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Of the Standard of Taste: Enriched edition. Unraveling the Mysteries of Aesthetic Judgment and Beauty in Different Cultures and Time Periods
Of the Standard of Taste is a book by the philosopher David Hume. It argues for a standard measure of taste regarding art; while remembering the importance of subjectiveness.
29 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1757
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About the author
David Hume
3,144 books1,684 followersDavid Hume was a Scottish historian, philosopher, economist, diplomat and essayist known today especially for his radical philosophical empiricism and scepticism.
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
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August 23, 2025
Since many of us here on Goodreads write book reviews, I thought I’d offer the following on how Hume’s criteria for a qualified judge of a work of art, five in number, applies to someone taking on the role of a literary critic/book reviewer. According to David Hume, we would be well to listen to someone in possession of the following:
Delicacy of Tate – Ideally, a reviewer will observe all those important facets and telling details of a literary work, that is, not miss anything. For example, in Edgar Allan Poe’s The Cask of Amontillado, if a reviewer were to miss how, toward the end of the tale, the narrator’s heart grows sick from the dampness of the catacombs, this would amount to a major oversight and lack in delicacy of taste.
Practice – The literary critic must have an experienced eye, having read a wealth of literary works. This speaks to how one must be seriously dedicated to the art of reading and reviewing, similar to a violinist spending years practicing and playing the violin or an actress honing theater skills through classes and training along with participating in many performances. From my own experience reading many reviews written here on Goodreads and also in newspapers and magazines, it quickly becomes obvious who has a dedication to craft and takes their responsibility as book reviewer seriously.
Comparison – For example, for someone to become an accomplished reviewer of literary novels, it is essential to have an exposure to a wide range of novels from different times and cultures, thus empowering a reviewer to compare and contrast the novel under consideration with other novels from other writers, past and present, from around the globe. Obviously, one can’t read all the great literary novels, but reading a healthy sample is what Hume is pointing to here. (Same idea goes for various genres, like science fiction: a serious reviewer needs to read many works of science fiction to give their judgements and opinions weight).
Good Sense – A good literary critic will have an awareness of the various themes and approaches that can be brought to bear on a work as well as an appreciation of the writer’s vision in writing the work in the first place. And, along with this, knowing when to include aspects of the author’s life or specific interpretations and themes. For example, making note of how Jungian psychology applies to Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf would make sense for two reasons: 1) Hesse was undergoing therapy from Carl Jung during the time he was authoring this novel; and 2) in essays and correspondence, Hesse himself indicated how Jungian concepts directly influenced the story. However, to apply a specific psychological interpretation one favors, Freudian or Jungian or Lacanian, for example, to every novel under review would be a gross error.
No Prejudice – According to Hume, a reviewer would be wise not to review a book written by a friend or relative, or a novel about a subject where they have a personal interest at stake or a particular ax to grind. In a word, the critic should be personally detached so as to render any assessment or judgement as objective as possible.
Anyway, as a more general review of Hume's book, I offer the following: Philosophic tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle assesses a work of art in terms of the qualities of the work itself: the harmony of its parts, the work’s proportion and scale, its function as a usable object, as in a well-made chair or altarpiece or cathedral. With his Of the Standard of Taste David Hume (1711-1776) was one of the key 18th century thinkers who shifted the focus from the work of art itself to the unique experience of each viewer, listener or reader. Taste counts and my taste is my taste and your taste is your taste. However, Hume still acknowledges a good work possess qualities that make it superior to a mediocre or bad work – a portrait by Rembrandt is far superior to a portrait painted by a beginning art student at your local community center. So, where and how do we draw the line between individual taste and the merits of the work itself? For over two hundred years, Hume’s essay has sparked much lively discussion over these very questions.
Here are three frequently quoted passages from Hume’s essay:
-----“Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty.”
-----“When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object: The finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded.”
----- “Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind.”
In effect, although we have our own feelings and judgments about which works of art might be great, good, average or bad, Hume encourages us to cede the last word to seasoned, knowledgeable, perceptive experts within their respective fields. Does this sound reasonable? Responses to Hume on this point have been mixed. To best illustrate how I myself find this topic relevant, here are a few case studies:
Major Conservative Voice
Back in the early 1970s, during a discussion with conservative William F. Buckley, Jr., a cultural critic bemoaned American crass consumer society. Buckley replied “Any society, like ours, where the recordings of all nine Beethoven symphonies are readily available and affordable is a culturally healthy society.” I almost could not believe my ears. Although what Mr. Buckley said is true, the more important point is that 99.9% of the population would not want to listen to Beethoven, not even close; rather, people want to listen to what they are familiar with and have always enjoyed – rock and roll, country music, show tunes, Frank Sinatra, etc. etc.. I cite this case to illustrate how availability and affordability will not automatically translate into people having a taste for or a desire to develop a taste for what experts consider the best of the best.
Anti-Hume
Sorry to say, in the sphere of music, literature and the arts, where individual taste plays such a strong role, generally people see themselves to be of sound taste and in a position to make judgments, even if they have very little experience in the field where they are passing judgments. There is an element of ego involved here and ego balks at admitting one might not be as learned, perceptive, educated, experienced or refined as others. For ego, even budging on this point is like admitting in public, “I am coarse and crude and totally uninformed and I like the base and mediocre because I am myself base and mediocre.” In other words, many people are not even close to buying Hume’s reasoning about ceding to experts.
Clement Chimes In
Here is a quote from Clement Greenberg’s influential essay, Avant-Garde and Kitsch: “Only when the plebian becomes dissatisfied with the social order the cultural elite administer does he begin to criticize their culture. Then the plebian finds courage for the first time to voice his opinions openly. Every man, from the Tammany alderman to the Austrian house-painter, finds that he is entitled to his opinion. Most often this resentment toward culture is to be found where the dissatisfaction with society is a reactionary dissatisfaction which expresses itself in revivalism and puritanism, and latest of all, in fascism.” Greenberg seems to be saying there is more going on than simply a judgment on an author or individual work of art or an entire form of art, for example, abstract art, literary novels, string quartets – there is a deep resentment of one’s place on the social ladder and/or resentment of one's culture in general.
Clement Chimes In Again
Another Greenberg quote: “Superior culture is one of the most artificial of all human creations, and the peasant finds no "natural" urgency within himself that will drive him toward Picasso in spite of all difficulties. In the end the peasant will go back to kitsch when he feels like looking at pictures, for he can enjoy kitsch without effort.” By ‘kitsch’ Greenberg is referencing easy-to-digest popular culture. And he is, in the main, correct - popular, commercial art, popular music, and more specifically, popular fiction do not require any real serious effort. On the other hand, writers like James Joyce, Virginia Woolf and Thomas Mann require quite a bit of serious effort.
My Own Two Cents
Rather than suggesting people cede to experts as David Hume outlines in his essay, I have taken a different tact - When I was a boy I played the trumpet. I quickly developed a great appreciation for trumpet playing. All of a sudden, I was so wowed by Dizzy Gillespie and Al Hurt. So any time I hear people making harsh pronouncements about a particular form of art or literature, I ask, “What have you yourself created in that sphere?” When people tell me they have never engaged in the arts, I suggest there might be a few good reasons, such as a complete lack of talent and deficiency in artistic perception.
In the end, Hume reminds us that criticism will never be reducible to a formula or checklist. Taste involves the interplay of our individual responses with standards shaped by history, culture, and experience. That means debate is not a flaw but the very lifeblood of criticism. Each generation of readers and reviewers must test their judgments against both their own sensibilities and the enduring works that challenge and refine them. Far from silencing disagreement, Hume gives us a framework for why it will always persist—and why serious criticism remains an art in itself.
Read
January 10, 2026At first glance, this extended essay by David Hume, written in the 18th century, does not seem like an obvious choice with which to start my reading and reviewing year. However, the author articulates some ideas that still resonate today, making this text worth reading. The essay centers on the question of what it means to be a consummate art critic. What qualities are necessary to judge the products of human imagination? Hume explains that people are not equal in their ability to understand and discuss art. Only a select few possess the refined taste, discerning eye, and profound erudition necessary to render accurate judgments about books, paintings, theater performances, and other forms of art. Put simply, some have far better taste than others.
Comparisons are essential to offering critiques and forming well-argued opinions.
All opinions carry different weight. Some are much more logical, sophisticated, and supported by evidence than others. In other words, some are much less wrong or misguided than others.
Prejudice impedes sound judgment. Indeed, we cannot expect healthy discussion or apt judgments from people whose minds are clouded by prejudice and strong bias.
"Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections, the generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be so rare a character: Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty."
Although some of the passages are rather vague, they can be interpreted as reflections on the power of context and as warnings against the "contamination of epochs." We should never judge products of human imagination created in the previous epochs by the standards of today, using the "particular manners and opinions of our age and country."
"A man of learning and reflection can make allowance for these peculiarities of manners; but a common audience can never divest themselves so far of their usual ideas and sentiments, as to relish pictures which nowise resemble them."
I doubt the author would have agreed with me, but reading his reflections has only strengthened my conviction that we should always strive to develop our own capabilities and form our own opinions and tastes rather than rely on experts and connoisseurs.
I will refrain from assigning a numerical rating to this essay. While the topic is interesting, some of the author's writing choices seem to obfuscate the things discussed. Of course, I understand that the meandering style, with some seemingly redundant rewordings, is most likely due to the time when this text was composed. Nevertheless, if the text were longer, it would probably become overbearing.
Comparisons are essential to offering critiques and forming well-argued opinions.
All opinions carry different weight. Some are much more logical, sophisticated, and supported by evidence than others. In other words, some are much less wrong or misguided than others.
Prejudice impedes sound judgment. Indeed, we cannot expect healthy discussion or apt judgments from people whose minds are clouded by prejudice and strong bias.
"Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections, the generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be so rare a character: Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty."
Although some of the passages are rather vague, they can be interpreted as reflections on the power of context and as warnings against the "contamination of epochs." We should never judge products of human imagination created in the previous epochs by the standards of today, using the "particular manners and opinions of our age and country."
"A man of learning and reflection can make allowance for these peculiarities of manners; but a common audience can never divest themselves so far of their usual ideas and sentiments, as to relish pictures which nowise resemble them."
I doubt the author would have agreed with me, but reading his reflections has only strengthened my conviction that we should always strive to develop our own capabilities and form our own opinions and tastes rather than rely on experts and connoisseurs.
I will refrain from assigning a numerical rating to this essay. While the topic is interesting, some of the author's writing choices seem to obfuscate the things discussed. Of course, I understand that the meandering style, with some seemingly redundant rewordings, is most likely due to the time when this text was composed. Nevertheless, if the text were longer, it would probably become overbearing.
November 28, 2020
Ovo je jedna od onih knjiga koje su napisane da bi bile prevaziđene. I ne treba se zavaravati – to mogu biti dragocena dela – nužna stepenica u razumevanju neke pojave.
Hjum tvrdi kako lepota nije svojstvo samih stvari, već postoji samo u duhu koji ih posmatra (53). Zbog toga, potreban je poseban senzibilitet ličnosti i odnegovana disciplina duha da bi se mogla doneti estetska ocena. Uz to, neophodno je i bogato iskustvo, koje podrazumeva razvoj uporedne pažnje: „čovek koji nikada nije imao prilike da poredi različite vrste lepote uistinu je potpuno nesposoban da dâ mišljenje o nekom predmetu koji mu je predočen” (61). Stoga, onaj ko prosuđuje o lepom treba da ima svojevrsni legitimitet ukusa – ako lepota nije inherentna osobina objekta, već ono što se tiče dejstva u odnosu na subjekta, onda je prosuđivač lepog u stanju stalnog samopotvrđivanja. Ipak, umesto osvešćivanja individualnog kao onog što je presudno za uspostavljanje (merila) ukusa, Hjum insistira da sebe pri estetskom prosuđivanju, treba da izuzmemo koliko god je to moguće i umesto toga da zauzemomo jednu vrstu opštečovečanske pozicije (63). Shodno tome, Hjum smatra da je ukus univerzalno načelo prisutno u svim vremenima i svim narodima, međutim, malo ko je merodavan da ga dosegne, jer mora uz lični senzibilitet, mnogo napora da uloži u razvoj svih sposobnosti potrebnih za njega. Jedna od njih je i oslobađanje od lokalnog, običajnog, a sputavanje tog segmenta sopstva predstavlja nužno nasilje nad samim sobom, jer spasava od ukorenjenih zabluda (72). A kad sam već kod toga, vrlo je važan Hjumov antidogmatski i antireligiozni stav i to ne samo sa epistemološke ili teološke, već i estetičke strane. Tako na primer, za Kuran kaže da je knjiga dobra u pojedinačnim idejama, ali kao celina zbrkano i besmisleno delo (49), dok Petrarki zamera da će uvek ostati smešan zato što pesnik svoju dragu, Lauru, poredi sa Hristom (74).
Zanimljiv je Hjumov stav prema prirodnosti i lepom. Da bi nešto bilo lepo, veli on, treba da se izdigne iz prvobitne, prirodne situacije – zbog toga, kako ističe, nikakvo zadovoljstvo našem duhu ne može pričiniti dosetka nekog čamdžije (a setimo se samo Paskoja Debelje i Nikole Zeta iz Hektorovićevog „Ribanja i ribarskog prigovaranja”), opaske seljaka ili šale kočijaša. Životna neposrednost, dakle, ne može biti estetski objekat, jer ono što je lepo mora u izvesnom smislu biti artificijelno, drugostepeno u odnosu na zbilju. Hjum ovako sažima tu ideju: „Kakva bi se bljutava komedija dobila ako bismo verno i iscrpno preneli sve što se kaže u ćaskanju uz čaj!” (75).
A ako je nešto suštinski zanimljivo, a moguće i lepo, ako mene pitate, onda su to upravo ćaskanja uz čaj. I to ne kažem samo kao osvedočeni čajopija.
Osim naslovnog eseja, ima ovde dosta korisnih informacija vezanih za fenomen tragičkog (Hjum npr. analizira to neobjašnjivo zadovoljstvo u tuzi u tragediji (83)), ili o tome kako ponekad, još je to Plinije Stariji znao, estetsku pažnju posvećujemo pre svega onome tek nagoveštenom, napola uobličenom, umesto celini (90). A da li je tačno da, kako Hjum kaže, lepota ne leži u spevu, nego u ukusu (101), odnosno, da lepota uvek proističe iz celine (102), to ostavljam da svako za sebe proceni.
Hjum tvrdi kako lepota nije svojstvo samih stvari, već postoji samo u duhu koji ih posmatra (53). Zbog toga, potreban je poseban senzibilitet ličnosti i odnegovana disciplina duha da bi se mogla doneti estetska ocena. Uz to, neophodno je i bogato iskustvo, koje podrazumeva razvoj uporedne pažnje: „čovek koji nikada nije imao prilike da poredi različite vrste lepote uistinu je potpuno nesposoban da dâ mišljenje o nekom predmetu koji mu je predočen” (61). Stoga, onaj ko prosuđuje o lepom treba da ima svojevrsni legitimitet ukusa – ako lepota nije inherentna osobina objekta, već ono što se tiče dejstva u odnosu na subjekta, onda je prosuđivač lepog u stanju stalnog samopotvrđivanja. Ipak, umesto osvešćivanja individualnog kao onog što je presudno za uspostavljanje (merila) ukusa, Hjum insistira da sebe pri estetskom prosuđivanju, treba da izuzmemo koliko god je to moguće i umesto toga da zauzemomo jednu vrstu opštečovečanske pozicije (63). Shodno tome, Hjum smatra da je ukus univerzalno načelo prisutno u svim vremenima i svim narodima, međutim, malo ko je merodavan da ga dosegne, jer mora uz lični senzibilitet, mnogo napora da uloži u razvoj svih sposobnosti potrebnih za njega. Jedna od njih je i oslobađanje od lokalnog, običajnog, a sputavanje tog segmenta sopstva predstavlja nužno nasilje nad samim sobom, jer spasava od ukorenjenih zabluda (72). A kad sam već kod toga, vrlo je važan Hjumov antidogmatski i antireligiozni stav i to ne samo sa epistemološke ili teološke, već i estetičke strane. Tako na primer, za Kuran kaže da je knjiga dobra u pojedinačnim idejama, ali kao celina zbrkano i besmisleno delo (49), dok Petrarki zamera da će uvek ostati smešan zato što pesnik svoju dragu, Lauru, poredi sa Hristom (74).
Zanimljiv je Hjumov stav prema prirodnosti i lepom. Da bi nešto bilo lepo, veli on, treba da se izdigne iz prvobitne, prirodne situacije – zbog toga, kako ističe, nikakvo zadovoljstvo našem duhu ne može pričiniti dosetka nekog čamdžije (a setimo se samo Paskoja Debelje i Nikole Zeta iz Hektorovićevog „Ribanja i ribarskog prigovaranja”), opaske seljaka ili šale kočijaša. Životna neposrednost, dakle, ne može biti estetski objekat, jer ono što je lepo mora u izvesnom smislu biti artificijelno, drugostepeno u odnosu na zbilju. Hjum ovako sažima tu ideju: „Kakva bi se bljutava komedija dobila ako bismo verno i iscrpno preneli sve što se kaže u ćaskanju uz čaj!” (75).
A ako je nešto suštinski zanimljivo, a moguće i lepo, ako mene pitate, onda su to upravo ćaskanja uz čaj. I to ne kažem samo kao osvedočeni čajopija.
Osim naslovnog eseja, ima ovde dosta korisnih informacija vezanih za fenomen tragičkog (Hjum npr. analizira to neobjašnjivo zadovoljstvo u tuzi u tragediji (83)), ili o tome kako ponekad, još je to Plinije Stariji znao, estetsku pažnju posvećujemo pre svega onome tek nagoveštenom, napola uobličenom, umesto celini (90). A da li je tačno da, kako Hjum kaže, lepota ne leži u spevu, nego u ukusu (101), odnosno, da lepota uvek proističe iz celine (102), to ostavljam da svako za sebe proceni.
June 22, 2023
Delo posebno važno za one koji se bave ili bi se bavili estetikom; van toga, onima koje zanima pitanje "o lepom", može biti posebno interesantno.
Generalno, Hjumova ideja da lepota nije inherentno svojstvo predmeta, već dispozicionalno, jeste nešto što će dosta uticati na istoriju estetike. Ne samo da je ideja zanimljiva u polju estetike, već je ovo hrabar iskorak i po pitanjima morala: kao što lepota ne pripada predmetima, već zavisi od sklopa našeg unutrašnjeg aparata, tako ni atributi koje pripisujemo činovima njima ne pripadaju po sebi, već predstavljaju način na koji ih vidimo. U tom pogledu, moral ne počiva na razumu, već na (ne)stalnosti našeg duhovnog sklopa koji se kalio ili ne u različitim kontekstima. Hjum će se dotaći još nekih važnih pitanja kao što su: esencijalizacija lepog, univerzalizacija ukusa kroz prepoznavanje "opstih modela i načela poznatih u svakom vremenu i kod svih naroda", istančanošću ukusa i od čega to zavisi , kao i mnogim drugim temama.
Topla preporuka.!
Generalno, Hjumova ideja da lepota nije inherentno svojstvo predmeta, već dispozicionalno, jeste nešto što će dosta uticati na istoriju estetike. Ne samo da je ideja zanimljiva u polju estetike, već je ovo hrabar iskorak i po pitanjima morala: kao što lepota ne pripada predmetima, već zavisi od sklopa našeg unutrašnjeg aparata, tako ni atributi koje pripisujemo činovima njima ne pripadaju po sebi, već predstavljaju način na koji ih vidimo. U tom pogledu, moral ne počiva na razumu, već na (ne)stalnosti našeg duhovnog sklopa koji se kalio ili ne u različitim kontekstima. Hjum će se dotaći još nekih važnih pitanja kao što su: esencijalizacija lepog, univerzalizacija ukusa kroz prepoznavanje "opstih modela i načela poznatih u svakom vremenu i kod svih naroda", istančanošću ukusa i od čega to zavisi , kao i mnogim drugim temama.
Topla preporuka.!
October 3, 2019
Pretty poor. Quite circular.
Hume argues for a standard of taste so that the judgements of people on art aren't completely subjective. However he also locates aesthetic qualities in the subject, not the object, and admits cultural relativism.
The judges of taste must have had practice in their delicacy of taste, and have no prejudice in their consideration of the object.
The good judge of art becomes a good judge by being exposed to good art, but good art is determined as good art by good judges.
Hume argues for a standard of taste so that the judgements of people on art aren't completely subjective. However he also locates aesthetic qualities in the subject, not the object, and admits cultural relativism.
The judges of taste must have had practice in their delicacy of taste, and have no prejudice in their consideration of the object.
The good judge of art becomes a good judge by being exposed to good art, but good art is determined as good art by good judges.
March 5, 2015
2.5
Too bad it fell into circular reasoning. What is good art? That which is judged to be so by a joint verdict of "true judges". How would one become a true judge? Among other things (such as being free from prejudices, being able to observe intricate details etc.) by being exposed to good art.
Too bad it fell into circular reasoning. What is good art? That which is judged to be so by a joint verdict of "true judges". How would one become a true judge? Among other things (such as being free from prejudices, being able to observe intricate details etc.) by being exposed to good art.
November 30, 2024
Why this circular, run-of-the-mill common-sense, hypocritical text is considered a classic of british aesthetic philosophy is beyond me. Did 18th-century Britain really have nothing else to offer in terms of art and philosophy?
April 19, 2024
David Hume’s essay on taste is a work that I think ought to be more widely appreciated. His position is that despite taste being a subjective matter, sensitive to the age and the culture and the experiences and preferences of a people, there may be some objectivity to art and its quality based on widely agreed upon norms that cross cultures and ages. The principles of taste, argues Hume, are universal, yet few are qualified to give judgment or establish their own sentiment on these standards of beauty.
“Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind.”
To be a discerning judge of art one has to be exposed to a lot of it, and mere exposure is not sufficient, one should spend a lot of time with it, give over their full attention to it, revisit it, because first impressions are often rushed, impatient. Most exposure to art, whether it’s writing or music or painting, tends to be shallow and non-contemplative, with only a fraction of one’s attention given. This isn’t conducive to a serious appreciation and love for art, and certainly not for an understanding of the art. Yet, those whose minds and tastes are scrambled by this attention deficit will still consider their opinions to carry weight. Goodreads is designed around this idea, and its social media component provides a sense of validation for shallow hot takes instead of patient reflection.
A fuller assessment of art takes serious time and devotion to art more broadly but also to each particular piece. You don’t glance at a painting, you don’t speed read your way through a book, you don’t listen to music in the background. Your ability to fully appreciate and understand what you have encountered is proportional to the time and attention you have given over to it.
If certain qualities are deemed good and important in art, and a person insensitive to these finer qualities claims some such piece is poor, then a person more attuned to what is good might direct their eye or ear toward these certain qualities that had escaped the cynical critic, showing him that in fact the art is better than he had first supposed.
I’m particularly open to this line of reasoning, since I used to spend way too much time arguing that certain books are a lot better than some people gave them credit for. I’ve spent over 20 years doing the same for music, so it’s hard to not see in Hume’s words some semblance of a personal sense of elitism. When you recognize the peerless beauty and glory and wonder of some piece of art and it seems to be met by others with indifference or active repulsion, it’s hard not to conclude they have missed something important. Sometimes it’s obvious that they have, and a prolonged argument can draw this out and you feel a sense of victory. They are either poor readers, or they listened to the music in the background instead of with their full attention, like some sort of backwards casual consumer. Sometimes it’s a matter of an attentive and focused listener or reader just having a difference of opinion, still capable of tuning into the finer qualities.
Feelings of self-aggrandizement and personal genius aside, there are good reasons to encourage a heightened sensitivity to, and awareness of, the finer details in writing, painting, music, whatever art one is experiencing.
The fun thing about this essay is that it validates a sense of snobbery, if done correctly, while presenting cases for why one must immerse themselves in the art to truly have a taste for it. It encourages everyone to rise to the level of elitist, of snob, and to cultivate better taste. If we are to recognize that objective thinking is important, though, then we should accept that our own sense of elite taste might not be as perfect as we think.
By his reasoning, one must put themselves in the position of the intended audience, not reject the prejudices or ideas of the culture or the age in which the art was made. This is sound advice to appreciating art. One’s own prejudice or those of their age and place blinds them to true appreciation and understanding of art. But Hume acknowledges that certain things change over time, or across cultures, and things like comedy or moral standards or religious beliefs or expectations of the artist change. This makes it impossible for some audiences to find beauty and perfection in the depiction of an unrelatable hero, a comedic scene that is funny for reasons alien to the contemporary culture, or an appeal to religious beliefs that aren’t held by the audience.
“It is well known that in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties. It is no less contrary to good taste: nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiment of beauty. It belongs to good sense to check its influence in both cases; and in this respect, … reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and correspondence of parts; nor can either of the beauties or blemishes be perceived by him whose thought is not capacious enough to comprehend all those parts, and compare them with each other, in order to perceive the consistence and uniformity of the whole.”
A person who is too close to the author or artist, who cannot distance themselves from him in order to absorb their art, will not correctly experience it and take it in. Limited imagination is a hindrance to grasping the depth and aesthetic and effects of good art.
“… the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the same clearness of conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are its infallible concomitants. It seldom or never happens that a man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound understanding.”
“When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object: the finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice his verdict is attended with confusion and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections the generality of men labor; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed even during the most polished ages to be so rare a character.”
Hume argues that not all have equal taste, and the qualities which one must possess in order to have this virtue of superior taste - be free of prejudice, have a delicate imagination. Everyone will suppose themselves to be described this way, and will agree these are important characteristics to possess when evaluating art, but whether one truly possesses these traits is a matter of argument and deeper examination.
True genius, he argues, is timeless and its appeal will endure through the ages even if it does not appeal to popular sentiment or what is in vogue in its own time. While philosophies may go into and out of fashion, and lesser art may steal the popular attention for a time, true genius in epics and poetry and sculpture and painting will always prevail, and will always be the standard against which other genius and brilliance are measured. “…though prejudices may prevail for a time, they never unite in celebrating any rival to the true genius, but yield at last to the force of nature and just sentiment.”
But he acknowledges a certain diversity of judgments is unavoidable, with no side in the disagreement being obviously superior to the other. Still, he argues we may be able to reconcile contrary sentiments by a universal standard. Our peculiarities and sensitivities to certain things, our preferences for one style or quality above another, our overlooking a dozen flaws in the presence of one paramount form of sublimity or beauty or grandeur that we tend to prefer, these are to be expected in everyone.
The essay is a bold endeavor with ideas I find compelling and important, eloquently written and artistically composed. But Hume doesn’t spend much time fleshing his ideas out, doesn’t attempt much rigor in arguing for his perspective, and although he makes a strong case with a few excellent examples of timeless art that will remain dominant through many ages to come, it would have been helpful for him to have spent some time explaining what sorts of qualities really set the great art apart from the rest. With too little time given to this, the essay is open-ended, giving any reader a sense that they too belong to this elite class of Master Tastemen. I am of course guilty of this.
We get the impression Hume had some specific pieces of art in mind, and some high-minded qualities that should be the fundamental qualities upon which all art is to be judged, but he only shows us the tip of the iceberg. It gets one thinking seriously about the objective metrics by which we should judge art, but leaves us wishing for a more complete exploration of these metrics. Still, he is right that not all taste is equal, and to have good or meaningful taste, one has to spend time with the art they are judging. This doesn’t mean going to school for it, because this can hinder one’s judgment by producing indoctrination instead of enabling informed contemplation free from the prejudices Hume points to as detracting from our ability to appreciate art.
“Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind.”
To be a discerning judge of art one has to be exposed to a lot of it, and mere exposure is not sufficient, one should spend a lot of time with it, give over their full attention to it, revisit it, because first impressions are often rushed, impatient. Most exposure to art, whether it’s writing or music or painting, tends to be shallow and non-contemplative, with only a fraction of one’s attention given. This isn’t conducive to a serious appreciation and love for art, and certainly not for an understanding of the art. Yet, those whose minds and tastes are scrambled by this attention deficit will still consider their opinions to carry weight. Goodreads is designed around this idea, and its social media component provides a sense of validation for shallow hot takes instead of patient reflection.
A fuller assessment of art takes serious time and devotion to art more broadly but also to each particular piece. You don’t glance at a painting, you don’t speed read your way through a book, you don’t listen to music in the background. Your ability to fully appreciate and understand what you have encountered is proportional to the time and attention you have given over to it.
If certain qualities are deemed good and important in art, and a person insensitive to these finer qualities claims some such piece is poor, then a person more attuned to what is good might direct their eye or ear toward these certain qualities that had escaped the cynical critic, showing him that in fact the art is better than he had first supposed.
I’m particularly open to this line of reasoning, since I used to spend way too much time arguing that certain books are a lot better than some people gave them credit for. I’ve spent over 20 years doing the same for music, so it’s hard to not see in Hume’s words some semblance of a personal sense of elitism. When you recognize the peerless beauty and glory and wonder of some piece of art and it seems to be met by others with indifference or active repulsion, it’s hard not to conclude they have missed something important. Sometimes it’s obvious that they have, and a prolonged argument can draw this out and you feel a sense of victory. They are either poor readers, or they listened to the music in the background instead of with their full attention, like some sort of backwards casual consumer. Sometimes it’s a matter of an attentive and focused listener or reader just having a difference of opinion, still capable of tuning into the finer qualities.
Feelings of self-aggrandizement and personal genius aside, there are good reasons to encourage a heightened sensitivity to, and awareness of, the finer details in writing, painting, music, whatever art one is experiencing.
The fun thing about this essay is that it validates a sense of snobbery, if done correctly, while presenting cases for why one must immerse themselves in the art to truly have a taste for it. It encourages everyone to rise to the level of elitist, of snob, and to cultivate better taste. If we are to recognize that objective thinking is important, though, then we should accept that our own sense of elite taste might not be as perfect as we think.
By his reasoning, one must put themselves in the position of the intended audience, not reject the prejudices or ideas of the culture or the age in which the art was made. This is sound advice to appreciating art. One’s own prejudice or those of their age and place blinds them to true appreciation and understanding of art. But Hume acknowledges that certain things change over time, or across cultures, and things like comedy or moral standards or religious beliefs or expectations of the artist change. This makes it impossible for some audiences to find beauty and perfection in the depiction of an unrelatable hero, a comedic scene that is funny for reasons alien to the contemporary culture, or an appeal to religious beliefs that aren’t held by the audience.
“It is well known that in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties. It is no less contrary to good taste: nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiment of beauty. It belongs to good sense to check its influence in both cases; and in this respect, … reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and correspondence of parts; nor can either of the beauties or blemishes be perceived by him whose thought is not capacious enough to comprehend all those parts, and compare them with each other, in order to perceive the consistence and uniformity of the whole.”
A person who is too close to the author or artist, who cannot distance themselves from him in order to absorb their art, will not correctly experience it and take it in. Limited imagination is a hindrance to grasping the depth and aesthetic and effects of good art.
“… the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the same clearness of conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are its infallible concomitants. It seldom or never happens that a man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound understanding.”
“When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object: the finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice his verdict is attended with confusion and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections the generality of men labor; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed even during the most polished ages to be so rare a character.”
Hume argues that not all have equal taste, and the qualities which one must possess in order to have this virtue of superior taste - be free of prejudice, have a delicate imagination. Everyone will suppose themselves to be described this way, and will agree these are important characteristics to possess when evaluating art, but whether one truly possesses these traits is a matter of argument and deeper examination.
True genius, he argues, is timeless and its appeal will endure through the ages even if it does not appeal to popular sentiment or what is in vogue in its own time. While philosophies may go into and out of fashion, and lesser art may steal the popular attention for a time, true genius in epics and poetry and sculpture and painting will always prevail, and will always be the standard against which other genius and brilliance are measured. “…though prejudices may prevail for a time, they never unite in celebrating any rival to the true genius, but yield at last to the force of nature and just sentiment.”
But he acknowledges a certain diversity of judgments is unavoidable, with no side in the disagreement being obviously superior to the other. Still, he argues we may be able to reconcile contrary sentiments by a universal standard. Our peculiarities and sensitivities to certain things, our preferences for one style or quality above another, our overlooking a dozen flaws in the presence of one paramount form of sublimity or beauty or grandeur that we tend to prefer, these are to be expected in everyone.
The essay is a bold endeavor with ideas I find compelling and important, eloquently written and artistically composed. But Hume doesn’t spend much time fleshing his ideas out, doesn’t attempt much rigor in arguing for his perspective, and although he makes a strong case with a few excellent examples of timeless art that will remain dominant through many ages to come, it would have been helpful for him to have spent some time explaining what sorts of qualities really set the great art apart from the rest. With too little time given to this, the essay is open-ended, giving any reader a sense that they too belong to this elite class of Master Tastemen. I am of course guilty of this.
We get the impression Hume had some specific pieces of art in mind, and some high-minded qualities that should be the fundamental qualities upon which all art is to be judged, but he only shows us the tip of the iceberg. It gets one thinking seriously about the objective metrics by which we should judge art, but leaves us wishing for a more complete exploration of these metrics. Still, he is right that not all taste is equal, and to have good or meaningful taste, one has to spend time with the art they are judging. This doesn’t mean going to school for it, because this can hinder one’s judgment by producing indoctrination instead of enabling informed contemplation free from the prejudices Hume points to as detracting from our ability to appreciate art.
October 25, 2023
You're confused in life, my boy. I understand what you mean but isn't that obvious? It's like you woke up one day and decided to make money by writing a book to the world explaining how sun means morning.
April 7, 2020
3½
Letto per esame universitario. Chiaro e interessante
Letto per esame universitario. Chiaro e interessante
July 22, 2018
“Theories of abstract philosophy, systems of profound theology, have prevailed during one age: In a successive period, these have been universally exploded: Their absurdity has been detected: Other theories and systems have supplied their place, which again gave place to their successors: And nothing has been experienced more liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than these pretended decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain for ever. ARISTOTLE, and PLATO, and EPICURUS, and DESCARTES, may successively yield to each other: But TERENCE and VIRGIL maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men. The abstract philosophy of CICERO has lost its credit: The vehemence of his oratory is still the object of our admiration.”
February 19, 2022
He wrote so much yet really said nothing at all
January 3, 2025
As a lover of the arts, and a quixotic believer in beauty’s potential to solve at least some of the world’s conflicts (and I’m sure that this naïve, misplaced optimism in beauty is merely the same as Stepan Trofimovich’s), the initial, central question I asked myself was ‘Can one piece of art be considered objectively better than another?’ Is it valid to say that ‘War and Peace’ is objectively better than a trashy airport romance novel? In other words, is there aesthetic objectivism? And ofc, the other interesting questions such as ‘Is AI-generated art art given that it’s devoid of emotion’, should humans continue making art if one day AI art beats even the best artist (like how DeepBlue beat Garry Kasparov), etc.
But then Hume, in his motivation for this essay, made me realize how intimately linked his aesthetic philosophy was to his broader philosophical system, especially his moral philosophy. This was confirmed thru some further research (i.e. just pursuing the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy lmao).
I’ll first synthesize Hume’s aesthetics, and only then how it links to his moral philosophy:
Hume starts by noting that the great variety of taste is so obvious that everyone observes it. Even men of ‘the most confined knowledge’, and those ‘educated under the same government’ can have different tastes. Nice, grand Hume quote alert: Even ‘those, who can enlarge their view to contemplate distant nations (economists) and remote ages (historians), are still more surprised at the great inconsistence and contrariety’.
Hume starts his analysis on: i) How to make sense of the great variety of tastes in art, ii) Is there a true ‘standard of taste’, iii) If so, how do we determine it?
To want to summarize Hume’s stance on aesthetics is to grasp the incredible nuance of his position on art.
But to get it out of the way, the main point of the essay is that some tastes in art ARE MORE VALID than others.
We know Hume’s signature stance on morality and the passions – that since the mind can only access ideas and impressions, morality is driven by SENTIMENT. Hume posits that there is no objective morality. Reason is but slave to the passions. And in this essay, he does indeed start his analysis by pointing out that judgments of beauty are indeed based on sentiment.
Hume makes a perhaps obvious but still philosophically interesting point: that ‘beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them …’. I find this interesting for its Lockean (‘qualities of objects’) and general philosophical implications – that beauty is mind-dependent. Hume even goes so far as to be sympathetic to the view that ‘every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others’. Hume also notes that it’s ‘common sense’ to see that beauty is subjective and there’s no right answer to these questions. (Common sense – the perennial enemy of philosophers)
So, can’t we now conclude that Hume is an aesthetic subjectivist?
Not quite.
Because aesthetic subjectivism, at least taken to more extreme forms, would imply that aesthetic judgments are arbitrary. But, as in the summary of the essay’s main point – Hume argues that certain aesthetic judgments are superior to others.
However, we can still conclude that Hume, in his classic philosophical tradition, rejects normative realism (i.e. mind-independent standards of right and wrong) for the standard of taste.
Is Hume – the great skeptic – a skeptic of aesthetic standards? No, because he concedes that a standard of taste exists. He even believes that appreciation of art is key to a good life, and to the refinement of the aesthetic ‘organ’.
It’s clear now that Hume’s take is nuanced. He believes that aesthetic pleasure is i) Real, ii) Mind-dependent i.e. reliant on the sentiments. Good art would, through delicate, fine points, move our sentiments and touch the soul – a philosophical technique that Hume also employs in the Treatise. And only people of ‘good taste’ would have the refined judgments to see these finer points. And, consistent with Hume’s classic empiricism, only through experience (the way the term is defined in philosophy) do we know what these finer points are. Importantly, Hume posits that these fine points of art are objectively pleasing, but are minute and mixed. The average person’s taste is not sufficiently refined, and so these finer points are lost on them.
Hume has some more interesting comments on taste scattered thru the essay, which is best to be blended with his 5 criteria of good taste (which is perhaps the essay’s most famous quote):
‘Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.’
(I also just interpreted this as Hume’s 5 suggestions on how to cultivate better taste, which I universally agree with.)
Hume continually stresses that the key to taste is DELICACY (his 2nd criteria: ‘United to delicate sentiment’). This rings true of my own views of good taste, which I picked up from this random af Youtube dude, which I’ve strongly agreed with and have come to practice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0FOy...
To paraphrase the random dude, good taste is NOT only indulging in art that consensus or even experts deem ‘good’ or ‘classic’ (because that’s just following the crowd), but having a very DELICATE or fine eye. You can discern minute differences between 1 art (or whatever object in examination) and another, which likely look the same to the untrained eye.
Hume makes an interesting point – We agree that the better an organ is, the more delicate its abilities of perception. It can ‘perceive with exactness its most minute objects’. For example, a strong eyesight is that which can see small objects. And so, the thinking goes, by refining our tastes, we’re making the ‘organ’ of our sentiments more perfect. I interpret the ‘organ’ of aesthetic tastes as the soul, (altho Hume doesn’t believe in the soul). And that is why good taste leads to a good life.
And how does Hume’s aesthetics closely link to his moral philosophy?
I’d put it this way – recall that in Hume’s system, moral values are but a matter of sentiment. Also recall the is-ought problem – we cannot infer what OUGHT to happen from a set of observations of what DID happen. Hume seems to think, which I agree with, that our moral sentiments and our aesthetic tastes are inseparable – clearly, a person’s cultural taste will affect how they think about moral issues i.e. how one SHOULD act in society.
The dual causality between the moral and aesthetic sentiments is more interesting for me.
Because conversely, a person’s moral sentiments also inform their aesthetic sentiments. For example, perhaps we’d feel soothed at a painting depicting a just and harmonious society, whereas we’d feel agitated at a depiction of a society sinking into depravity. The finer points of good art, presumably, tugs at those heartstrings which remind us of our ideals of a good state of the world. There is also extraordinary art which explore the complexities of our moral values – Crime and Punishment is a supreme example. And of course, people will cancel or downplay art that don't align with their values - Hume discusses cancel culture at length, which places him remarkably ahead of his time, and is especially tragic, given that Hume himself was cancelled in his own University of Edinburgh!
In the is-ought problem, Hume thinks it doesn’t necessarily follow that we can infer normative statements from positive descriptions – he thinks that we sort of have to assume it, in the same fashion in which we assume causality thru CUSTOM. In this broader inquiry, one’s aesthetic judgments fits perfectly well as a key variable to how we infer value judgments.
One good contemporary example imo – lots of data have shown that economics is the most politically heterogenous field out of all the social and business sciences. During the peak of attention of the Israel-Gaza war, all the other social sciences (e.g., anthropology, political science, sociology etc) pretty much uniformly condemned Israel and advocated ‘Free Palestine’. A prime example of how people trained in the same aesthetic judgments will come to infer the same moral judgments.
The synthesis of Hume’s thought that aesthetic and moral judgments is grounded by sentiment, not reasoned analysis, clearly also links to epistemology, then. Aesthetics sits at the boundary beyond pure reason. The broader project that we must set for ourselves is – How does the question of ‘what can we know?’ tell us about ‘how should we live?’
What is the role of the Standard of Taste? Not just an exposition of Hume’s theory of art, but an application of a broader philosophical system. A fun historical fact that I learned: Hume wanted to integrate his aesthetics into the Treatise, but its weak reception only allowed him to limit his analysis to ‘Morals’ in Book 3. Clearly, an examination of how we judge art will complete our Treatise of Human Nature.
