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Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965-1968
Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965-1968 is the sequel to the immensely influential and controversial Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965.
Like its predecessor, this book overturns the conventional wisdom using a treasure trove of new sources, many of them from the North Vietnamese side. Rejecting the standard depiction of U.S. military intervention as a hopeless folly, it shows America’s war to have been a strategic necessity that could have ended victoriously had President Lyndon Johnson heeded the advice of his generals. In light of Johnson’s refusal to use American ground forces beyond South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland employed the best military strategy available. Once the White House loosened the restraints on Operation Rolling Thunder, American bombing inflicted far greater damage on the North Vietnamese supply system than has been previously understood, and it came close to starving North Vietnam into submission.
American military operations enabled the South Vietnamese government to recover from the massive instability that followed the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem, while American culture sustained public support for the war through the end of 1968, giving South Vietnam realistic hopes for long-term survival. America’s defense of South Vietnam averted the imminent fall of key Asian nations to Communism and sowed strife inside the Communist camp, to the long-term detriment of America’s great-power rivals, China and the Soviet Union.
Like its predecessor, this book overturns the conventional wisdom using a treasure trove of new sources, many of them from the North Vietnamese side. Rejecting the standard depiction of U.S. military intervention as a hopeless folly, it shows America’s war to have been a strategic necessity that could have ended victoriously had President Lyndon Johnson heeded the advice of his generals. In light of Johnson’s refusal to use American ground forces beyond South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland employed the best military strategy available. Once the White House loosened the restraints on Operation Rolling Thunder, American bombing inflicted far greater damage on the North Vietnamese supply system than has been previously understood, and it came close to starving North Vietnam into submission.
American military operations enabled the South Vietnamese government to recover from the massive instability that followed the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem, while American culture sustained public support for the war through the end of 1968, giving South Vietnam realistic hopes for long-term survival. America’s defense of South Vietnam averted the imminent fall of key Asian nations to Communism and sowed strife inside the Communist camp, to the long-term detriment of America’s great-power rivals, China and the Soviet Union.
808 pages, Hardcover
First published December 6, 2022
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 7, 2023
So much of the conventional wisdom about the Vietnam War is simply not true, deliberately misleading or wishful thinking. Moyar, in the second book of a three volume history of the war rebuts and corrects the record. This is not “revisionist” history as the cynics would have you believe, a label serving to subtly question its integrity – this is actual history superbly documented and narrated. Drawing on sources from all sides – US, South Vietnamese and crucially, multiple North Vietnamese histories, official records, memoirs and interviews.
By 1968, the war was being won by the US and South Vietnamese. North Vietnam incessantly lost battle after battle, suffering horrific casualties in its planned offensives, and suffering significant destruction and disruption of its logistical systems, routes and bases. The military strategies implemented by General Westmoreland worked... his focus on destroying NVA military forces was uniformly effective and the attrition was relentless and successful in reducing North Vietnam’s influence, capabilities and presence in the south. But our media took it upon themselves to constantly call it into question, belittling body counts and search and destroy missions, assuming North Vietnamese resiliency and resources far in excess of reality.
US intelligence agencies drastically underestimated both the extent of the damage done to NVA forces and the ability and capacity of North Vietnam to absorb those losses and continue the war. It was a disservice to the US effort, magnified by the anti-war movements and their numerous media advocates reinforced by the unshakeable pre-disposition of various administration “wise men” such as McNamara, Bundy, Harriman, Vance, et al. to dogmatically pursue one-sided de-escalation measures and the chimera of diplomatic initiatives in the face of adamant North Vietnamese refusal to respond. The critics of the US policies, tactics and strategies increasingly chose to believe the propaganda of a hard core Communist regime without a trace of skepticism or demonstrable evidence, and they were expressly targeted by that same Communist regime, for all those same reasons... sowing discord, undermining US policies and reducing if not ending successful US tactics.
It is a deplorable narrative, and yet one that seems to recur in US foreign affairs. Vietnam is a hard lesson that I am not sure we have learned – we certainly won’t if we persist in maintaining the politically correct mythology of the war and the actions of the US pursuing what were actually laudable, and achievable, goals. Interestingly, then-President Lyndon Johnson comes off far better than conventional history would have us believe. He was a reluctant war President, but he was committed to US goals and the men and women of the military implementing them. He was terribly served by many of closest advisors around him (see above) , very well served by others (Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Dean Rusk and Walter Rostow, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, the Joint Chiefs) – and yet despite wanting victory, and despite actually having the conditions to realize victory, he waffled between the two sets of advisors, often undermining his own successful policies at critical moments and thereby again giving North Vietnam breathing room and recovery space and time. It’s terribly frustrating to imagine what could have been, especially in the aftermath of the final North Vietnamese invasion in 1973 and the death and misery of millions that ensued. This is a must-read - and I'm eager for the third and final volume to be released.
By 1968, the war was being won by the US and South Vietnamese. North Vietnam incessantly lost battle after battle, suffering horrific casualties in its planned offensives, and suffering significant destruction and disruption of its logistical systems, routes and bases. The military strategies implemented by General Westmoreland worked... his focus on destroying NVA military forces was uniformly effective and the attrition was relentless and successful in reducing North Vietnam’s influence, capabilities and presence in the south. But our media took it upon themselves to constantly call it into question, belittling body counts and search and destroy missions, assuming North Vietnamese resiliency and resources far in excess of reality.
US intelligence agencies drastically underestimated both the extent of the damage done to NVA forces and the ability and capacity of North Vietnam to absorb those losses and continue the war. It was a disservice to the US effort, magnified by the anti-war movements and their numerous media advocates reinforced by the unshakeable pre-disposition of various administration “wise men” such as McNamara, Bundy, Harriman, Vance, et al. to dogmatically pursue one-sided de-escalation measures and the chimera of diplomatic initiatives in the face of adamant North Vietnamese refusal to respond. The critics of the US policies, tactics and strategies increasingly chose to believe the propaganda of a hard core Communist regime without a trace of skepticism or demonstrable evidence, and they were expressly targeted by that same Communist regime, for all those same reasons... sowing discord, undermining US policies and reducing if not ending successful US tactics.
It is a deplorable narrative, and yet one that seems to recur in US foreign affairs. Vietnam is a hard lesson that I am not sure we have learned – we certainly won’t if we persist in maintaining the politically correct mythology of the war and the actions of the US pursuing what were actually laudable, and achievable, goals. Interestingly, then-President Lyndon Johnson comes off far better than conventional history would have us believe. He was a reluctant war President, but he was committed to US goals and the men and women of the military implementing them. He was terribly served by many of closest advisors around him (see above) , very well served by others (Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Dean Rusk and Walter Rostow, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, the Joint Chiefs) – and yet despite wanting victory, and despite actually having the conditions to realize victory, he waffled between the two sets of advisors, often undermining his own successful policies at critical moments and thereby again giving North Vietnam breathing room and recovery space and time. It’s terribly frustrating to imagine what could have been, especially in the aftermath of the final North Vietnamese invasion in 1973 and the death and misery of millions that ensued. This is a must-read - and I'm eager for the third and final volume to be released.
February 21, 2023
Second of Three Books on the Vietnam War
I’ve read many books on the Vietnam War, seeking to know how the American effort could have been so messed up; how our military, who generally performed very well, could have their efforts thwarted by the disastrous leadership of President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and other government leaders. Mark Moyar’s books are the best on the Vietnam War because he uses sources from all the countries that were players, including North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. He often challenges the commonly accepted story of events by thorough analysis and sound judgment. He represents well the younger generation of historians, as he was born in 1971, and was not around during the war to be influenced by the passions of the times. He has impeccable academic credentials, and is fearless in challenging the party lines that developed during and after the war. I had to devour this book as soon as it came out, and I eagerly await his third book in the series.
I’ve read many books on the Vietnam War, seeking to know how the American effort could have been so messed up; how our military, who generally performed very well, could have their efforts thwarted by the disastrous leadership of President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and other government leaders. Mark Moyar’s books are the best on the Vietnam War because he uses sources from all the countries that were players, including North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. He often challenges the commonly accepted story of events by thorough analysis and sound judgment. He represents well the younger generation of historians, as he was born in 1971, and was not around during the war to be influenced by the passions of the times. He has impeccable academic credentials, and is fearless in challenging the party lines that developed during and after the war. I had to devour this book as soon as it came out, and I eagerly await his third book in the series.
October 6, 2024
Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War 1965-1968 is an excellent history of South Vietnam’s recovery and rise from the chaos after Ngô Đình Diệm’s assassination, in addition to the then extensive Communist infiltration, into a coherent & competent country that was more well-prepared to defend itself from Northern aggression, and almost completely free of insurgents than ever before.
I hold this book in extremely high regard for many reasons, chief among them the the level of detail with which the book examines the topic. The author gives blow-for-blow descriptions of many key battles, supplemented by quotes and anecdotes from various parties involved and tales of extraordinary actions taken by individuals. He not only covers the war and its development on Vietnamese ground, but also the political changes occurring in America at the same time, and their effects on the situation in Vietnam. In addition, Mr. Moyar takes the time to clear up the many inaccurate representations that surround the issue of American involvement in the Vietnam War. For example, he provides the context behind the famous picture of a South Vietnamese sergeant shooting a Northern militant in the head after the Tết Offensive; the sergeant was executing the militant for having massacred an entire family of 7 just a few minutes before the photo was taken.
I have no complaints about what Mr. Moyar has written. I only feel that the book would have painted a more thorough picture of the period if some attention was paid towards the effects the presence of massive numbers of American soldiers had on the local population, and what civilian life was like in the hamlets and cities, both in 1965 and 1968. These are, of course, only additional details which had little effect on the progression of the war. Nonetheless, I feel that their inclusion would give the reader an idea of the experience of the average South Vietnamese civilian. In addition, something that would have improved my reading experience is a table of military units and their respective details for the armies of both Vietnams and the United States.
In conclusion, while there are some additional details would like to learn about, the book thoroughly covers all important points to an exacting degree of detail. I would highly recommend it to anyone who is interested in the Vietnam War along with Triumph Forsaken, Mr. Moyar’s previous work. I hear that he is writing a third book on the War as well, which will cover it from 1968 to the its end, something that I look forward to very much. I suggest that anyone who sees this review in the future check its publication status.
I hold this book in extremely high regard for many reasons, chief among them the the level of detail with which the book examines the topic. The author gives blow-for-blow descriptions of many key battles, supplemented by quotes and anecdotes from various parties involved and tales of extraordinary actions taken by individuals. He not only covers the war and its development on Vietnamese ground, but also the political changes occurring in America at the same time, and their effects on the situation in Vietnam. In addition, Mr. Moyar takes the time to clear up the many inaccurate representations that surround the issue of American involvement in the Vietnam War. For example, he provides the context behind the famous picture of a South Vietnamese sergeant shooting a Northern militant in the head after the Tết Offensive; the sergeant was executing the militant for having massacred an entire family of 7 just a few minutes before the photo was taken.
I have no complaints about what Mr. Moyar has written. I only feel that the book would have painted a more thorough picture of the period if some attention was paid towards the effects the presence of massive numbers of American soldiers had on the local population, and what civilian life was like in the hamlets and cities, both in 1965 and 1968. These are, of course, only additional details which had little effect on the progression of the war. Nonetheless, I feel that their inclusion would give the reader an idea of the experience of the average South Vietnamese civilian. In addition, something that would have improved my reading experience is a table of military units and their respective details for the armies of both Vietnams and the United States.
In conclusion, while there are some additional details would like to learn about, the book thoroughly covers all important points to an exacting degree of detail. I would highly recommend it to anyone who is interested in the Vietnam War along with Triumph Forsaken, Mr. Moyar’s previous work. I hear that he is writing a third book on the War as well, which will cover it from 1968 to the its end, something that I look forward to very much. I suggest that anyone who sees this review in the future check its publication status.
October 15, 2024
An okay book, providing an insightful but incomplete analysis of the Vietnam War. The author, American historian Mark Moyar, delivers a well-researched account, particularly highlighting the successes of General Westmoreland's 1966-1968 attrition campaign against the North Vietnamese forces operating in South Vietnam. This detailed examination of military operations offers valuable insights into the tactical victories achieved during this period. However, the book falls short in its assessment of why these military successes did not translate into political victory. Moyar's explanation is overly simplistic, attributing the war's failure to the ineptitude of specific individuals and an abstract liberal cabal, rather than exploring the broader and more complex military, political, and social dynamics of the period. A good book for those desiring decisive statements that sound authoritative at their next debate on who lost Vietnam.
October 20, 2023
A very detailed account of the Vietnam War 65-68. This was a pivotal period. Moyar confirms through research that North Vietnam was hanging on by a thread. Politics lost the war for the Americans. Sadly, news media at the time saw that they could, not only report world events, but create world events. It's a lesson they are still using today. We no longer have truth in reporting, but spin doctors ready to spin any event to show their world views. Dr Goebbels would be so proud of today's media.
September 29, 2023
This second volume is the best overall history of the war that I have read. The war is fraught with complexity, arrogance, and indecision. These volumes cut through all of that and provide a detailed analysis that provides the reader a comprehensive picture of what 1n happening in Hanoi, Washington and Saigon. He does not forget the magnificent bravery of our fighting men.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews