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The Taliban at War: 2001 - 2021
How does the Taliban wage war? How has its war changed over time? Firstly, the movement's extraordinary military operation relies on financial backing. This volume analyses such funding. The Taliban's external sources of support include foreign governments and non-state groups, both of which have affected the Taliban's military campaigns and internal politics. Secondly, this is the first full-length study of the Taliban to acknowledge and discuss in detail the movement's polycentric character. Here not only the Quetta Shura, but also the Haqqani Network and the Taliban's other centers of power, are afforded the attention they deserve.
The Taliban at War is based on extensive field research, including hundreds of interviews with Taliban members at all levels of the organization, community elders in Taliban-controlled areas, and other sources. It covers the Taliban insurgency from its first manifestations in 2002 up to the end of 2015. The five-month Battle of Kunduz epitomized the ongoing transition of the Taliban from an insurgent group to a more conventional military force, intent on fighting a protracted civil war.
In this latest book, renowned Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi rounds off his twenty years of studying the Taliban with an authoritative study detailing the evolution of its formidable military machine.
The Taliban at War is based on extensive field research, including hundreds of interviews with Taliban members at all levels of the organization, community elders in Taliban-controlled areas, and other sources. It covers the Taliban insurgency from its first manifestations in 2002 up to the end of 2015. The five-month Battle of Kunduz epitomized the ongoing transition of the Taliban from an insurgent group to a more conventional military force, intent on fighting a protracted civil war.
In this latest book, renowned Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi rounds off his twenty years of studying the Taliban with an authoritative study detailing the evolution of its formidable military machine.
388 pages, Paperback
First published June 27, 2019
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
November 12, 2021
Desde o livro de Ahmed Rashid sobre as origens do Talibã, não havia lido algo tão completo sobre o grupo e sobre a região. Antonio Giustozzi prova mais uma vez ser um dos melhores analistas sobre o assunto. Só não ganha cinco estrelas porque por vezes o texto é truncado de tão detalhista, ficando fácil se perder.
September 3, 2021
This book serves as a great reference work, reorganized with chronological order, clearly thematic structure, and well-written expressions, for a sharp peek into the intra-faction rivalries within the Taliban group.
Parts of the book rely on isolated oral accounts without documented evidence, but this is excusable given the opacity in the group and difficulty in obtaining solid data. They should be taken with a grain of salt notwithstanding. For example, if this is the only book you read about the Taliban, an impression you would easily get is that all those factions/leaders are memorable only in so far as they have had one or more powerful "foreign backers" (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and even China, etc.), while in fact they should be treated as autonomous agents trying play their cards at hand in the most strategic way within their characters.
Thesis summary:
During 2009–13 the Taliban stood against a much larger force, with the US contribution to the coalition amounting at one point to over 100,000 men. With US funds, the Afghan security forces increased to over 300,000 men by 2014, and US airpower in particular inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban. During 2002–14 Taliban combat groups often took casualties averaging between 10–20 per cent yearly. (pp.1-2)
That the NATO's support of Kabul government, transitioned from ISAF to Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Jan 2015, followed by the 2014 presidential in which Ashraf Ghani won, turned out to be a favorable settlement chance Pakistan came to think for the Taliban, as RSM per UNSCR 2189 is a "noncombat" mission aimed at bolstering Afghan native security forces- the "downgrading" in forceful foreign engagement against the Taliban.
Unfortunately, the Taliban factions weren't in accord for this, as 2014-5 was a year of debilitating infighting for them. Serajuddin Haqqani, son of the famous Haqqani network's namesake founder Jalaluddin, rose to prominence with clear ISI backing (as the Haqqani network is the structurally most centralized and "un-organic" wing in Taliban, leaning heavily towards foreign jihadists in both its recruitments and finance) during this time, dominating the southern Taliban.
Akhtar Mansur, then the de jure leader, had reasons to go to Iran in March 2016 for additional IRGC support, only to be followed by the mishap on his way back to Quetta on May 21 by American drone strike in Baluchistan. The cleric leader Haibatullah Akhund was immediately appointed as Mansur's successor.
Haibatullah's diplomatic balancing approach between IRGC and ISI was supposed to have unifying effect in comparison to his Iran-leaning predecessor, but his lack of military credentials and procedural illegitimacy as supreme leader gave Serajuddin many things to dissatisfied with.
Serajuddin first brought huge military success for Taliban in 2016, assaulting landmark cities such as Kunduz (northeastern city, 6th largest), Tarin Kut, and Lashkargah (both were southwestern inland cities). The ease with which this was done only revealed what the Taliban could have achieved in 2015 in pressurizing Ghani government had there been no infighting between Mansour and Serajuddin.