PS: Hume makes some more interesting analyses of morality and language. In the following notes I think he is even doing a ‘Genealogy of Morals’ in the spirit of Nietzsche.
Hume made me realize how we can think of morals as analytic and synthetic statements. If you think about it – moral philosophy and the philosophy of language are closely intertwined. For example, many words in the dictionary are already bookmarked as ‘meaning in a good/ bad sense’. The clearest example (for me) would be when I was in learning new vocabulary in school, dictionaries would always bookmark vocabulary as ‘褒义’ or ‘贬义’. Idioms to mean essentially the same thing, e.g., ‘随机应变’ and ‘见风使舵’ – flexibility, in this case – are already pre-bookmarked to be complimentary or pejorative terms.
Thus as Hume says, ‘some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language’.
The key is that morality is already contained in the definitions of the words themselves, like analytic statements. Take a widely accepted good moral – humility, for example. It doesn’t tell us anything to say ‘Being humble is good’, because ‘good’ is already encompassed in the definition of ‘humble’, much like saying ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ doesn’t tell us anything. But now, take a close synonym of ‘humble’ – let’s say ‘submissive’. It immediately becomes ‘not good’. So we would balk at a preacher who called for people to be ‘submissive’. Saying that ‘Being submissive is good’ is a contradiction because the definition of ‘submissive’ contains the connotation of ‘bad’.
As Hume observes – ‘Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves.’ And so the ‘people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his writings.’
Very Nietzschean implications, then. We should search for the GENEALOGY of morality. The people who inverted the moral system had way more impact than those who preach the morals.
1 more note: Hume theorizes that our failure to reach a consensus on taste stems from a failure of language to express our differences. Obviously a very Wittgensteinian idea. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. The problems of philosophy stem from a failure/ misuse of language.
But then Hume, in his motivation for this essay, made me realize how intimately linked his aesthetic philosophy was to his broader philosophical system, especially his moral philosophy. This was confirmed thru some further research (i.e. just pursuing the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy lmao).
I’ll first synthesize Hume’s aesthetics, and only then how it links to his moral philosophy:
Hume starts by noting that the great variety of taste is so obvious that everyone observes it. Even men of ‘the most confined knowledge’, and those ‘educated under the same government’ can have different tastes. Nice, grand Hume quote alert: Even ‘those, who can enlarge their view to contemplate distant nations (economists) and remote ages (historians), are still more surprised at the great inconsistence and contrariety’.
Hume starts his analysis on: i) How to make sense of the great variety of tastes in art, ii) Is there a true ‘standard of taste’, iii) If so, how do we determine it?
To want to summarize Hume’s stance on aesthetics is to grasp the incredible nuance of his position on art.
But to get it out of the way, the main point of the essay is that some tastes in art ARE MORE VALID than others.
We know Hume’s signature stance on morality and the passions – that since the mind can only access ideas and impressions, morality is driven by SENTIMENT. Hume posits that there is no objective morality. Reason is but slave to the passions. And in this essay, he does indeed start his analysis by pointing out that judgments of beauty are indeed based on sentiment.
Hume makes a perhaps obvious but still philosophically interesting point: that ‘beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them …’. I find this interesting for its Lockean (‘qualities of objects’) and general philosophical implications – that beauty is mind-dependent. Hume even goes so far as to be sympathetic to the view that ‘every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others’. Hume also notes that it’s ‘common sense’ to see that beauty is subjective and there’s no right answer to these questions. (Common sense – the perennial enemy of philosophers)
So, can’t we now conclude that Hume is an aesthetic subjectivist?
Not quite.
Because aesthetic subjectivism, at least taken to more extreme forms, would imply that aesthetic judgments are arbitrary. But, as in the summary of the essay’s main point – Hume argues that certain aesthetic judgments are superior to others.
However, we can still conclude that Hume, in his classic philosophical tradition, rejects normative realism (i.e. mind-independent standards of right and wrong) for the standard of taste.
Is Hume – the great skeptic – a skeptic of aesthetic standards? No, because he concedes that a standard of taste exists. He even believes that appreciation of art is key to a good life, and to the refinement of the aesthetic ‘organ’.
It’s clear now that Hume’s take is nuanced. He believes that aesthetic pleasure is i) Real, ii) Mind-dependent i.e. reliant on the sentiments. Good art would, through delicate, fine points, move our sentiments and touch the soul – a philosophical technique that Hume also employs in the Treatise. And only people of ‘good taste’ would have the refined judgments to see these finer points. And, consistent with Hume’s classic empiricism, only through experience (the way the term is defined in philosophy) do we know what these finer points are. Importantly, Hume posits that these fine points of art are objectively pleasing, but are minute and mixed. The average person’s taste is not sufficiently refined, and so these finer points are lost on them.
Hume has some more interesting comments on taste scattered thru the essay, which is best to be blended with his 5 criteria of good taste (which is perhaps the essay’s most famous quote):
‘Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.’
(I also just interpreted this as Hume’s 5 suggestions on how to cultivate better taste, which I universally agree with.)
Hume continually stresses that the key to taste is DELICACY (his 2nd criteria: ‘United to delicate sentiment’). This rings true of my own views of good taste, which I picked up from this random af Youtube dude, which I’ve strongly agreed with and have come to practice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0FOy...
To paraphrase the random dude, good taste is NOT only indulging in art that consensus or even experts deem ‘good’ or ‘classic’ (because that’s just following the crowd), but having a very DELICATE or fine eye. You can discern minute differences between 1 art (or whatever object in examination) and another, which likely look the same to the untrained eye.
Hume makes an interesting point – We agree that the better an organ is, the more delicate its abilities of perception. It can ‘perceive with exactness its most minute objects’. For example, a strong eyesight is that which can see small objects. And so, the thinking goes, by refining our tastes, we’re making the ‘organ’ of our sentiments more perfect. I interpret the ‘organ’ of aesthetic tastes as the soul, (altho Hume doesn’t believe in the soul). And that is why good taste leads to a good life.
And how does Hume’s aesthetics closely link to his moral philosophy?
I’d put it this way – recall that in Hume’s system, moral values are but a matter of sentiment. Also recall the is-ought problem – we cannot infer what OUGHT to happen from a set of observations of what DID happen. Hume seems to think, which I agree with, that our moral sentiments and our aesthetic tastes are inseparable – clearly, a person’s cultural taste will affect how they think about moral issues i.e. how one SHOULD act in society.
The dual causality between the moral and aesthetic sentiments is more interesting for me.
Because conversely, a person’s moral sentiments also inform their aesthetic sentiments. For example, perhaps we’d feel soothed at a painting depicting a just and harmonious society, whereas we’d feel agitated at a depiction of a society sinking into depravity. The finer points of good art, presumably, tugs at those heartstrings which remind us of our ideals of a good state of the world. There is also extraordinary art which explore the complexities of our moral values – Crime and Punishment is a supreme example. And of course, people will cancel or downplay art that don't align with their values - Hume discusses cancel culture at length, which places him remarkably ahead of his time, and is especially tragic, given that Hume himself was cancelled in his own University of Edinburgh!
In the is-ought problem, Hume thinks it doesn’t necessarily follow that we can infer normative statements from positive descriptions – he thinks that we sort of have to assume it, in the same fashion in which we assume causality thru CUSTOM. In this broader inquiry, one’s aesthetic judgments fits perfectly well as a key variable to how we infer value judgments.
One good contemporary example imo – lots of data have shown that economics is the most politically heterogenous field out of all the social and business sciences. During the peak of attention of the Israel-Gaza war, all the other social sciences (e.g., anthropology, political science, sociology etc) pretty much uniformly condemned Israel and advocated ‘Free Palestine’. A prime example of how people trained in the same aesthetic judgments will come to infer the same moral judgments.
The synthesis of Hume’s thought that aesthetic and moral judgments is grounded by sentiment, not reasoned analysis, clearly also links to epistemology, then. Aesthetics sits at the boundary beyond pure reason. The broader project that we must set for ourselves is – How does the question of ‘what can we know?’ tell us about ‘how should we live?’
What is the role of the Standard of Taste? Not just an exposition of Hume’s theory of art, but an application of a broader philosophical system. A fun historical fact that I learned: Hume wanted to integrate his aesthetics into the Treatise, but its weak reception only allowed him to limit his analysis to ‘Morals’ in Book 3. Clearly, an examination of how we judge art will complete our Treatise of Human Nature.
PS: Hume makes some more interesting analyses of morality and language. In the following notes I think he is even doing a ‘Genealogy of Morals’ in the spirit of Nietzsche.
Hume made me realize how we can think of morals as analytic and synthetic statements. If you think about it – moral philosophy and the philosophy of language are closely intertwined. For example, many words in the dictionary are already bookmarked as ‘meaning in a good/ bad sense’. The clearest example (for me) would be when I was in learning new vocabulary in school, dictionaries would always bookmark vocabulary as ‘褒义’ or ‘贬义’. Idioms to mean essentially the same thing, e.g., ‘随机应变’ and ‘见风使舵’ – flexibility, in this case – are already pre-bookmarked to be complimentary or pejorative terms.
Thus as Hume says, ‘some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language’.
The key is that morality is already contained in the definitions of the words themselves, like analytic statements. Take a widely accepted good moral – humility, for example. It doesn’t tell us anything to say ‘Being humble is good’, because ‘good’ is already encompassed in the definition of ‘humble’, much like saying ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ doesn’t tell us anything. But now, take a close synonym of ‘humble’ – let’s say ‘submissive’. It immediately becomes ‘not good’. So we would balk at a preacher who called for people to be ‘submissive’. Saying that ‘Being submissive is good’ is a contradiction because the definition of ‘submissive’ contains the connotation of ‘bad’.
As Hume observes – ‘Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves.’ And so the ‘people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his writings.’
Very Nietzschean implications, then. We should search for the GENEALOGY of morality. The people who inverted the moral system had way more impact than those who preach the morals.
1 more note: Hume theorizes that our failure to reach a consensus on taste stems from a failure of language to express our differences. Obviously a very Wittgensteinian idea. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. The problems of philosophy stem from a failure/ misuse of language.
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October 12, 2024For whatever reason, following his treatise and the incessant bad reviews in light of his seeming scepticism, atheism, and whatever other -ism unfavourable at the time, Hume seems to take this huge downturn in argumentative strength and stylistic capabilities. Despite its recent resurgence in popularity in studies of aesthetics, this essay really is a complete failure.
Hume recognises a paradox in taste between two seemingly readily agreeable propositions about taste: 1) we are all right in our tastes: which is to say, we are entitled to say what we like and dislike and there is no way in which to say that is "wrong" but 2) we still make judgments of taste in art, and consider it easy to judge some artworks as better or lesser than others. We are thus given a contradiction when endorsing both propositions.
Hume's solution is that there are "true critics," who meet five traits (which I won't bother detailing).
My problem with his argument is probably threefold:
1) The argument regarding "true critics" seem hopelessly circular unless he cashes out into cultural relativism. This is because true critics can only become true critics by practice and familiarity with both the respective field and good artworks in the first place. But we don't even know what the good artworks are yet. So we are placing what the method ought to find at the base of the method's justification. This can't work if we maintain universal judgments. Hume has an option though to say that those who are familiar and better judges are those that are more intensely aware of the cultural milieu of the artwork: they detect the subtle references and underlying intents better than others. In this case those "good" artworks are merely historically relative, and contradict Hume's striving for universality.
2) Hume reduces aesthetic judgments to a pure subjectivism. Where in Kant the object has an determinate interplay with the subject in a very intriguing manner, Hume resolves to a very blunt, and ultimately very unsatisfying subjectivism. Judgments regarding the beauty, virtue, or vice of an object are merely on the side of the judging subject, and no sentimental qualities inhere in the object outside of the mind. Of course, despite producing this subjectivism Hume can't help himself but try to stumble around it (e.g. arguing that some objects MIGHT but NOT NECESSARILY be able to encourage certain sentiments in the minds of certain people -- this reads ridiculously).
3) Lastly, and on a broader, metacritical level, Hume encourages a bourgeois frame of mind in which the aesthetic judgment is a purely passive expression of cultural inculcation. This is to say that, sentiments arise, with no determinate causality, in no determinate subject, with relation to an object that gains significance purely due to a certain aesthetic and cultural economy. The legitimacy of taste claims seems to me to really be reliant on this passivity, this non-contemplative mode of petrified thought. This lends itself to a brand of blind chauvinism both in aesthetics and outward.
Hume recognises a paradox in taste between two seemingly readily agreeable propositions about taste: 1) we are all right in our tastes: which is to say, we are entitled to say what we like and dislike and there is no way in which to say that is "wrong" but 2) we still make judgments of taste in art, and consider it easy to judge some artworks as better or lesser than others. We are thus given a contradiction when endorsing both propositions.
Hume's solution is that there are "true critics," who meet five traits (which I won't bother detailing).
My problem with his argument is probably threefold:
1) The argument regarding "true critics" seem hopelessly circular unless he cashes out into cultural relativism. This is because true critics can only become true critics by practice and familiarity with both the respective field and good artworks in the first place. But we don't even know what the good artworks are yet. So we are placing what the method ought to find at the base of the method's justification. This can't work if we maintain universal judgments. Hume has an option though to say that those who are familiar and better judges are those that are more intensely aware of the cultural milieu of the artwork: they detect the subtle references and underlying intents better than others. In this case those "good" artworks are merely historically relative, and contradict Hume's striving for universality.
2) Hume reduces aesthetic judgments to a pure subjectivism. Where in Kant the object has an determinate interplay with the subject in a very intriguing manner, Hume resolves to a very blunt, and ultimately very unsatisfying subjectivism. Judgments regarding the beauty, virtue, or vice of an object are merely on the side of the judging subject, and no sentimental qualities inhere in the object outside of the mind. Of course, despite producing this subjectivism Hume can't help himself but try to stumble around it (e.g. arguing that some objects MIGHT but NOT NECESSARILY be able to encourage certain sentiments in the minds of certain people -- this reads ridiculously).
3) Lastly, and on a broader, metacritical level, Hume encourages a bourgeois frame of mind in which the aesthetic judgment is a purely passive expression of cultural inculcation. This is to say that, sentiments arise, with no determinate causality, in no determinate subject, with relation to an object that gains significance purely due to a certain aesthetic and cultural economy. The legitimacy of taste claims seems to me to really be reliant on this passivity, this non-contemplative mode of petrified thought. This lends itself to a brand of blind chauvinism both in aesthetics and outward.
February 1, 2023
ljepota nije svojstvo samih stvari, ona postoji samo u umu koji ih razmatra, a svaki um zamjećuje drugačiju ljepotu
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March 13, 2024mu goodreads on nii kuiv ja tühi olnud, ma loen esteetikaks igast asju !!! aga need on ainult katkendid,,,,
March 31, 2014
I guess this one should be read along with another essay by Hume called 'on tragedy'. But this one seemed dull in comparison with that. This one felt more like unnecessarily complicating things. I like Hume's writing for his direct way of writing. This one doesn't seem to be in that style.
January 1, 2026
1. But we must also allow, that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language.
2. That people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his writings.
3. Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.
4. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it. We shall be able to ascertain its influence, not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy.
5. A good palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest.
6. Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.
7. Aristotle, and Plato, and Epicurus, and Descartes, may successively yield to each other: But Terence and Virgil maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men.
8. But notwithstanding all our endeavours to fix a standard of taste, and reconcile the discordant apprehensions of men, there still remain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humours of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country.
9. We choose our favourite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of humour and disposition.
2. That people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his writings.
3. Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.
4. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it. We shall be able to ascertain its influence, not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy.
5. A good palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest.
6. Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.
7. Aristotle, and Plato, and Epicurus, and Descartes, may successively yield to each other: But Terence and Virgil maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men.
8. But notwithstanding all our endeavours to fix a standard of taste, and reconcile the discordant apprehensions of men, there still remain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humours of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country.
9. We choose our favourite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of humour and disposition.
March 20, 2024
A great essay, worth reading for critics and artists alike.
I didn't find the circular reasoning that everyone's talking about (which, they say is this... "What is good art?" "That which is judged so by true judges... "How to become a true judge of art?" "By being exposed to good art").
This appears to me a very whittled down version of what Hume is arguing. He does mention early in the essay that the judgment is not borne out of a vacuum. If we can begin by saying that there is Good art (say, of Shakespeare) vs Bad art (take any shitty writer), with time being the arbiter of 'beauty' and 'goodness', not any judge, then we already have a starting point.
He goes on to delineate 5 things needed to be able to judge well. These are, simply:
1. Delicacy of taste (finer, nuanced emotions of the mind elicited by the work)
2. Practice in an art (to allow first hand understanding, its difficulties, challenges, etc.)
3. Comparison (made through exposure to both widely considered good and bad art)
4. Freedom from prejudice
5. Good sense
And it is not simply the judgment of one such critic or judge. But the collective judgment of such critics (which he already considers so very rare) that make a piece good or bad.
I've only read it once, which is exactly what Hume warns against (peruse works of art multiple times to understand the finer distinctions between things, etc. etc.) so my own judgments could very well be specious and crippled by sentiment alone.
I didn't find the circular reasoning that everyone's talking about (which, they say is this... "What is good art?" "That which is judged so by true judges... "How to become a true judge of art?" "By being exposed to good art").
This appears to me a very whittled down version of what Hume is arguing. He does mention early in the essay that the judgment is not borne out of a vacuum. If we can begin by saying that there is Good art (say, of Shakespeare) vs Bad art (take any shitty writer), with time being the arbiter of 'beauty' and 'goodness', not any judge, then we already have a starting point.
He goes on to delineate 5 things needed to be able to judge well. These are, simply:
1. Delicacy of taste (finer, nuanced emotions of the mind elicited by the work)
2. Practice in an art (to allow first hand understanding, its difficulties, challenges, etc.)
3. Comparison (made through exposure to both widely considered good and bad art)
4. Freedom from prejudice
5. Good sense
And it is not simply the judgment of one such critic or judge. But the collective judgment of such critics (which he already considers so very rare) that make a piece good or bad.
I've only read it once, which is exactly what Hume warns against (peruse works of art multiple times to understand the finer distinctions between things, etc. etc.) so my own judgments could very well be specious and crippled by sentiment alone.
January 25, 2024
Interesting, but generally inconsistent. Hume posits that judgements about beauty and art are subjective, rooted in sentiments and emotions. He proposes a that a ‘true aesthetic judge’, who possesses a more refined understanding of aesthetics, can make more accurate judgments, yet this theory totally undermines the possibility of establishing a universal standard, or any kind of Kantian approach to the subject, which defeats Hume’s main objective in the book (which itself isn’t even entirely clear).
Furthermore, his emphasis on cultural influence, contra Hutchinson’s theory of aesthetics, raises questions about the universality of aesthetic principles. Hume only concedes overlap in the moral sentiments of others, ignoring Hutchinson’s more reasonable proposition, that these sentiments could cross cultural boundaries.
Nonetheless, I appreciate the influence of the book, not only on the Scottish enlightenment’s contribution to aesthetics, but also for providing a foundation for understanding the complex interplay between objectivity and subjectivity in matters of judgment and taste.
Furthermore, his emphasis on cultural influence, contra Hutchinson’s theory of aesthetics, raises questions about the universality of aesthetic principles. Hume only concedes overlap in the moral sentiments of others, ignoring Hutchinson’s more reasonable proposition, that these sentiments could cross cultural boundaries.
Nonetheless, I appreciate the influence of the book, not only on the Scottish enlightenment’s contribution to aesthetics, but also for providing a foundation for understanding the complex interplay between objectivity and subjectivity in matters of judgment and taste.
May 2, 2025
Relativament curta i molt interessant teoria estètica: què s’entén per bellesa, la seva evolució històrica i la possibilitat d’establir un criteri de bellesa transhistòrica a partir de l’examinació de les obres d’art que han resistit el pas del temps —la resistència com a criteri de geni. Argumentació que inicia amb un clar escepticisme sobre la idea transcendental de bellesa platònica, acabarà, tot i això, per afirmar que si bé la bellesa —igual que la bondat o maldat d’una acció— és sempre una qualitat que inserim en les coses, és una qualitat de les coses mateixes la que ens fa dir que quelcom és o no bell, a partir de la captació d’un plaer o dolor gràcies a la nostra sensibilitat. Per tant, la bellesa no és res més que la identificació d’una o vàries qualitats en un objecte que són plaents al cos, a nivell sensible: la bellesa no és, doncs, universal sinó en tot cas, intraespecífica; per a les papallones, belles serien altres coses.
May 10, 2019
It's a nice overview on the concept of delicacy of taste. This essay sheds some light on Hume's vision on how to criticize art, despite the difficulty of defining Art. It is an interesting theoretical meditation on the nature of the universality of some works of art and on how should behave a person criticising art.
However, some questions are left unanswered. Firstly, if I understood it correctly, the definition of Art used is quite loose and faulty (i.e. Art is defined as something agreeable, that has passed the test of time). Secondly, Hume pinpoints that the concept of "universal good art" exists and is tied up with "being appreciated by good critics", which is a somewhat circular argument. Finally, the dogmatic stance on personal taste clashed with the idea of prejudice.
In spite of any criticism, it is a nice reading on aesthetics.
However, some questions are left unanswered. Firstly, if I understood it correctly, the definition of Art used is quite loose and faulty (i.e. Art is defined as something agreeable, that has passed the test of time). Secondly, Hume pinpoints that the concept of "universal good art" exists and is tied up with "being appreciated by good critics", which is a somewhat circular argument. Finally, the dogmatic stance on personal taste clashed with the idea of prejudice.
In spite of any criticism, it is a nice reading on aesthetics.
December 14, 2020
3.5 based on my beginner understanding of philosophy and Mr. Hume. This is a fairly short essay that you can fully read and comprehend in about 1 hour or so. He discusses the standards of taste and preferences amongst people for literary/musical/artistic material. The one thing that is a barrier to my understanding is that one needs to know the classics that he discusses in the essay like Don Quixote, the various works by Homer, Tacticus, Ovid, and Epicurus amongst others. I'd say I understood maybe 50% of what he talked about in his essay since I lacked the understanding of the literary work he cited.
It's pretty good for a first read but you need to consult wikipedia or other websites if you are new to philosophy like me. This is worth rereading sometime in the future.
It's pretty good for a first read but you need to consult wikipedia or other websites if you are new to philosophy like me. This is worth rereading sometime in the future.
October 29, 2025
David Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste (1757) is included in Volume 27 of The Harvard Classics. I find the essay to be appealing, although the central argument is circular. This blog post (2017) by Jeff Searle and this video essay (2024) summarize and analyze the essay well.
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[Image: Cover of the Delphi Classics’ The Harvard Classics]
Citation:
Hume, D. (2018). On the standard of taste. In C. W. Eliot (Ed.), The Harvard classics (eBook). Delphi Classics. https://www.delphiclassics.com/shop/t... (Original work published 1757)
Title: On the Standard of Taste
Author(s): David Hume (1711-1776)
Year: 1757
Series: The Harvard Classics (1909): Volume 27 - Delphi Complete Harvard Classics and Shelf of Fiction
Genre: Nonfiction - Philosophy
Date(s) read: 10/20/25
Book 219 in 2025
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*******************************************************************************************
[Image: Cover of the Delphi Classics’ The Harvard Classics]
Citation:
Hume, D. (2018). On the standard of taste. In C. W. Eliot (Ed.), The Harvard classics (eBook). Delphi Classics. https://www.delphiclassics.com/shop/t... (Original work published 1757)
Title: On the Standard of Taste
Author(s): David Hume (1711-1776)
Year: 1757
Series: The Harvard Classics (1909): Volume 27 - Delphi Complete Harvard Classics and Shelf of Fiction
Genre: Nonfiction - Philosophy
Date(s) read: 10/20/25
Book 219 in 2025
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January 22, 2018
Alcuni spunti sono indubbiamente interessanti. Mi è piaciuta la concezione del critico: una figura super preparata che è in grado di riconoscere gli invisibili particolari di un’opera letteraria grazie alla pratica della lettura. Riassumendo il contenuto potremmo dire: “non è bello ciò che è bello ma è bello ciò che piace”.
July 15, 2022
Ahora, nos vemos en la necesidad de recordar la postura de Hume en torno a la "norma" del gusto en un momento en el que los escépticos parecen haber revivido y tener más voz y fuerza que nunca. Hume en la actualidad se enfrentaría a lemas relativistas como "todas las opiniones son igual de válidas" o a aquellos que basan la moralidad en el puro emotivismo.
March 18, 2023
It's a compelling argument to me, though I am pretty sympathetic to deferring to tradition. In any case, Hume makes me feel less pretentious about reading classic literature. I mean, there's a reason people still read Bronte 100+ years later. It's just damn good.
May 18, 2020
The essay is rather circular with very basic ideas and arguments supported by blasphemous examples.
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September 1, 2021Somewhat interesting but I don't agree
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