯托夫，它们依然在被战火荼毒，只不过当年的保家卫国者已经变成了侵略者，真的令人唏嘘。
本来我2月就开始看这本书了，但是它的战史部分写得过于详细了，实在是不适合答辩和找工作期间看，于是中间停了两个多月。

[Stan Salvino · Rating 5 out of 5]

This impressive first volume of David Glantz's Stalingrad trilogy focusses entirely on the German offensive operations leading up to the climactic battle in the ruined streets of Stalin's namesake city on the Volga river. This fact alone makes this book series unique, as most authors who write about the battle of Stalingrad gloss over these events.

Glantz however manages to brilliantly convey the importance of these events to the reader. Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army did not simply brush aside Soviet opposition, but had to fight monthslong tough and attritional battles long before even reaching the city limits of Stalingrad. The level of detail in which these battles are described can only be called impressive and clearly overshadow the works of more 'mainstream' authors on the subject. On top of his highly detailed chronological description of events, Glantz also takes his time to reflect on crucial tactical and strategic decisions that were made throughout the Fall Blau campaign. What comes to mind here are the protracted battles around Voronezh during the initial stages of Blau I, the decision to focus units on forcing an encirclement near Rostov instead of immediately clearing the Don bend, failing to secure large encirclements either near Kalach or before the gates of Stalingrad and the decision to split Army Group South prematurely, focussing their limited resources over an ever expanding front in the Caucasus and near Stalingrad.

At times the book does face some limitations. Especially the maps are lackluster, suffering from the black and white printing which make the markings of moving frontlines nearly illegible. Also at times one wishes the author would offer more insight into what importance regions and cities the Germans captured during the summer campaign of '42 had. There are hints here and there, like the mention of railwayheads, oilfields and the Soviets evacuating factories, but their scale, importance to the USSR or use by their new occupiers are never made clear.

Regardless of these nitpicks the end result is a fantastic volume of an almost unparalleled scale and depth, especially when one takes into account the difficulties the English-speaking author must have faced while studying the Russian and German sources. Five stars well deserved.

[Fred · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the best book that has been written on the subject, but Glantz did a worse job on it than the later volumes in the series. It is weak on manpower data, a lot of the maps stink, and there are several typos and mistakes.

One omission is the 26th Tank Corps’ participation in the July battles. Pamyat Naroda document #100005584 shows 26th Tank Corps in the line near Bolshaya Polyana on 7/15/42. It had 19th Tank Brigade and possibly 157th Tank Brigade.

Page 117: 53rd Tank Brigade had 51 tanks, not 61, assuming that the counts of the different tank types and the overall strength of the 11th Tank Corps are correct.

Page 119: 25th Tank Corps should have the 175th Tank Brigade instead of the 87th.

Page 123: Look at Pamyat Naroda documents #238965135 and #100802437 for the maps that the book’s map was based on. Move the 141st Rifle Brigade to the 14th Rifle Brigade’s spot and delete the 14th Rifle Brigade. Move the 111th Rifle Brigade up near the 14th Tank Brigade. Move 115th and 116th Tank Brigades to Kastornoe. Delete 91st Tank Brigade: it was part of 23rd Tank Corps. Add 6th Guards Tank Brigade near 300th Rifle Division.

Page 132: 134th Rifle Brigade, not 135th.
Page 135: 119th Rifle Brigade, not Tank.
Page 186: 29th Rifle Division, not Guards.
Pages 304 and 328: 63rd Army had 1st Rifle division, not Guards.
Pages 306 and 365: 125th Tank Battalion, not Brigade.
Page 388: 278th Rifle Division, not 178th.
Pages 401 and 405: 395th Rifle Division, not 385th.
Page 415: 155th Rifle Brigade, not 156th.

Page 433: 417th Rifle Division did have only 545 rifles on August 8-10, but it was still in the process of being equipped before being sent to the front. On September 15 it had 5221 rifles for 7594 men.

Pages 447-451: I don’t believe that the 7th NKVD Division was ever in the Caucasus. I believe it was actually in the sector opposite Army Group Center. Glantz cites only Grechko for it, but Grechko mentions only two NKVD detachments, an NKVD composite regiment, and the NKVD 23rd, 25th, and 33rd Frontier Regiments.

Page 579 note 78: 563rd Tank Battalion, not Brigade.

[Carlos Solis · Rating 4 out of 5]

At the moment reading the first volume, it is an astounding piece of work, tons of information and well thought and expressed conclusions. The main drawback is that the text info is difficult to follow in the maps. (bit to small, colorless, and unclearly printed) If not because of that, id give it 5 stars.

Mister Glantz, when will you follow up with the battle of Berlin?

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Extremely detailed and intricately researched, this book focuses heavily on the military strategy and tactics of the German and Soviet armies leading up to the Battle of Stalingrad. There are excellent bits of analysis thrown in, but most of this book is unit numbers and maps with arrows on them, so if that isn’t your cup of tea, this will probably be incredibly dry reading.

[Gema Muñoz · Rating 4 out of 5]

El libro está impecablemente documentado y con un desarrollo muy bueno, pero yo creo que no es para el público general. Es un libro para historiadores o militares... demasiado técnico para quien no es un especialista.

[Binston Birchill · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you want operational level detail about the Eastern Front during WWII you go to Glantz... (with House) In each of his books that I’ve read (Stalingrad, Kursk, Kharkov) I’ve come away with a vastly greater understanding of how the battles progressed. I do not have a military background and at times the sheer weight of the numbers (army, corps, division, etc.) thrown out is daunting, but the detail pays off in the end. My mental picture of the battle is always much more clear by the end, and that’s all I ask for. I can not recommend these highly enough.

[Mitchell · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a great book for a serious student of the eastern front of WWII - though I wouldn't recommend it to anyone else. Glantz is terrific for unveiling previously unrecognized records and using them to critically revisit assumptions of key periods of the summer of 1942 in the southern USSR... Though unfortunately, it suffers from his habit of hurling dense, dry loads of numbers, statistics, dates, horribly bad maps, and comparatively minimal amounts of analysis in between the barrages of raw data... It changed my opinion of the period and left me wanting to know more -- preferably from an author who writes better...

[Maku Sato · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read David M. Glantz because I am curious. I am curious as to why I read David M. Glantz. As a military historian, his prose is technical, dry and exacting. This book would be a gold mine for statisticians. Detailed troop movements, cryptic hand drawn maps, lack of historical context, it reads like an dictionary or day-to-day journal of troop movements without the context of the larger strategy. It wasn't until I read THE THIRD REICH AT WAR that I realized that his hundreds of pages devoted to endless Red Army attacks on the Nazi column North of Stalingrad were designed to slow down the Nazi attack, rather than to actually repulse it. Mind numbing.

[Stormy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I look forward to reading the rest of this trilogy. I want something understood about the four star rating. If not for the maps I would have easily given the book five stars. The scope of the story of Germany's invasion of Russia is almost impossible to comprehend. The writing was good but the number of Corps and Divisions listed in the text tend to get in the way and make the reading difficult if you do not love the subject. (which I do) To anyone who is interested in the history of World War Two, it is a must read.

[Stephen · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very detailed account of the German advance in the summer of 1942. Author presents new data from Soviet archives that sheds new light on what was thought to be a cake walk to the Volga. While there are many maps, they have been reduced to fit the book so they can be rather crowded. Historians and wargamers will find lots of data.

[Bryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Tremendous amount of detailed information on the Summer 1942 campaign in Southern Russia. Recommended for those serious students of the Eastern Front.

[Tim · Rating 5 out of 5]

I love a book with longer footnotes than text.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

The narrative is here is classic Glantz - dry, heavy with formation names and locations, but I still learned a lot about the pace and timeline of the campaign that reached the city.

[Crunknor · Rating 3 out of 5]

Meticulously researched, but too much of a slog for casual reading. Could have benefited hugely from better-designed, more readable maps.

[Marty Weghorn · Rating 2 out of 5]

Exhaustively detailed and thorough, this is a very dry read. A paucity of maps make it difficult and confusing to follow the numerous battles and skirmishes.

[Todd Farman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Once again Glantz sets the standard for in-depth operational studies of the Eastern Front. On to Vol 2!