Since after the fall of Kunduz, the Americans resumed airstrikes and special force operations. RSM at its height in 2017 also had roughly 16,000 personnel from 36 NATO allies. They made the Taliban to surrender all previous territorial gains. (to be continued)
Parts of the book rely on isolated oral accounts without documented evidence, but this is excusable given the opacity in the group and difficulty in obtaining solid data. They should be taken with a grain of salt notwithstanding. For example, if this is the only book you read about the Taliban, an impression you would easily get is that all those factions/leaders are memorable only in so far as they have had one or more powerful "foreign backers" (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and even China, etc.), while in fact they should be treated as autonomous agents trying play their cards at hand in the most strategic way within their characters.
Thesis summary:
During 2009–13 the Taliban stood against a much larger force, with the US contribution to the coalition amounting at one point to over 100,000 men. With US funds, the Afghan security forces increased to over 300,000 men by 2014, and US airpower in particular inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban. During 2002–14 Taliban combat groups often took casualties averaging between 10–20 per cent yearly. (pp.1-2)
That the NATO's support of Kabul government, transitioned from ISAF to Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Jan 2015, followed by the 2014 presidential in which Ashraf Ghani won, turned out to be a favorable settlement chance Pakistan came to think for the Taliban, as RSM per UNSCR 2189 is a "noncombat" mission aimed at bolstering Afghan native security forces- the "downgrading" in forceful foreign engagement against the Taliban.
Unfortunately, the Taliban factions weren't in accord for this, as 2014-5 was a year of debilitating infighting for them. Serajuddin Haqqani, son of the famous Haqqani network's namesake founder Jalaluddin, rose to prominence with clear ISI backing (as the Haqqani network is the structurally most centralized and "un-organic" wing in Taliban, leaning heavily towards foreign jihadists in both its recruitments and finance) during this time, dominating the southern Taliban.
Akhtar Mansur, then the de jure leader, had reasons to go to Iran in March 2016 for additional IRGC support, only to be followed by the mishap on his way back to Quetta on May 21 by American drone strike in Baluchistan. The cleric leader Haibatullah Akhund was immediately appointed as Mansur's successor.
Haibatullah's diplomatic balancing approach between IRGC and ISI was supposed to have unifying effect in comparison to his Iran-leaning predecessor, but his lack of military credentials and procedural illegitimacy as supreme leader gave Serajuddin many things to dissatisfied with.
Serajuddin first brought huge military success for Taliban in 2016, assaulting landmark cities such as Kunduz (northeastern city, 6th largest), Tarin Kut, and Lashkargah (both were southwestern inland cities). The ease with which this was done only revealed what the Taliban could have achieved in 2015 in pressurizing Ghani government had there been no infighting between Mansour and Serajuddin.
Since after the fall of Kunduz, the Americans resumed airstrikes and special force operations. RSM at its height in 2017 also had roughly 16,000 personnel from 36 NATO allies. They made the Taliban to surrender all previous territorial gains. (to be continued)
May 10, 2024
"IS however was able to exploit Taliban rivalries and ear at least some tolerance from some Taliban groups." (229)
"[S]tarting from the very day that Kabul fell (15 August), the old intra-Taliban divisions immediately began to resurface, pitting in particular the Haqqani Network, now master of Kabul, against a Quetta Shura that desperately needed to control the capital to justify its leadership ambitions in post-conflict Afghanistan. This upset the delicate balance of power within the Taliban and resulted in a delay of weeks to the Taliban being able to form and announce a new government, as factions within the group competed for a dominant position. The pragmatist wing of the Taliban seemed unable to affirm its leadership, with hardliners such as the Haqqani holding veto power over the formation of a government. The polycentric, diverse and decentralized organization that successfully fought against the might American superpower and its allies for long years had now to deal with a new, unexpected task: governing Afghanistan." (265)
"[S]tarting from the very day that Kabul fell (15 August), the old intra-Taliban divisions immediately began to resurface, pitting in particular the Haqqani Network, now master of Kabul, against a Quetta Shura that desperately needed to control the capital to justify its leadership ambitions in post-conflict Afghanistan. This upset the delicate balance of power within the Taliban and resulted in a delay of weeks to the Taliban being able to form and announce a new government, as factions within the group competed for a dominant position. The pragmatist wing of the Taliban seemed unable to affirm its leadership, with hardliners such as the Haqqani holding veto power over the formation of a government. The polycentric, diverse and decentralized organization that successfully fought against the might American superpower and its allies for long years had now to deal with a new, unexpected task: governing Afghanistan." (265)
September 7, 2021
This was just way to dry for me, but it had all the Juicy Information inside it. Real War Nerd shit so good in that sense, but I’ve learned maybe that’s just not me.
January 3, 2023
Informative and expectational read into Taliban Insurgency and internal wars for Power.
May 4, 2023
A great book, gave me a great insight on how insurgencies work, the structure of the Taliban, the tactics, strategies and its development.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews